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Introduction
Rhetorical Citizenship as a Conceptual 
Frame: What We Talk About When We 
Talk About Rhetorical Citizenship
C H R I S T I A N KO C K A N D L I S A V I L L A D S E N
Under the heading “Rhetoric in Society” scholars have met four times: in 
Aalborg, Denmark; Leiden, The Netherlands; Antwerp, Belgium; and Co-
penhagen, Denmark. These events arguably make up the first series of rheto-
ric conferences on European soil. This volume is a manifest indication of the 
increasing interest this topic attracts in Europe and beyond. We welcome 
this growing attention to the role of rhetoric in public life, but for the pur-
poses of constructive scholarly exchange we also felt the need to delimit the 
notion of “rhetoric in society” in selecting a theme for RiS4, the conference 
on which this book is based. Hence, we took rhetorician Gerard Hauser’s 
words to heart: “A public’s essential characteristic is its shared activity of 
exchanging opinion. Put differently, publics do not exist as entities, but as 
processes; their collective reasoning is not defined by abstract reflection but by 
practical judgment; their awareness of issues is not philosophical but eventful” 
(1999, p. 64; emphasis in original). This creative, collective, and processual 
understanding of rhetoric’s place in society struck us as highly resonant with 
the concept of rhetorical citizenship, which we had worked with earlier. By 
choosing “Contemporary Rhetorical Citizenship: Purposes, Practices, and 
Perspectives” as the theme of the RiS4 conference, we hoped to learn more 
about how colleagues near and far would challenge, develop, or make use of 
this notion to conceptualize the discursive, symbolic, and otherwise partici-
patory aspects of civic life. 
Since public discourse should not be studied merely as a theoretical or 
idealized notion the conference theme also called for scholarly endeavors in 
accounting for and critiquing actual practices. Focusing on how citizens ac-
tually engage each other across various forms of public fora allows us to con-
sider both macro and micro practices – always with an eye to the significance 
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for the individuals involved. For example, what forms of participation does 
a particular discursive phenomenon encourage – and by whom? How are 
speaking positions allotted and organized? What discursive norms inform 
a particular forum? What possibilities – and obstacles – are there for “ordi-
nary” citizens to engage in public discourse? How do individuals come to see 
themselves as legitimate “voices” in public debate – and is there any sign of 
resonance? How does one assess arguments presented on public issues?
While we think that rhetoric has something valuable to contribute to 
the study of such questions, it cannot possibly do the work alone. Exploring 
rhetorical citizenship and fleshing out the concept should, we believe, be a 
much wider, cross-disciplinary scholarly project including political scientists, 
media scholars, philosophers, and discourse analysts – to mention just a few.
The array of papers in this book reflects the breadth of what the no-
tion of rhetorical citizenship can cover and subsume as well as its limits. In 
this introduction, we open with some comments on the scope and relevance 
of the concept, and then lay out the structure of the book and the various 
ways in which its chapters relate to the theme of rhetorical citizenship and 
each other.
Rhetorical citizenship as a conceptual frame
Rhetorical citizenship was from the beginning meant as an umbrella term 
for studying what rhetoricians Robert Asen and Dan Brouwer call “modali-
ties” of public engagement (2010). While we maintain an interest in more 
traditional public and political debate, we want to heed Asen’s call to at-
tend to the “fluid, multimodal, and quotidian enactments of citizenship 
in a multiple public sphere” (p. 191) where democracy is seen more as a 
“guiding spirit that informs human interaction” than a “set of institutions or 
specific acts” (p. 196). In our conceptualization, rhetorical citizenship may 
be theoretically accessed via the notion of rhetorical agency, i.e., citizens’ 
possibilities for gaining access to and influencing civic life through symbolic 
action; or it may be embraced from a focus on how people may be involved 
with, and evaluate, public rhetoric – not as participants, but as recipients. 
We think it important to maintain this dual focus on what one might call, 
respectively, the participatory and the receptive aspects of civic interaction. 
It bears underscoring that rhetorical citizenship is not a new idea (and 
not even a new term). The notion that rhetoric is what makes civilized society 
possible goes back to the ancients, and many great thinkers and scholars have 
prepared the way for thinking of citizenship as something that is, at least in part, 
discursively or symbolically constituted. Also, plenty of theorists have written 
about how citizenship is not just a formal or rights-based category but also a 
more qualitative, participatory process. Thus, we see rhetorical citizenship as a 
conceptual frame accentuating the fact that legal rights, privileges and mate-
rial conditions are not the only constituents of citizenship; discourse that takes 
place between citizens is arguably more basic to what it means to be a citizen. 
With this conceptual assumption it becomes natural to wish for a re-
search platform that allows different strands of rhetorical scholarship to come 
into contact, including studies in public argumentation and deliberation on 
the one hand and studies in rhetorical agency on the other. At best, such efforts 
can enrich each other. Whereas argument and deliberation theories tend to 
rely on normative standards that are often pure and clinical, rhetorical agency 
theory for its part could sometimes do with more conceptual precision. In 
any case either might benefit from being brought into contact with the other. 
For example, argumentation studies and deliberative democracy theory might 
look more at real and less-than-ideal practices, and rhetorical agency theory 
might be more systematically applied and exemplified in case studies with an 
eye to evaluation. If not synthesis, there might be synergy. Complementary 
strengths and perspectives might coalesce in a common pursuit.
To take rhetorical citizenship as one’s conceptual frame in scholar-
ship has a descriptive and a normative side, and its purpose is ultimately 
critical, as in any other kind of rhetorical criticism. But the focus is less on 
what a particular utterance is like, or how effective it is, but more on how 
suited it is to contribute to constructive civic interaction. The late rhetori-
cian Thomas Farrell defined the constructive potential of rhetoric, which 
again is the basis for a normative approach, by saying that rhetoric builds not 
on “an a priori validity claim in advance of speech” - rather, “rhetorical prac-
tice enacts the norms of propriety collaboratively with interested others” (1991, 
p. 200; emphasis in the original). More specifically, he argued, “important 
civic qualities – such as civic friendship, a sense of social justice – are actively 
cultivated through excellence in rhetorical practice” (p. 187). This line of 
thought echoes that of founding rhetorical thinkers like Isocrates and Cicero 
who believed that human societies could not have been built and sustained 
without rhetoric; and recently, Robert Danisch (2012) has maintained that 
the sophists, from Protagoras on, saw rhetoric as a “prudential pragmatism” 
and taught it to equip citizens to participate in their polity. If this is so, then 
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these norms, whether they are recognized or not, one has a better basis for 
critique – one that takes into account the ruling doxai and social and other 
constraints, which can sometimes be at odds with more abstract idealiza-
tions of civic discourse. Such grounded criticism is, we believe, a mean-
ingful supplement to existing cross-disciplinary scholarship on citizenship, 
which often is either primarily theoretical or focused on greater trends and 
quantifiable generalizations. Case studies are useful in at least two respects: 
first, they are useful for pedagogical purposes because they are concrete and 
thus easy to remember. Second, detailed analysis can further nuanced un-
derstanding, regardless of whether the analyzed artefact is representative of 
many or somehow odd or marginal. Whether under the aegis of rhetorical 
agency or not, rhetorical critics of, e.g., minority and women’s rhetoric have 
thus expanded our appreciation of the multiple ways in which rhetorical 
citizenship is manifested. Hannken-Illjes’ study of the celebration of trees 
as concrete material entities in a controversy over the new train station in 
Stuttgart is one such example of how social protest argumentation displays 
an expanded understanding of the stakeholders in the controversy and their 
means of symbolic expression. Similarly, Goggin’s study of “yarn bombing” 
as a protest form with global appeal illustrates how citizens, whether anony-
mously or not, contribute to the array of symbolic expressions inviting criti-
cal reflection on civic issues.
So, thinking of rhetorical citizenship becomes an impetus for forging 
more explicit links between particular utterances and their role in the main-
tenance and development of civic life. This may give renewed emphasis to the 
critical and social potential of rhetoric by teaching students to appreciate that 
the way we “do” citizenship discursively and the way we talk about society are 
both constitutive of and influential on what civic society is and how it develops. 
Rhetorical citizenship: participatory and receptive
Rhetorical Citizenship as a conceptual frame emphasizes the fact that laws, 
rights, and material conditions are not the only constituents of citizenship; 
discourse broadly conceived among citizens (in other words: rhetoric in so-
ciety) is arguably just as important. The concept unites under one heading 
citizens’ own discursive exchanges, in public or in private conversation, i.e., 
the active or participatory aspect of rhetorical citizenship, and the public dis-
course of which citizens are recipients. On a more fundamental level Thomas 
Farrell described this as “a dual sense of constraint and opportunity” (1991, 
citizenship inherently has a rhetorical side. And rhetoric is not merely per-
suasion in a narrow sense, but in fact a form of society building.
The place of rhetoric and rhetorical criticism, constructive or oth-
erwise, in society and civic life is addressed below by Chaput, Mifsud, and 
Zarefsky in their respective chapters. At a theoretical level, Chaput interro-
gates the implications of the metaphors we use to conceptualize democracy: 
commodity and the common. Mifsud focuses on Aristotle’s notion of the 
audience as “simple judges” and argues that it represents an archaic concept 
of citizenship, based on mutual sympathy, deeper than the Rhetoric’s more 
technical notion of persuasion. The potential societal consequences of rhe-
torical criticism of public discourse are the topic of Zarefsky’s chapter. He 
asks if rhetorical criticism may have a degenerative effect by virtue of the 
risk it entails for cultivating cynicism and systematic suspicion. The study 
of individual rhetors’ utterances has different levels. Most fundamentally, 
there is a descriptive element in simply mapping how rhetors, whether elite 
or “common,” actually present arguments or positions in the public realm. 
In this volume, we have included case studies of various types of discursive 
practices, from the large public hearings in three states in the US on same-sex 
marriage, studied by Karen Tracy, to Gene Navera’s cross-presidential study 
of the evolving uses made of the concept of “people power” in Philippine 
national politics, to Carolyne Lee and Judy Burnside-Lawry’s study of small 
group conversations as breeding grounds for rhetorical citizenship. Kuroiwa-
Lewis’ and van Belle’s chapters both focus on individual rhetors’ conceptions 
of civic cohesion and division. While Kuroiwa-Lewis’ reading of Franklin D. 
Roosevelt’s rhetoric on taxes as a collective social responsibility shows how 
FDR attempts to create moral consensus around a contested political topic, 
van Belle’s study focuses on the Dutch immigrant poet Bouzza’s embrace of 
polarization as a means of igniting public debate. 
Provocation to reflect on social membership and civic norms of com-
munication is also the theme of Olmos’ critical analysis of the Rico affair 
in Spain, named after a a well-known intellectual, accused of deceiving the 
public regarding his status as a smoker in a debate on smoking bans. 
Olmos’ study ventures the step from analytic criticism toward a nor-
mative assessment of how well a rhetor has performed in a debate, and how 
that debate might more profitably have continued. Such analyses, which 
necessarily imply norms of rhetorical merit, may lead to questions about 
how rhetors’ various practices reflect ruling discursive norms. By examining 
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This figure illustrates how various rhetorical concerns are connected, but also 
how much recent thinking in other disciplines addresses rhetorical concerns; 
thus interdisciplinary contact becomes an obvious agenda. For example, the 
idea that citizenship involves not only citizens’ rights but also what might 
be expected or demanded of them is stated clearly as an emerging insight in 
an overview on citizenship research by the philosophers Will Kymlicka and 
Wayne Norman: “most theorists now accept that the functioning of society 
depends not only on the justice of its institutions or constitutions, but also 
on the virtues, identities, and practices of its citizens, including their ability 
to co-operate, deliberate, and feel solidarity with those who belong to differ-
ent ethnic and religious groups” (2000, p. 11).
As for the distinction between the active and the receptive aspects of 
rhetorical citizenship, it parallels what political theorists Amy Gutmann and 
Dennis Thompson call the “principles of accommodation.” These princi-
ples, they say, “make two kinds of general demands on citizens; one concerns 
how citizens present their own political positions, and the other how they 
regard the political positions of others” (1996, p. 80). 
As for citizens’ rights or rightful expectations with regard to rhetoric 
in society, citizens not only have the right to speak, they also need the capac-
ity and position to speak so that they may be heard. Studies of rhetorical 
agency and how it is achieved by some and denied to others belong here. 
How is rhetorical agency manifested or contested? What does it take to gain 
a hearing? What counts as participation in public debate? How do we de-
termine what points of view are to be considered legitimate and appropriate 
forms of expression on issues of common concern? How can we account for 
changes in these categories? 
Are there certain responsibilities or duties incumbent on those who 
speak – such as standards of responsible discourse or even of deliberation? 
Many scholars in disciplines other than rhetoric have reflected on what those 
standards might be. Recently, political theorist John Dryzek has recognized 
rhetoric as a necessity in democracy, while not per se a constructive factor. 
He argues for a “systemic” criterion to distinguish between “desirable and 
undesirable uses of rhetoric,” and after analyzing how rhetoric may be either 
“bridging” or “bonding,” and how both kinds may play positive roles, he 
concludes that we should be “asking whether or not the rhetoric in question 
contributes to the construction of an effective deliberative system joining 
competent and reflective actors on the issue at hand” (2010, p. 335).
p. 199). With this bi-focal sensibility, Farrell wanted to capture the creative 
tension of customary practice on the one hand and on the other the inevi-
table uncertainty with regard to the constraints of the particular situation. 
Together, these competing forces explain how rhetoric can be at once adap-
tive and inventional. He calls it “reflective participation” and suggests that it 
also implies that propriety has both an ethical and an aesthetic dimension. 
When we talk about the receptive aspects of rhetorical citizenship, we may 
link that with the “constraint” aspect posited by Farrell. Rhetorical encoun-
ters are circumscribed by situation, genre, and discursive norms; but that 
is precisely part of what makes it possible for us to identify better or worse 
instantiations of public argument. Farrell’s “opportunity” aspect is closer to 
ideas about how rhetorical agency can emerge, even where it is unexpected, 
when individuals do not let convention or habit constrain them, but begin 
to see themselves as citizens and even citizens with a point to make – be it in 
traditional oratorical form or some other kind of symbolic behavior.
A more concrete way of expressing these ideas is to see rhetorical citi-
zenship as integrating two complementary aspects of both these categories: 
on the one hand, there are the rights that we, as citizens, are accorded, and the 
expectations that citizens may rightfully have in regard to discourse among 
citizens; on the other hand there is all that which other citizens are entitled 
to expect from us, precisely because we are citizens; we may also refer to this 
aspect as comprising discursive responsibilities or duties as citizens. 
The two dimensions, active/passive and rights/responsibilities, define, 
much like the cardinal directions of a compass rose, four broad areas of 
interest. The “North-South” axis may represent the active or participatory 
aspect versus the passive or receptive aspect; the “West-East” axis may then 
represent citizens’ rights versus their responsibilities or duties (see Figure 1).
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Just as we have a right to expect deliberative public rhetoric, the polity 
may also expect from us that we will indeed weigh in our minds the informa-
tion and reasons we hear. Indeed, a major emphasis on rhetoric as a capacity 
to listen, deliberate and assess, justifying its centrality in civic education, is 
evident in one of the most influential rhetoricians in history, the Renaissance 
theologian and educator Philipp Melanchthon, whose work informed the 
organization of general education in all of Protestant Europe. In the open-
ing of his Elementa rhetorices (1531) he declares that the precepts of rhetoric 
were developed not just for aspiring rhetors, but for every young person, 
and not primarily so that they can become orators, but because it helps 
them in the reading of excellent writers and in judging upon complex is-
sues (”in longis controversiis judicandis”). Even citizens who do not actively 
participate in debate and other discursive exchanges have a responsibility to 
listen to reasons, including those supporting views other than their own, and 
to information that is new and perhaps unwelcome. One important refer-
ence here might be to the rhetorician Wayne Booth’s concept of “listening-
rhetoric” (2009). McKerrow’s contribution to the present volume addresses 
the criteria of the enactment of citizenship and points to issues of voice and 
silence and the respective motives that may lie behind the choice of speaking 
or remaining silent.
Rhetorical citizenship has potential as an interdisciplinary conceptual 
frame in which to interpret and assess rhetoric, in its practical as well as its 
theoretical and/or critical manifestations. Dahlgren’s chapter below on the 
interfaces between discourse studies and rhetorical studies provides a helpful 
overview of mutual points of interest and of areas where they either overlap 
or have yet to do so. Deneire, Eelbode, and Lauwers’ application of game 
theory to the study of political debate offers a completely new perspective on 
how to understand campaign rhetoric, and how to reform it.
One thing rhetorical citizenship might certainly be is a pedagogical 
project. With an increasingly heterogeneous population, public education has 
a growing responsibility to teach students not only about democracy and civic 
rights, but also about their own roles and obligations in civic life; and that 
should include training them in the practical skills necessary to participate 
in, and to receive, public discourse, including intercultural communication. 
In 1998, a committee in Britain, led by the political theorist Bernard 
Crick, published a report, Education for Citizenship and the Teaching of De-
mocracy in Schools (Crick 1998). The report pointed to a number of “skills 
Simone Chambers is another political theorist who has addressed the 
standards issue. She believes that deliberation is needed in a democracy, but 
also that “the mass public can never be deliberative.” Democratic delibera-
tion in small groups of citizens is fine, but not enough. However, she believes 
that the public rhetoric we hear, mainly through the media, has the potential 
for providing deliberation. Regrettably, very often it provides none: failing to 
engage citizens’ “capacity for practical judgment,” it becomes what she calls 
“plebiscitary,” based on pandering and manipulation. So we must critically 
assess public rhetoric and the media that bring it to us, because we do have 
the task and at least some means of “making the mass public more rather 
than less deliberative.” “If rhetoric in general is the study of how speech af-
fects an audience then deliberative rhetoric must be about the way speech 
induces deliberation in the sense of inducing considered reflection about a 
future action” (2009, p. 335).
Public rhetors’ responsibilities may also be expressed in terms of indi-
vidual citizens’ rights. We citizens have a right to expect that public rhetoric 
helps us identify, understand and reflect on issues of common concern – by 
providing information and reasons that call on us to engage public issues and 
assist us in developing informed views on them. 
The political theorist Robert Goodin has emphasized the importance 
of what he calls “deliberation within,” pointing out that “very much of the 
work of deliberation, even in external-collective settings, must inevitably be 
done within each individual’s head.” In modern nation states there is no 
way everyone can speak up and be heard by everyone else on any issue. 
But we may “ease the burdens of deliberative democracy in mass society 
by altering our focus from the ‘external-collective’ to the ‘internal-reflective’ 
mode, shifting much of the work of democratic deliberation back inside the 
head of each individual.” Goodin adds that “internal-reflective deliberations 
might hope to secure better representation of the communicatively inept or 
the communicatively inert than external-collective deliberations ever could” 
(2000, p. 83). 
In this volume, Jørgensen’s chapter on politicians’ and especially the 
media’s abuse of the concept of election “promises” calls on us to be criti-
cal when presented with hasty or disingenuous characterizations of political 
statements as speech acts of various kinds. Similarly, Navera’s and Olmos’s 
chapters focus on evolving and ambiguous rhetoric presented by elite rhetors 
to the public. 
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mask for power, or a tool for ideological false consciousness. Deliberative 
rhetoric is the core of democracy, but criticism that claims always to see 
sinister underlying motives, or sees rhetoric as manipulation that obfuscates 
people’s self-interest, paralyze democracy by suspending deliberation. Rather 
than that, we need constructive rhetorical criticism that may help us work 
through our predicaments.
Paula Olmos, in “On Rhetorical Ethos and Personal Needs: A Span-
ish 2011 Public Controversy,” focuses on the Aristotelian notion of ethos 
and then discusses, by means of a borderline case, the classic question of 
what constitutes the basis of a speaker’s ethos: the discourse alone or a more 
comprehensive impression including the speaker’s biography. The aforemen-
tioned Rico affair illustrates the conundrum of ethos: a well-known author 
made an ethotical statement known by the public to be untrue, thus stirring 
up intense speculation about his intentions and widespread disapproval of 
his letter and person.
Charlotte Jørgensen, in “The Hunt for Promises in Danish Political 
Debate,” criticizes the obsessive media focus on politicians’ promises and 
alleged breaches thereof, arguing that this orientation undermines the delib-
erative ideal of informed public debate. Along with so-called “contract poli-
tics” it renders argumentation superfluous, demotivating citizens from en-
gaging themselves in the issues that arise in the contingent realm of politics.
In her paper “Keep[ing] profits at a reasonably low rate: Invoking 
American civil religion in FDR’s rhetoric of tax equity and citizenship,” Na-
thalie Kuroiwa-Lewis highlights aspects of Roosevelt’s presidential rhetoric 
that appear striking today: he presented taxation, even progressive taxation, 
as a civic good and a matter of social justice – a means for citizens to enact 
their citizenship and a part of a “civil religion.” Both Jørgensen’s and Ku-
roiwa-Lewis’ chapters may be said to represent the kind of appreciative and 
constructive criticism of rhetoric in the public sphere that Zarefsky suggests 
as a necessary counterbalance to systematically negative criticism. 
Maureen Daly Goggin, in “Yarn Bombing: Claiming Rhetorical Citi-
zenship in Public Spaces,” investigates how knitted patches, sewn together 
and displayed prominently at sites of civic controversy, become a global 
form of agency and an instantiation of contemporary feminist protest tac-
tics on issues such as war and environmental sustainability. Yarn bombing, 
graphically exemplified, is conceptualized as a materialist epistemology in 
the form of DIY activism.
and aptitudes” that schools should teach, most of which might clearly be 
seen as mainstays of a rhetorical education. Among them were: “to make 
a reasoned argument both verbally and in writing,” “to consider and ap-
preciate the experience and perspective of others,” “to tolerate other view 
points,” and “to recognise forms of manipulation and persuasion” (p. 44). 
So, without ever mentioning rhetoric, the report confirmed that citizenship 
is in large part a rhetorical concept, and that citizenship education should in 
large part be rhetorical, too. In her present study of a pedagogical project in 
a Greek school, Egglezou describes an educational program aimed at prepar-
ing students to consider for themselves and discuss with each other complex 
topics of civic importance, exemplified by the case of GMO food products. 
While Kuehl’s starting point for talking about citizenship in the classroom 
is also local, her argument in this book is that rhetorical citizenship should 
be introduced to students as not just an invitation to participate in local 
concerns, but as a global awareness. Ulrich, in her chapter on the TV series 
The West Wing, shows how this series refutes the common notion that the 
portrayal of politics in popular film and TV fiction rests on a basic attitude 
of cynicism. Rather, she finds the series to be at once entertaining and edu-
cational in its celebration of rhetoric in the political culture as an important 
civic and aesthetic craft. 
The Structure of the Book
As we said above, we hoped, when these papers were first invited, to learn 
how colleagues near and far would challenge, develop, or make use of the 
concept of rhetorical citizenship. They did all these things, and they did 
so in numerous divergent ways. Despite the diversity in theoretical starting 
points, methodology, and studied discourse, we found that the submissions 
nevertheless converged in broad groups. We have therefore organized the 
book in three sections, each headed by one of the three invited keynote lec-
tures by internationally celebrated scholars.
In the first section, “Rhetorical Criticism from the Viewpoint of Rhe-
torical Citizenship,” David Zarefsky asks, “Is Rhetorical Criticism Subver-
sive of Democracy?” He reminds us that rhetoric builds communities and 
makes citizenship active, but also cautions that rhetorical criticism may be 
subversive by fostering cynicism and thus apathy with regard to rhetori-
cal invention and practice. This is so if, with systematic negativity, it sug-
gests that individuals can have no agency, or that discourse is always a mere 
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position, listening to the positions of others, and finally responding appro-
priately to them. A triad of concepts helps explain this: voice – understood 
as the opportunity for people to speak and be heard on what matters in their 
lives; narrative; and listening. Narrative is an essential means for individuals 
to drive the feedback loop, and small group talk may thus be seen as a micro-
model of what rhetorical citizenship could be like.
“Argumentative Literacy and Rhetorical Citizenship” is Fotini Egg-
lezou’s detailed account of an ‘Isocratean’ program of rhetorical education 
implemented in a modern Greek primary school. A wide range of argumen-
tative and reflective verbal activities concerning the same controversial issue 
led a group of twelve-year-olds to a measurable increase in “the Isocratean 
qualities of sophia or phronesis.” Egglezou thus makes an empirically sup-
ported case that the internalization of rhetorical argumentation, with the 
implied dimensions of criticism, evaluation and choice, lays a foundation for 
the cultivation of civic virtue; citizenship, as Isocrates believed, is grounded 
rhetorically.
Gene Segarra Navera, under the title “’People Power’ in Philippine 
Presidential Rhetoric: (Re)framing Democratic Participation in Post-author-
itarian Regimes,” traces the term “people power” in five Philippine pres-
idents’ rhetoric as a malleable resource for talking about and performing 
democracy. Using concepts from cognitive linguistics, particularly “frames” 
stemming from seminal “conceptual metaphors,” he highlights the fluidity 
in the conceptualization of a hallowed phrase in its various metamorphoses 
from a form of resistance to an element of nation building.
In “On Being a Simple Judge,” Mari Lee Mifsud explores the notion 
of the haplous kritēs in Aristotle’s Rhetoric. This “simple judge” who judges 
public rhetorical argument is a citizen who understands the fundamental 
of eudaimonia: the “happiness” that the polis should seek to provide for all 
citizens. Aristotle here refers to Homeric examples. At the core of civic hap-
piness are solidarity and mutual benefaction, central to archaic norms for 
gift-giving, which honors those who give and reciprocate gifts. Rhetoric and 
rhetorical citizenship built on this basis is “simpler,” i.e., deeper and more 
essential than, rhetorical technē based on persuasion. 
Raymie McKerrow’s chapter is also an essay into thinking deeper on 
the nature of rhetoric and the social motives that carry it. “The Rhetorical 
Citizen: Enacting Agency” considers the nature and enactment of agency in 
the guise of the rhetorical citizen as a person whose actions within the public 
Establishing a linkage of two concepts: materiality and argumenta-
tion, Kati Hannken-Illjes, in “On Trees: Protest Between the Symbolic and 
the Material,” investigates a related aspect of the rhetoric of protest: how 
non-discursive entities – things – influence discourse, frame argumentation 
and thereby function rhetorically. Hundreds of old trees, destined to be cut 
down in a grand remodeling of Stuttgart’s main station, became a strong and 
central theme of dispute, and this can teach us something about the status of 
“things” and their materiality in public discourse. 
Anne Ulrich, in her chapter “’Cicero Would Love This Show’: The 
Celebration of Rhetoric and Citizenship in The West Wing,” shows us how 
fictional narratives in the successful TV series The West Wing teach us “an 
entertaining civics lesson” and constitute a “celebration of rhetoric.” She 
considers Aaron Sorkin, the creator of the series, a political orator actively 
engaging in public discourse and openly performing his vision of citizen-
ship. Analyzing crucial scenes in the activities of the White House oratorical 
team, Ulrich discusses how Sorkin conceives rhetoric and in what way one 
can understand the series itself as, literally speaking, epideictic rhetoric, i.e., 
a demonstration of rhetoric apt to enhance political participation and iden-
tification, that is, citizenship.
The second section of the book, “Studies in the Practice and Cultivation of 
Rhetorical Citizenship,” raises the perspective from the rhetorical criticism 
of intriguing cases to a more general level, namely what we might call rhe-
torical culture (or cultures). 
Karen Tracy, in “Rhetorical Citizenship in Public Meetings: The 
Character of Religious Expression in American Discourse,” analyzes citizen 
testimony at public hearings on same-sex marriage bills, pointing to link-
ages for Americans among citizenship, public hearings participation, and 
religious talk. She identifies patterns of invoking religion as relevant to civic 
issues and calls for increased attention to rhetorical citizenship as a culturally 
inflected practice. Talk at such public hearings, she maintains, serves impor-
tant functions, even if at odds with stringent norms of deliberation. Thus, 
rhetorical citizenship becomes a more useful concept if it can maintain a 
productive balance between deliberation and advocacy.
Carolyne Lee and Judy Burnside-Lawry consider, in “The Communi-
cative Construction of Rhetorical Citizenship in Small Groups,” how people 
in small groups practice a continuous feedback loop of articulating one’s 
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rhetoric as a specific component of civic education, focusing on teaching 
skills such as critical thinking, speaking, and writing. Global citizenship, 
defined as a specific type of rhetorical citizenship, including issues that span 
nation-states, is claimed to be useful in extending the civic rhetoric tradition 
via arousing people’s emotions about political issues. In this way, Kuehl con-
nects concepts of interconnectedness and social belonging as central to the 
notion of civic republicanism and civic liberalism.
Catherine Chaput argues that rhetoric, concomitant with democracy, 
has long helped capitalism appear inevitable in a “triple helix of freedom.” 
But this “triumphant knot” is unraveling. In “Rhetorical Citizenship beyond 
the Frontiers of Capitalism,” she posits that the core metaphor of capitalism 
is the commodity, emphasizing individual ownership and profit as central to 
citizenship. An alternative metaphor is the common. Both conceptions of 
citizenship are rhetorically constituted, but the “common” metaphor nudges 
us toward a sense of citizenship based on shared resources (such as history, 
knowledge, the environment). Jason Barker’s documentary Marx Reloaded, 
as Chaput sees it, revitalizes Marx’s thinking and imaginatively visualizes the 
commodity and the common as structuring myths of citizenship. 
Finally, Tom Deneire, David Eelbode and Jeroen Lauwers in “A Game 
with Words: Rhetorical Citizenship and Game Theory” represent a fresh 
look at how political argumentation might be construed. Conceptualizing 
rhetorical behavior, and in particular: political discourse, with the metaphor 
of the “game,” the authors explore the hermeneutic questions whether the 
critical potential of mathematically formalized game theory for rhetorical 
criticism. The authors argue that rhetorical discourse can be interpreted as a 
game, speakers as players, and the rhetorical situation as providing the con-
straints on the actions the players can take. These lead to consequences with 
a certain pay-off, or rhetorically speaking to discourse capable of altering re-
ality. The partisan nature of rhetoric is used as a starting point for discussing 
the speaker from the point of view of a rational decision-maker, thus linking 
to game-theoretical analysis. The authors compare rhetorical action to the 
so-called “prisoner’s dilemma,” and a location game model suggests that it is 
rational for politicians to stay close to the middle and at times concentrate 
on particular swing votes while ignoring many other voters. Finding this 
result unattractive, the authors conclude by suggesting the basic premise of 
an alternative voting system that they envision as fostering more responsible 
political debate.
sphere encompass considerations of race, class, sex, and gender lines. Pre-
mised on a Burkean sense of motive, McKerrow explores two major criteria 
undergirding the enactment of citizenship: the constraints provided with re-
spect to access and the role of motive in highlighting why one acts in giving 
voice to one’s role as a citizen. The role of voice includes that of silence, and 
the author suggests that the refusal to act is as much a rhetorical statement, 
provided the motive is clear, and is an overt action. 
In the third and last section of the book, “Crossing Borders, Disciplinary, 
Political and Otherwise,” we have brought together five chapters that each 
in their different ways explore borders between theoretical, disciplinary, 
and cultural assumptions about what communication in society is and 
should be like.
In “Rhetorical Analysis and Discourse Analysis: Probing the Inter-
face,” Peter Dahlgren highlights key similarities and differences between 
rhetorical analysis and two prominent schools of discourse analysis to render 
them mutually accessible. All three do qualitative analysis of discourse in so-
ciety and may learn from each other. He focuses on two strands of discourse 
analysis: Critical Discourse Analysis (Fairclough et al.) in a sense updates 
ideology critique, taking a constructionist view of language. Discourse The-
ory (Laclau & Mouffe et al.) adds theoretical weight to discourse analysis, 
with the aim of enabling us to “think and do otherwise.” Dahlgren finds that 
rhetorical analysis typically extrapolates readers’ and listeners’ responses to 
communication, but the subject and subjectivity remain less theorized.
Hilde van Belle’s chapter, “A Stowaway of Emigration: Polarization in 
Hafid Bouazza’s Work” deals with the Dutch writer Hafid Bouazza’s prac-
tice of challenging widely held assumptions that polarization in debate is 
undesirable and detrimental to constructive rhetorical citizenship. Bouazza 
is a full-blooded exponent of diversity and complexity, in fiction and drama 
as well as in his polemical writings, which castigate Islamic fundamentalism 
and tendencies in Holland, and the West generally, to seek appeasement and 
deny polarization. His driving force is passion for all colors of the spectrum, 
in language, literature, and society. 
Under the title “Extending Civic Rhetoric: Valuing Rhetorical Di-
mensions of Global Citizenship in Civic Education,” Rebecca A. Kuehl ar-
gues that civic rhetoric would benefit from a rhetorical view of global citi-
zenship in extending the practices of rhetorical education. She defines civic 
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Closing remarks
We believe rhetoric has a place in the study of civic life in virtue of the dis-
cipline’s dual nature as an everyday practice and a field of academic inquiry. 
Lots of rhetoric takes place every day. Sometimes it inspires us, sometimes 
it irks us, sometimes we are part of it, sometimes we don’t even notice it. 
Rhetoric makes society hang together. By paying close attention to what 
people say and do in various civic settings, we stand to learn about how 
people understand their society and their own role in it. The way they speak 
and what they say are keys to this understanding, which rhetorical analysis 
and criticism might promote. Studying the kind of argumentative “work” 
that certain viewpoints or topoi are being used to accomplish, or how they 
travel from vernacular settings to government discourse (or not), may be a 
way of understanding the workings of society better. Expectations may be 
confirmed, but at other times new arguments or new angles may emerge. 
As rhetorician Robert Hariman noted, “understanding, appreciating, 
and improving democratic participation is impeded by both the rationality 
standards of deliberative democracy theorists and classical rhetoric’s ideal of 
eloquence” (2007, p. 222). We take this as a call for scholarly approaches 
that better account for, and can offer suggestions for, actual vernacular dis-
course. We as academics can assist in showing how praxis is both invention-
al and reflects civic norms and cultural values. As a practice, rhetoric holds a 
built-in impetus of improvement. This is where the normative aspect rests, 
both on the practical and the theoretical level. With its keen eye for contin-
gency and indeterminacy, rhetoric is equipped to deal with the imperfect 
nature of civic discourse, at once serving as a resource for improvement and 
a sober acknowledgement of the constraints of the situation. Rhetoric, in 
the words of Thomas Farrell, is “practical reasoning in the presence of col-
laborative others” (1991, p. 189). It is, he believed, “more than the practice; 
it is the entire process of forming, expressing, and judging public thought 
in real life. … this enhanced understanding needs to include the condition 
of being a rhetorical audience. This is a condition in which we are called to 
exert our own critical capacities to a maximum extent. We have to decide – 
quite literally – what sort of public persons we wish to be” (p. 208).
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Is Rhetorical Criticism Subversive 
of Democracy?
DAV I D Z A R E F S K Y
Statement of the problem
For nearly 45 years I have studied and taught rhetorical criticism, the analy-
sis and interpretation of public discourse in order to explain, evaluate, and 
change social practices. I saw myself as contributing in a small way to demo-
cratic life. I still do – rest assured that I am not entering into some late 
midlife crisis. But as I have thought about public discourse, and about gov-
ernance in democracy, and about our complicated current predicaments, I’m 
not sure that rhetorical criticism is always a positive force. There may be a 
dark side to both popular and academic rhetorical criticism which we would 
do well to identify and try to ameliorate. 
Rhetoric builds community through appeals to common bonds and 
transcendent values. There is an element of mystery in such appeals, and by 
demystifying rhetoric, explaining everything, criticism may prevent rhetoric 
from doing its work. This risk is especially serious for democracies since 
rhetorical appeals are their only means for mobilizing public judgment and 
decision. Can we have strong rhetorical practice and strong criticism too, or 
are the two inherently at odds?
I have raised a provocative question, perhaps even an outlandish one: 
Is rhetorical criticism subversive of democracy? To forecast my answer, it is 
“not necessarily.” Yet the danger is real. The argument I’ll advance is some-
what indirect. Most of my examples will come from the United States, be-
cause I know it best, but I believe that the questions and concerns I raise 
speak to the human condition at this moment, without geographical limita-
tion. I will proceed in four steps: (1) clarifying what I mean by “citizenship,” 
“rhetoric,” and “democracy,” (2) explaining how “rhetorical citizenship” is 
achieved through “democratic deliberation” which is itself a rhetorical en-
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rhetoric separately from the analysis and criticism of rhetoric. The former 
forms the substance of courses in public speaking and the goal of consultants 
and coaches of politicians and business executives. The latter becomes the 
province of academics. The former emphasizes rhetoric’s potential; the latter, 
its limitations. The former is typically local and private in its orientation; the 
latter concerns discourse in the public sphere. Rhetoricians may train people 
to be good speakers or writers, but critics may argue that these people deploy 
their newly acquired skills in futile pursuits if they aim to make a difference 
in the public sphere, because rhetoric may be only a cover for the impersonal 
forces that really control public life. If it conveys the message that individu-
als have no agency, rhetorical criticism is indeed subversive of democracy. It 
“teaches” that individuals might as well opt out of public life and it implies 
that the inevitable stalemates in the public sphere ultimately will be over-
come not through discursive engagement but through anarchy; surrender 
to authoritarianism; whim, fashion, or caprice; a crisis so dire that it upends 
presumptions about what is possible; or even violence. Even democracies 
fall victim occasionally to these forces, but to depend on them is to deny the 
prospect of democracy itself.
Fortunately, the converse is also true. If rhetorical criticism and rhe-
torical practice can be rejoined, if academic and scholarly critics adopt Ken-
neth Burke’s comic rather than tragic frame1 so that rhetoric is seen as the 
comic corrective to impersonal social forces, then rhetorical criticism can 
strengthen rather than subvert democracy. Rhetoric can become a means 
for working through seemingly intractable conflicts, exploring alternative 
frames of reference, identifying what is at issue and distinguishing between 
the trivial and the crucial, determining when consensus is possible and when 
it is not, and building legitimacy for a majority’s decision while respecting 
the minority’s rights.
But I am getting ahead of myself here. I have talked about what I 
mean by “citizenship” and “rhetoric,” but not yet about “democracy.” And 
“democracy” is a charismatic term2 – positive in its connotations (at least it 
is now, unlike in the 18th century when it was equated with mob rule) but 
1 See Burke (1959) [1937], esp. pp. 92-105, for a discussion of the comic and tragic 
frames.
2 The concept of “charismatic terms,” terms of great potency but unclear referents, is 
explained in Weaver (1953), pp. 227-232.
terprise, (3) describing how democratic deliberation builds identification as 
a counter to the natural divisions among people, and (4) identifying and 
discussing potential threats to democratic deliberation posed by rhetorical 
criticism, and also their possible remedies.
Citizenship, rhetoric, and democracy
My argument pivots around the relationships among three key terms: citi-
zenship, rhetoric, and democracy. All three terms are used in multiple ways, 
so I need to make clear where I am going with each of them.
Citizenship is the enactment of the individual’s relationship to the pol-
ity, whether it is local, state or regional, national, or global. Most of us, in 
fact, enact this attachment at multiple levels. “Thin” expressions of citizen-
ship include voting, paying taxes, performing military service, and holding a 
passport. In these cases the attachment to the polity may be weak or indirect. 
Other forms, such as attending to the news, campaigning for public office, 
and undertaking legal action to protect one’s rights, require more active en-
gagement.
Kock and Villadsen propose that citizenship be understood as rhetori-
cal, “in the sense that important civic functions take place in deliberation 
among citizens, and that discourse is not prefatory to real action but is in 
many ways constitutive of civic engagement” (2012, p. 1). I share their view: 
what makes citizenship active rather than passive is its rhetorical character.
Once freed of its widespread negative stereotypes in everyday usage, 
rhetoric is understood as both an academic discipline and a social practice. 
Ordinary people engage in it and academics study it. Our studies seek both 
to strengthen and perpetuate the discipline through the deepening of theo-
retical insight, and also to analyze and interpret the practice of rhetoric in 
society. We understand rhetoric broadly as about the relationships between 
messages and people. 
We tend to distinguish between rhetorical practice and rhetorical 
criticism – between performance, on the one hand, and analysis, interpreta-
tion, and judgment on the other. But this is in some sense a false dichotomy. 
Analysis and criticism of rhetoric in society should also help to improve 
rhetorical practice, whether of the rhetors we study, or others, or our own. 
Likewise, efforts to develop or improve skills should make us more sensi-
tive to how, and how well, those skills are deployed in society. In practice, 
however, we have reified the distinction, teaching and studying the arts of 
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run? What if there is an “inside” candidate and opposition supporters are 
intimidated so that they do not vote? What if the turnout is very low or the 
voters are unrepresentative of the total population? What if the counting of 
the ballots is suspect? Each of these things has happened in my lifetime, and 
each undercuts the legitimacy of an election. The citizen-voters are not in 
fact the rulers; the will of the majority is not being carried out; the rights of 
the minority are not protected. These are not democratic elections.
Second, democracy is sometimes confused with an extreme form of 
populism, in which an inherent division is assumed between “elites” and “the 
people.” Rulers and ruled are not drawn from the same category. Elites never 
can represent the wishes of the people, even if chosen by them, because their 
interests as elites are at odds with the interests of the people. The goal of the 
elites is to preserve and build upon their own power. One way to do that is 
to oppress the people, but that might precipitate revolution. A better way is 
to appear to share the people’s values and interests while actually co-opting 
them. Thus, for example, an officeholder may claim to support “family val-
ues” while opposing specific legislative measures to benefit families, such as 
family medical leave or child care allowances, even if a majority of the people 
support them. The officeholder is not necessarily being dishonest (although 
he or she may be), but according to this view of democracy, the officeholder 
is undemocratic. There is no doubt that this scenario in which elites co-opt 
the people sometimes develops. But it is a mistake to think that it is inher-
ent, that there is a perpetual class struggle. To believe that is to advocate not 
democracy but anarchy, for there is no way by which the will of the people 
can be made effective. And the critic of public discourse who presumes that 
the practice of the culture is in such a state will have a ready-made and 
all-purpose interpretation at the ready: discourse is a mask for power, pure 
and simple. The critic may argue that individuals lack agency because their 
discourse is smothered by the intractable power struggle. Nuance does not 
matter; audience adaptation does not matter. These are only clever tricks to 
instill a kind of false consciousness among the people. Such an account, to 
say the least, is overdetermined.
There is another understanding of “democracy” that makes good 
sense at first glance. If the goal is for decisions to reflect the will of the peo-
ple, why not ask each person (or a representative sample) his or her opinion, 
tabulate the responses, and present the answer? But the view of democracy 
as polling has two basic flaws. First, it neglects a sense of the commons and 
attached to widely differing referents. Abraham Lincoln perhaps defined it 
best when he called it “government of the people, by the same people.”3 Sov-
ereignty resides ultimately and collectively with those who also are subjects 
of the regime. Rulers and ruled are the same. If government violates the 
people’s rights or liberties, the people have the prerogative of altering it. If 
the people desire an outcome that is within the scope of government, they 
have the power through majority vote to bring it about. But since a major-
ity vote could be used to enshrine tyranny and to undercut democracy itself 
(as happened in Germany in 1934), fundamental rights of the minority are 
protected. Anti-majoritarian provisions assure that a regime based on major-
ity rule can prevail since the minority of one day becomes the majority of 
the next.
The core elements of democracy, then, are the identity between rulers 
and ruled, majority rule, and minority rights. Certainly democracy is not a 
necessary condition for rhetoric. One need only recall the public address of 
Hitler and Stalin to recognize that totalitarian rulers can evoke raw emotion, 
constitute individuals as a mob, and convert the will to act into violent ac-
tion. These in large measure are rhetorical outcomes, despise them though 
we may. They remind us of Aristotle’s dictum that rhetoric is a neutral in-
strument that can be used for good or for ill.
On the other hand, rhetoric may well be a necessary condition for 
democracy, or at least for a healthy and functioning one. It fits comfortably 
with the recognition that people must come to collective decisions and act in 
the face of matters that are uncertain and contingent, about which we do not 
have all the information we would like. It recognizes that people are fallible, 
that decisions and commitments can be reviewed, that majorities and mi-
norities may trade places, that controversies often are managed rather than 
ultimately resolved, and that great issues can remain contested over time.4
Democracy is sometimes confused with two other notions that share 
its trappings but not necessarily its substance. One is elections. They are 
a valuable and efficient means to determine the will of the majority, but 
they are not democracy itself. What if only a single candidate is allowed to 
3 “Message to Congress in Special Session, July 4, 1861.” In: Collected Works of Abraham 
Lincoln (1953), 4:426. The phrasing anticipates that of the Gettysburg Address.
4 On the importance of democracy’s acknowledging human fallibility, see especially 
Thorson (1962). 
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Nevertheless, the deliberative democracy literature is largely theoreti-
cal and abstract. There are but a few empirical applications, and they involve 
contrived situations. The literature is based on the normative but counter-
factual situation of “open and uncoerced discussion,” which seldom if ever 
obtains. Deliberative democracy also envisions relatively small discussion 
groups as the model, not an entire society or its representatives pursuing col-
lective decisions about war or peace, taxation, the role of government in the 
economy, the tension between national and local interests, the general wel-
fare, or any of the other topics usually placed under “public policy.” But de-
liberative democracy does make clear that rhetoric has a central role to play. 
Rhetorical sensitivity can rehabilitate the concept of deliberative democracy 
and can invigorate its practice – if rhetorical criticism will allow it to.
Democratic deliberation and rhetorical citizenship
Armed with that premise, scholars such as Kock and Villadsen are fleshing 
out a concept of rhetorical citizenship based upon a more empirical under-
standing of deliberation, and scholars such as Tracy are conducting empirical 
studies, particularly of representative governing bodies at the local level.7 
These studies reflect the fact that discussion is not usually “open and un-
coerced.” People bring with them the baggage of their own circumstances, 
ranging from class and economic self-interest to personal identity and po-
litical ideology, and they evaluate others’ ideas within the context of these 
commitments. Discussion moves that might violate conventional norms of 
decorum or politeness are not condemned out of hand; they are examined 
for an understanding of their function in widening or narrowing the view-
points under consideration, and for facilitating decisions or slowing the rush 
to consensus.
What is not so generally realized is that the same processes of rhetori-
cal deliberation evolve as a larger society works toward public decisions. Citi-
zens read and listen about issues from a wide variety of information sources, 
incorporating what they learn into a pre-existing set of knowledge and be-
liefs, adjusting the set when necessary to incorporate new or discordant ele-
ments. Leaders write and talk about these issues, trying to make connections 
between their ideals and proposals, on the one hand, and the audience’s be-
liefs and values, on the other. Interested parties try to arouse others’ interest 
7 See, for example, Tracy (2010).
makes the public nothing more than an aggregate of individuals. “What is 
best for the country (or society)” reduces to “What do I like?” when these 
in fact are not identical. Second, this is at best a “thin” form of democracy. 
Poll numbers generally do not reflect either intensity of belief or the degree 
of information on which it is based. They yield inconsistent results, partly 
because people may be inconsistent (approving of social programs but not 
wanting to fund them, for instance) but also because answers to the pollster 
may be superficial or because answers are highly sensitive to the specific 
wording of a question. A richer, or “thicker” conception of democracy would 
promote the expression of reasoned, considered opinions as the basis for 
public judgment. For this reason, political scientist James Fishkin and his 
colleagues have experimented with what they call “deliberative opinion poll-
ing,” obtaining people’s opinions after they have been involved in structured 
discussion on the topic.
Deliberative opinion polling has been criticized on grounds of practi-
cality, but it reflects the insight that rhetorical scholars often find congenial: 
that deliberation is the essence of democracy, or (as it is sometimes said) 
that democracy exists in communication. Realizing this insight, some have 
theorized about what they have called “deliberative democracy.” The term, 
coined in 1980 by Joseph M. Bessette, refers to a system in which con-
flict is resolved and disagreement addressed through “open and uncoerced 
discussion.”5 The assumption is that “political agreement can be reached on 
the basis of principles that can be justified to others.”6 What determines the 
value of an idea or proposal is its ability on its own merits to influence others. 
Deliberation is characterized by giving and seeking reasons. What emerges is 
collective rationality – what the decision-making group as a whole considers 
to be reasonable. This is not necessarily the same as a simple aggregation of 
individual preferences, because presumably individuals will transform their 
preferences to take others’ views into account. This approach to decision 
making is fundamentally rhetorical, because the justifications people provide 
for their views are justifications to an audience. They are not deduced like 
syllogisms but are premised on the beliefs and values of a deliberating com-
munity in a specific situation.
5 I discuss strengths and flaws of the deliberative-democracy research in Zarefsky (2008), 
pp. 131-153.
6 Guttman and Thompson (2003), p. 33.
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structively by advising advocates on the structure of audience beliefs and the 
burden the advocates face, or analytically by accounting for the presence and 
significance of these predispositions. Too often, references to context treat it 
just as historical background, useful for knowing what is happening at the 
time, without recognizing its constitutive nature with regard to the con-
troversy at hand. Understanding public discourse as extended democratic 
deliberation might make us more sensitive to this problem.
Democratic deliberation and identification
How are we to understand what happens in a deliberating group or society? 
What is the rhetorical process involved, how is it democratic, and in what 
ways might it be threatened by rhetorical criticism?
People are by nature divided, Kenneth Burke has written.9 They are 
separated from one another by differences in experience, thought, feeling, 
motivation, and interest, among other things. Each of us is a solitary be-
ing, yet persistent solitude is unpleasant and uncomfortable, so we are also 
by nature social. Burke’s maxim is that “identification is compensatory to 
division.”10 We identify with others when they fit our ideas into their values 
and vice-versa. When that happens, we can understand how they think and 
what they value. We see their viewpoint as fitting within our own. More 
than that, Burke employs religious imagery in maintaining that we become 
“consubstantial” with them – metaphorically, we become one. We come to 
see ourselves as parts of the same whole, with which we both affiliate.
But how does this happen? Participants in deliberation try out their 
stories on one another, exchanging them and comparing others’ stories with 
their own. In referring to stories, I mean the accounts that people offer to 
explain their world-views or frames of reference. The stories may be narra-
tives with characters and plot, but they also may take the form of arguments, 
descriptions, or explanations. The participants’ goal is to have stories that 
match, so that you can see yours in mine and vice-versa. When that happens, 
the deliberation has produced a common story. Sometimes all or nearly all 
will need to accept the story for the deliberation to be successful; sometimes 
a supermajority will be required; sometimes a simple majority. Sometimes the 
deliberation will not succeed in its primary goal but nevertheless will have 
9 Burke (1969) [1950], esp. p. 22.
10 Burke, (1969) [1950], p. 22.
and support through a wide variety of media and presentational choices. On 
the surface, the process hardly resembles a conversation, much less a meeting 
of a decision-making body. But in a larger sense, that is exactly what it is – a 
wide-ranging conversation across space and time in which a loosely defined 
but vast body of individuals comes to a collective sense of its identity, its 
values, and its priorities – or, in the case of a stalemate, fails to do so.
A rhetor anticipating or confronting such a broad audience does not 
begin in a vacuum. Every society, as Bourdieu asserts, has unquestioned as-
sumptions that are widely believed as if they were facts – whether because, as 
he claims, those in power want to present contestable claims as if they were 
settled, or simply as a result of socialization into a culture.8 For example, 
many Europeans find it hard to understand why in the United States gun 
control is such a troublesome issue even in the face of clear evidence that 
guns easily get into the wrong hands and lead to unnecessary violence, some-
times on a massive scale. It is hard to understand, at least until one recognizes 
this issue as the latest instantiation of ideas that trace back to the American 
founding: distrust of and hostility toward government, which is seen as the 
people’s enemy rather than as their agent; a strong emphasis on individual-
ism and self-reliance rather than communal action as the best guarantor of 
safety and security; the historical experience of colonists in Boston in the 
1770s who were forced to quarter British soldiers in their private homes and 
who sought means of self-defense; and the belief that local militias offered 
better defense against enemies than did national standing armies which eas-
ily could be turned against the people instead. Taking stock of these cultural 
facts does not decisively tip the scales against gun control, of course, for there 
are multiple considerations on the other side. But it does help to explain why 
the question is controversial and divisive, even in the face of tragedies such 
as the recent mass shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, 
Connecticut. And it does make clear the burden on the advocates of gun 
control: either to demonstrate to the public’s satisfaction that proposed mea-
sures will not jeopardize this set of prevailing beliefs or to provide a convinc-
ing explanation for why the set should be altered or overthrown.
Participants in a controversy such as this one on gun control may not 
consciously recognize that this is their task, caught up as they are in their 
own advocacy. But that is where the rhetorical critic comes in, either con-
8 Bourdieu (1979), cited in von der Lippe (2012), p. 165.
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with the person’s belief system than was the old. This is the most overt case 
of people changing their minds. This happens occasionally, especially if the 
original commitment is not very strong. What is more likely is to establish 
that a person’s original commitment leads him or her to results that he or she 
finds unacceptable, rejecting it for that reason, and adopting the proposed 
alternative in order to avoid a vacuum. This is a particular illustration of 
the circumstantial ad hominem argument.12 For example, a person believing 
that there should be absolutely no government involvement in the economy 
might be confronted with the knowledge that this position is at odds with a 
call for government to provide funds to rebuild one’s town after it has been 
hit by a major national disaster – a view which our hypothetical citizen also 
supports, having been a victim of a hurricane in the past. The pull of per-
sonal interest might prove stronger than that of abstract principle, and being 
aware of the tension between the two might induce our hypothetical citizen 
to abandon the unyielding opposition to any and all government involve-
ment in the economy.
Transcendence, multivocality, and displacement are three examples 
of strategic appeals that a deliberating group or a larger society can use to 
move from division toward identification. But exactly how they work in-
volves something of a “black box.” Forty years ago, Ernest Bormann (1972) 
proposed that people tell stories exchanging what he called “fantasy themes” 
and that these “chain out” in a group as they resonate with others. People 
pick up on a particular theme because it “speaks to them.” They elaborate on 
its meaning, develop additional implications, carry a metaphor further, or 
find an additional application, and thereby join with others in commitment 
to the theme. Bormann used “fantasy theme” as a somewhat technical term, 
but the process of “chaining out” may have more general application.
An obvious example would be the acceptance of “war” as a metaphor 
to describe what took place on September 11, 2001. The dominant story 
might have been that there was a monstrous crime, or that it was the act of 
insane and deluded people on a massive scale, or that this was the assertion 
by a non-state actor of the prerogatives of a state, or something else. But 
these options gained little traction because the metaphor of “war” so quickly 
chained out that it became the normalized way to describe these terrible 
12 On this use of the ad hominem argument, see Johnstone (1959), p. 73, p. 76; Walton 
(1998), pp. 2-6.
identified the precise matters about which there is disagreement and will suc-
ceed in clarifying the different positions and developing an understanding of 
how they will be tested.
This abstract model of deliberation, of course, is enacted in real time, 
with real actors operating with real baggage. They will try to do one or more 
of three things. First, advocates may seek transcendent appeals – ones that 
will subsume whatever are the matters on which the advocates disagree. In 
the recent fiscal-policy debates in my country, for example, the conviction 
that we must not go over the “fiscal cliff ” induced the deliberators to reach 
at least a semblance of agreement. The need to build “a common European 
home” during the 1990s likewise subsumed competing nationalistic desires 
even though those forces remained active. If deliberators can see their inter-
ests subsumed within a common vision, to that degree they will see them-
selves as united, members of the same community pursuing the same goal.
A second possibility is for advocates to develop multivocal appeals, 
messages that attract people’s support for different reasons and that may even 
mean different things to different people. Division is overcome through a 
unified message that people can understand each in his or her own way yet 
all can support. A contemporary example is “income tax reform,” which can 
be understood as meaning anything from eliminating loopholes and deduc-
tions to making tax rates sharply more (or less) progressive. A wide swath of 
the U.S. public views “tax reform” favorably as an essential component of a 
solution to the problem of the U.S. national debt, but they do not all mean 
the same thing by the phrase. A famous 19th century example was the term 
“popular sovereignty,” which for a decade papered over differences within 
the Democratic Party about whether territories did or did not have the right 
to prevent the introduction of slavery before they became states. Multivocal 
appeals depend on a certain degree of ambiguity; their power to build con-
sensus is lost if they are rendered too precise. They function in a way similar 
to what political scientist Murray Edelman, borrowing from anthropologist 
Edward Sapir, called “condensation symbols”; they condense into one sym-
bol a wide range of ideas and referents that might otherwise diverge.11
A third option is for advocates to formulate displacement appeals, those 
that lead advocates to abandon one commitment and to replace it with an-
other, having been convinced that the new commitment is more compatible 
11 Edelman (1964), p. 6; Sapir (1934).
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Muslim socialist who was born in Kenya. Documents establishing the con-
trary are dismissed as forgeries or otherwise inauthentic, as clever devices to 
obscure the truth and prop up illegitimate holders of power. German chan-
cellor Angela Merkel’s call for a more integrated euro zone is disdained on 
the grounds that what she “really” is trying to do is to reassert German domi-
nance of the European continent. U.S. Secretary of State Hillary Rodham 
Clinton’s recent illness was said to be faked, statements of medical experts to 
the contrary notwithstanding, because she wanted to avoid having to testify 
before the Congressional committee investigating the Benghazi tragedy that 
was, it was said, highly critical of the State Department.
These examples are especially disconcerting because they call into ques-
tion such fundamentals as the nature of fact and evidence. Even more, they 
divide people into radically different communities with different standards 
of knowledge and belief – each of which can perpetuate itself by insulating 
its members from exposure to alternative viewpoints – rather than a single 
community of people who hold diverse opinions. Without sharing such basic 
beliefs about the world, they cannot deliberate together and instead either 
withdraw into their separate enclaves or else engage in full-scale culture wars.
It is easy to disparage such blatant disregard for fact. But a second 
way by which advocates try to become rhetorical critics is harder to dismiss. 
Consider as an example a book that appeared almost a decade ago, Thomas 
Frank’s What’s the Matter with Kansas? (2004). While he writes specifically 
about the state of Kansas, Frank’s argument applies far more broadly to sig-
nificant elements of the U.S. population. Noting that a century ago Kansas 
was a hotbed of radical populism, Frank asks how it has happened that the 
state has come to be dominated by social conservatives who do not represent 
the economic self-interest of the people. His answer, in a nutshell, is that a 
generation of people has been led to vote against its own self-interests, reject-
ing government economic policies that actually would help them, because 
they have given priority to ideologically conservative beliefs about social top-
ics such as abortion, religion, and marriage, which somehow trump their 
economic self-interest. I happen to share Frank’s wish that Kansas would 
return to its more radical roots, but I find his analysis flawed. It reduces 
legitimate grounds for voting to personal economic self-interest alone, im-
plying that the people of Kansas are misguided if they cast their votes on any 
other grounds. This both exalts the economic over other dimensions of a 
person’s life and also suggests that people should select officials and policies 
events. More recently, the September 11, 2012 attack on the U.S. mission in 
Benghazi, Libya, has come to be understood as a terrorist act rather than – as 
some in the U.S. intelligence community had maintained – only the sponta-
neous and unplanned consequence of a protest demonstration. As a different 
story chained out from the one the early commentators had used, they were 
perceived not just as mistaken but as dangerously naïve.
The trajectory by which a story chains out, however, is not predeter-
mined and always could be otherwise. It is contingent and depends upon in-
tervening variables ranging from contemporaneous events to the ideological 
predisposition of the decision makers. This fact underscores the rhetorical 
nature of deliberation. Rhetoric is situational; it is grounded in particulars 
rather than following law-like generalizations. It is an art, not a science. Its 
outcome depends upon the inventional resources and aptitude of individuals 
in a given moment. And since it cannot be fully or definitively explained, it 
contains an element of mystery. This element keeps rhetorical practice open 
and potential, not closed and definitive. It preserves the possibility of rebut-
tal, and therefore is foundational to democracy. 
Rhetorical criticism and threats to democratic deliberation
This brings me at last to the concern I raised at the outset. If rhetoric in soci-
ety depends on an element of mystery, then rhetorical criticism, in seeking to 
demystify what is going on, poses a potential threat. It may contribute to the 
paralysis of democratic deliberation that is so often noted today. Surely this 
paralysis has many other causes, such as sharply increased political polariza-
tion, the recognition of limits, and the emergence of seemingly intractable 
positions. But rhetorical criticism, if it presumes to explain too fully, may 
leave no room for rhetors to use the resources of invention to work creatively 
in the face of these challenges. And, of course, if democracy is paralyzed and 
grinds to a halt, necessary decisions will be made and actions taken by non-
democratic means.
Both everyday and academic rhetorical criticism can reveal this dark 
side, in two different ways in each case. I begin with the everyday. First, 
political actors can too easily become rhetorical critics, not accepting others’ 
words at face value nor even retaining a healthy skepticism, but scrutiniz-
ing their discourse to determine what it “really” means beneath the surface. 
Recent politics furnishes some examples. Unencumbered by evidence, a 
non-trivial number of people continue to believe that President Obama is a 
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to do? The argument that seemingly would deny the charge is reinterpreted 
to support it instead. The preposterous claims become self-sealing.14 If the 
allegations cannot be dislodged on their own terms, the remedy must be to 
shift the terms – objecting to the line of argument because it is destructive 
of individual freedom, or perhaps subjecting it to ridicule through a cir-
cumstantial ad hominem showing that the self-sealing argument can be used 
against its own perpetrator.
But it is not just the amateur critics about whom I worry. There are 
problematic tendencies in academic rhetorical criticism as well. Here I am 
understanding “critical” in “rhetorical criticism” as meaning “analytical” or 
“reflective,” not “negative” or “hostile.” The academic subfield of rhetorical 
criticism has made immense advances in the past sixty years, evolving from 
a formula-based approach that proved primarily that any discourse could be 
sorted out into pre-defined categories taken from Aristotle’s Rhetoric. One of 
the more significant advances has been the productive complication of the 
concept of agency. Even sixty years ago, it seemed strange to judge a speech a 
failure in a situation in which the speaker had no realistic possibility of suc-
cess to start with. Assuming complete agency on the speaker’s part was un-
doubtedly naïve. Attributing a more limited sense of agency to the speaker, 
and granting agency to situational, social, economic, and ideological forces 
has made the critic’s task more difficult but has produced criticism of greater 
sophistication and force.
One very strong move in this direction was the “critical rhetoric” proj-
ect undertaken by Raymie McKerrow (1989). McKerrow urged a special 
focus on the relationship between rhetoric and power. Discourse can be used 
by the powerful as an instrument to maintain power, even if it professes neu-
trality or openness to critique. Meanwhile, it can be extremely difficult for 
insurgent challengers to employ discourse as a means to equalize or threaten 
power in the way enacted by social protest movements of the 1960s. These 
are important insights, and one of the clearest trends in rhetorical criticism 
over the past decade is the growing emphasis on power and ideology as ex-
planations for the strength or weakness of discourse.
Here too, though, I think there is at least a potential problem. It is 
tempting to infer from the influence of power and ideology that they are 
14 The concept of “self-sealing arguments” comes from Robert J. Fogelin. See, for example, 
Fogelin and Sinnott-Armstrong (1997), pp. 353-357.
not on the basis of what they think is good for society as a whole but only on 
the basis of what will benefit them personally. The people of Kansas surely 
are not the only ones who sometimes allow the common good to trump 
their personal self-interest. I myself have sometimes supported measures for 
which I would need to pay even though I would not benefit from them per-
sonally, in the belief that they were beneficial to society as a whole and that, 
in the given case, that was more important. This preference for the public 
over the private is what the 18th century understood as the meaning of virtue.
If Frank’s recommendations to vote based on economic self-interest 
were widely adopted, there would be no need for deliberation, because there 
would be nothing to discuss with others. Each person could calculate his or 
her own self-interest and vote on that basis; the results could be tallied up; 
and the outcome would be that choice which the greatest number of indi-
viduals saw as being in their self-interest. This approach would stop delibera-
tion in its tracks and would substitute a thin for a robust sense of democracy. 
If one agrees with Frank’s underlying ideological position, then one should 
focus not on the fact that social values can trump self-interest but on the par-
ticular social values that the people of Kansas have been persuaded to accept.
The two approaches to amateur rhetorical criticism I’ve described here 
seem to be opposites. One is marked by disregard for “the facts” and the 
surface claims of discourse, in the belief that they are but a cover for deeper 
underlying motivations that the would-be critic would expose. The other is 
marked by reduction of discourse to only “the facts,” and to a narrow concep-
tion of them at that – economic self-interest. But they actually share a most 
disturbing feature. They stymie continued deliberation. If “the truth” really 
is secret and known only to a privileged few, then deliberation is pointless. 
If “the truth” reduces to facts that are not disputable, then deliberation is 
unnecessary. And if, as I’ve claimed above, deliberation is constitutive of de-
mocracy, then discouraging deliberation is indeed subversive of democracy.
What is worse, these positions are not easily refuted. Can one prove 
conclusively that the President is not a Muslim or that he was not born in 
Kenya? The documents on which one would rely would be dismissed by the 
would-be critic as forgeries or corrupted by misinterpretation. The reaction 
is the same as that to conspiracy rhetoric:13 if a suspect denies that he or she is 
in on the plot, isn’t that exactly what you would expect a devious conspirator 
13 An excellent review of the literature on conspiracy arguments is Pfau (2005), chap. 1.
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takes ideology all the way “to the end of the line,” certainly not the work 
of Mc Kerrow. But I confess that I occasionally read essays in our journals 
that make me wonder if this is the direction in which we are heading, and 
that lead me to issue a pre-emptive warning against following that path. We 
need to find and produce criticism of rhetorical moments when ideology is 
present and yet not deterministic, in which creative invention blunts, sets 
aside, limits, or challenges its influence. Periods of ideological turbulence 
and change offer especially rich resources for such studies.
Another potential challenge to academic rhetorical criticism is that, 
despite what I said before that “critical” does not mean “hostile,” there may 
be a tendency for critics to “go negative.” It’s my sense, and I could be wrong, 
that we write more often in condemnation of our subjects than in praise. 
In part, there is a natural asymmetry here. The sublime does not require 
detailed analysis. In fact, to explain its success is to detract from its artistry: 
great art conceals art. Rhetorical masterpieces are to be appreciated for what 
they are. It is perhaps not surprising, then, that there are relatively few criti-
cal works, for example, that examine the speeches ranked near the top of the 
rhetorical scholars’ “top 100” list.17 On the other hand, weaker performances 
may cry out for critical attention – to explain where they went wrong and 
to propose how they might have gone better, or at least what other, more 
promising alternatives might have been available.
Even beyond this basic asymmetry, however, I suspect that there may 
be a critical preference for the negative. It may reflect the tendency of many 
scholars to be skeptical generally. Or it may reflect a tendency not to write 
approvingly of rhetorical efforts if one disagrees with the conclusions they 
advance. The furor caused almost 40 years ago by Forbes Hill’s sympathetic 
reading of Richard Nixon’s “Vietnamization” speech is still with us.18 I find 
it noteworthy that, while there are guarded readings of President George 
W. Bush’s address to Congress after the tragedy of September 11,19 there is 
hardly any sympathetic reading of any of his other speeches, including his 
17 In 1999, a panel of over 130 rhetorical scholars was asked to identify the top 100 
speeches delivered in the United States during the twentieth century. The list and copies of 
the top 100 texts can be found in Lucas and Medhurst (2009).
18 Hill (1972a). For alternative viewpoints, see Newman (1970); Campbell (1972); Hill 
(1972b).
19 For example, Murphy (2003); Zarefsky (2004).
completely deterministic, explaining the outcome of rhetorical acts without 
remainder. If it is all power, all the way down, then as a practical matter there 
is no need to undertake the criticism, because we already know the answer 
before we ask the question. If everything can be explained by patriarchy, or 
exploitation of labor, or white privilege, or any other ideology to which one 
might subscribe, then rhetoric itself is rendered inert. And from the view-
point of the rhetors we study, if our criticism were convincing and they came 
to understand that rhetoric was inert, then there would be no reason for 
them to engage in deliberation. Deliberation is a sham, on this view; the real 
game is amassing or overturning power, and – with apologies to Clausewitz 
– rhetoric becomes the continuation of warfare by other means.
Furthermore, ideological criticism, when “taken to the end of the 
line” in the manner I am imagining, is also self-sealing. A critic who disputes 
the force of ideology easily could be accused of displaying “false conscious-
ness,” having been seduced by the hegemony of that ideological force. Not 
realizing the determinism of ideology, he or she would posit the existence 
of rhetorical agency, thereby revealing only that he or she didn’t “get it” 
and causing the challenging criticism to be dismissed rather than taken seri-
ously. This result is even more likely to come about if the discourse being 
examined is itself ideologically driven, situated in a controversy in which the 
participants appear to have completely different world-views and the dispute 
among them is marked by “deep disagreement.”15 
The problem with this approach is that it is at odds with what we 
know about rhetoric itself: that it is grounded in specific situations and that 
it arises in moments that are uncertain and contingent. Robert Ivie put it 
this way in an e-mail exchange he and I had on this topic: “Our field seems 
inclined to locate rhetoric under the sign of ideology, which sacrifices rheto-
ric’s potential for addressing pragmatically the problem of perceived incom-
mensurability. Rhetoric doesn’t require us to solve these divisions completely 
or universally. It is situational and adaptive.”16 I would add that we sell our 
own subject short when we pretend otherwise.
I suspect that I have constructed a caricature of ideological criti-
cism; I hope so. There is no particular example I can cite of criticism that 
15 I discuss the problem of “deep disagreement” and some possible rhetorical moves to 
overcome it in Zarefsky (2012). The term “deep disagreement” comes from Fogelin (1985).
16 Robert L. Ivie, e-mail message to the author, March 16, 2012.
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than I know about, but I suspect there is relatively little of it and certainly 
less of it than is needed to direct the field’s considerable intellectual capital 
toward constructively addressing the challenges of the present era.”21
Situations perceived as deadlocked, after all, are tailor-made for rhe-
torical intervention – for imagining things in a different way, for shifting the 
frame of reference, for introducing a new term or a new hierarchy of terms 
or a new definition of a term, for all the ways in which rhetors and audiences 
might take a new look at an old problem. To the degree that such conversa-
tions take place, they are usually proprietary, between political leaders and 
their advisers, and they are dismissed by others as nothing more than “spin.” 
But democratic deliberation would be enhanced if the conversation were 
broadened, if rhetorical critics took up topics like these: How can we over-
come the frustrating impasse about the size and role of government that is at 
the heart of the “fiscal crisis” in the United States and, I suspect, in the Eu-
ropean Union as well? How can we reconcile the seeming deep disagreement 
between faith in the government and faith in the market? How do we decide 
what values are universal and exportable and which are culture-specific and 
not the business of ‘outsiders,’ and how do we regard a value such as “democ-
racy” that belongs to some degree in both categories? In a time of increased 
religiosity around the world and the rise of fundamentalism in all religions, 
how can we respect religious differences while also respecting religious belief 
and practice? How can those who believe that prophecy has ceased engage 
in productive dialogue with those who claim to have received the word of 
God? How can we reconcile a commitment to equal opportunity with the 
realities of unequal achievement? And how can we reconcile a commitment 
to free and unfettered expression with the recognition that speech has con-
sequences?
Hard questions, these. They pose seemingly sharp dichotomies. But if 
that is the final answer, they cannot be resolved by democratic deliberation. 
They will be subject to the whims of shifting majorities or through deference 
to authority or appeal to force. Democracy will wither as citizens withdraw 
from the public sphere in the belief that democratic deliberation is futile 
and that the outcome will not matter to them anyway. If, on the other hand, 
rhetorical critics can take up these questions and begin to offer constructive 
alternatives, the benefits are huge. We can revitalize the study of invention 
21 Ivie, e-mail message to the author, March 16, 2012.
Second Inaugural Address, which – like it or not – is a masterful presenta-
tion of the theories of democracy promotion and American exceptionalism, 
on which his presidency was based. Likewise, there are few if any attempts to 
read sympathetically the discourse of the Tea Party in defense of limited gov-
ernment that has echoes of Thomas Jefferson, or the social-policy discourse 
of conservatives who oppose abortion consistently without exceptions. I do 
not agree with any of these positions, but the fact is that they are legitimate 
rhetorical stances, rich in topoi with deep historical resonance. For that mat-
ter, with the exception of one or two specific speeches he gave before becom-
ing president, there have been few sympathetic readings of the speeches of 
Barack Obama.
Now, a preference for condemnation over appreciation might have 
no serious consequences if we did not imagine academic rhetorical criti-
cism having any impact beyond illustrating the act of criticism itself. But we 
usually imagine that criticism can make a difference in shaping the course 
of public deliberation. Critical discourse that is long on blame and short 
on praise will offer little guidance about how to advance discussion of im-
portant public issues, other than a steady stream of admonitions to “avoid 
this.” Moreover, it will induce cynicism about the critics, or about the act of 
criticism itself, that will harm the prospects for its use in deliberation. The 
cynicism will be justified, especially if critics hold the rhetorical performance 
up to the standards of an impossible ideal, as is done in some of the “delib-
erative democracy” literature. As Hauser points out, if everyday debates are 
measured by the standards of ideal speech, negative evaluation will be guar-
anteed.20 This too is essentially a non-rhetorical evaluation because it does 
not reflect the grounding of rhetoric in specific situations.
Perhaps even more than sympathetic criticism, there is a need for 
constructive criticism, that is, rhetorical criticism that not only identifies 
our predicaments but also proposes ways to work through them. The needs 
for such “work around” proposals can be seen acutely in the United States, 
which now has experienced 20 years of persistent political gridlock and 
stalemated discourse, but it probably characterizes much of the world facing 
seemingly intractable problems without deep reservoirs of political sensitiv-
ity or good will. Ivie expressed this concern to me when he wrote, “There 
probably is more of this kind of constructive rhetorical scholarship going on 
20 This is one of the themes of Hauser (1999). It is referred to in Klujeff (2012), p. 101.
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by rhetoricizing the situational context and then deriving possibilities from 
our own creativity and our understanding of rhetorical traditions. We can 
give more credibility to our critical judgments by suggesting alternatives to 
those we criticize, rather than merely offering critiques. We can give potency 
to what Robert Asen has called “a discourse theory of citizenship” (2004) by 
explaining and showing how it works, how the process of public deliberation 
is the enactment of citizenship. And we thereby can make rhetorical criti-
cism an instrument of democracy rather than a possible threat to it.
The four potential threats to democracy I’ve discussed – two from 
everyday rhetorical criticism and two from academic rhetorical criticism – 
have in common that they deny the richness of rhetoric itself, especially its 
grounding in specific situations and its inventional possibilities. Revitaliza-
tion of democracy springs from a healthy respect for and use of these very 
features of rhetoric. This is only one of many ways in which we might orient 
our intellectual resources. We will need to respond to cynics who may accuse 
us of being overly optimistic or naïve, but the potential rewards of this ef-
fort are vast. Perhaps most of all, we will take the idea of “rhetorical citizen-
ship” seriously and we will strengthen democratic deliberation as the way to 
achieve it. Surely that is a worthy task.
References
Asen, R. (2004). A Discourse Theory of Citizenship. Quarterly Journal of Speech 90, 189-
211.
Bormann, E.G. (1972). Fantasy and Rhetorical Vision: The Rhetorical Criticism of Social 
Reality. Quarterly Journal of Speech 58, 396-407. 
Bourdieu, P. (1979). Outline of a Theory of Practice. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Burke, K. (1959) [1937]. Attitudes toward History, 2d. rev. ed. Boston: Beacon Press. 
Burke, K. (1969) [1950]. A Rhetoric of Motives. Berkeley and Los Angeles: University of 
California Press.
Campbell, K.K. (1972). Conventional Wisdom – Traditional Form’: A Rejoinder. Quarterly 
Journal of Speech 58, 451-454; 
Edelman, M. (1964). The Symbolic Uses of Politics. Urbana: University of Illinois Press.
Fogelin, R.J. (1985). The Logic of Deep Disagreements. Informal Logic 7, 1-8. 
Fogelin, R.J. and W. Sinnott-Armstrong (1997). Understanding Arguments: An Introduction 
to Informal Logic. 5th ed. New York: Harcourt Brace. 
Frank, T. (2004). What’s the Matter with Kansas? How Conservatives Won the Heart of 
America. New York: Henry Holt. 
i s  rhetorical criticism subversive of democracy?david zarefsky
[  50 ] [  51 ]
On Rhetorical Ethos and Personal Deeds: 
A 2011 Spanish Public Controversy1
PAU L A O L M O S
The two sides of ēthos theory
Within the conceptual framework of Rhetorical Citizenship, the notion of 
the individual citizen’s identity and its enactment through rhetorical partici-
pation becomes a crucial concern. Any rhetorical act both takes advantage of 
and helps to construe the orator’s identity as a public image, for public pur-
poses. In other words, her disclosed and received character or public ēthos 
is both a substantial ingredient and one of the most conspicuous outcomes 
of her involvement in civic interaction. That is why rhetorical attention to 
ēthos theory and ēthos-centered criticism of argumentative discourse are an 
inescapable feature in any study of rhetorical agency. 
According to Aristotle’s Rhetoric (1356a9-10), ēthos, the orator’s 
character – a basic source of persuasion, together with logos and pathos 
– should be understood by means of the orator’s own discourse (dia tou 
logou) and not through any previous information and opinions we may 
have about her acts and person (alla mē dia to prodedoxasthai, i.e., “but not 
through what was previously known/opined”). In this Aristotelian cau-
tion, we may see the origins of a long and complex rhetorical tradition, 
a conception of ēthos as “the self-image that a speaker, either willingly or 
unwillingly, construes through her own discourse” (Bokobza Kahan 2009, 
p. 2; cf. Amossy 1999, 2006 [2000], 2009), as something distinguishable 
from her biographical self. Contemporary rhetoricians and discourse ana-
lysts seek to study the relationships between such a discursive ēthos and: i) 
the speaker’s discourse as such, ii) the speaker’s biographical and social self 
1 Supported by Research Project FFI2011-23125, funded by the Spanish Ministry of 
Economy and Competitiveness. 
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and iii) the social and institutional context of her discursive practice; in 
what constitutes a “complex conception of ēthos.”2 
According to R. Amossy (1999), the analyst’s aim is not at all to ex-
clusively identify the speaker’s ēthos with either of the two extremes: her 
biographical self or her pure discursive image, but rather to articulate an in-
tegrated approach to the concept of ēthos as a constellation of relationships 
including both textual and extra-textual elements. Amossy also alludes to the 
possible differences between what the speaker projects and what the audi-
ence receives, which is ultimately beyond her control. Literary studies have 
particularly focused on the exploration of various “ethotic games” which 
might be described and analyzed through the use of a collection of opposable 
notions, such as “author/author’s image,” “responsible/responding author,” 
‘actor-author/auctor-author.’3 
But going back to Aristotle’s Rhetoric and regarding, then, the “orator’s 
character” as an “available means of persuasion” (1355b25-26) and not just 
a literary proposal, Aristotle’s caution that we should focus on the explicitly 
discursive ēthos (ēthos dia tou logou) does not seem to be entirely justified; 
least of all if we are thinking about a civic context and an audience that is to 
decide on political matters (the paradigmatic referent of ancient rhetoric). 
Why should we renounce the information we already have about the orator 
in our reception of her discourse? Is this at all operative or commendable in 
such contexts?
In spite of the contemporary rhetorical and literary resonance of Ar-
istotle’s caution for a modern informed reader, the philosopher was in fact 
responding in an innovative way to certain aspects of 4th c. BCE Greek rhe-
torical theory. The allegedly more conventional Rhetoric to Alexander, at-
tributed to Anaximenes of Lampsacus, and what we know about Isocrates’ 
rhetorical teachings reveal to us the crucial importance placed by these two 
authors and their schools on the opposition between an interlocutor’s dis-
2 A complex conception of ēthos would try to include and account for a whole array of 
notions, ranging from the speaker’s own real traits and characteristics, her widely and 
publicly known traits, her visible traits, to their translation into her verbal and discursive 
traits (as “sujet de l’énonciation”) and even explicit ethotic self-references (as “sujet de 
l’énoncé”).
3 Cf. Mainguenau (2009), who talks about a complex “ontology of authorship” which we 
could reconstruct as an “ontology of ēthos.”
course and her previously known character. The contrast between these two 
aspects is a conspicuous part of the argumentative techniques studied and 
recommended by the Rhetoric to Alexander (RA). Several “types of proof” or 
means of persuasion defined and proposed in this text are based on the rhe-
torical exploitation of possible pragmatic inconsistencies between a person’s 
discourse and her deeds or character. M. Kraus (2011) offers the following 
schema of the types of proof presented and studied in the RA.
The type of counter-argumentative proof known as tekmērion explicitly con-
centrates on well-, or in any case previously, known information about the 
interlocutor’s character (Noël 2011). The tekmērion exploits, thus, the no-
tion of an ēthos dia tōn ēthōn (a biographical ēthos) with a constant reference 
to the extra-discursive realm of the arguers’ real biographical characteristics. 
Moreover, Pisani (2011) explores the contrast between the RA’s enthymeme 
and tekmērion in a way that points to a conception of the former which may 
also be rather ethotic in content.
Kraus (2011) also notes another ethotic element present in the RA, 
namely the kind of external proof rather ambiguously called doxa tou lego-
ntos: i.e., the opinion “of” or “about” the speaker, according to divergent 
interpretations. Kraus’s own position is that it is more plausible to interpret 
this as the “speaker’s reputation,” rather than referring to his own opinions 
(2011, pp. 275-278). This would mean that there is something akin to Ar-
istotle’s ēthos in the RA, although precisely and explicitly pointing to a bio-
graphical ēthos that is somewhat opposed to Aristotle’s explicit caution.4
4 Kraus ultimately claims that there is still the possibility of accepting a reasonable amount 
of ambiguity in the expression, which would thus refer to the speaker’s reputation as based 
on his known opinions. This possibility would make the doxa tou legontos a type of proof, 
Internal proofs External proofs (epithetoi)
a. eikos (based on what is plausible) a. doxa tou legontos
b. paradeigma (example) b. witnesses
c. tekmērion (indication of a pragmatic inconsistency) c. torture
d. enthymema (indication of a contradiction) d. oaths
e. gnomē (maxim)
f. sēmeion (sign)
g. elenchos (direct effective refutation)
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will be clearly revealed in the case we are going to present and analyze). 
Additionally, it recommends a stance that is intellectually problematic in 
epistemic terms, suggesting a temporary cancellation of information we may 
have about the people involved in a controversy. However, we could take 
it as a methodological suggestion, a tactical presumption that may help us 
examine certain possibilities which could be relevant from an argumentative 
and communicative point of view and which might pass unnoticed. 
To maintain an initial presumption about the exclusive internal rel-
evance of the discursive ēthos (vs. a biographical ēthos) may help us comply 
with the ethical imperative of offering the speaker a renewed opportunity 
(independent of her previous life) to put forth her arguments. It is also the 
basis of the exercise of advocacy, allowing an orator to represent other people’s 
interests, which she may or may not share. Finally, an initial focus on discur-
sive ēthos and a cautious subsequent broadening of perspective to take into ac-
count other available information may in certain cases help us examine issues 
related to the relevance and right to participate of some voices in a particular 
controversy. This is also something that the “Rico Scandal” we are about to 
examine will shed light on.
A 2011 Spanish Controversy: The Rico Scandal
During the early months of 2011, an article published in the opinion section 
of the Madrid newspaper El País by a rather well-known university professor 
and specialist in Spanish literature, Francisco Rico, gave rise to a prolonged 
scandal in which very different people took part quite passionately. A critical 
analysis and rhetorical assessment of this interesting case – involving a public-
ly conducted and extended exchange of opinions on an issue of public policy 
by people not directly engaged in politics – may help us see the workings, the 
perils and the role of discursive ēthos in the context of rhetorical interaction 
and conscious representation of both receptive and participatory citizenship.
The original article by Rico criticized the new smoking bans enacted 
by the government and offered a number of arguments against the prospec-
tive policy. However, it contained a very controversial claim that aroused the 
anger of many readers. Let us take a look at the overall chronology of the 
scandal in order to get a general picture of its length, scope and actors:
Jan. 11 Article published by Francisco Rico in El País: “Teoría y realidad de la ley 
contra el fumador” (“Theory and reality of the law against smokers”).
We could try to solve the theoretical conflict between Aristotle and 
Anaximenes in a rather trivial way, by claiming that with his caution Aristo-
tle is simply giving instructions to a prospective orator. He would be talking 
about what the speaker can control, i.e. her ēthos dia tou logou, the only pos-
sible technical ēthos. Her previous life, character or actions known to the au-
dience would be atechnoi, i.e. beyond rhetorical control. We could then say 
that the RA, for its part, shows a characteristic practical bent towards con-
troversy (especially legal adversarial controversy). This would contrast with 
Aristotle’s focus on a single orator’s “persuasive discourse,” and thus, it would 
be consistent for it to emphasize the role of dialectical moves (arguments 
and counter-arguments between proponent and opponent). In neither case 
would we be reading about technical recommendations or suggestions for 
“argument assessment” by either the audience or an “external analyst,” an 
omnipresent figure today, but rather absent in Greek rhetorical theory.
I contend, nevertheless, that we can make more fruitful use of Ar-
istotle’s caution and its focus on discursive ēthos within the context of a 
contemporary approach heedful of the normative evaluation of arguments. 
We could ask ourselves how an argument analyst should proceed in the face 
of the ethotic aspects of discourse. Should she focus on the argumentative 
interchange or exploit the information she has from other sources? Is it rea-
sonable and legitimate to bring in external information? Or is it reasonable, 
on the other hand, to neglect such information and ask for a “candid” recep-
tion of the discourse?
My position is not that we should always do either one or the other. 
These are not entirely incompatible approaches and a judicious combina-
tion of the two is surely the best option, depending on the context and the 
social practice involved. However, I believe that Aristotle’s caution deserves 
additional attention. Although it should not be taken as a permanent rule 
(that would preclude exposure, in the appropriate context, of the speaker’s 
imposture), it is nevertheless a useful initial imperative of ethical value, em-
bodying a defeasible presumption about the speaker’s pragmatic consistency 
which may help us better understand her discourse. 
Aristotle’s indication seems to dictate a somewhat difficult, almost 
unnatural, attitude on the part of the audience and the analyst (and this 
a means of persuasion, rather akin to the modern and complex idea of a doubly conceived 
(intra- and extra-discursive) ēthos.
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So far, so good. However, the article included a postscriptum which we will 
for these purposes call reason R4. It did not provide an additional direct ar-
gument against the law, but sought to grant credibility and authority to the 
entire argumentation by means of an ethotic assertion about the writer (as 
“sujet de l’énoncé”): “I haven’t smoked a single cigarette in my whole life” 
(“En mi vida he fumado un solo cigarrillo”). This postscriptum was the source 
of the scandal.
Five days after publication of this piece, Milagros Pérez de Oliva, the 
paper’s ombudswoman, issued a long commentary stating that she had re-
ceived a number of complaints from the newspaper’s readers, had passed 
them on to Francisco Rico and obtained from him an initial reaction. The 
title of this commentary was quite expressive: “The smoker’s deception.” 
In her report, Pérez de Oliva mentioned several remarks about R0, many 
of them made by doctors, who could not imagine how the alleged “lack of 
rigor” could be supported. There were also complaints about the article’s 
aggressive and contemptuous tone, but mainly infuriated denunciations of 
Rico’s own compulsive smoking habits. According to these readers, he had 
simply lied.
The ombudswoman would have to hear both parties, however, before 
issuing a verdict. As she claimed that she did not fully understand Rico’s 
reaction on the phone, she chose to transcribe parts of a letter which he had 
subsequently sent to her:
The postscriptum means some things literally, and others not so literally, but these 
are obvious: that “Je est un autre” (Rimbaud), that writing isn’t autobiography, that 
“truth is true, whether it is Agamemnon or his pigman who tells it” (A. Machado). 
The postscriptum has given me the sad satisfaction of confirming my diagnosis: this 
law is a school of vileness. Most of those who are against my article are prying into 
my life and habits, spying on my friends and looking for criminal records. They 
scarcely touch my arguments. 
He also insisted on a particularly sensitive point for him, mentioning “the 
vileness [again] of certain articles in the law: especially the smoking ban on 
hospitalized, particularly dying patients.” But the ombudswoman was not 
very sympathetic to Rico’s stance, nor touched by his concerns. Her evalu-
ation was entirely negative: “lies” such as Rico’s were not admissible in the 
opinion section: 
Jan. 16 Long commentary by El País ombudswoman Milagros Pérez de Oliva: “La 
impostura del fumador” (“The smoker’s deception”), including excerpts from 
some letters to the editor and from Rico’s oral and written responses. 
Jan. 19 Additional letter by Rico published in El País: “Sobre la prohibición del tabaco” 
(“On smoking bans”).
Feb. 13 Written defense of F. Rico published in El País by writer and friend Javier 
Cercas “Rico, al paredón” (“Rico, facing the firing squad”).
Feb. 15 Satirical rejoinder against Cercas, published by Arcadi Espada in rival paper El 
Mundo.
Feb. 20 Final “judgment” by the El País ombudswoman: “En defensa de Cercas y de la 
verdad” (“In defense of Cercas and truth”).
Mar. 06 Syntactic note and clarification by writer and El País contributor Javier Marías: 
“Dos postdatas” (“Two postscripts”).
The original article by Rico, in a literary style, offered a particularly well-
written and rather structured argumentation – although, of course, defea-
sible and subject to contrary opinion – against prospective smoking bans 
that could have begun an argumentative dialogue on certain quite substan-
tive issues. We can summarize his arguments and reasons for opposing the 
government’s policy as follows:
R0 (mentioned but left unjustified by means of an explicit praeteritio, “let’s leave 
aside…”): There is lack of scientific rigor in “arguments against tobacco.”
R1: the law is a low blow against freedom, because the excessive expansion of bans 
represents a change in policy, from “space segregation” to “impediment.”
R2: There is “stolidity” in the law’s wording (he uses a difficult, bookish word and 
provides the definition: “estolidez” is “lack of reason and discourse”). Articles 
7 and 8 provide a list of places where smoking is banned which could be 
compared in its unintelligibility with the well-known classification found in 
J.L. Borges’ Chinese Encyclopedia.
R3: It also advocates a “vile” procedure, encouraging people to report violators 
(moreover, anonymous, online reporting). This kind of “vileness” (“vileza,” 
another bookish word) is explicitly associated with the social blindness of 
the legislators: “sons of an abstract morality and deprived of any human 
understanding, they despise real people and real situations.”
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sively, on his ethotic assertion. Cercas’ column – published in the same 
paper, El País, under the title “Rico, facing the firing squad” – was long and 
rather confusing. It advanced different lines of argument, not all of them 
adequately coordinated, in defense of Rico’s postscriptum. It contained first 
a rather polemic argumentum ad Hitleri directed at his critics: “Beware of 
those who demand truth at all costs: Hitler did that,” combined with a 
paradoxical kind of maxim: “emphasis on truth usually reveals a liar.” It 
subsequently engaged in a defense of “literary license” in both fiction and 
history (supported by R. Carr’s “imaginative conception of history”), only 
to assume in the end that the assertion was simply a joke, made after a 
piece of argumentation that nobody had really tried to respond to. It was a 
joke because: “Everybody knows that Rico is like a chimney.” So, the intel-
ligent thing would have been to disregard it with humor – the critics and 
the ombudswoman had proved to be “humorless people.” The postscriptum 
had no real argumentative value and the critics had not taken on the true 
arguments. Cercas thus assumed, in the long run, the irrelevance of R4, and 
incidentally of all ethotic resources, because he insisted on claiming that 
arguments are “independent” of their source. 
In my opinion, Cercas’ defense was not very brilliant, nor was it re-
ally effective. Javier Cercas is also somewhat of a public figure in Spain, 
who often writes opinion and literary columns and has his friends as well 
as his enemies in the literary world. He had probably exposed himself too 
much with his complicated and confusing defense, had revealed too many 
weak spots, and someone was prepared to take advantage of this. Two days 
after the publication of Cercas’ column, another well-known polemist and 
columnist, Arcadi Espada, tried to show in the pages of the rival paper, El 
Mundo, that he, at least, was not at all a humorless person. He played a 
rather mischievous joke on Cercas, making use of his own supposed liter-
ary precepts. In his column, Espada feigned sorrow at the (totally fictitious) 
arrest of J. Cercas at a brothel in Madrid’s Southern district of Arganzuela. 
This “unfortunate situation” was preventing him from responding, in due 
form, to Cercas’ article on Rico and about literary and rhetorical imposture:
I feel terrified and ashamed that his name has been dragged through the mud 
of brothels which are not those of Arganzuela. The story reveals that we’re just 
innocent soldiers, solely interested in the maneuvers of rhetoric, style and truth.
An article in the opinion section is not a piece of literary fiction, and less so in the 
case of a text with so many political implications. It isn’t an error or witticism. It is 
a question of truth and falsity. In the end, the question is if it is acceptable to use a 
lie to defend a true position. 
She simply assumed that Rico had only tried, unsuccessfully, to conceal his 
biographical reality in an attempt to claim a lack of personal concern and 
made it clear who could legitimately be considered to have no “conflict of 
interest” with regard to legislation on tobacco:
[it] is usually assumed that the absence of a conflict of interest may reinforce an 
argumentative stance. In this case, those who have no links to tobacco companies 
or are non-smokers are free from a conflict of interest.
Rico probably felt he had not been at all understood by either the readers 
or Pérez de Oliva, but apparently did not find much else to say on R4, so 
he gave up pursuing that point further. But he was still interested in the 
discussion and in having his main arguments stand. So, just three days later, 
he sent an additional letter to the paper entitled “On smoking bans,” in 
which he sought to justify his support for R0, the only one of “his substan-
tive arguments” that had been duly opposed by the infuriated readers. He 
was not talking about the scientific rigor of medical studies identifying the 
physical damage suffered by individual active or passive smokers. He referred 
instead to the more controversial studies about the real social effects of such 
restrictive measures as those prescribed by Spain’s forthcoming law. He cited 
academic studies (published in the British Academic Review, for example) 
in which it was claimed that smoking bans in leisure spaces had the effect 
of restricting smoking to private homes, which were less suitable places for 
such a habit, with further exposure for children, etc. Thus, he could insist on 
his cherished point about the necessity to understand real social situations 
instead of thinking about “abstract” laboratory conditions.
This might have been the end of it, because nobody tried publicly to 
continue discussing either this or any of his other arguments against smok-
ing bans with Rico. The infamous postscriptum and the angry reactions to it 
had apparently succeeded in “poisoning the well.” However, about a month 
later, Javier Cercas, a widely known writer and Rico’s pupil and friend, 
attempted to defend him from his critics, focusing again, almost exclu-
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take into account that Marías’ interpretation is not a natural one, nor even an 
absolutely correct one from the point of view of Spanish grammar. But, more 
importantly, the widespread “negative” interpretation of the postscriptum was 
not only due to the application of syntactic rules. It was of course also a ques-
tion of pragmatic relevance, in this case, of specifically argumentative relevance.
An appraisal of R4 from a rhetorical point of view
So there were ultimately three different public evaluations of Francisco Rico’s 
R4. For M. Pérez de Oliva, it was an inadmissible – false and dishonest – eth-
otic argument. Rico wanted to deceive the readers and had failed and been 
exposed. In the event he wanted to continue with the discussion, he should 
withdraw the claim and start again. But this time there was a presumption 
against the rest of his arguments, as the newly revealed ethotic information 
(that he was, indeed, a smoker) meant that he had a conflict of interest with 
regard to the issue under discussion.
For J. Cercas, it was simply a joke for the (many) people who know 
him. In any case, those who did not know him did not have to react, be-
cause it was not a substantive part of his argument and Cercas maintains 
that arguments should be understood and assessed independently of their 
author. In short, he was not trying to deceive, but only being ironic with an 
argumentatively irrelevant postscriptum. Finally, for J. Marías, it was just a 
syntactic witticism; a joke, again, but more sophisticated than simple irony, 
although also irrelevant to his argument. None of these interpretations took 
it seriously as a relevant move from a discursive or rhetorical point of view. 
Nor did they feel that it should be read in combination with the rest of his 
arguments as building a particular ēthos, selected for a concrete stance in 
relation to the issue at hand.
The first thing we have to take into account is that, in my opinion, 
Rico could never have thought that the falsehood would simply prevail (as 
Pérez de Oliva assumed time and again). Of course, not everybody knows 
him, but he is enough of a public figure and the people who know him best 
are in fact women and men of letters, writers and journalists: it was impos-
sible that it could pass unnoticed or undisclosed. So my first claim, which I 
think is more than reasonable, is that he wanted to “continue the discussion,” 
he wanted it to be pointed out to him that he is a smoker and he already had 
part of his response prepared. I cannot imagine he wanted the deception to 
stand permanently.
The tone was satirical enough and the irony was not much disguised, but 
Cercas was indignant and sued Espada for libel. His own paper, El País, con-
sidered this article “a defamation of Cercas.”
This second scandal, in which Rico took no part, led Milagros Pérez 
de Oliva to return to the issue in a rather self-reassuring piece entitled “In 
defense of Cercas and truth.” It contained a maternal rejoinder against Cer-
cas along the lines of: “look what may happen if one follows Rico’s practices 
that you so advocate…” and a complete reassertion of her initial stance: 
“Lies cannot be used in defending truth”; “Journalism has nothing to do 
with fiction.” She also rejected Cercas’ thesis that Rico’s postscriptum was 
a joke, because the larger audience did not know him personally. Pérez de 
Oliva’s final sentence again condemned Rico’s choice, claiming that Arcadi 
Espada had clearly shown that, if we leave that possibility open, there is no 
limit to what can be expected.
Things calmed down somewhat after this sober and commonsensical 
commentary and it seemed as though there was nothing more to be said 
about either Rico’s postscriptum or his other arguments, completely forgot-
ten by now, against smoking bans. However, about two weeks later, another 
well-known writer and friend of Francisco Rico (and regular contributor to 
El País), Javier Marías, decided to try a different line of defense in a shorter 
column entitled “Two postscripts.” His was just a grammatical note that at-
tempted to clarify something pointed out by Rico in his first written answer 
to Pérez de Oliva: “The postscriptum means some things literally.” Marías 
claimed again that it was a kind of joke, but not simply an ironic remark, 
because it had in fact played with the syntactic ambiguity of the sentence:
It seems it was just me, but when I read the infamous postscriptum, knowing that 
Rico is an even more compulsive smoker than myself, I didn’t take it as a lie, but as 
a syntactic witticism: “I haven’t smoked a single cigarette in my whole life” means, 
for me, literally “Never a single one; never in my whole life; always more than one.” 
Or: “It was always the same cigarette. Only one: i.e. it has been a continuum.”
This was a nice and funny final remark that at least granted Rico some literary 
merit and linguistic ingenuity. Nevertheless, although such a witticism might 
have been present in Rico’s mind during the process of selecting the wording 
of the postscriptum (or, at least, at the moment he wrote his first answer to the 
ombudswoman), I seriously doubt there was nothing more to it. We have to 
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requirement for comprehensible and univocal principles,” “the problems of 
abstract morality and symbolic policy making” and seem to be carefully se-
lected to address a “universal audience” (Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca, 
1958). These are questions about which citizens in general should, in prin-
ciple, be concerned and pose possible problems that create a presumption 
in favor of, at the very least, further examination of the case at hand. In my 
opinion, although they can of course be contested and are not conclusive 
in any sense, they at least succeed in passing the onus on to the respondent 
(Pinto 2001).
The problem is that with the large and varied audience represented 
by the readers of a national newspaper (with different degrees of personal 
knowledge about the author), this ethotic game was somewhat difficult to 
manage … unless they had all been devoted followers of Aristotle’s Rhetoric 
and its caution about discursive ēthos (not a very plausible presumption). 
Both the initial reactions on their part and Rico’s own initial response did 
not succeed in reestablishing the grounds for mutual understanding. Rico’s 
choice was ultimately not effective in rhetorical terms as it was unsuitable 
for such a large audience. He could have chosen a different way of signal-
ing the alleged “objectivity” and “universality” of his stance; for example, by 
making its independence from his personal status as a smoker explicit or by 
openly stating as an assumption that he was arguing “as a non-smoker.” He 
chose instead the rhetorical impact of an unexpected claim in an ambigu-
ously positioned postscriptum, naively trusting in the unpredictable outcome 
of a process of revelation and possible objection – in addition to (according 
to J. Marías’ interpretation) taking advantage of a certain syntactic ambigu-
ity. But things got somewhat out of hand.
Now, leaving aside Rico’s own mindset when designing his strategy, I 
also think there is another significant point to this story that is worth em-
phasizing and which is in fact related to the concept of Rhetorical Citizen-
ship (Kock and Villadsen 2012). Rico’s confidence that he could naturally 
adopt the role and ēthos of a non-smoker places him in direct opposition to 
Pérez de Oliva’s explicit account of the agents to which we could attribute 
a “conflict of interest” in this particular matter. The El País ombudswoman 
claimed that both “tobacco companies” and “smokers” were in such a dubi-
ous position, as opposed to “non-smokers unrelated to the tobacco busi-
ness.” But Rico’s stance against the smoking bans had, according to his own 
projected ēthos, nothing to do with defending interests like those of the 
But with this starting point in mind, we may still allow for a rather 
cynical interpretation of his move, as a dialectical trap. According to this 
possibility, he would have foreseen his critics attacking his position as a “con-
taminated” arguer and not taking on his more substantive points. This would 
have granted him the opportunity to crush them with the “sad satisfaction” 
mentioned in his first letter, his recourse to the “vileness” spread by the spirit 
of the law (thus reinforcing one of his “substantive” reasons), etc. A certain 
superior tone in Rico’s language and attitude may support this idea, which 
would make his postscriptum a kind of red herring argument that, in the end, 
would block further discussion by humiliating the opponent. I think, how-
ever, that this was only a possibility which emerged later, when Rico realized 
that the initial reactions to his proposal were so negative, and it made his first 
written response neither very satisfactory nor constructive. Nevertheless, the 
fact that he sent the second letter about what we have called R0 would seem 
to indicate that he was still interested in discussing his stance and that the 
point about “the scientific rigor of studies on smoking bans” was not a com-
pletely independent line of argument, but instead was rather coherent with 
his main position against “abstract or symbolic legislation.”
To maintain, instead, that the red herring outcome was Rico’s idea 
from the beginning presupposes his complete lack of confidence in his other 
arguments, yet he certainly took pains to present them carefully, in an or-
derly manner and with carefully chosen vocabulary and wording. A method-
ological “principle of charity” encourages us to seek a more sympathetic ac-
count of at least his initial intentions. We might thus assume the postscriptum 
can be viewed as a “sincere” ethotic argument – one that could even have 
been presented face to face with a cigarette in hand, in which case, I presume 
it might have been more successful – not precisely referring to Rico’s bio-
graphical ēthos, but rather to a discursive ēthos assumed and construed on a 
specific occasion, for a particular discussion. In such a case, it would simply 
mean that the entire argumentation was presented as defended by, and thus 
as defensible by, a non-smoker (it would have been an undisguised, overt “Je 
est un autre”). 
Under this interpretation, instead of counting on avoiding exposure, 
Rico would have (probably too naively) counted on the stark evidence of 
the irony (as J. Cercas suggested), not, however, to make a joke, but to bring 
to our attention the allegedly “universal” character of his arguments. R1 to 
R3 in fact focus on issues like “a suitable balance of freedoms,” “the legal 
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case a satirical, although rather extreme and somewhat defamatory, response 
to the latter.
Absolutely True Postscriptum
I (Paula Olmos’ biographical ēthos speaking) have never been a smoker. 
Additionally, I do not think that Francisco Rico’s argumentation against 
smoking bans was especially conclusive, strong or truly difficult to op-
pose. Regardless of this, I do believe it was a more interesting and qualified 
argumentative piece than the subsequent controversy assumed. Rhetorical 
theory has helped us to suggest alternative interpretations that link Rico’s 
move to a tradition of adopting a somewhat detached and civil ēthos in a 
deliberation about a public policy, a tradition that is an essential part of 
rhetorical agency and citizenship.
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The Hunt for Promises in Danish
Political Debate
C H A R L O T T E J Ø R G E N S E N
Introduction
In recent years promises have played an increasing role in Danish political de-
bate, a development that has culminated in the so-called “breach of promises 
debate.”1 The corresponding Danish word “løftebrudsdebatten” was coined in 
the wake of the general election in September 2011 to characterize the politi-
cal debate after the Thorning-Schmidt government took over. This theme has 
persisted as the dominant frame throughout this government’s reign.
In my view the intensified focus on promises has deteriorated into a 
“hunt for promises” that has gotten out of hand. The purpose of this paper is 
neither to defend the government nor to discuss how many election promises 
the two “red” political parties – S (the Social Democrats) and SF (the Social-
ist People’s Party) – have fulfilled or walked away from. My concern is with a 
general tendency that works against the deliberative ideal of informed public 
debate and does not promote rhetorical citizenship. In what follows I discuss 
why indiscriminate accusations about broken promises are a problem.
Since the breach of promises debate is a culmination of a general de-
velopment, the background leading up to this debate is outlined in section 2. 
Section 3 evidences how it exploded. In section 4, I argue that the debate re-
veals confusion between policy statements and actual election promises in the 
proper sense of “promises” as described in speech act theory. Finally, the impli-
cations for rhetorical citizenship and political debate are discussed in section 5. 
1 This development is not peculiar to Danish affairs. The debate focus on promises and 
breaches appears to be an international trend. For instance, the political commentator 
Nielsen (2013) refers to similar debates as “political wars about breach of promises” in a 
number of European democracies. 
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The background
Election promises and accusations of breaking them play natural roles as topoi 
of political argumentation before and after an election. The issuing of prom-
ises that a political party commits itself to, if elected, obviously has a positive 
function for the electorate, helping citizens decide how to vote. Especially 
promises not to take certain actions if elected may provide relevant informa-
tion in the election process. If a politician afterwards acts in a way that is con-
trary to the promise, the citizens who voted for him or her have reason to feel 
deceived. Such cases are relatively frequent. Some attract little public attention 
and are soon forgotten. Others create public outrage, fed by massive media 
coverage, and persist for a long time in public memory. A notorious example is 
Danish Prime Minister Jens Otto Krag. In 1966 he formed his Social Demo-
cratic government with SF as its supporting party, the so-called “Red Cabi-
net,” although he had declared that he would never do so. His remark: “You 
hold a position until you take another”2 has become a formula for the topos 
of broken election promises, often referred to by Danes in similar situations.3
The most significant event that prepared the ground for the breach of 
promises debate is what has become known as “the case of the early retire-
ment allowance” (“efterlønssagen”) from 1998. About eight months after the 
general election in that year, Prime Minister Poul Nyrup Rasmussen struck 
a political compromise with the opposition to implement cuts in the early 
retirement allowance. Since during the election campaign he had made it a 
top issue to preserve the program, this caused a media storm. 
This case has hampered the Social Democrats severely in the long run, 
drawing heavily on the party’s “ethos account” (McCroskey 1997, p. 95). It 
has attained status as a textbook example of broken election promises that 
political opponents and commentators return to time and again when, for 
instance, opinion polls look bad for the Social Democrats. 
To prevent something similar from happening to himself, Nyrup Ras-
mussen’s successor, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, introduced the so-called “con-
tract politics” at the 2001 election. The expression was used to refer to a 
list of governmental policies that he promised to uphold unconditionally 
until the next election. The mantra went: what we say before the election is 
2 “Man har et standpunkt til man tager et nyt.”
3 The topos is used both negatively and positively. It is often quoted in order to expose the 
absurdity of the idea that politicians should not be allowed to get wiser and change their minds.
also what we do after the election! Thus, contract politics was launched as a 
strategy to meet the general distrust of politicians that Nyrup Rasmussen’s 
broken promise had stirred up in the electorate. 
On the face of it, contract politics seems a sound principle – pure 
common sense, a voter might think. Upon reflection, however, it poses vari-
ous problems. As it later turned out, it restricted the government’s room for 
maneuvering as the financial crisis developed, and Fogh Rasmussen’s suc-
cessor Lars Løkke Rasmussen eventually took steps to depart from it. With 
respect to the democratic ideal of deliberation, the foremost problem with 
contract politics is that it renders argumentation by politicians about the 
current issues more or less superfluous: if the course of action is settled, why 
should politicians deliberate the pros and cons of the issue? This means that 
contract politics undermines rhetorical citizenship because it demotivates 
citizens from engaging in the issues that arise in the contingent realm of 
politics. Instead, it invites citizens to sit on their hands between elections, 
reducing them to voters who reward or punish politicians for having imple-
mented or walked away from what they once promised.
The attention to promises has been heightened by the fact that the op-
position parties tended to adopt the idea of contract politics that had worked 
successfully for the Fogh Rasmussen government. Thus, although the era of 
contract politics is over, it seems probable that Danes after a decade of this 
kind of politics have become accustomed to it and, in turn, more prone to 
expect and demand promises from politicians. Either way, much attention 
was devoted to promises in the election campaign of 2011. On the one hand, 
politicians across the spectrum spent much energy on blaming each other on 
this account and, on the other, they were constantly confronted in the media 
by journalists repeatedly asking whether they could promise this or that.
The debate frame is launched
We now turn to the breach of promises debate itself. It exploded almost 
from day one after the S-R-SF government took office.4 As R (the Danish 
4 SF left the government in the beginning of 2014 in consequence of the increasing turmoil 
in the party’s political backing caused by the discrepancy between the policy that SF stands 
for according to its members and the policy that the party leadership shouldered as their 
share of the responsibility for in government – generally referred to as the party leaders’ 
many breaches of promise.
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Social Liberal Party) had come out strengthened from the election, and the 
two “red” parties weakened, essential parts of S and SF’s collective election 
program Fair løsning 2020 (A fair solution) were taken out, even negated, in 
the government program negotiated by the coalition parties after the elec-
tion and then presented to the public.
According to a study by the weekly Mandag Morgen, the word “løfte-
brud,” i.e., “breach of promise” or “broken promise,” occurred in as many 
as 1,200 newspaper articles within the first eight months of the new govern-
ment (Andersen 2012a). My own investigations indicate that the compound 
noun “løftebrudsdebat,” i.e., “breach of promises debate,” is a new word in 
the Danish vocabulary that was triggered by the opening debate in the Danish 
parliament on October 6, 2011, shortly after the election. Promises given and 
broken were the main theme in this 15-hour opening debate, turning it into 
an extremely hostile confrontation and a conspicuous display of futile and 
repetitive argumentation (transcript in Folketingstidende, October 6, 2011). 
According to my searches on Google and the database Infomedia, the word 
“løftebrudsdebat” (“breach of promises debate”) yields only one result before 
that date. This hapax legomenon had occurred in an online editorial from Feb-
ruary 2010 predicting that no parties would risk being caught up in “a breach 
of promises debate of the sort that hit” Poul Nyrup Rasmussen.5 Used here 
as an indefinite noun I consider it a nonce word created momentarily by 
the author for the specific instance. The next result occurs in Berlingske’s on-
line edition on October 6, 2011, this time used by the political commentator 
Thomas Larsen in reference to the opening debate while it was still taking 
place in the Danish Parliament. From that day on the word “løftebrudsdebat” 
abounded in the media for months to come.6 The fact that it is often used in 
the definite form shows that the word has now become conventionalized with 
direct reference to the unremitting debate succeeding the election – primarily 
as a frame directed against the Thorning-Schmidt government. 
5 180grader.dk, 24.02.2010: “… Efter valget vil ingen af partierne turde ende som 
centrum i en løftebrudsdebat af samme slags, som ramte tidligere statsminister Poul Nyrup 
Rasmussen, og derfor…”
6 Thomas Larsen’s active part in this development is evidenced by the information in 
Mandag Morgen that over the period of eight months he wrote 34 political analyses – 
“almost once a week” – about the case that he has called “the century’s breach of promise” 
(Andersen 2012b). 
Is an election promise a promise?
What strikes me as a major problem with the breach of promises debate is 
that politicians and commentators as well as members of the electorate seem 
to extend the meaning of an “election promise” beyond a “promise” in the 
proper sense as described in speech act theory (Austin 1975, Searle 1969). 
This problem raises the questions: Are election promises proper promises? 
Do they count as true promises? In other words: Do the same speech act 
rules for performing a promise apply to election promises? Or does the elec-
tion context make them a special case of promising? In that case we must 
evaluate them by different rules than we do proper promises. These ques-
tions relate primarily to the essential felicity conditions, i.e., the obligation 
to undertake the responsibility for fulfilling the promise and perform the 
promised act. The questions are of special relevance for evaluating argumen-
tation in the breach of promises debate. Moreover, I suggest that a major 
problem with the breach of promises debate stems from the contamination 
of election promises in the proper sense and the word used in a broader 
sense. The following examples serve to explicate my points. 
The first example illustrates a clear-cut election promise counting as 
a proper promise in accordance with speech act theory. In her election cam-
paign 2005 to become Lord Mayor of Copenhagen, the Social Democrat 
Ritt Bjerregaard issued a promise to provide housing that ordinary people 
could afford under the slogan: “Five thousand flats for five thousand crowns 
in five years.” As I have argued elsewhere (Jørgensen 2011, 2012), she did 
indeed make a promise, explicitly saying that she had promised to build the 
“cheap flats,” and that she had committed herself to doing so. Yet, two years 
later when it became more and more obvious that her plan would fail, she 
denied the promise in a newspaper interview (Weiss 2007). She now claimed 
that she had “merely stated what [she] intended to work towards” (Jørgensen 
2011, p. 910).
The second example, a paraphrase of a passage from the opening de-
bate in the Danish parliament mentioned above, illustrates the massive ac-
cusations in the breach of promises debate. The leader of the Conservatives, 
Lars Barfoed, describes what he sees as the enormous political turnaround 
of S and SF as “voter deception” (vælgerbedrag). While underscoring that 
he – a Conservative – of course appreciates these policy changes, he attacks 
the government on this account: it makes a politician untrustworthy to run 
away from a policy presented in the election campaign once the election 
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is won. Claiming that there are lots of similar examples, he points to one 
of “the 12 SF promises.” It allegedly promised less money to millionaires 
and more to those with low incomes, but now SF wants lower taxes for all, 
including millionaires! (Folketingstidende October 6, 2011, 84, 8.09 p.m.)
Also, this example illustrates the duplicity of an arguer who, on be-
half of others, accuses an opponent of breaking a promise to do something 
he himself agrees with. The main point here, however, concerns the 12 SF 
promises Barfoed refers to. You cannot accuse someone of breaking a prom-
ise unless that person has made a promise. This self-evident condition was 
met in the former case of the cheap flats. Now, had SF actually issued a 
promise? The question in this second case is tricky.
The alleged promises were presented in SF’s election pamphlet Friske 
øjne på Danmark (2011). The front page announces 12 concrete goals to 
achieve a stronger Denmark and to measure the party by. Next follows a list 
of these goals, arranged in threes under four headings. Goal no. 3 under the 
heading New Growth says: “Less to millionaires, more to pensioners and 
wage earners.” However, on the last page these goals are suddenly called elec-
tion promises. In other words, the pamphlet uses the word in a weak sense as 
interchangeable with goals or policy statements in election programs. An “elec-
tion promise” now refers to a future act that the politician promises to work 
for – a significant shift from the obligation undertaken in a proper promise, 
where the speaker is committed to do the future act, not just work for it.
This notion of an election promise as something different from a 
regular promise is adapted and explicated in an editorial in the newspaper 
Politiken (August 11, 2011) after party leader Villy Søvndal’s presentation of 
SF’s election program. The 12 items are called election promises (valgløfter) 
one moment and the next moment goals or policy aims (målsætninger). The 
expression “promises that [SF] wishes to be measured by” is first criticized 
because it conjures up bad memories of the failed and now abandoned no-
tion of contract politics. However, the editor adds, Søvndal has wisely dis-
tanced himself from this interpretation: he has made a crucial distinction, 
saying that they are “promises which he cannot guarantee, but shall work 
for.”7 In that case the obvious reply would be: Why then call it a promise? A 
promise that you cannot guarantee is not much of a promise.
Note that Ritt Bjerregaard defended herself with the very same dis-
7 “Der er tale om løfter, som han ikke vil garantere, men som han vil arbejde for.”
tinction when she denied her promise. Only, she did it in retrospect. As the 
journalist at that time remarked in the interview, one has to be in politics for 
a lifetime to apprehend this subtlety. 
One is tempted to suspect that politicians parade goals as promises, 
reckoning that citizens will see them as binding commitments, while not 
doing so themselves. Using election promise in this weak sense may thus serve 
as a wild card to capture votes. Whether politicians do this manipulatively 
or unwittingly, they should consider the loss of credibility they risk when 
their more or less obtainable goals, masked as promises, are not – or cannot 
be – realized.
Back to Barfoed's accusation: Is it fair argumentation to say that SF 
has broken a promise on the criterion that the accusation presupposes that 
a promise has actually been made? My answer is: No. Barfoed’s accusation 
cannot be sustained on this account. As long as he censures the disparity 
between, on the one hand, the policy that SF put forward in the election 
campaign and the policy they usually stand for and, on the other, the policy 
they are now willing to implement, so far so good. But when he frames it 
as a broken promise, his argumentation becomes a violation of the standard 
of fairness as defined by Onsberg and Jørgensen (2008, see Jørgensen 2007, 
pp. 170-173).
Admittedly, the leaders of SF have themselves been partly to blame 
since they did use the word “promise” in their election program; had they 
stuck to “goals” they could legitimately be censured for having held up un-
feasible policy prospects in the election campaign, but they would not have 
laid themselves bare to the accusation of breaking a promise.
However, to maintain, as Barfoed does, that SF issued promises in 
the proper sense in the pamphlet is based on a skewed reading: it takes the 
word out of context and neglects the fact that SF obviously used it in the 
weak sense, as supported by the editorial. Speaking as if SF unequivocally 
issued promises and did not talk of goals, Barfoed clearly presents a false 
picture of SF’s speech act in the pamphlet. Although SF may be accused 
of making a blunder, or even of manipulative language, in using the word 
promise, Barfoed is still to be criticized for contributing to the general slip-
page of terms referring to political speech acts in debate. I thus see the ac-
cusation as an example of unfair argumentation, more specifically as a case 
of distortion by oversimplification (Jørgensen 2007, p. 171). Furthermore, I 
consider it as rather seriously unfair on the following grounds. To accuse a 
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able for promises they have clearly made, or that they should not be exposed 
and censured severely when breaking them. Rather, it is the inflation in 
“promising” and, in particular, the escalation of the topos of broken election 
promises that I have argued against – the ever more widespread assumption 
that promises are what matters most in politics. 
An idealistic, probably utopian, hope is that the breach of promises 
debate has exhausted itself so that the hunt for promises will not turn out to 
be an enduring condition in future political debate. Looking back at the era 
of contract politics and at the last couple of years of the breach of promises 
debate, a political journalist on national TV news predicted that the focus on 
promises will be absent in the next election campaign and that the ensuing 
debate will be “completely different” from the breach of promises debate 
that has “raged” since the 2011 election (Ringberg 2013). 
The prospects for a positive development, however, seem bleak. Politi-
cians may well have learned a lesson, be less inclined to make promises, take 
pains to specify that a party’s goals are not promises, and guard themselves 
against later attacks for running away from them. But apart from that, one 
should preserve a right to skepticism. Although the intensity of the breach 
of promises debate has dropped somewhat over the years since the election, 
it remains the dominant topos in contemporary Danish political debate, con-
stantly popping up across the field. A curious example to illustrate the wide 
range of the topos is a newspaper advertisement inserted by the new Neo-
liberalist party Liberal Alliance, attacking former Prime Minister Lars Løkke 
Rasmussen, leader of the right wing party Venstre, as a Social Democrat in 
disguise. The upper half of the ad is a close-up photo of his face with the 
headline above: Løftebryder!, i.e., Promise breaker! The main argument is that 
Løkke Rasmussen in the election campaign said that it “must not cost more 
to be a Dane,”8 but now he has struck a compromise on energy with the 
Government that will cost Danes more and make it harder for businesses 
to compete (Liberal Alliance 2012). In view of the ubiquity and frequency 
of the topos, I suspect that the breach of promises debate will not die out in 
the near future. My guesses for the next election campaign is that politicians 
will continue to holler løftebryder (promise breaker) at each other, that the 
media will continue their hunt for promises, that interviewers will keep ask-
ing if the politicians can promise or guarantee this or that, and that after the 
8 “Det må ikke blive dyrere at være dansker.”
person of breaking a promise is a strong attack on that person’s ethos. This 
increases the burden of proof on the accuser. Performing this speech act 
legitimately requires that the accuser has solid grounds for making it and is 
able to produce convincing evidence that the politician did in fact issue a 
proper promise. The Ritt Bjerregaard case serves as an example of such an 
election promise. 
By contrast, if we accept that an election promise is merely a goal that 
the politician will “work for,” the implication is that the essential condition 
for the speech act of promising does not apply. In turn, we cannot talk of a 
broken promise. The accusation of breaking election promises now becomes 
just another of the hollow strategic maneuvers that politicians perform to at-
tack each other. In the broader context of public debate, the indiscriminate 
outcry of “broken promise” becomes feed for the media, which seek conflict 
according to the notion that the good story is a bad story. As for the elector-
ate, a “broken promise” becomes an outlet for frustrated citizens who feel let 
down by the politicians they voted for – politicians whose actions in power 
they find inconsistent with the policy their party represents.
I have taken the Barfoed example as representative of many of the 
accusations in the breach of promises debate; it illustrates some of the con-
fusions that the hunt for promises, to my mind, has created. To be fair, I 
should add that Barfoed was one of the least eristic arguers among all those 
who made breaches of promise the main theme in the opening debate, mak-
ing those accusations on loose grounds. He, after all, could provide some 
evidence that a promise had been made.
Some implications 
In conclusion, let me sum up the views put forward in this paper. The im-
plication is not that politicians should abstain from issuing promises, but 
that they should confine themselves to only those promises they intend to 
keep and are confident that they will be able to fulfill after the election. In all 
other cases, they should stick to “goals” and insist that this is what they are, 
resisting the temptation to dress them up as promises in order to get a short-
term advantage, and not give in to the constant pressure from the media or 
to demands from the electorate. Journalists, for their part, should let up on 
their efforts to nail politicians to promises that they can afterwards blame 
them for having broken. 
Nor do I mean to imply that politicians should not be held account-
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election journalists as well as voters will condemn them indiscriminately for 
breaches of promise. 
As for the alleged semantic slide from “goals” to “promises,” one 
might object that the word “promise” has always in election contexts been 
used in the weak sense, sometimes referring to “goal,” as for instance in the 
expression “manifesto promise.” True enough, the expression gyldne løfter 
(golden promises) is well on in years in Danish usage. But it has been used 
figuratively – as a dead metaphor. In the breach of promises debate, how-
ever, “promise” is used in a more literal sense where “promise” is synony-
mous with “goal” (what the politician will work for), and, at the same time, 
it carries the same commitment as a regular “promise” (what the politician 
has undertaken an obligation to do). 
My main objections to this muddle is that it empties the speech act 
of promising of its meaning – it erodes its illocutionary force, namely that 
promising is among those speech acts that place the heaviest load of com-
mitment on the speaker,9 and, in turn, that accusing someone of breaking 
a promise is a very serious charge against that person’s ethos. Both promises 
and accusations of breaking them should therefore be uttered with utmost 
caution. If done indiscriminately, political debate will deteriorate into a 
populist rhetoric that distrusts electors’ sound judgment, and into toxic 
eristic that departs from the notion of deliberative democracy where dissent 
is considered potentially valuable and politicians are supposed to respect 
their opponents’ views (see for instance Jørgensen 1998, Kock 2007, 2009).
If politicians and the media continue on the path of the breach of 
promises debate, the implications are thus negative from a normative point 
of view. In relation to a notion of rhetorical citizenship, the general tenden-
cy to use “goals” and “promises” synonymously in the contexts of elections 
and parliamentary debate poses several problems. In the first place, voters 
need party goals, especially in a democracy like the Danish, characterized 
by a fairly large number of political parties and a tradition of coalition gov-
ernments. The political debate obviously becomes absurd if parties cannot 
set up their individual goals, i.e., policy statements, without being accused 
9 Cf. Searle, who argues that the reason why we sometimes use the locution I promise 
emphatically, i.e., in utterances that do not count as promises, is that it is among “the 
strongest illocutionary force indicating devices for commitment provided by the English 
language” (1969, p. 58).
afterwards of being promise breakers every time they make a compromise. 
In this connection, the breach of promises debate is a pseudo-debate that 
sidesteps the real issue, namely how far a party in power can deviate from 
the goals and policies they stand for in the eyes of the voter, without losing 
its integrity. 
Further, as indicated in section 2, the problem in relation to rhe-
torical citizenship pointed out in connection with contract politics is trans-
ferred to the breach of promises debate, namely that the focus on promises 
reduces the deliberating citizen to a consumer-like position (Kock and Vil-
ladsen 2012, p. 3). The citizen, on this view, is nothing but a voter whose 
democratic participation is limited to election day, and who, in voting every 
few years, either rewards or punishes the politicians in power for either 
delivering or failing to deliver the desired products. More specifically, the 
semantic slide from “goals” to “promises” appeals to a passive recipient role, 
in contrast to the active and responsible listener role suggested by Kock and 
Villadsen’s discussion of rhetorical citizenship in their introduction above: 
see especially figure 1. The crucial distinction in the present context is that 
as long as we talk of “goals,” the voters share the communicative responsi-
bility with the party they vote for in the sense that they partly have them-
selves to blame if these goals are unrealistic or obviously unfeasible. Talk 
of “promises” involves citizens less in the sense that it makes the promise-
maker solely accountable for the feasibility of the propositional content of 
the promise. The risk is that this invites voters to assume an uncritical posi-
tion, allowing them to blame the politician alone, not themselves, when 
the promises afterwards are not kept, whether the reasons for this are good 
or bad. For instance, many citizens, including left-leaning voters, by all ac-
counts found S and SF’s election program Fair løsning too “rosy,” i.e., full 
of idealistic political goals and loose proposals that seemed too far from 
reality. Afterwards seeing this as a case of broken promises is to trivialize 
a much more important and urgent issue, involving big questions such as 
demagogy, manipulative argumentation and the gulf between political elites 
and the electorate. This way, the focus on promises may promote a passive 
and irresponsible attitude, detrimental to the ambition of creating better 
conditions for rhetorical citizenship, and the breach of promises debate may 
be regarded as a symptom of the problems that contemporary Western de-
mocracies are facing.
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“Keep[ing] Profits at a Reasonably Low 
Rate”: Invoking American Civil Religion 
in FDR’s Rhetoric of Tax Equity and 
Citizenship
NAT H A L I E KU R O I WA- L E W I S
The tax wars
In the midst of the 2012 Republican debate in Florida and under pressure 
from both the Right and Left to release his tax returns, then presidential can-
didate and self-professed multi-millionaire Mitt Romney informed Ameri-
cans, “You’ll see my income, how much taxes I’ve paid, how much I’ve paid 
to charity.” He then affirmed, “I pay all the taxes that are legally required 
and not a dollar more. I don’t think you want someone as the candidate for 
President who pays more taxes than he owes.”1 Effectively, in this moment, 
Mr. Romney asked his audience to identify with his opposition to paying 
a higher tax rate. Implicit in this statement is the premise that it is socially 
acceptable for the very wealthy to pay only the bare minimum. Not surpris-
ingly, Mr. Romney’s tax returns revealed that he paid a 13.9 % tax rate in 
2010, and would likely pay a 15.4 % tax rate in 2011, lower than what many 
middle class Americans pay (Peralta 2012).
Approximately one year later, following the re-election of President 
Obama to the White House, House Speaker John Boehner argued in an 
opinion piece for The Wall Street Journal that President Obama had altered 
bipartisan plans to reduce the budget by calling for new taxes. From a per-
spective commonly voiced by the Republican party, Mr. Boehner opposed 
paying for the national deficit through taxes. In order to offset a growing def-
icit, Mr. Boehner proposed instead increasing spending cuts in lieu of rais-
ing tax revenue, writing that “[t]he president has repeatedly called for even 
1 Republican Debate Transcript. Transcript. January 23, 2012. Council on Foreign Relations, 
accessed July 10, 2013, http://www.cfr.org/elections/republican-debate-transcript-tampa-
florida-january-2012/p27180. 9. 
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more tax revenue, but the American people don’t support trading spending 
cuts for higher taxes. They understand that the tax debate is now closed” 
(Boehner 2013). What Mr. Boehner failed to mention, however, was the 
economic feasibility of balancing the federal deficit via spending cuts only. 
Now compare Mr. Romney’s and Mr. Boehner’s views on taxation to 
Franklin Delano Roosevelt’s perspective on the role that taxes play in 1930s 
civil society. In his famed June 19, 1935, message to Congress, FDR calls for 
an estate and inheritance tax, along with a graduated tax for corporations. 
He justifies curbing inherited wealth and the profits of big business, arguing 
that great wealth is evidence of the elite’s capacity to pay more to the public 
sphere. Similarly, he voices opposition to the idea of a wealthy elite owning 
the majority of society’s wealth. It is thus he makes the case for a uniquely 
American tax imperative, providing a powerful philosophical rationale for 
progressive taxation. He points to the 1913 Income Tax Law as representa-
tive of the ideal “that taxes should be levied in proportion to ability to pay 
and in proportion to the benefits received.” He affirms further that “taxation 
according to income is the most effective instrument yet devised to obtain 
just contribution from those best able to bear it and to avoid placing onerous 
burdens upon the mass of our people” (Roosevelt 1935). Consider here how 
FDR, using a rhetoric that may at first appear politically reckless (particu-
larly from today’s perspective), places the burden of tax responsibility on the 
wealthy, carefully constructing an ideal of tax equity as a civic good. By ask-
ing the audience to participate in a vision of economic equity, FDR appeals 
to the audience’s sense of social justice, whereby wealthy private individuals 
come second to the needs of the collective. In the later years of his presiden-
cy, FDR would shape the civic sphere further by making a direct correlation 
between taxes and the funding of war, arguing in particular that the wealthy 
have unique fiscal obligations in contributing to society and nation building.
A premise underlying this article is that FDR employs the progressive 
tax system as a powerful means of inculcating the audience to rhetorical 
citizenship, and in so doing paves the way for a model of public moral ar-
gument articulating fiscal responsibility as a moral principle. To assert this 
premise, I refer to William Keith and Paula Cossart’s definition of rhetorical 
citizenship that focuses on praxis as a means of creating spaces for citizens to 
participate in the public sphere (Keith and Cossart 2012). To demonstrate 
how FDR’s rhetoric invokes taxes as a means of performing moral citizenship, 
I draw on Robert Bellah’s theory of American civil religion. As outlined in 
his formative critique titled, “Civil Religion in America” Bellah contends 
that American civil religion is a “religious dimension” manifest “in a set of 
beliefs, symbols, and rituals” of the public sphere (1988, p. 42). Bellah fur-
ther contends there is a religious element to American political society and 
that the US possesses a unique civil religion guiding its culture, history and 
sense of nationhood. In particular, Bellah argues that American civil religion 
propels nation-building and that American presidents play a unique role 
in acting as the chief officers of this religion (1988, pp. 110, 115). In this 
article, I propose that the construct of American civil religion informs how 
FDR frames tax equity as an ethical principle that is distinct to the American 
people. I assert that the power of FDR’s tax rhetoric lies in his ability to use 
taxes to formulate a moral principle and therefore call on his audience to act 
as moral agents who will contribute to nation building. To assert this claim, 
I analyze FDR’s 1936 “Address at Worcester Massachusetts” and his 1942 
“Call for Sacrifice” speeches and contend that in these speeches FDR creates 
a rhetorical framework from which to discuss and perceive taxes through a 
public moral discourse. 
Civil religion and the poor
In contrast to the mantra of a highly individualistic, right leaning popular 
discourse expressed in much of contemporary tax discourse today, it may 
appear almost unthinkable to even consider how FDR was able to speak so 
candidly about shared values such as equity and self-denial for the common 
good.2 To understand FDR’s rhetoric of taxation and its potential contribu-
2 Thompson (2003). Understanding critical historical-political moments influencing 
today’s current tax rhetoric can lend insight to the Republican Right’s relative success 
in being able to shape the rhetoric of taxation and influence the mainstream public’s 
perception of taxes as a social burden rather than an investment into civic society. In his 
article, Thompson outlines a brief history of tax reform following WWI and WWII through 
George W. Bush’s administration’s implementation of tax cuts in 2003. Thompson argues 
that following the World wars, many government officials agreed that they wanted 
progressive taxes and that they could be employed as a means of managing the economy. 
He describes how Keynesian economics in the 1950s and 1960s motivated fiscal spending 
for a larger government and that most Americans profited from a progressive tax structure 
and therefore sanctioned progressive taxes. Interestingly enough, during this period, there 
existed an anti-tax rhetoric that equated higher taxation with lack of productivity, however, 
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tions to contemporary American tax discourse, it is important to consider 
how FDR assumed the role of chief magistrate that characterizes civil reli-
gion and used his position as president to assert a religious conception of 
nationhood (Bellah 1988, p. 105). In this regard, a Christian social activist 
element permeated much of FDR’s tax discourse and vision of nationhood 
(Smith 2006, pp. 191-220). For in many of FDR’s public remarks on taxes, 
he professed a commitment to fiscal fairness that drew on a specific Chris-
tian orientation deeply concerned with the plight of the needy3 as he placed 
particular attention on the responsibility of the wealthy towards improving 
the lot of the poor. Although FDR was by no means entirely successfully in 
promoting these values throughout the duration of his many administra-
tions, and did prove himself to be fallible on a host of domestic and foreign 
policy issues, it is, nonetheless, not unusual for many scholars to point to 
FDR’s acumen as a moral leader, particularly in his tax rhetoric. 
For FDR expressed his moral leadership by making a strong case that 
tax equity was fundamental to the progressive tax system. Such a view drew 
on a shared, historical understanding of the progressive tax system. As Jo-
seph Thorndike explains, the progressive tax system is the philosophical 
base for the American tax system. At its roots lies the fundamental belief in 
contributing to one’s “fair share” in democracy. This understanding of the 
progressive tax system shaped much of FDR’s rhetoric. So much so, in fact, 
that a case can be made that FDR employed the progressive tax system as a 
rhetorical device for illustrating the principle of tax equity where the respon-
sibility for shouldering taxes would lie most with the upper classes. Ronald 
according to Thompson, this discourse received no “political support from the citizenry of 
the United States and also any empirical support from the social science establishment.” 
Thompson points to the 1970s as a turning point in American attitudes towards taxes 
because during this decade, many Americans began to benefit economically and climb 
larger tax brackets and therefore were required to pay more taxes than in the past. Due to 
this change, the redistributive advantages that Americans had previously enjoyed did not 
appear as palpable as in the past. Hence, a public pressure led to a conservative movement 
under the auspices of the Reagan administration in the 1980s. What is fascinating in 
Thompson’s account is his contention that the logical result of a conservative rhetoric in 
favor of tax cuts “is a gradual destruction of the public sector and the expansion of the 
market to more domains of society.”
3 Gal. 2:10; Isa. 1:17; Luke 6: 20, 24; Ps. 9:18; Ps. 41:1; Ps 82: 3-4 (NRSV). 
Isetti compares Leuchtenburg’s critique of FDR to Hofstadter and shows how 
Leuchtenburg viewed FDR as a moral individual, distinct from his advisors, 
and one who through the office of the presidency, taught and preached to 
the public (Isetti 1996, p. 678). Thorndike describes FDR as revealing a na-
scent fidelity to the system of progressive taxation. Progressive taxation to 
FDR lay in his conviction that the wealthy were obligated to contribute more 
taxes than the needy, particularly in times of crisis (2013, p. 45). 
The fact that FDR was able to empathize with others and communi-
cate that empathy with the struggling poor and middle class (and by some 
historical accounts was both pragmatic and sincere) is testament to FDR’s 
adept use of rhetorical skills to lead as a moral leader, particularly so, at least 
when it came to the topic of taxation.
Situating FDR’s tax rhetoric in history
The Great Depression and WWII were historical events that made possible 
FDR’s ability to use civil religion for nation building purposes. Like President 
Lyndon Johnson, who was influenced by the social foment of the era and 
drew on civil religion to rally support for voting rights (Bellah 1988, p. 110), 
FDR utilized civil religion to shape a tax policy that would respond to the 
needs of his times.
For this reason, it would be next to impossible to understand the pow-
er of FDR’s rhetoric of taxation without first considering how the economic 
and social scene of his era shaped his tax rhetoric and policies. The state of 
the economy during the Depression, for example, was so severe that it had 
a far-reaching impact adversely touching not only the lower class, but large 
numbers of the middle class. Interestingly enough, McElvaine suggests that 
it was the middle class that pushed values for a morality-based reform of the 
economy, thereby shaping FDR’s rhetoric, and not the other way around. He 
makes this case when he remarks that “[t]he Great Depression served to con-
firm the poor in their belief that moral considerations ought to have a role in 
economic practices” and that it was through experiencing the Great Depres-
sion that “the middle class [came to] identify their interests and values with 
those of the poor” (McElvaine 1984, p. xiv). McElvaine, in this light, paints 
the portrait of an era preoccupied with the values of economic fairness and 
equity (p. 206), where social attitudes leaned towards governmental actions 
favoring the equitable distribution of the nation’s wealth. 
With this point in mind, we can see that for FDR the summer of 1935 
“keep[ing]  profits  at a  reasonably low rate”nathalie  kuroiwa-lewis
[  86 ] [  87 ]
signaled a politically motivated though sincere shift to the left, as McElvaine 
contends. He describes FDR as moving “in the same direction that a majority 
of the people at the time was going – towards the left, toward humanitar-
ian, cooperative values” (McElvaine 1984, p. 263). According to McElvaine, 
1936 was the year where FDR “was casting his lot with the forgotten man 
(who seems most often to be remembered during and just prior to election 
years). It would be ‘us’ against ‘them’ in 1936, and FDR clearly wanted to be 
one of ‘us’” (1984, p. 261). On June 19, 1935 (the day that Social Security 
had been passed through the Senate and the Wagner bill approved by the 
House), FDR told Congressmen that the excessive concentration of wealth 
was leading to a “perpetuation of great and undesirable concentration of 
control in a relatively few individuals over the employment and welfare of 
many, many others” and used the occasion to ask for a variety of tax solu-
tions ranging from federal gift taxes to a graduated corporate income tax to 
increased income taxes for the very wealthy (McElvaine 1984, p. 260).
In addition to the much talked about influence that the summer of 
1935 had on FDR, Thorndike contends that the years of 1933 and 1934 
played a formative role in setting the themes of tax evasion and tax avoidance 
in national debate, which in turn influenced the rhetoric of FDR (Thorndike 
2013, p. 75). In particular, the 1935 Revenue Act or Wealth Tax, which in 
reality did little to change the distribution of taxes, nonetheless signaled a 
profound cultural shift in FDR’s ability to speak to the left (Thorndike 2013, 
p. 131). Influential academics such as Herman Oliphant, the general counsel 
to the treasury, for example, aided FDR on key tax issues and were inspired 
by the Supreme Court Justice, Louis Brandeis, who distrusted corporate 
concentration of wealth and advocated for tighter regulation of big busi-
ness (Thorndike 2013, pp. 138, 139). Others like Robert Jackson, the Chief 
counsel of the Bureau of Internal Revenue, studied the tax evasion practices 
of wealthy families and helped inform FDR’s tax message denouncing tax 
avoidance (Thorndike 2013, pp. 141, 152).
Linking taxes to the American Revolution
A significant aspect of FDR’s tax rhetoric that deserves attention is how FDR 
frames his position on taxes within a historical context specific to the 1776 
American Revolution, therefore appealing to a powerful symbol of Ameri-
can civil religion (Bellah 1988, p. 105). Consider how, for example, in FDR’s 
October 21, 1936, “Address at Worcester Massachusetts,” FDR associates 
taxes with the concept of the American revolution, creating a model of 
democratic citizenship. To enact this concept of citizenship, FDR interprets 
the cause of the revolution as that over “the doctrine of democracy in taxa-
tion,” highlighting tax inequity and stressing the colonists’ rejection of a 
British imposed tax. In this way, FDR frames the conflict between the Brit-
ish and the colonists over taxes as America’s burgeoning attempt to become 
independent from the British.
Such a presentation of leadership draws on a narrative structure of 
American civil religion, where, as Bellah asserts, Washington becomes “the 
divinely appointed Moses who led his people out of the hands of tyranny” 
(Bellah 1988, p. 105). Through this narrative, FDR frames the British, like 
the wealthy who oppose paying higher taxes, as the undesirable Other, while 
aligning himself with the national leaders who guided the nation away from 
a foreign colonial power to a higher law. 
FDR plays with this narrative further, equating the colonists’ fight for 
American independence in 1776 with his defense of the New Deal dur-
ing a presidential election year. By placing himself and his audience in the 
subject position of the colonists fighting the British in 1776, he frames the 
colonists’ fight as not only for autonomy from England, but for US civiliza-
tion. He creates this construction when he states: “In 1776, the fight was 
for democracy in taxation. In 1936 that is still the fight. Mr. Justice Oliver 
Wendell Holmes once said: ‘Taxes are the price we pay for civilized society.’” 
In comparing 1776 to 1936, FDR links the goal for tax equity in 1936 to the 
quest for national autonomy during the revolution. This idea, in particular, 
suggests that tax inequity is undemocratic because it is threatening to na-
tionhood.
Demonizing tax avoiders 
Another noteworthy feature of FDR’s tax discourse is how he uses taxes to 
create powerful lines of division and identification. Although FDR’s tax 
discourse is not explicitly religious in nature, he invokes the concept of a 
“higher criterion” or notion of right and wrong with roots in the philosophy 
of American civil religion.4 Framing tax equities as a civic good and tax in-
4 Bellah (1988), p. 100. As outlined in Bellah’s discussion of American civil religion, 
American governance is traditionally influenced by the concept of political sovereignty in 
God and presidential allegiance to a “higher criterion.” 
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equities as a moral ill allows FDR to articulate a standard of right and wrong, 
swaying the audience to a moral ideal based on the concept of a higher law. 
To do this, FDR frames the standard of right and wrong by creating 
lines of division between citizens willing to pay taxes and those unwilling to 
do so. Importantly, he defines citizens unwilling to pay taxes as those “who 
still do not recognize their advantages and want to avoid paying their dues,” 
framing them as Undesirable Others. This construction frames those who 
oppose paying higher taxes as morally delinquent in their responsibilities to 
the collective, thus arousing feelings of indignation in the audience. 
At the same time as FDR draws lines of division by stating a “they 
and we,” he blurs them by positing a shared motive between “they and we.” 
Observe how he identifies common ground between business persons and 
the middle class by asserting that “the overwhelming majority of business 
men are like the rest of us. Most of us whether we earn wages, run farms or 
run businesses are in one sense business men. All they seek and we seek is 
fair play based on the greater good of the greater number – fair play on the 
part of the Government in levying taxes on us and fair play on the part of 
Government in protecting us against abuses.” Drawing on the precepts of 
American civil religion, FDR utilizes the concept of fair play as a moral stan-
dard or higher criterion to strive for. This appeals to the audience’s collective 
allegiance to fairness and calls on the audience to act as moral agents par-
ticipating in the civic good of tax equity. At the same time, FDR prioritizes 
government as guardian of the civic good, leading the audience to want to 
participate as agents of that good.
Influenced by the precepts of American civil religion, an additional el-
ement of FDR’s tax rhetoric worthy of consideration is the focus on sacrifice, 
which was a pertinent theme in much of FDR’s WWII rhetoric (Bellah 1988, 
p. 107). In FDR’s later years, particularly throughout World War II, FDR’s 
tax rhetoric would evolve into a discourse that increasingly came to link the 
concept of self-denial with the overall maintenance of the general economy. 
As the government, under the leadership of FDR, anticipated the potential 
threat of price inflation during World War II, it sought to employ taxes as 
a tool for curtailing consumption.5 It was at this time, not surprisingly, that 
5 Thorndike (2013), pp. 207, 214, 216. According to Thorndike, World War II led to 
an increased understanding of how taxes could be used to control inflation, and even 
corporate profiteering. (Emphasis on profiteering, 216). The intellectual scene during 
FDR’s rhetoric became strongly influenced by the work of the Nye Commit-
tee, which targeted war profiteering and advocated for war profits taxation 
(Thorndike 2013, p. 221). According to Thorndike, World War II brought 
a significant change in the American tax structure. The federal government 
perceived a need to fund the war through taxes, and taxes came to be seen 
as a way of managing the economy. As a consequence, in spite of opposition 
from the business community, FDR demanded an increase in higher taxes for 
the wealthy, along with the creation of new taxes for those in the low and 
middle income brackets (Thorndike 2013, p. 275).
Paying taxes for war as a privilege
Nowhere is the need to rally a nation towards a unified goal made more 
manifest than in wartime. Here FDR’s discourse, like that of many presidents 
before him, draws on a salient facet of American civil religion through its 
focus on the commendable goal (Bellah 1988, p. 111). In his 1942 speech 
titled “A Call for Sacrifice,” FDR puts the focus on the laudable goal – asking 
Americans to pay more taxes to fund the war – at the center of his rhetoric. 
He shapes the civic discourse by framing fiscal responsibility as a method of 
fighting the war. To do this, he blurs the lines of identification and division, 
situating the citizen in the subject position of the soldier who has the “privi-
lege” of fighting. The enthymeme that logically emerges from this construc-
tion is that fighting for one’s country in war-time entails self-denial. This 
conclusion, in a sense, attempts to lower the audience’s expectations about 
what the government can do to contribute to the war effort. 
As FDR instills a sense of duty in the audience, arousing a collective 
desire to fiscally contribute to the war, he prepares the audience to anticipate 
paying higher taxes as a means of funding the war effort. FDR’s use of the 
positive term “privilege” in the theme of “fighting as a privilege” simultane-
ously identifies and divides two groups of people – civilians not participat-
ing directly in the war with soldiers/workers physically active in military 
preparation for war. While calling fighting a “privilege,” he states that “not 
all of us can have the privilege of fighting our enemies in distant parts of the 
world” and that “not all of us can have the privilege of working in a muni-
tions factory.” Here, FDR associates soldiers fighting in war with workers 
World War II was inspired by heavy weights such as Randolph Paul who saw taxation as a 
vehicle for decreasing inflation, and imparted this belief to FDR (pp. 222, 223).
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laboring for the war effort. By arguing that soldiers and workers are both 
uniquely “privilege[d],” FDR frames fighting as a civic good and the negative 
“not all of us” creates a line of division and assigns guilt to those not privy 
to this civic good. 
Such a construction creates an ambiguous space that serves to both 
include and exclude civilians removed from the war effort, suggesting that all 
Americans may share the goal of fighting though not all are directly involved 
in military preparation for war. Consider how FDR extends the theme of 
privilege, creating a space for civic action in the domestic sphere, when he 
states: “But there is one front and one battle where everyone in the United 
States – every man, woman, and child – is in action,” adding that “[t]hat 
front is right here at home, in our daily lives, in our daily tasks. Here at home 
everyone will have the privilege of making whatever self-denial is necessary, 
not only to supply our fighting men, but to keep the economic structure of 
our country fortified and secured during the war and after the war.” Here 
FDR equates soldiering abroad with soldiering at the home front. By stressing 
words such as “daily,” “self-denial” and “home,” FDR creates a domestic space 
for the average American to express citizenship through fiscal self-restraint.
The legacy of FDR’s tax rhetoric
A central preoccupation that recurs throughout FDR’s tax rhetoric is the no-
tion of social justice. The fact that FDR strove to actively induce his audience 
to participate in an ideal of tax equity and collective sacrifice for war illus-
trates a view of social justice influenced by Christian values that informed 
much of FDR’s thinking, specifically in regard to the economy. In the role of 
socio-economic redeemer, crucial to the philosophy underpinning Ameri-
can civil religion, FDR articulates a social activist Christian message of fiscal 
fairness, prioritizing the needs and interests of the poor over the rich. His 
rhetoric was one that drew on arguments based on fiscal capacity to pay for 
taxes, which he employed to rationalize higher taxes on both the rich and the 
voluminous corporate sector (Thorndike 2013, pp. 139, 140).
The tendency for FDR to be critical of what he saw as an overzealous 
corporate American drive to make profits allowed him to blame an exces-
sive free market model for the fiscal ills of the nation and create a powerful 
argument that took sides with the financial underdog – the nation’s poor and 
unemployed.
In sum, the strength in FDR’s discourse on taxes lies in his use of 
American civil religion to construct and lead the nation towards ethical pre-
cepts of equity and self-denial. FDR was not altogether able to push tax poli-
cies representing this ideal through Congress. However, his progressive tax 
argument and public chastising of tax avoidance, along with the emphasis 
on taxes as a social contract necessary for promoting a civil society, created a 
rhetorical framework that makes a viable, public moral argument possible in 
the civic sphere. The subtle power in FDR’s tax rhetoric lies in the endeavor, 
at least, to frame tax equity as a moral principle. In this, FDR appeals to his 
audience’s belief in fairness and calls on his audience to consider participat-
ing as moral agents in a tax structure conducive to a larger civic good – 
namely, tax distribution as a form of social justice. 
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Yarn Bombing: Claiming Rhetorical 
Citizenship in Public Spaces
M AU R E E N DA LY  G O G G I N
Put simply, rhetorical citizenship is the search for, and practice of, methods of 
communication capable of guiding public decision and judgment 
(Danisch 2011, p. 38)
Robert Danisch captures the theoretical thrust of this edited collection 
when he calls attention to the “importance of communication practices in 
grounding habits of citizenship.” He fittingly observes that:
Contemporary conceptions of citizenship have been qualified in a number of 
different ways: social citizenship, multicultural citizenship, citizen-soldiers, or 
citizen-workers are just a few examples. Although these are useful elaborations 
of the concept of citizenship, they fail to recognize the importance of 
communication practices in grounding habits of citizenship. The earliest Ancient 
Greek model of citizen was so closely tied to speech acts that the word ‘rhetor’ 
could be used as a place holder for citizen. (2011, pp. 37-38).
Indeed, as Christian Kock and Lisa Villadsen point out in the introduc-
tion to this collection, rhetoric has been central to the concept of Western 
citizenship since the sophists in Ancient Greece. For example, J. H. Freese 
observes that “The object which Isocrates professedly had in view was to 
train young men in the art of speaking and writing on political subjects, 
in order to fit them to fulfil the active duties of life in a manner worthy 
of the citizens of the Hellenic world” (1973, p. xiv). This important co-
constructive connection between rhetoric and citizenship remains with us 
today, a significant connection Kock and Villadsen have termed “rhetorical 
citizenship” for the 2008 “Rhetorical Citizenship” conference in Copen-
Thorndike, J. (2013). Their Fair Share: Taxing the Rich in the Age of FDR. Washington D.C.: 
The Urban Institute Press.
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and toward unexpected ends (Greer 2008; Knitshade 2011; Tapper 2011; 
Werle 2011). Globally, women and men are taking up their knitting needles 
and crochet hooks to make political, social, cultural, aesthetic, and artistic 
statements.3 Thus, in describing yarn bombing as a feminist activity, Beth 
Ann Pentney usefully conceives of feminist knitting practices horizontally 
along a continuum that recognizes “while they may differ in tactics, scope, 
and purpose they nevertheless contribute to a feminist ethos” (2008). This 
continuum moves from “women’s community building and celebration of 
knitting as a domestic art (located at one end of the continuum), ... into a 
consideration of outreach and fundraising activities ... (located towards the 
middle of the continuum) [and ends with] knitting used in public forms of 
political protest, including rallies, marches, and public displays (located at 
the other end of the continuum).” More recently the practice has become 
 
hagen from which selected papers were published in Rhetorical Citizenship 
and Public Deliberation. There they define “rhetorical citizenship” as “a way 
of conceptualizing the discursive, processual, participatory aspects of civic 
life” (2012 “Introduction,” p. 5). 
Protesting is but one way to lay claim to rhetorical citizenship in 
public spaces. This deliberative rhetoric calls for co-active participation 
from both those creating/circulating protest agendas and those consum-
ing/debating such agendas. Such a view calls on us to examine everyday 
practice to see how active agents participate in public protests both as con-
tributors and as listeners. In short, rhetorical citizenship recognizes publics 
as practices not as abstractions, as fluid not as stable, as active in practical 
judgment not as passive recipients, and as operating in the here and now 
not in some imagined future (cf. Kock and Villadsen “Rhetorical Citizen-
ship”). While rhetorical citizenship has a long history, how it plays out in 
the world, the actions it engages, shifts over time and space. 
In the twenty-first century, Western feminist activism has taken a 
radical turn, moving beyond traditional rhetorical strategies of public pro-
test and confrontation among throngs of gatherers. As Stacey Sowards and 
Valerie Renegar point out, today feminist activism also includes tactics such 
as “creating grassroots’ models of leadership, using strategic humor, build-
ing feminist identity, sharing stories, and resisting stereotypes and labels” 
(2006, p. 58). I call this political turn “soft power.” This oxymoronic phrase 
for contemporary feminist activism challenges the connotation of “soft” 
as flimsy, weak, stereotypical feminine and the connotation of “power” as 
brute force, strong, stereotypical masculine. Both words are turned inside 
out in many current activist movements: Soft is strong and power is nonag-
gressive. Soft is physical and power is cerebral. Soft is durable and power 
is creative. In this essay, I examine the practice of yarn bombing as one 
instantiation of contemporary feminist protest tactics. Specifically, I exam-
ine protest yarn bombing as an act of rhetorical citizenship across different 
countries on issues concerning: war, political decisions, economic prob-
lems, and environmental sustainability.
Yarn bombing1 is a relatively new form of outsider street art2 that is 
popping up all over the world in unexpected places, for unexpected reasons, 
to paint a surface. The practice is also known by other names such as yarn storming, yarn 
graffiti, urban crochet and knitting, and guerilla crochet and knitting. Prior to Prain and 
Moore’s book, knitting and crocheting had been used for various feminist activist projects 
but these terms of the art were yet in play. See, for example, Sabrina Shirobayashi (2007); 
and David Revere McFadden and Jennifer Scanlan (2007). These works include several 
yarn bombing pieces described as performative, subversive, and activist art.
2 On outsider art, see John Maizels (2009); Lucienne Peiry (2001); Lyle Rexer (2005); 
Colin Rhodes (2000); and Susan Goldman Rubin (2004).
3 The origins of yarn bombing are fuzzy at best. Books, magazine articles, newspaper 
accounts, and blogs typically report that the first recorded yarn bombing took place in 
Den Helder in the Netherlands in 2004 and that in the US it was founded in 2005 in 
Houston, Texas by Magda Sayeg. A yarn store owner who rounded up friends to form 
a group called “Knitta Please,” Sayeg and the group used leftover yarns and unfinished 
projects to yarn bomb decorative pieces in unusual places around the city. Their activities 
were a response to the dehumanizing qualities of the urban environment. However, as early 
as 1992, contemporary Canadian artist Janet Morton was covering up public spaces with 
crocheted and knitted pieces. Her first installation was a huge knitted sock that she laid on 
a memorial in Queen’s Park, Toronto. The following year she covered a bicycle, calling the 
installation “Sweater Bike.” In 1994 she exhibited a huge mitten she named “Big, Big Mitt” 
by hanging it off an urban building. Since then she has completed many yarn installations. 
See the CCCA Canadian Art Database for images of Janet Morton’s knitted work at http://
ccca.concordia.ca/artists/work_detail.html?languagePref=en&mkey=55160&title=Big+Big
+Mitt&artist=Janet+Morton&link_id=5793).
1  The term “yarn bombing” was coined by Leanne Prain (a graphic artist, writer, knitter, 
and crafter) for her 2009 co-authored book titled Yarn bombing: The art of crochet and knit 
graffiti (Moore and Prain 2009). The term “bombing” comes from graffiti slang meaning 
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mainstreamed: commodified and commercialized with some yarn bombers 
being called upon by Fortune 500 companies to create yarn installations for 
large sums of money. Ironically, this latter form of yarn bombing has become 
the very thing that outsider and contemporary artists in general and yarn 
bombers in particular are calling into question. In this piece, I do not take 
up this practice but focus instead on yarn installations as public protest that 
fall toward one end of Pentney’s continuum and as concrete manifestations 
of everyday rhetorical citizenship.
Perspective by incongruity
Yarn bombing takes place in unexpected spaces. A car, tree, street lamp, 
parking meter, sidewalk, park bench, for example, are adorned to a lesser or 
greater extent with yarn pieces. (See figure 1 where trees are yarn bombed in 
a central square in Spain.)
These installations thus disrupt the genius locus of the space. In classi-
cal Roman times, genius locus referred to the resident spirit of a place and was 
represented in religious iconography by figures dedicated to specific protec-
tive or guardian spirits. Today genius locus refers to the distinctive character 
of a location. As Danielle Endres and Samantha Senda-Cook note in “Lo-
cation matters: The Rhetoric of Place in Protest,” “locations, bodies, words, 
visual symbols, experiences, memories, and dominant meanings all interact 
to make and remake place” (p. 277). Typically these makings and remakings 
are part of a schema and as such are expected. Yarn bombing disrupts the 
schema of the making and remaking of place to call attention to itself. In a 
word, the installations are ironic.
Yarn bombing installations offer what Kenneth Burke termed “per-
spective by incongruity” (1964; 1970) in that they disrupt patterns of ex-
pectations and experiences regarding both yarn and the genius locus of public 
space. Clothing outdoor ‘things’ in yarn disrupts the domestic use of yarn 
and the public use of space. As Burke explains, “perspective by incongruity” 
serves as an invention device – a “method of gauging situations by verbal 
‘atom cracking.’ That is, a word belongs by custom to a certain category – 
and by rational planning you wrench it loose and metaphorically apply it to 
a different category” (1984 Attitudes, p. 308). In Philosophy of Literary Form 
he defines perspective by incongruity as “a rational prodding or coaching of 
language so as to see around the corner of everyday usage” (1973, p. 400). As 
Abram Anders points out, perspective by incongruity thus serves as “a tool 
figure 1
Yarn bombing at Plaça d’Hondures, Valencia, Spain. Wikimedia Commons photograph by 
JoanBanjo. 27 October 2013. Creative Commons Attribution – Share Alike 2.0 Generic license.
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for challenging and reshaping the orientations through which we experi-
ence the world” (2011). Perspective by incongruity is not a tool restricted to 
verbal language. Functioning through both words and images, “perspective 
by incongruity,” in Ross Wolin’s words, “pushes to the limit our ability to 
generate meaning and make sense of the world through rational, pragmatic 
means. Perspective by incongruity is a violation of piety for the sake of more 
firmly asserting the pious” (2001, p. 76; also see Biesecker 1997). This vio-
lation calls attention to itself to assert firmly the issue at stake in the yarn 
bombing – an issue that might be as crass and mundane as the marketing 
of a product to as sensitive and extraordinary as raising charitable funds to 
fight breast cancer.
As Kock and Villadsen explain about rhetorical citizenship as a con-
ceptual frame in their introduction to this collection, the “focus is less on 
what a particular utterance is like, or how effective it is, but more on how 
suited it is to contribute to constructive civic interaction.” Perspective by 
incongruity evokes and induces an interaction. 
Yarn graffiti as a materialist epistemology
Grounding my exploration in “thing theory,” I argue that yarn bombing can 
be understood to constitute a materialist epistemology, what Davis Baird has 
termed “thing knowledge,” “where the things we make bear knowledge of the 
world, on par with the words we speak” (2002, p. 13, emphasis added; also 
see Baird 2004 and Latour 2005). Indeed, the term yarn graffiti underscores 
this discursive construct as the word “graffiti” comes from the Greek term 
γράφειν – graphein – meaning “to write.” What is written? When the graffiti 
artist who is credited with beginning the contemporary graffiti movement in 
Tehran, Iran, was asked about the meaning of graffiti, the artist self-named 
A1one (a.k.a. Taṇhā4) said: “A drawing on the street is similar to a letter: It 
proves that there is a writer. Whether people want to receive this letter or 
not is a different question” Graffiti confirms the presence and reality of the 
“maker” in a public space that is typically controlled by and reserved for 
those in power. Graffiti – whether in yarn or paint – bears knowledge of the 
world; it expresses dynamically “thing knowledge.” The question of what 
4 Taṇhā is one of the Four Noble Truths of Buddha meaning “thirst” literally but defined 
as the craving to hold onto pleasurable and neutral experiences and to be separated from 
unpleasant ones. 
audiences think about the graffiti message is open because audiences will 
vary deeply in their responses.
Without official permission or a permit, yarn bombing like graffiti is 
illegal which is why many yarn bombers use pseudonyms to conceal their 
identities. Where yarn bombing differs from graffiti is that yarn bombing 
doesn’t damage property; it is easily removed and leaves no mark. In some 
spaces it is more tolerated than others; nevertheless, it is seen in ‘public 
spaces’ as ‘defacing property.’ Of course, yoking the phrases ‘public spaces’ 
and ‘defacing property’ blurs public and private worlds. This blurring is a 
hegemonic reading of graffiti, delimited it to the narrow notion of violation 
rather than expression. 
Yarn bombing may be understood as a form of “girlie feminism,” a 
term coined by Jennifer Baumgardner and Amy Richards in their Mani-
festa: Young Women, Feminism, and the Future to describe the pro-femininity 
line of young feminists (2000, p. 136). Girlie feminism is a strand of third-
wave feminism that seeks to validate traditional female activities by “valu-
ing knitting, cooking and dressing up” while challenging their stereotypical 
and hegemonic charac terizations (2010, 216). As Beth Ann Pentney notes, 
“If second-wave feminists have been historicized as women who put down 
their knitting, third-wave feminists may be characterized as those who have 
picked it back up again” (2008). Jack Z. Bratich and Heidi M. Brush refer 
to this resurgence of interest especially among young women as “fabricul-
ture,” “a whole range of practices usually defined as the ‘domestic arts’: knit-
ting, crocheting, scrapbooking, quilting, embroidery, sewing, doll-making” 
(2011, p. 234). 
Of course, third-wave feminism, like first and second waves, is com-
prised of many contradictory strands of feminism; however, what most 
strands share is a vibrant critique of earlier waves of feminism as impotent 
and a political stance that is much gentler than the “kick the door” down 
strands of some first- and second-wave feminists. This softer tactic is evident 
in what some guerilla yarn bombers say about the act. For instance, Deadly 
Knitshade (a pseudonym for a guerrilla yarn bomber in London) says:
Change and making the world a better place can be done with a grin instead of a 
grimace, a whisper instead of a bellow. What we do can alter the way people look at 
their world. How it [yarn storming] alters it is up to them. That’s really our point. 
(2011, p. 124) 
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This symbolic transformation of military hardware into an object of comic irony 
seeks to disarm the offensive stance of a machine justified by its defensive capability. 
Whilst the sinister Trojan undertones of disguising a real weapon as soft and fluffy 
lead us to review the deaths from ‘friendly’ fire, as well as the women and children 
who suffer the largest percentage of deaths in most conflicts. Activist craft has many 
forms of symbolism and disguise. … [M]ost importantly the Pink M.24 Chaffee 
enables, or should enable, an alternative critical discourse about global militarism. 
(2010, p. 4) 
Carpenter’s point echoes Deadly Knitshade. Public spaces and the author-
ity that typically regulates them are subverted and transformed when filled 
with color, difference, and domestic work in ways that demand some kind 
of response (cf. Shepphard 2012). Finally feminist Beth Ann Pentney rightly 
points out that:
Deadly Knitshade coined the term “yarn storming” to deflect the association 
of the term “bombing” with war and violent tactics. Her point calls atten-
tion to the dialogic nature of protest with both rhetor and interlocutors who 
will vary in their responses to the rhetor’s yarn installation. Further, as Den-
nis Stevens notes in discussing the Do-it-Yourself (DIY) movement in which 
many yarn bombers participate:
Rather than bringing revolution to the front door and kicking it open, as their 
parents may have hoped to do, these independent [DIY] makers are using the 
disarming and unassuming aesthetic of DIY craft’s remixed domestic creativity to 
make subversive statements about the world in which they live. (2009) 
So how are women and men attempting to alter political and social practices 
and perspectives? We turn now to protest yarn bombing as acts of civil dis-
obedience – a global practice for making subversive statements about politi-
cal issues and engaging polypublics. The following sections address activism 
in yarn against war, political decisions, economic problems, and environ-
mental sustainability.
Protests against war
In April 2006, Danish artist Marianne Jørgensen created a yarn bombing 
war protest against the US, British, and Danish involvement in the Iraqi war, 
covering in yarn a World War II tank that she borrowed after much negotiat-
ing with Danish government (Sandra 2011). Titled Pink M.24 Chaffee Tank, 
the installation was made up of more than 4,000 15 X 15 cm pink crocheted 
and knitted squares donated by more than one thousand contributors from 
the United States and European countries, then assembled together by a 
group of volunteers and fit over the borrowed WWII combat tank. 
These squares of various crochet and knitted patterns, according to 
Jørgensen, “represent a common acknowledgement of a resistance to the 
war in Iraq” (n.d.). Catherine Mazza notes that “When pieced together 
from numerous individual contributions, as many knitted protest projects 
are, the works become a sort of handcrafted petition” (qtd. in Gohil 2007). 
As a known artist, Jørgensen did not hide her identity but the thousand 
or so square makers remain anonymous. The piece was displayed between 
April 7th and 11th in 2006 in front of the Nikolaj Contemporary Art Center 
in Copenhagen. As Ele Carpenter points out about this protest, 
figure 2
Pink M.24 Chaffee Tank by Marianne Jørgensen. April 2006. Photograph courtesy of 
Marianne Jørgensen.
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against death, powerful beauty against ugliness. The yarn patch stands out 
against the bleak walls drenched in graffiti. In another installation, Strick 
and Liesel again draw on the familiar nuclear activity logo at the top in the 
branded yellow and black and repeated at the bottom in white and black. 
The middle yellow and black section sports the words “Nein Danke” or 
“No thanks,” a phrase that is part of the logo of the large international Anti-
Nuclear Movement. The two young women hung banners of this design 
on trees, street lamps, bridge banisters, and the pillars in front of the state 
parliament building around Dusseldorf, Duisburg, and Essen. This low-key 
anonymous activism relying on a private domestic practice attached to pub-
lic spaces offers a powerful example of perspective by incongruity. Although 
the streets in several cities throughout Germany were filled with protesters, 
this protest offers no shouting, no crowds, and no force. In doing so, it 
Combining what Jørgensen refers to as the symbolic ‘home, care, closeness’ [and, 
I would add, ‘the traditionally feminine’] with the violence and trauma caused 
by war machines forces the viewer to reconsider the perceived ordinariness or 
inevitability of war. The ideological affiliation of knitting with the feminine 
is exploited rather than rejected by Jørgensen in this demonstration, to such a 
degree that the cultural meanings imbued in the colour pink – femininity, a lack 
of authority, and nostalgic ties to the domestic – are used to destabilize the tank’s 
symbolic power. (2008)
The inverted sense of “soft power” is clear here. Power is, as Pentney notes, 
“destabilize[ed]” and soft takes on a new sense of strong. Here the alternative 
critical discourse about global militarism as Carpenter notes challenges the 
role of military warfare for peaceful ends by likening the cover to warmth 
and domesticity that brings to mind the many friendly fire accidents and 
civilian deaths, especially of women and children, that are the unforgivable 
fall out of hostile and aggressive fighting.
The incongruity of the yarn pieces against the military machinery 
function as “perspective by incongruity” that is, as heuristic that wrenches 
viewers out of their customary habits of perception by disrupting familiar 
habits of mind so as to move them towards another perspective. 
Protest against political decisions
Yarn bombers challenge various political decisions. In April 2011, thou-
sands of German citizens held an anti-nuclear protest, demanding the end 
of nuclear power. In Essen, Germany (near where the next yarn bombing 
took place), about 3,000 people participated in the nationwide anti-nuclear 
demonstration. As part of that protest, two young German university stu-
dents who call themselves by the pseudonyms Strick and Liesel (named after 
“Strickliesel” or “Knitting Nancy,” a toy that teaches children how to knit) 
conducted yarn bombings (C. G. 2011). (See figure 3.) In part, these pro-
tests were a response to the German parliament passing a law in fall 2010 to 
extend the operation time of the country’s 17 nuclear power plants. 
Figure 3 shows one of Strick and Liesel’s yarn bombing installation. 
The piece echoes the yellow and black nuclear power signs scattered near 
reactors or nuclear facilities with a twist. The center circle is marked by “Xs” 
for eyes and a stitched mouth both referencing death. At the top right hand 
corner are two colorful flowers that juxtapose nature to the manmade, life 
figure 3 
Strick and Liesil Yarn Bomb Protest against Nuclear Power. 4 September 2011. Wikimedia 
Commons photograph by Fluffy on Tour. Creative Commons Attribution – Share Alike 2.0 
Generic license.
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attention to the incongruity of this piece and all it symbolizes – both in 
terms of granny and language. In reaction to this anonymous installation, 
Yarnivore Rose (also a yarn bomber and former yarn store owner) is reported 
to have said, “Actual political speech in yarnbomb form rather than ‘mere’ 
decoration! BRING IT ON!” (“Mystery” 2012).5 Here “decoration” serves as a 
pun – yarn work as decoration and political speech as decoration. Of course, 
the contrast of decoration and political protest, softness of material and 
hardness of message, expectations for a respectable granny and the pseudo-
swear “hell” makes this piece a sophisticated pun, meant to draw attention 
to the incongruity of its presence and message. In short, it is meant to spark 
a response and a reflection on the issue of the tram extension. 
Protests against economic problems 
We turn now to yarn bombing protests regarding economic problems. In 
June 2012, outside the Bank of America on 1715 North Vermont Ave, in 
Los Feliz, California (an affluent neighborhood in Los Angeles, California, 
USA), the KnitRiot Collective (a group of US guerrilla knitters and crafters) 
hung 99 hand-knitted houses among the ficus trees to protest the foreclo-
sure crises (“Los Feliz” 2012). Ironically titled HOMEsweetHOME, this yarn 
storming was intended to demonstrate solidarity among Americans who 
have lost or are losing their homes to foreclosures. (See figures 5, 6, and 7.)
Hanging domesticated yarn houses along a clothes line structure with 
clothes pins – symbols of home – calls attention to the devastation of the 
home foreclosure problem during the economic collapse of 2009 onward. 
The clothes pins hold the houses on the line as if they were drying/driving 
home the point that homes like clothing are necessary shelters and coverings 
– something the flurry of home foreclosures, short sales, and home aban-
donments precluded. These problems, largely caused by inappropriate and 
shady mortgage practices, are all more distressing as they could have been 
avoided except for power and greed. 
On the back of the knitted houses, KnitRiot attached a tag urging 
5 Rose’s response resonates with the riot grrrl’s perspective of an anti-corporate stance 
through self-sufficiency and self-reliance. See Sara Marcus’s Girls to the Front: the True 
Story of the Riot Grrrl Revolution. Also see the video of Rose White (Yarnivore Rose’s) talk 
on “The History of (Guerilla) Knitting,” 24th Chaos Communication Congress, Yovisto: 
Academic Video Search (December 29, 2007). http://www.yovisto.com/video/9916. 
makes a robust statement quietly but no less powerfully. The piece makes 
a passerby stop to ponder the “nuclear symbol” and the words “no thanks” 
together. The ironic twist makes the message serve as an invention device to 
get some people thinking and perhaps caring about the dangers of nuclear 
power and maybe even considering future actions.
Northwest of Germany in Scotland in September 2012, an unknown 
crochet artist yarn bombed a political protest against the underground ex-
pansion of the city of Edinburgh’s tram line. The installation was put up on 
Princes Street in the city. Against a warm, soft, colorful blanket of crocheted 
squares is the message “Tramway to Hell.” (See figure 4.)
The letters are on plain crocheted squares; the pattern of the other 
squares is worth noting as it is called Granny square. Embroidering the let-
ters on plain colored crocheted squares surrounded by Granny squares calls 
figure 4 
Tramway to Hell Yarn Bombing, Edinburgh, Scotland. September 2012. Photograph by Mary 
Gordon.
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viewers to call on banks and elected representatives in the State Assembly to 
vote in favor of the California Homeowners Bill of Rights, a bill to curtail 
illegal foreclosures. (See figure 6.) Calling on viewers to “stop supporting 
Big Banks” in favor of “ethical lending practices,” the tag offered informa-
tion on how to apply for compensation after a foreclosure. Each point was 
highlighted with a viable web address. The California Homeowners Bill of 
Rights passed and became law in January 2013.6 The leftwing political posi-
tion of this knitting group is clear in both the visual rhetoric and the written 
rhetoric on their installation.
Sustainability protests
The last kind of protest I examine concerns environmental sustainability 
protests specifically against two damaging practices: fracking and logging. 
On November 28, 2012, a yarn bombing protest against hydraulic frac-
turing or fracking took place at St. Annes Square in Blackpool, England 
6 For more information on this bill, see “California Homeowner Bill of Rights,” State of 
California Department of Justice, Office of the Attorney General at http://oag.ca.gov/hbor. 
Close-up of HomeSWEETHome Yarn Bombing Protest of Home Foreclosures. Los Angeles, US. 
June 2012. Courtesy of and photograph by KnitRiot Collective.
figure 5 
figure 6 
HomeSWEETHome Yarn Bombing Protest of Home Foreclosures. Los Angeles, US. June 2012. 
Courtesy of and photograph by KnitRiot Collective.
figure 7
Tag on backside of knitted home. Yarn Bombing Protest of Home Foreclosures. Los Angeles, US. 
June 2012. Courtesy of and photograph by KnitRiot Collective.
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(“Yarnbombing” 2012). Fracking is a process of drilling and injecting fluid 
of various chemicals into the ground at a high enough pressure to fracture 
shale rocks to release the natural gas contained inside. The shale gas drilling 
technique is now common in the US and is being introduced and vehe-
mently protested in Europe. Stanley Reed points out that “Environmental-
ists, as well as many people living near possible shale gas sites, worry about 
the huge quantities of water that fracking uses. They also fear that shale gas 
will prolong the fossil fuel era by reducing the incentive to switch to cleaner 
but more expensive energy sources like solar and wind” (2012). For this 
protest, urban guerrilla knitters tied blue triangular crocheted tags to railings 
and trees to which was attached a blue note. On one side of the note was a 
diagram of a drilling rig; the other side sported the phrase “Against Water 
F.O.W.L.E.R.S. Awareness Campaign” with contact details for the group and 
notification of an upcoming December 1, 2012 planned demonstration.7 
The acronym F.O.W.L.E.R.S. stands for “Fracking Our Water Leaves Environ-
mental Residential Stress.” The effects of fracking are still being discovered, 
but so far the chemicals used have been linked to kidney and liver damage. 
The practice has also “been linked to earthquakes in the US, witnessed in 
states such as California, Ohio, and Arkansas” (“Environmental” 2012). The 
blue triangles dangling from railings and trees drew attention to the protest. 
The color blue is an ironic pun, connoting both clean skies and sadness, 
signaling both purity and contamination.
On February 16, 2012, a stretch of Highway 774 near Pincher Creek 
in Alberta, Canada was yarn bombed by a group protesting the practice of 
logging that was taking place just 4 kilometers south of the highway. (See 
figure 8.)
Yarn bombers targeted trees so that those who passed by would “pause 
to reflect on the ‘knitting together’ of people, their communities, and the 
beauty in the space that surrounds them” (Castle 2012). With its perspec-
tive by incongruity – human made afghans in nature on trees – passersby 
would surely notice the installation and pause. A spokesperson for the group 
described the installation as “creating a voice for wild spaces” (Castle 2012). 
The knitted afghan on each tree works as a metaphor supplying warmth, 
nurturing, and protection against the devastation of logging while at the 
7 Over 300 protestors held a demonstration in London on December 2, 2012 
(“Environmental” 2012). 
figure 8
Protest Against Logging, Pincher Creek, Alberta, Canada. February 16, 2012. Courtesy of and 
photograph by Barbara Amos, Art Works for Wild Spaces.
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deed, the internet has been absolutely vital to circulating and sharing yarn 
bombing strategies through viral videos, blogs, and social networks. On the 
first International Yarn Bombing Day, June 11, 2011, founded by Joann 
Matvichuk of Lethbridge, Alberta, Canada, Matvichuk wrote on her blog: 
I had no idea when I came up with the idea for International Yarnbombing 
Day that it would have gotten this big. I figured a few hundred Canadians and 
Americans would be participating but I had no idea that I would have people 
from all over the World including countries like Iceland, Norway, Egypt, Israel, 
Germany and Australia. (2011)
Virtually every continent has participated. It has been an annual event across 
the world ever since 2011. This widespread and ongoing activity confirms 
that yarn bombing is a global community movement. In the words of one 
reporter, “This global reach is one reason why some yarn-bombers believe 
their work has the potential to make political statements” (“Yarn-Bombing” 
2010). Crossing physical, ideological, and political borders via the internet, 
yarn bombers can find those who share similar political views even when 
the politics of their individual countries are very different. As Kock and 
Villadsen point out, “Globalization and digital media are two major factors 
creating increased attention to national and global citizenship, and to the 
opportunities and the need to communicate across space and other barriers” 
(2012, p. 4). Yarn bombing clearly fits this contemporary paradigm.
Conclusion
Throughout the globe, yarn graffiti activists juxtapose the softness of yarn 
against the hardness of the issues they protest and the sterility of the spaces 
on which they install them. Often, they juxtapose the beauty of the colors 
and design against the ugliness of the issues at hand. As one guerilla knitter 
puts it, “this style of folk craft renovation is ... integral to altering and beauti-
fying ugly aspects of urban architecture” (van de Velde 2010). Not everyone 
shares their passion or vision; indeed, some are downright hostile to yarn 
graffiti. In some ways, it matters little what the exact response is as it is more 
important that there is a response, for as Simone Chambers, whom Kock 
and Villadsen also cite in “Rhetorical Citizenship as a Conceptual Frame in 
Academe,” says: “If rhetoric in general is the study of how speech affects an 
audience then deliberative rhetoric must be about the way speech induces 
same time shouting a message of “do not touch me.” The notion that knit-
ting ‘knits’ folks together has a long history and this pun is certainly evoked 
by the colorful ‘protected’ trees in the ‘wild.’ 
Ephemeral strength
Feminists Betsey Greer and Debbie Stoller8 argue that the resurgence of 
interest in knitting and crocheting, especially among third-wave femi-
nists, comes from an epistemic perspective that values making over made 
– that values production over consumerism, and process over product 
(Greer 2008; Stoller 2004). Yarn bombing fits this paradigm because it is 
an ephemeral, transient art. For example, self-described yarn bombers on 
Flickr were asked “How long do your yarn bombs last?” Over a dozen 
answered. All agreed that length of depends on the location and on the 
design. One reported, “I had one last less than 24 hours;” another said 
“we’ve got some that stay up until the weather kills them; others disappear 
much sooner for reasons unknown.” Still another wrote: “Really depends 
on so many things. The shortest I’ve had was less than half an hour and 
another I’ve had up for over a year” (“How Long,” 2009). Yarn installations 
are often taken down by the public who see them as a nuisance, the police 
who see them as vandalism, or even those who see the whimsy of them and 
appreciate the art and message often take them precisely because of those 
very reasons. Not everyone, in other words, is accepting of or enthusiastic 
and uncritical about the practice of yarn bombing. But we should not ex-
pect unified responses. What is important is that there are responses to the 
act. Given that it is unclear how long a piece will remain, yarn bombers are 
clearly more invested in the process of creating the installation than in the 
finished product itself. That is, it is the performance of yarn bombing that 
creates the meaning rather than thing itself and that engenders a response 
– whether good or bad. 
Valuing the doing over the done and the self-made over the mass made 
is to claim slow process practices as a reaction against the staggering rate of 
technological change today, what Colin Bain calls “hyperculture” (2002). 
Paradoxically, however, it is this speedy race of communication technology 
that has facilitated yarn bombing to spread across the globe so quickly. In-
8 Debbie Stoller is founder of BUST magazine and the writer of the Stitch and Bitch series of 
knitting and crochet books.
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(2001, p. 279). What Shaw neglects in his advice are those who co-participate 
as interlocutors to take up the work on issues long deferred. As Kock and 
Villadsen remind us, “Public discourse is concrete, manifest, omnipresent, 
visible, and accessible for all; anyone can relate to it, and it is the conduit of 
numerous societal functions and dynamisms” (2012, p. 4). The global reach 
of the everyday rhetorical citizenship practice of yarn bombing offers the pos-
sibility of extending social and economic justice across the world. Bring it on. 
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On Trees: Protest between the Symbolic 
and the Material
K AT I H A N N K E N- I L L J E S
Once there was a tree, and she loved a little boy.
And every day the boy would come and he would gather her leaves.
And make them into crowns and play king of the forest.
He would climb up her trunk and swing from her branches. And eat apples.
And they would play hide and go seek. 
And when he was tired, he would sleep in her shade. And the boy loved the tree – 
very much.
And the tree was happy. 
(Shel Silverstein, The Giving Tree)
Introduction
This paper is about trees. About the trees in the “Schlossgarten” – the castle 
garden – in the city of Stuttgart, Germany, and how they have shaped the 
protest against the remodeling of Stuttgart’s main station. Thereby this pa-
per also aims to establish a linkage of two terms and concepts: materiality 
and argumentation. It starts from the assumption that the role of “things” 
in argumentation and their relation to symbolic action are worth explor-
ing. The interest in the materiality of communication and the materiality in 
communication has been growing in the last twenty to thirty years. One of 
the cornerstones of this interest is marked by a book edited by Gumbrecht 
and Pfeiffer (1988) with exactly this title: Materiality of Communication. 
The chapters of that volume circle around the material aspects of media that 
enable communication. Many of them stress the surface – aspects of com-
munication, which do not necessarily refer to some deeper meaning, but 
rather function through (bodily) perception and experience. Gumbrecht, for 
instance, in his chapter (1988) already hints at his later theory of presence by 
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formulating a tension between the rhythm (open to bodily experience) and 
the meaning of texts. The underlying assumption when discussing the mate-
riality of communication is that it determines not only how something can 
be communicated but what can be communicated. A public park allows for 
other means today, with a combination of mobile, internet–based means of 
communication and ‘traditional’ paper-based forms like leaflets and posters, 
than it did twenty years ago. At the same time, a park still allows for entirely 
different forms of symbolic action than a parliament. 
What I am interested in moves one step further and relates to work 
in the rhetoric of protest: how non-discursive entities – things – influence 
discourse, frame argumentation and thereby function rhetorically. This is 
somewhat in line with the actor-network theory as put forward by Latour 
(2005). He suggests describing practices while refraining from prior strong 
conceptions of human action. Rather, the researcher should stay open and 
describe the center of agency, and this center can be human as well as non-
human. Latour applies the term “actor” also to non-human agents. However, 
when he applies the term “actor,” the concept of “acting” is quite different 
from that in a strong human-action paradigm. As Latour puts it, “an ‘actor’ 
in the hyphenated expression actor-network is not the source of an action 
but the moving target of a vast array of entities swarming toward it” and “to 
use the word ‘actor’ means that it’s never clear who and what is acting when 
we act since an actor on stage is never alone in acting” (2005, p. 46). It is in 
this sense that I am interested in the entanglement of different things and 
humans acting rhetorically. It might prove fruitful to conceive of the things 
– in this case the trees – not only as something that is being acted upon, but 
as things which themselves have agency. So the questions addressed in this 
essay are: How is the materiality of the specific trees incorporated in the pro-
test? What kind of protest practices are the trees subjected to? How are the 
trees acted upon by the protesters? How could the trees in the Schlossgarten 
become such a strong and central argument theme? And also: what can a 
case study of the Stuttgart protests show about the status of “things” and 
their materiality for public discourse? 
This focus is grounded in my interest in public discourse as a process 
between different participants/citizens and in my interest in the significance 
of rhetoric for a democratic society. As Kock and Villadsen put it: “Rhetoric 
is at the core of being a citizen” (2012, p. 5). The focus on processes rather 
than products of rhetorical action allows for how questions rather than why 
questions: how do participants take part in public discourse, how do they 
enact rhetorical citizenship? This then includes taking into account not only 
traditional rhetorical means (speeches and debates) but all forms employed 
by citizens performing citizenship. Asen stresses this notion of multimodal-
ity when he writes: “In drawing attention to the citizenship as a process, 
a discourse theory recognizes the fluid, multimodal, and quotidian enact-
ments in a multiple public sphere” (2004, p. 191).
Before moving to the method section and my analysis, let me first set 
the scene by briefly describing the history of the protest movement against 
the remodeling of the train station. In 1995 the German federal railways, 
the federal government, the Land of Baden-Württemberg and the city of 
Stuttgart agreed on the project to remodel Stuttgart’s main station and turn 
it from an over-ground dead-end into an underground through-station. This 
project has become known as Stuttgart 21 or just S21. From the beginning 
several environmentalist groups questioned the project for a variety of dif-
ferent reasons: among them cost, threat to the ground water (Stuttgart has 
mineral water springs), logistics, and the threat to the “Schlossgarten.” This 
protest stayed within smaller circles. It existed, but was neither heard nor 
seen much publicly. Then in 2007 more than 60,000 citizens of Stuttgart 
moved for a public referendum about Stuttgart 21. The motion was dis-
missed by the majority of the city council.
In 2010 the beginning of the visible construction work drew closer, in-
cluding the demolition of one part – the North wing – of the station building. 
Under the heading of the slogan “stay up” (oben bleiben) a form of public 
protest arose that Stuttgart had never encountered before. Since then Stuttgart 
has seen “Monday rallies” every week – ranging from a couple of hundreds 
of participants to 100,000. The label “Monday protests” was not chosen by 
chance: since the revolution in the former GDR, instigated by the “Monday 
protests” in Leipzig, among others, this label has been used by rallies that mean 
to place themselves in line with an oppressed people against an, at best, disen-
gaged government. Then in July 2010, a steady picket was established in the 
Schlossgarten by the protesters, trees were occupied and some tree houses built.
On September 30, 2010 thousands of citizens, mainly high school 
students, rallied against the felling of 250 trees in the Schlossgarten. The 
police answered with pepper spray and water cannons. These means were 
widely perceived as too harsh and inappropriate. In a legendary TV-news in-
terview anchor Marietta Slomka interrupted the Minister of the Interior, as 
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he described and justified the police action, with the question: “Are you now 
actually talking about the Swabian citizenry? It sounds like you are talking 
about a war zone” (“Reden Sie denn jetzt über das schwäbische Bürgertum? 
Das hört sich an, als würden Sie über den Krieg berichten”). This quote puts 
in a nutshell the controversy that accompanied the S21 protests: what does 
it mean to be a good citizen? How should citizenship be enacted? On Oc-
tober 1 between 50,000 and 100,000 protesters rallied against Stuttgart 21. 
September 30 gave rise to an even stronger protest movement. The Schloss-
garten at that time was an assemblage of tents, occupied trees, informa-
tion booths, the picket, percussion groups, and overall a very lively, colorful 
crowd. The protests had altered the face of the city, and a specific mode of 
involvement, a specific mode of “being a citizen” (see Asen 2004, 195) had 
been introduced. And this way of being a citizen was not orderly, but loud 
and colorful, representing in some ways the “rowdiness” that Ivie (2002) 
identifies as central to rhetorical deliberation (see p. 279), although rowdi-
ness might be too strong a term. At the same time the government of Baden-
Württemberg initiated an arbitration procedure, which led to few results and 
only minor changes in the project. In 2012, already under the newly elected 
Green/Social Democrat administration, the majority of citizens in Baden-
Württemberg (and in Stuttgart) voted for the continuation of the project. 
Shortly after that, 250 more trees were felled in the “Schlossgarten.”
What struck me when looking more closely at the argumentative 
strategies of proponents, and especially opponents, was the motif of the tree. 
This motif in itself is not unusual in this kind of protest. The tree is an em-
blem often featured in environmentalists’ discourse and protest, and it is a 
topos often taken up in arguments about “green” themes. What struck me 
in the protest against S21 was that it did not only take up the prominent 
topos of a tree discursively, but that the protestors’ argumentation was inex-
tricably bound to the concrete, particular trees. One could probably argue 
that the trees themselves protested, had agency in the protest. In this paper 
I want to offer an analysis of the S21 controversy by following a theme and 
a materiality through the discourse. I shall first lay out my method and then 
analyze how “the tree” as an argument and a materiality functioned during 
the controversy. Finally, I will tie this analysis to the discussion on material-
ity and discourse. I will argue that one cannot grasp the impact of the argu-
mentation when taking it into account only as discursive entities, but that 
discourse and materiality are interwoven.
Method
This analysis performs a form of argumentation analysis that is informed by 
my interest in the development or career of argument themes: how do argu-
ments develop over time in a specific discourse, how are they employed, how 
do they fail? So my interest is not in the argument as a product but rather as 
a becoming, as something that is in flux while it is employed in the discourse 
and itself influences the discourse it enables. In an earlier project on the 
career of statements in criminal cases this included following the career of 
arguments through different materialities: files, informal chats, lawyer-client 
conferences and trials.1 For the current project on trees, I mainly relied on 
websites, info brochures, interviews, field notes and the trees themselves.
This interest is informed by ethnographic work – although in itself 
it does not represent “real” ethnographic work. As Endres and Senda-Cook 
(2011) argue, the rhetorical impact of “place” as a materiality can best be 
grasped when experiencing it, when “being there” is part of the research, as 
it allows one to access participant categories. This hints at an ethnographic 
approach where participant observation, or rather participating observation, 
is key. At the same time it needs to be accompanied by the alienation of that 
which is being seen, heard, experienced. As Ammann and Hirschauer stress, 
“ethnography is in some ways about, after having understood something, 
being even more astonished by it. Familiarity is not a goal, but a point that 
always needs to be overcome anew” (1997, p. 29).2
Focusing on the intertwinement of the material and the symbolic also 
invites what Marcus (1995) called “multisited ethnography.” This approach 
answers the conditions of modern life, being held in a tension between the 
local and the global, as well as the attention to the ethnography of one’s own 
culture, by suggesting that one not focus on a single, specially circumscribed 
field, but rather follow something (the people, the thing, the metaphor, the 
story, the conflict, the life) through discourse, practice, culture (Marcus 
1995, p. 106) in order to be able to produce and appropriate analysis and 
thick description of cultural phenomena. In my analysis I am following two 
entities: the theme of the tree in the S21 controversy seen through the dis-
course, and the actual trees in Stuttgart. Two entities that, although distin-
guishable from each other, are intertwined at the same time. The underlying 
1 See for example Scheffer, Hannken-Illjes and Kozin (2010).
2 Translation my own.
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assumption here is that following the trees will also show how arguments 
and their premises are being produced. My interest is not so much in a 
single snapshot of an argument as product, but rather in the becoming of 
arguments. As Latour put it, “we are going from final products to produc-
tion, from ‘cold’ stable objects to ‘warmer’ and unstable ones” (2005, p. 21). 
Thus this work is a hint at an ethnography of argumentation, as has been 
advocated by Prior (2005). Prior has asked argumentation studies “to give 
the diagrams a bit of a rest and consider seriously the implications of seeing 
argumentation as sociohistoric practice, to ask how pedagogies can help at-
tune students to the work of appropriating situated knowledge practices, to 
open up the ethnography of argumentation as a branch of the larger ethnog-
raphy of communication” (Prior 2005, p. 133). This includes focussing not 
so much on the premises and the inferential relationships between them but 
rather on the way these premises are constructed and become available. But 
note again: my approach and analysis in this research are not ethnographic, 
they rather borrow insights and concepts from ethnography to conduct a 
rhetorical analysis (and in certain ways an argumentation analysis). By doing 
so I mean to suggest that taking up ethnography in argumentation analysis 
would be extremely fruitful.3 
As my starting point I utilized different forms of data: the website and 
the activities by a group called “die Parkschützer” (the park guardians) and 
“die Baumpaten” (the Godparents of trees), interviews with protestors and 
my notes. With all this, I followed the trees.
Trees
The tree is a central metaphor and material topos. It stands for knowledge, 
for life, for duration, for shelter. A vast number of literary works centering 
around childhood speak of trees – trees that protect, that become witnesses, 
become friends. It is not by accident that trees in The Lord of the Rings are 
the oldest creatures and among the most powerful. I would need an extra 
3 My reluctance to position this work more clearly in the ethnographic strand is twofold: 
most importantly, I started to work on this project after the trees were gone, so although I 
have experienced the protest in the Schlossgarten, I have not done so as a researcher. Also, 
this project stands currently at the beginning. I am still continuing to gather data, mainly 
from interviews with different activists. So what this paper presents are first outcomes to be 
supplemented in the future.
essay, if not an extra book, to lay out in what different senses “the tree” bears 
in different disciplines. Not only the tree in itself, but also the planting of 
trees can have a strong rhetorical impact. In 1985 Joseph Beuys, a German 
artist well known for his concept of “the social sculpture” and for the state-
ment that every person is an artist, started his art project “7,000 oaks” at 
the documenta in Kassel. He framed this project as an act of creation: “…
here, there is nothing to hope, or to believe, or to doubt, but here something 
is being created, that in itself is a creation” (Beuys, Blume and Rappmann 
2006, p. 25).
In the Stuttgart protests, the planting of trees was one of the rhetori-
cal practices: well-known protestors planted a “Stuttgart-21-resistance-tree”. 
This tree became an object of controversy, being attacked by the proponents 
of S21 and planted anew, resulting in at least three “resistance trees” being 
planted.
 Especially in environmentalists’ discourse and protests the tree is a 
central theme. The beginning of the environmentalist concern in Germany 
in the 1970s, for example, was marked by the concern about the “German 
Forests,” which were threatened by pollution and acid rain. This importance 
of the motif of the tree is also reflected by the label sometimes used for 
environmentalists: tree-huggers. This nickname – often pejoratively used – 
points to another important aspects of the tree as an argument theme:4 it 
oscillates between the botanical and the human. Trees, it seems, are often 
granted personhood, anthropomorphized. Some statements of the “godpar-
ents of trees” in Stuttgart point to this: “A tree is a creature like you and me” 
(Ein Baum ist ein Lebewesen wie du und ich). “The animal, the human, the 
tree, they all share the same breath” (Das Tier, der Mensch, der Baum, sie 
alle teilen denselben Atem). “Who cuts – kills – a tree is a sinner” (Wer einen 
Baum fällt – tötet – ist ein Frevler).
Looked at from an argumentation point of view, one could argue with 
Cox (1982) that the tree is here taken as “unique.” Cox introduces unique-
ness as one aspect of the topos of the irreparable. This topos he takes from 
Perelman and Olbrechts-Tyteca “as one of several ‘lines of argument relating 
to the preferable’” (1982, p. 228). The trees here are depicted as irretrievable 
once cut down and are thereby anthropomorphized. It also offers an expla-
nation why the argument often brought forward by the proponents – that, 
4 On the difference of topos and argument theme see Hannken-Illjes (2008).
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although 250 trees will have to go, 5,000 will be planted once the construc-
tion work is done – fails to persuade the protesters.5 They reply that these 
trees will need a very long time to grow into trees of comparable strength. 
And something else seems to be at work here: that you cannot just replace a 
tree with another one, as you cannot just substitute a person for another one.
But I shall stop this line of analysis before it has really started. Conven-
tional arguments employing the theme “tree” can easily be identified in the 
broader environmentalist discourse as well as in the specific protest against 
Stuttgart 21 (which is not solely a protest out of environmentalist consider-
ations). Those would include the tree as a habitat: you cannot fell this tree 
because it gives shelter to insects and mammals. In the case of Stuttgart 21 
this argument has been put forward with respect to the hermit beetle, which 
lived in the trees and is threatened with extinction. Also the trees would be 
depicted as useful, as they clean the air and provide a resting place. This ar-
gument for Stuttgart 21 would take into account the geography of the city, 
which sits like a cauldron within steep hills, with the park and its trees as a 
central area to provide the inner city with fresh air. It is not overly surprising 
that these common arguments can be found in the Stuttgart 21 discourse. 
Analyzing them could be an interesting and worthwhile undertaking. At 
the same time, these arguments seem to be interchangeable among various 
protest sites, had they not been accompanied by references to the concrete 
trees in the Schlossgarten and the practices that surrounded them. Here the 
conventional argument themes with their history are coupled with the ma-
teriality that can be experienced: a coupling of a general discursive unit with 
a specific thing that is open to experience.
This coupling and the notion of specificity are represented by many 
personal narratives, especially by older protesters. It is the theme of these 
trees as survivors. These trees were protected by the citizens during World 
War II, when the inner city of Stuttgart was bombed. This is a narrative with 
a clearly argumentative function that appears in very different forms and 
functions as one of the leading arguments.6 And these trees were left stand-
ing during the cold winters (“hunger winters”) just after the Second World 
5 See open letter by the Parkschützer to the mayor of Stuttgart who wrote in a public letter 
addressed to two children that although some trees would need to be felled, many more 
would afterwards be planted. http://www.parkschuetzer.de/wissenswertes/habensiekinder
6 This was also apparent in one of the interviews with participants of the protest.
War, when the citizens of Stuttgart used pretty much everything they could 
find as firewood. As one user on the platform of the “Parkschützer” (the park 
guardians) writes: 
Stuttgart’s green lung must not be excavated, otherwise we will all have shortage 
of breath. Also, the park was given to us by King Wilhelm, who was close to the 
citizens. Nobody can just take it away from us. In the hard winters of the 40ies 
in the last century, the freezing people saved this park and did not cut it down. 
Because it has given them and still gives us a place for recreation and health. Hence: 
“No excavators in the park!” (“Stuttgarts grüne Lunge darf nicht angebaggert 
werden, sonst bekommen wir alle Atemnot. Außerdem wurde uns der Park vom 
bürgernahen König Wilhelm geschenkt. Den Park darf uns niemand einfach 
wegnehmen. In den harten Wintern der 40er Jahre des vergangenen Jahrhunderts 
schonten frierende Bürger diesen Park und holzten ihn nicht ab, grade weil er 
ihnen und uns bis heute zur Erholung und Gesundheit dient. Also Bagger weg vom 
Park!!!!!” (roberta penz)).7 
From a formal point of view, what is employed here is a classical “more or 
less” topos. At the same time it becomes obvious that this is about specific 
trees. So I want to shift the focus to those specific trees and how they were 
acted upon in order to make them meaningful and a part in the protest.
Guarding the guardian
In 2010 and 2011 the “Schlossgarten” was – next to the building of the 
main station itself – the central place for protest. Here 250 trees were sup-
posed to be felled for preliminary construction work. Starting in the middle 
of 2010, protesters occupied the “Schlossgarten” and along with it some of 
the trees. Trees were being decorated, tents were built underneath the trees, 
the picket had its place among the trees, political and cultural events took 
place, there was music, there was food. The park was also a place for spiritual 
practices like prayers and meditations. The “Schlossgarten” and especially 
its trees became a place for protest and exemplified what Endres and Senda-
Cook stated for places of protest in general: “Place is a performer along with 
activists in making and unmaking the possibilities of protest” (2001, p. 258). 
The trees were decorated and utilized in quite different ways. One tree had 
7 http://www.parkschuetzer.de/php/public.php?page=discussions, accessed 28.12.2012
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so many teddy bears – large and small ones – strung around it that its trunk 
was barely visible. Others were decorated with teddy bears and political leaf-
lets. One trunk held a large poster, reading “My friend, the tree. This tree 
must not die and must not fall. Then my heart would go with him.” In the 
treetops many houses were built and constantly occupied. This image of the 
occupied tree is one I want to take a closer look at. Here two arguments, two 
topoi merge that at first sight might appear to be contradictory: the tree as 
shelter and the tree as in need of protection.
On the one hand there is the tree as a shelter: The occupation makes 
the notion of the tree as shelter open to experience. Unlike the argument of 
the habitat, the shelter for the hermit beetle, this shelter can be seen and felt. 
Anybody could climb into the tree house and experience what it means to be 
protected by a tree. And many people will probably remember what it meant 
to climb into a tree as a child and being protected and shielded from view by 
it. These trees were not like shelters, they were shelters. These same practices 
– exhibiting the tree as a shelter – feed into another topos. By making the 
strength of the trees visible, their vulnerability is stressed at the same time. The 
trees are at the same time depicted as in need of protection, most clearly in the 
notion by one group of protesters of the tree as a godchild. This group of pro-
testers called itself “Baumpaten” (tree sponsors or tree godparents). I chose the 
latter translation because – as also evidenced by the teddy bears – at least some 
of the protesters related to the trees as to persons, vulnerable persons. Hence 
being a tree-godparent implied taking responsibility for someone vulnerable 
and possibly in need of protection. What is striking, again, is that these people 
were not “like godparents,” they were godparents. This is underscored in their 
vow: “This tree has a godparent. I allow everybody to come to my godtree, to 
rest in his shade, to meet others there, to celebrate, sing, laugh, sleep, just do 
what you like. I would enjoy more godparents. I ask everybody to protect my 
godtree, It is prohibited to cause harm to my godtree.”8 (“Dieser Baum hat ei-
nen Paten. Ich erlaube jedem, meinen Patenbaum aufzusuchen, sich in seinem 
Schatten auszuruhen, sich mit anderen dort zu treffen, dort zu feiern, singen, 
lachen, schlafen, einfach zu tun was gefällt. Ich freue mich über weitere Paten. 
Ich bitte jeden, meinen Patenbaum nach besten Kräften zu schützen. Es ist 
verboten meinem Patenbaum Schaden zuzufügen”). This vow establishes a 
close relation of the individual protester to the individual tree. 
8 www.baumpaten-schlossgarten.de/?seite=zertifikat, as of 14.01.2013
By means of the specific, material tree, open to experience, two 
seemingly opposed arguments are integrated: the tree as shelter and the tree 
as godchild. Something (or someone) who protects is, while protecting, in 
need of protection. One could argue at this point that the tree functions 
simply as a non-technical proof in the Aristotelian sense and thereby in 
itself does not belong to the realm of rhetoric. As Aristotle puts it, those 
proofs are “not supplied by the speaker but are at the outset” (1980, p. 12). 
He also says of them that they are used rather than invented. However, the 
trees are not just employed by rhetors, but rhetors, by granting them per-
sonhood and turning them into shelters, act upon them in a way to turn 
them into actors that cannot be dismissed. It is an essential part of making 
the trees part of the protest to transform them into actors themselves. This 
position of the trees in the protest might also explain how the felling of the 
trees was treated.
In February 2012, 250 trees were cut down in the Schlossgarten. 
The trees are gone. You can look at what is left: a void – an empty space, 
a construction site. Thereby a place for protest, the central place of the 
movement, is gone and the tree as an argument has become unavailable, 
or rather, publicly invisible. At the same time the trees are still available for 
the protest, but in a very different form. Many of the trees – that is, their 
large trunks – have been taken to a forest, close to the city center. Here, in 
the Feuerbacher forest, I encountered what could be called a public view-
ing of the deceased and a death watch. I first saw this mourning ritual on 
a Youtube video,9 documenting the whereabouts of the trees and talking 
about them. When I saw the video, my first impression was that now the 
protest had become somewhat obscure. Sanctuary lamps could be seen in 
the trees, the faces of the people on the videos were those of mourners. But 
when I went to the forest to look at this myself, my impression changed 
somewhat: there was a sign above the trees, stating that these were cut 
down in the Schlossgarten. I first went there around Christmas, and al-
though there were no candles, the trees were decorated with stars made of 
straw. One could even argue that they still demanded attention, that they 
could not “just be dismissed” by the protesters. What they demanded was 
a form of burial and mourning. This was certainly no form of protest that 
9 http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=syciS9-ItJ4 (last access 05.07.2013), also http://www.
youtube.com/watch?v=yAcFoOtELTs (last access 05.07.2013)
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was directed towards other people, but it seemed to function for the protest 
movement as a form of internal identification work – a view also voiced by 
several protesters themselves. 
Conclusion
In this analysis I have tried to show how the materiality of the trees in the 
Schlossgarten fed into the protest against Stuttgart 21, and how the mate-
rial is related to the symbolic. Not only is the tree material and a “thing” 
acted upon, it even in a way becomes an actor of the protest itself. This is 
due to strategies of anthropomorphization – especially in evidence in the 
discursive and topical power of the tree and in the way the trees become a 
central locus of protest practices, discursive as well as material. The trees were 
taken up in their specificity in different ways: through personal narratives of 
the Schlossgarten and its history, by decorating them with political as well 
with personal items, and, not least, by inhabiting them and making them 
the very place of protest. All these ways of acting upon the trees used the 
experienceable materiality of the tree: the wood, which holds posters and tree 
houses, gives shelter, can be touched, smelled, leaned against. At the same 
time these ways of integrating the trees into the protest relate to the strength 
the tree has as a topos in very different discourses. Here the material and the 
symbolic are bound together and refer to one another. This interaction of a 
strong topos with the material trees that allowed for a wide range of practices 
could also explain its potency: the trees were common and specific enough 
to integrate very different forms of protest and political beliefs. Thereby “the 
trees” opened the protest up to a wider public and offered a form of common 
ground with personal experience attached to it. Thus they also offered a space 
for those protesters who usually would not take part in a public protest. 
In this way the case of the S21 protests illustrates what the concept of 
rhetorical citizenship refers to: the focus on the enactment of citizenship and 
its rhetorical processes and forms. The S21 protests show that – and how – 
citizenship is not only a status but at the same time needs to be performed, 
to be enacted. The S21 protests achieved a broad mobilization of citizens by 
relying on practices and topoi that centered around the park and the trees 
that allowed a very diverse movement to unify. Interestingly enough, the 
notion of what it means to be a citizen in the city of Stuttgart, to take the 
park as a gift to the citizens of Stuttgart, addressed the concept of citizen-
ship explicitly. After the felling, “the trees” allowed for rituals that might 
have helped some protesters to reform and regroup through symbolic action 
whose aim was more internal than external. The mourning here represents a 
strategy to use when something has been irreparably destroyed, aimed at the 
reintegration of a group rather than affecting an opponent in a controversy. 
At the same time the trees seemed to demand this kind of ritual treatment. 
In conclusion, the materiality of place and thing affected participants in 
such a way that the theme “tree” was taken up not only intellectually, but 
also by experience.
“Well,” said the tree, straightening herself up as she could, “well an old stump is 
good for sitting and resting. Come Boy, come sit down. Sit down and rest.” And 
the boy did. And the tree was happy… The end. (Shel Silverstein, The Giving Tree)
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“Cicero Would Love This Show”:
The Celebration of Rhetoric and 
Citizenship in The West Wing
A N N E U L R I C H 
Television shows, citizenship, and the display of rhetoric 
“The more diverse a society becomes, the more pressing is the need for pub-
lic reflection on what is best for the society as such and not just for its seg-
ments – in other words, the need for deliberation, for rhetoric.” According 
to Christian Kock and Lisa Villadsen (2012, p. 4), rhetoric plays a central 
role in defining citizenship and in connecting individuals and groups with 
abstract political entities like the “nation” or the “state.” In a face-to-face de-
mocracy like the ancient polis, the communitarian aspect was very concrete 
because citizens knew each other and participated together in the ekklesia 
and dikasteria and therefore had a clear sense of membership and affilia-
tion. But in contemporary societies, as Dominique Leydet (2011) rightly 
remarks, “[c]itizens do not meet under an oak tree to formulate the laws; 
they are basically strangers and citizens’ involvement in the politics of rep-
resentative democracies is episodic and diluted. Politics in this context can-
not be expected to play a central role in most individuals’ lives; something 
else must generate the trust and loyalty necessary to the functioning of a 
political community.” But what are trust-generating factors in a fragmented 
and diverse society? In this paper, I argue that television can be an alterna-
tive forum for public deliberation and the formation of citizenship. Kock 
and Villadsen would claim that television involves citizens “at the receiving 
end of public deliberation” who engage themselves “in ‘inner’ deliberation.” 
(2012, p. 5) The authors are certainly thinking of factual television, such as 
electoral debates, news broadcasting, talk shows or other forms of political 
journalism. But I want to show that fictional television, especially the politi-
cal television series, can also be interpreted as both active and passive forms 
of public engagement and that their depiction of the art of rhetoric is worth 
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investigating in the context of rhetorical citizenship. In fact, it is crucial to 
explore fictional forms of public engagement as a reaction to and extension 
of factual forms of citizenship. 
There has been a renaissance of political issues in television series 
during the past years, for instance in series like Borgen (DR1, Denmark, 
2010–), The Thick of It (BBC, UK, 2005-2012), Veep (HBO, USA, 2012–), 
or Scandal (ABC, USA, 2012–), to name only some of the most prominent. 
Their tradition goes back to UK series like Yes, Minister and Yes, Prime Min-
ister (BBC Two, UK, 1980–1988; repr. Gold, UK, 2013–) or House of Cards 
which was recently re-adapted for the US (BBC, UK, 1990; repr. Netflix, 
USA, 2013–). Each of these series chooses politicians and their staff as the 
main characters and the political stage as central scenery, showing everyday 
political procedures like negotiations, photo-ops, press interviews, etc., as 
well as extraordinary situations like general elections, evolving national cri-
ses or private scandals. 
Most of these series paint a rather cynical picture of politics. They 
use the political more as a backdrop against which a further drama or an-
other sitcom unfolds. Thus, the plot has political connotations, but is not 
politically motivated – the only political purpose of such series is, at best, 
to question the uprightness of politics. The West Wing, in contrast, is more 
serious about politics – despite its orientation to entertainment. While other 
series mercilessly exaggerate the depiction of politicians and their staffers, 
The West Wing remains more realistic and therefore develops a fictional but 
quite plausible alternative to “real” politics. Aaron Sorkin, the creator of the 
series, imagined a fictional US administration that differed quite clearly from 
the Clinton Administration at the time. By making viewers identify with the 
fictional president and his staff, the series sought to activate their desire for 
political change; in this way, the series has a relatively strong political agenda.
Much has been already written about The West Wing as a political 
television series. But only a few studies have drawn attention to the political 
rhetoric of the show. I want to concentrate on the show’s diverse depictions 
of political rhetoric in order to crystallize the show’s own conception of de-
liberative rhetoric as a specific modality of public engagement. First, I will 
draw a sketch of the series’ general plot and cast and introduce show runner 
Aaron Sorkin as a political orator. Then I will focus on three different rhe-
torical aspects to characterize the show’s specific enhancement of rhetorical 
citizenship. 
An entertaining civics lesson 
The West Wing aired on NBC in the United States from September 1999 to 
May 2006 and was created by Aaron Sorkin, an award-winning US-Amer-
ican screenwriter and television producer. The show sought to entertain its 
viewers in a specific way, by addressing them as citizens and by showing 
them the process of making political rhetoric, and not just as an ordinary TV 
audience interested in primetime entertainment – even if the viewers were 
not US citizens. Its appeal to citizenship goes beyond national borders and 
involves the representation of politics and political rhetoric in a plausible 
and skillful way – almost based on the following aphorism quoted by The 
West Wing character Sam Seaborn, “Aristotle says, a probable impossibility 
is preferable to an improbable possibility” (Season 4, Episode 8: Process Sto-
ries). In seven seasons and 155 episodes in total, the series accompanied the 
fictional US-American President Josiah ‘Jed’ Bartlet and his well-educated 
and quick-witted White House staff during his two terms of office. The West 
Wing is not only a show about politics, it is a political show. According to 
the taxonomy of Terry Christensen and Peter J. Haas, The West Wing is a 
show with both political content and political intent and is therefore “ex-
plicitly political”, i.e. it depicts various aspects of the political system as well 
as delivering a political message (2005, p. 8). That’s why I consider Sorkin 
to be a political orator who was actively engaging in public discourse and 
openly performing his vision of citizenship through the show. Although a 
great number of people were involved in the production of the series (John 
Wells and Thomas Schlamme, for instance, were both important players), 
Sorkin had a crucial role in the creative production process and can therefore 
be considered to be the main author and producer of the show. From a rhe-
torical perspective, his name stands for the collective authorship of the show. 
Who are the characters in the show, and what is their relation to 
rhetoric? Martin Sheen plays US President Jed Bartlet, a president that is 
often described as an idealized version of left-leaning presidents like Jimmy 
Carter or Bill Clinton (Rothöhler 2012, p. 19). The character is catholic, a 
Democrat, a Nobel-prize winning economist, a quick-witted, elitist wise-
guy with an immense instinct for power, and a dedicated and responsible, 
but also very hard-to-assess, “leader of the free world”. As a bit of a political 
pun, the fictional President is a direct descendant of a certain Josiah Bartlet, 
a real-world signatory of the Declaration of Independence (Clark 2005, p. 
224). Jed Bartlet is conceived as a charismatic character for a well-educated 
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public: he received a comprehensive education in the humanities, is well-
versed in the Bible, and likes to “entertain” his staff with erudite anecdotes, 
preferably in Latin (Cicero would love that, too). Although he is thought to 
be a “good guy,” the character becomes more ambiguous over the course of 
the series, which increases the “reality effect” of the show. But above all, Jed 
Bartlet is a rhetorical talent. The Bartlet “entourage,” which consists of seven 
main characters, is conceived in a similar way: they are both admirable and 
sometimes reprehensible because of their flaws and weaknesses, in life as well 
as in politics – and they are depicted as masters of rhetoric in many different 
ways. Chief of Staff Leo McGarry (John Spencer), Bartlet’s oldest and most 
like-minded political companion, is something like the White House “consi-
gliere,” laying out the strategic guidelines according to which the President’s 
staff should act. The continuous dialogs between Deputy Chief of Staff Josh 
Lyman (Bradley Whitford) and his assistant Donna Moss (Janel Moloney) 
reveal quite a few absurdities of the Washington “political machine,” and 
their mutual attraction (and denial of that attraction) is responsible for a 
certain soap opera feeling (see also van Zoonen 2005, pp. 19–35). Com-
munications Director Toby Ziegler (Richard Schiff ) and his Deputy Sam 
Seaborn (Rob Lowe) are both speech writers and spin doctors, and therefore 
represent hard-working “rhetorical craftsmen.” Press Secretary C.J. Gregg 
(Alison Janney), another “rhetorical craftswoman,” deals with the Washing-
ton journalists and the 24/7 news cycle. Finally, the President’s personal aide 
Charlie Young (Dulé Hill) plays the part of an “ordinary young man” and 
functions as a rhetorical sidekick for the Bartlet character. 
It has often been pointed out that Jed Bartlet is not the only character 
modeled on real world people. Several reviews of the series claim that many 
of these characters are based on real members of the Clinton administra-
tions: Communications Director Toby Ziegler is supposed to depict Gene 
Sperling, Deputy Communications Director Sam Seaborn parallels George 
Stephanopoulos, Deputy Chief of Staff Josh Lyman is a mirror of Paul Be-
gala, and Press Secretary C.J. Gregg is a stand-in for Dee Dee Myers (see 
Waxman 2003, p. 204, and Podhoretz 2003, p. 222). Former Clinton Press 
Secretary Dee Dee Myers also served as a consultant for the show and even 
as a screenwriter for several episodes – as did other former White House 
employees. Thus, with regard to the main characters, the setting, and the 
fact that the story is set in the present, there are a lot of direct references 
to actual political reality. This is very important in order to understand the 
political nature of the show and the Aristotelian “probable impossibilities” 
that Sorkin wants to propose to his audience. From a rhetorical perspective, 
his intention was to “realize” his White House and his portrayal of the presi-
dency in order to open up new spaces for conceivable political possibilities. 
His inspiration was taken from the real White House and real American 
politics, but his goal was to depict another, “better” White House and a “bet-
ter” American politics in order to work towards it in the real world. 
The West Wing also focuses on citizenship by confronting the audience 
with political topics and political problems, and it becomes entertainment by 
presenting them in a very witty and amusing way. The show’s ratings averaged 
between 8 and 17 million viewers per season. Its audience was interested in 
politics, stemmed from both the Democratic and the Republican electorate, 
and averaged an income over $100,000 (Finn 2003, p. 118f.; an analysis of 
this target demographic would be interesting, but is outside the scope of this 
paper). According to Jeannie Rutenburg, viewers claimed to enjoy “better 
looking staffers who are funnier and talk faster than real ones,” (2003, p. 12) 
but they also enjoyed the regular “civil education” that came along with every 
episode. Critics such as Simon Rothöhler praised the “historically profound 
study of political institutions,” as well as the ability to illustrate “sophisti-
cated aspects of U.S.-American constitutional reality.” (2012, p. 52) Over 
the course of seven seasons, the series went through almost every conceivable 
political scenario in both an informative and entertaining way: we witness a 
filibuster (Season 2, Episode 17: The Stackhouse Filibuster), a shutdown due 
to budget negotiations (Season 5, Episode 8: Shutdown), the nomination of 
judges for the Supreme Court (Season 5, Episode 17: The Supremes), the un-
folding of a presidential electoral campaign (Seasons 6 and 7) and even a typo 
in the constitution (Season 7, Episode 21 Institutional Memory). 
The show uses rhetorical evidentia and shows us democracy in the 
making. Other Sorkin TV shows like Sports Night, Studio 60 on the Sunset 
Strip, and, currently, The Newsroom are also backstage shows that cast an eye 
behind the scenes of television shows. The aesthetic concept of the backstage 
as the “frontstage” (Goffman 1959) on The West Wing may, at first glance, 
imply that politics is nothing but another television show, and may therefore 
recall academic discourse on the dramatization and mediatization of politics 
(Meyer 2002) or the so-called television malaise thesis, which holds that 
television only provides entertainment and transforms serious information 
or debate into entertainment. Yet, Sorkin’s The West Wing turns the tables by 
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overcoming the skepticism of TV through TV itself. It addresses its audience 
as a citizenry and not as an uninformed, misguided or manipulated “mass.” I 
agree with Liesbet van Zoonen that series like The West Wing “enable people 
to think about the dilemmas that politicians and politics face” (2005, p. 137) 
and confront them with new knowledge about specific aspects of politics 
that allow them to adjust their image of politics again and again. Simon 
Rothöhler has said that an important effect of the show is that “almost every 
episode contains a detail you want to google,” or provokes a question you 
want to answer (Rothöhler 2012, p. 52). By gradually getting to know both 
the various aspects of politics and the characters of the show, the audience is 
invited to engage in the process of ‘making’ politics. 
The show relies on the principle of para-social interaction, a concept of 
television theory elaborated by Donald Horton and R. Richard Wohl (1956) 
that explains how viewers establish a virtual but vivid relationship to their 
favorite characters. By identifying with one or more characters, viewers take 
sides and therefore not only observe but also participate in their actions. This 
is underlined by the general “backstage” strategy. While the real President 
and his real staffers can only be seen by the public performing their profes-
sional roles on the “frontstage,” the fictional characters of The West Wing are 
also shown “backstage,” where viewers can see them as they “really” are. This 
strategy of creating authenticity was one of the main drivers of the show’s 
success, not least because of the way it created a professional and entertaining 
manner for the subject matter of presidential politics to become pop culture. 
In the real world, we are either denied a look behind the scenes of the Presi-
dent and his staff, or the images that we do receive are completely staged – we 
thus never have the chance to get close to these figures. With The West Wing, 
on the other hand, we are able to develop an almost intimate relationship 
with the protagonists, and we identify with and pick up on their problems, 
which could, indeed, be our own political problems because of the way that 
Sorkin blends fiction and reality in the writing of the show. Over the course 
of the series, the aversions or affections that we have for the protagonists de-
velop into political attitudes that increase our readiness for civic engagement. 
Rhetoric behind the scenes 
If we consider The West Wing to essentially be a show about rhetoric, the aes-
thetic concept of the backstage becoming the frontstage indicates an impor-
tant deviation from the common display of rhetoric in film and television. 
When political rhetoric is featured in film or television it is usually depicted 
by an actor delivering a speech accompanied by the “shot–reverse shot” tech-
nique, which shows the reaction of the audience. In such cases, the character 
rises to speak during some substantial crisis and becomes an “orator” through 
some kind of fundamental rhetorical speech act that resonates well in the rep-
resented audience. We can think of Marlon Brando as Mark Antony in the 
1953 film adaption of Shakespeare’s Julius Caesar, for example, or of Denzel 
Washington as Malcolm X in the Spike Lee movie (for further examples see 
the section “Movie Speeches” on www.americanrhetoric.com). These depic-
tions of political orators are best described as the perfect combination of the 
Aristotelian zōon politikon and zōon logon echōn: a person that gains his (or, 
more rarely, her) status only through the power of speech that nature has 
given him or her. The speech is performed at its best and it is successful and 
effective beyond any doubt. In these depictions, only the frontstage is shown, 
and the orator doesn’t show up on stage until he’s already perfect.
The West Wing, on the other hand, isn’t afraid of disenchanting us 
of this artificial image of rhetoric. In fact, it shows the manufacturing of 
speeches and other rhetorical forms by shifting the emphasis from the front-
stage to the backstage and from the product to the production process (ac-
cording to ancient rhetoric, the five canons of rhetoric). This reversal and 
its aesthetic appeal are implicitly referred to by West Wing character Leo 
McGarry in one of the first episodes when he remarks, “there are two things 
in the world you never want to let people see how you make ’em: laws and 
sausages.” (Season 1, Episode 4: Five Votes Down) “And speeches,” the rheto-
rician would add, for if the audience “sees how you make ’em,” they would 
instantly lose their persuasiveness. This phenomenon was described by the 
ancient rhetorical notion of dissimulatio artis, the dissimulation of the rhe-
torical technique in order to inspire the confidence of the audience. Aaron 
Sorkin deliberately ignored this suggestion by showing and explicitly cel-
ebrating “how you make ’em.” By analyzing crucial scenes in the activities of 
the White House orators, I want to show how Sorkin conceives of “rhetoric” 
and how we can understand the series itself as, literally speaking, epideictic 
rhetoric, i.e., a demonstration of rhetoric. 
The collective fabrication of speeches 
In The West Wing, speeches are perfectly delivered, but they are also shown 
as hard-earned achievements. The most important speech that the series 
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centers on is the annual State of the Union, but there are also speeches at 
fundraising events, in front of lobbyist organizations or during electoral 
campaigns. The third of the five canons of rhetoric, the elocutio, is reflected 
upon in several episodes, for instance in Season 2, Episode 13 (Bartlet’s Third 
State of the Union). In this episode, Communications Director Toby Ziegler 
discusses the concrete wording of the speech with another speechwriter and 
the president: 
TOBY: Delete “vigorously” from the first sentence. 
[…]
SPEECHWRITER 2: We’re not going to vigorously pursue campaign finance reform?
TOBY: No, we’re just gonna pursue it regularly.
SPEECHWRITER 2: Not vigorously.
TOBY: Not tonight. [to Leo] McGowan says we’re fine. He feels the word “vigorously”’s 
inflammatory. 
[…]
BARTLET: Bob Novak just said this was the speech of my political life. You know how 
many times I’ve heard that?
TOBY: Sir, Senator McGowan say’s we’re fine if we cut “vigorously.” (All quotes from 
The West Wing episodes are taken from http://www.westwingtranscripts.com)
In this scene, the quite vigorous claim that this is the “speech of my po-
litical life” is contrasted with the petty reservations of a powerful senator 
in regard to the adverb “vigorously.” Besides being a nice joke, the scene 
shows how arduous the fabrication of a presidential speech is – especially 
in light of the annotations and reservations of countless powerful senators 
and other important government functionaries that have to be considered 
and incorporated up to five minutes before the speech is to be delivered. 
But this example also shows the love and the feeling for language that Sor-
kin puts in the mouths of the speechwriters. In Season 4, Episode 14 (Inau-
guration), speechwriter Will Bailey (played by Joshua Malina), says to the 
President, “there’s a ... partnership, sir, that can develop between someone 
and his speechwriter. It happens over time. You get to know just where he 
likes his commas and why he says self-government instead of government. 
Why he doesn’t like the word ‘implement’ but does like the word ‘obfus-
cate’. Like jazz musicians ...” Additionally, Season 1, Episode 2 (Post hoc, 
ergo propter hoc) features speechwriter Sam Seaborn formally proclaiming: 
“I’m a lawyer and a speechwriter. I argue for a living, and I’m sought after 
because I’m good at it.”
But elocution and argumentation are not the only rhetorically rel-
evant issues in the fabrication of speeches in The West Wing. In the previously 
mentioned episode Five Votes Down, President Bartlet gives a dinner speech 
promoting a bill on gun control that is supposed to pass Congress a few days 
later. We see him performing the final paragraphs of the speech, interrupted 
by several cuts to the President’s staff backstage. At the same time, Toby 
Ziegler is watching the speech on a monitor and orchestrating the President 
like a conductor with a baton, “take a beat. [pause] There you go,” – and 
the President is obviously “following” these instructions. But towards the 
end of the speech, Bartlet begins to extemporize for just a few moments. 
Toby – who has a penchant for skepticism and pessimism – complains to his 
deputy Sam about how the President high-handedly, “blew the D section,” 
– while Sam clearly finds the speech “outstanding”. Further on, Toby tells 
Press Secretary C.J. Gregg that, “Sam wrote two and a half paragraphs and 
I wrote thirty-seven pages.” This makes it clear that the speech had at least 
three authors, and that there is a possible conflict between those who wrote 
it and the person who actually delivers it. This conflict results in an ironic 
exchange between the President and his Communications Director: 
BARTLET: What’d you think?
TOBY: I thought my work was outstanding, Mr. President. […] Couldn’t help but 
notice you got a little extemporaneous there in the D section.
BARTLET: Oh, you noticed that, did you? […] Yes. I did a little polish right up there on 
my feet.
TOBY: Yes indeed.
BARTLET: Right in front of everybody. I looked to the side at one point, you know. I 
half expected to see you coming at me with a salad fork.
There is no doubt that Toby is none too happy with the President improvis-
ing and changing the speech deliberately before his eyes. We thus have to 
deal with a fragmented and collective oratorship, which is made even more 
difficult by the despicable “political machine” in Washington, as is shown, 
for example, in Season 1, Episode 12 (He Shall, From Time to Time).
In this episode, the speechwriting process is widely obstructed by 
characters other than the speechwriting team or the President – and their 
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reservations are not merely concerned with elocutionary aspects. As the title 
indicates, the episode focuses once again on the annual State of the Union. 
The West Wing shows us how many people are involved in the shaping of 
both content and form of the speech. Drafts circulate weeks before the date 
(see also Schlesinger 2008), and Toby has to sit down with interest groups, 
party members, members of Congress and Cabinet Members that have 
their own agenda to write or change certain paragraphs. Thus, the speech is 
shown more as an object of diplomatic political negotiations than as a result 
of the best oratorical craft. In another episode, The Portland Trip (Season 2, 
Episode 7), the staff is working on a speech on education at the last minute 
while on a flight to Portland. Toby complains about how great oratory is be-
ing sacrificed to tactical decisions and political compromise. 
SAM: Toby, you’re the one for the last six months who’s been saying we need a radical 
approach...
TOBY: [raising his voice] Yes, yes I have, and I got shouted down in every meeting! 
I’d love to write a speech about a radical new approach to education, but 
we don’t have one! So unless we can come up with an idea and implement 
it before land in Portland, I’d prefer not to paint a picture in the interest of 
great oratory.
In this way, The West Wing explicitly reflects not only on the collective au-
thorship inside the White House, but also on the mutual relationships be-
tween the President, his staff and the political machine that has “shouted 
[them] down in every meeting.” What a president can say when he rises to 
speak obviously depends on his respective range of power. I wouldn’t go so 
far as to say that the other political actors are also “authors” of the President’s 
speech, but their agendas are a constraint that cannot be denied or ignored, 
and thus constitute what the sociologist Anthony Giddens (1984, p. 31) 
would call a structure of domination. Without going too far into detail, 
the staff ’s struggle for the right wording in every speech can be understood 
as a constant struggle for agency in a pre-structured communication envi-
ronment – even if the actor is the “leader of the free world.” This is also a 
struggle for public engagement and citizenship that the audience can take 
inspiration from. When it is successful in The West Wing, oratory isn’t “mag-
ic,” but rather a hard-won battle in a complex and challenging environment. 
Another topic in The West Wing’s depiction of “oratory” is the kind of 
self-referential presentation of a speech on television and the measurement 
of its effects on the audience. In 100,000 Airplanes (Season 3, Episode 12), 
there is another State of the Union to prepare. Once more, we participate in 
the production process, but this time Sorkin starts at the end, as the delivery 
of the speech is shown on monitors in the rooms of the “National Strategic 
Group.” As Sam Seaborn explains to a visiting journalist, the speech is being 
exposed to real-time polling. The polls are visualized as blue (Democrat), 
red (Republican) and green (independent) lines going up and down across a 
graph as the speech is being delivered. Sam predicts a peak of all three lines 
for the following paragraph in Bartlet’s speech: 
BARTLET [on T.V.] Now in a new century, when we meet and master new forms 
of aggression and hatred, ignorance and evil, our vigilance in the face of 
oppression and global terror will be unequaled by any moment of human 
history.
LISA [the journalist]: Now you’re cooking.
BARTLET [on T.V.]: And to the enemies of freedom, the enemies of democracy, the 
enemies of America, the enemies of humanity itself, we say here tonight with 
one voice. There is no corner of this earth so remote, no cave so dark, that you 
will not be found and brought to light and ended.
Here, we recognize a different tone in the speech of the fictional President 
following the real-world 9/11 event, but this change of tone is not the focus 
of this essay. Instead, it is the way that Sorkin stresses the importance of 
public opinion and visualizes the way it shapes and affects the speech. Once 
again, the delivery of the speech is only a vehicle in order to show what’s 
normally behind the screen – in this case the submission of political rhetoric 
to polling and public opinion. This arrangement can be just as limiting as 
lobbyism and opposition, and it is one that is present throughout the whole 
series as the audience learns that political rhetoric is about seeking attention 
and goodwill, about compromise and, sometimes, about compromising on 
your ideals. But it is also about regaining the sovereignty of interpretation 
of political or social reality. Thus, The West Wing is absolutely ambivalent: it 
both praises and criticizes political rhetoric, while other TV series prefer to 
provide a purely cynical look at politics.
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The “walk and talk” and “real” debates
The series’ most significant aesthetic feature is not the monolog, but rather 
dialog. In the words of film scholar Thomas Morsch (2010, p. 228), “in 
terms of the series’ portrayal of politics, the ‘walk and talk’ is assigned the 
role of visually dramatizing what, in itself, fails to provide interesting im-
ages, but is essential to the series’ idea of politics: the verbal exchange of po-
litical arguments.” There are several very long shots in almost every episode 
that illustrate the series’ extensive depiction of dialog and debate. The char-
acters walk through the labyrinthine corridors of the White House, talking 
at high speed and outperforming each other in quick-wittedness. The walks 
are orchestrated by Sorkin and his director Thomas Schlamme in a very 
sophisticated manner – the wit is not limited to one character but is the 
result of all characters performing the “art of argument.” Not only does this 
prove to be the right tactic for making agreements internally, but it is also 
presented as a way to conduct political negotiations between the staff and 
lobbyists, members of Congress, opposition politicians and others. While 
in the real world such debates are held behind closed doors, The West Wing 
presents them openly – and as a very dynamic form of communication. As 
Morsch puts it, “to speak constitutes the chief form of action.” (p. 230) 
The last season focuses on the presidential race as Bartlet’s second 
term in office comes to an end. The seventh episode, The Debate, features 
a quite remarkable rhetorical form: the two presidential candidates, Alan 
Alda as Arnie Vinick (Republican) and Jimmy Smits as a Latino candidate 
Matt Santos (Democrat), staged a live, improvised debate on television. 
This kind of live “improv debate” was an exceptional challenge for both 
actors because they were forced to debate as if they were real candidates. To 
increase the illusion of reality, the debate took place on the same set that 
had been used in the actual presidential debate between President George 
W. Bush and Senator John Kerry on NBC in 2004. And as in real life, 
the debate was surveyed by a pollster, with the following result, accord-
ing to the Washington Post (de Moraes 2005), “before the episode, viewers 
between 18 and 29 preferred Santos over Vinick, 54 percent to 37 per-
cent. But after the debate, in which veteran Alda gutted pretty-boy Smits 
without him even knowing it, Vinick now leads among viewers under age 
30, 56 percent to 42 percent.” Unique episode formats like this underline 
the show’s perspective on political reality (Skewes 2009). But even in this 
“realistic” debate setting, the TV show leaves enough space for political 
fantasy by staging a “real debate,” as the fictional Republican candidate 
Arnie Vinick puts it: 
VINICK: You know, I’ve watched every televised Presidential debate that this country 
has ever had. And every time I heard them recite the rules, I always thought 
that meant they’re not going to have a real debate. When the greatest hero of 
my party, Abraham Lincoln, debated, he didn’t need any rules. He wasn’t afraid 
of a real debate. Now I could do a 2-minute version of my Sensible Solution 
stump speech and I’m sure Congressman Santos has a memorized opening 
statement ready to go. And then we could go on with this ritual and let the 
rules decide how much you’re going to learn about the next President of the 
United States, or we could have a debate Lincoln would have been proud of. 
We could junk the rules. We could let our able and judicious moderator ask us 
questions. And we could forget about whether each of us has the exact same 
number of seconds to speak. We could have a real debate if that’s all right with 
you, Matt. 
So, NBC has a fictional “real debate” that exceeds every “real” debate be-
cause of its spontaneity and sincerity. The actors stage an idealized, somehow 
adjusted debate that contains only “good” rhetoric. It reproduces, as Jean-
nie Rutenburg put it, “values of this civic humanism – peace, reason, free-
dom, and the rule of law,” and explains why “Cicero would love this show” 
(Rutenburg 2003, p. 14).
Conclusion 
By creating a both realistic and idealistic White House, Sorkin proposes a 
concrete political and rhetorical message: what if the president and his staff 
were wittier, what if they made better decisions, what if participating in the 
political process was entertaining, what if constitutional history was fun, 
what if debates weren’t tainted by spin doctors and polls, what if a nuclear 
accident changed a whole election – and, last but not least: what if a Latino 
like Matt Santos was elected president? Sorkin suggests that this would be 
better than the actual White House. It is no secret that Sorkin’s team got in 
touch with Barack Obama’s advisor David Axelrod as early as 2004. In this 
way, the election of Barack Obama in 2008 somehow “imitated” the election 
of Matt Santos in the final season of the show in 2006, and this certainly 
is the strongest “political fantasy” to be found in the The West Wing script. 
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There is also no doubt that as political orators, the executive producers of 
the show, Sorkin and later John Wells, were very pleased that the Obama 
team lived out their scripts (Freedland 2008). But all political fantasies are 
closely linked to political reality, either by being accurate or dramatically 
convincing. I want to call this strategy “visionary plausibility,” and it is a 
sophisticated and intriguing interplay of reality and fictionality. Never one-
dimensional and always ambivalent, Sorkin creates, in his own words, a, 
“kind of a valentine to public service” (quoted from Clark 2005, p. 226). 
I think the term “valentine,” as Thomas Morsch has also said, refers to the 
series being performative in a way that the audience cannot ignore. It de-
mands a reaction, and at the very least a virtual sense of involvement that 
enhances political participation and identification – even beyond U.S. bor-
ders. Most of the problems depicted in the show resonate in other modern 
Western democracies as well. Even if political systems may differ slightly and 
non-American viewers may miss some subtle allusions, the general problems 
of political rhetoric in Western democracies are clearly the same. Thus, as 
Trevor and Shawn Parry-Giles (2002, p. 211) put it, “fictionalized represen-
tations of politics are powerful and accessible rhetorical forms, increasingly 
influential as they improve in technological sophistication and mimetic ca-
pacity. Such discourses play a central role in the definition and expression of 
political culture and political leaders” – and, if I may add – in the definition 
of rhetoric and citizenship.
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Rhetorical Citizenship in Public Meetings: 
The Character of Religious Expression in 
American Discourse
K A R E N T R AC Y
Speaking out is the patriotic duty of democratic citizenship.
– Robert Ivie (2002), p. 281
If we are concerned about the shape of our democracy, we would do well to start by 
exploring exactly those practices, by investigating the norms we already live by.
– Gary Shiffman (2004), p. 112
Christian Kock and Lisa Villadsen (2012) begin their discussion of rhetorical 
citizenship by asserting that talk is not a precursor to real action but itself 
is “constitutive of citizen engagement” (p. 1). I strongly agree; this chapter 
evidences the essence of their claim even as a twist and a challenge are made. 
The twist I add is that rhetorical citizenship needs to recognize the degree 
to which it is a culturally-inflected practice. Citizenship for Americans in-
volves distinctly different discourse activities than are typical for Europeans. 
In particular, American citizenship valorizes ordinary people speaking out at 
public meetings, and it legitimates the relevance of talk about God and reli-
gion in state policy-making debates. The challenge I make is of an assumed 
close relationship between deliberative democracy and rhetorical citizenship. 
I develop these claims by analyzing citizen testimony at three U.S. state leg-
islative hearings considering bills about same-sex marriage. 
The chapter begins by evidencing the linkages for Americans among 
citizenship, public hearing participation, and religious talk. Then, after 
providing background on the legislative hearings, I describe six different 
ways citizens drew upon or oriented to religion in their testimony. In the 
chapter’s conclusion I identify how deliberative democracy and rhetorical 
citizenship have been tied and suggest why the tie needs to be loosened.
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Citizenship for Americans 
How do citizens shape policy? In representative democracies, the main way 
ordinary folks influence what becomes policy is by voting for the representa-
tives who will make the decisions. But there is another avenue for influence. 
Citizens can speak at public meetings in which a governance group is con-
sidering a particular policy issue (Laidman 2010). As a populist democracy 
the United State gives to its citizens a bigger role for speaking out in meet-
ings than is the case in European countries that have an elite democracy 
philosophy. In elite democracies, deliberation is largely restricted to elected 
and appointed government officials. In the federalist system of governance, 
American citizens are extended an opportunity to testify at local and state 
levels that is rare in European countries. In a large survey that Conover, 
Searing, and Crewe (2002) carried out with American and British citizens 
they found that more than twice as many U.S. citizens reported speaking in 
public meetings than did British citizens (29 % vs. 13 %). 
The American belief that there should be a place for ordinary citizens 
to speak in democratic institutions is accomplished through the design of 
local and state meetings in which speaking slots for members of the public 
are routinely included. Such is the typical structure in both regularly 
recurring governance bodies such as city council meetings (Leighter & Black 
2010), school board meetings (Tracy 2007, 2010), and university trustee 
boards (West & Fenstermaker 2002), and in meetings that are specially set 
to decide about an action or policy that is controversial, such as building of 
a Wal-Mart (Buttny 2009, 2010) or introduction of a Disney Park (Olson & 
Goodnight 2004) in a community. 
A second difference between American and (most) European notions 
of citizenship is the role religion plays in the American notion of democracy. 
The vast majority of Americans define themselves as religious. A recent 
survey by the Pew foundation (“Nones on the rise” 2012), in fact, treated it 
as news that the number of Americans defining themselves as not religious 
(agnostic, atheist, or nothing in particular) had increased from 15 % five 
years ago to slightly less than 20 % in 2012. In addition, 65 % of Americans 
report religion to be an important part of their daily life (Newport 2009). 
Wald and Glover (2007, 115) described the United States as a “nation with 
the soul of a church” that is also a secular society.
In the 1960s before the rise of the religious right, Robert Bellah 
(1967) popularized the idea that the United States had a “civil religion,” 
a valuing of God in political life that permitted many different versions of 
belief. In his influential essay, “Civil Religion in America” he proclaimed 
that the relationship between politics and religion had been “singularly 
smooth.” Writing a decade later Hart (1977, 1) described civil religion as 
the “ritualistic homage being paid by expedient politicians to a religious-
conscious electorate.” By the 1980s, though, the smooth relationship had 
disappeared (Hulsether 2007), and by the 21st century, legal scholar Noah 
Feldman (2005) described the relationship between government and religion 
as the issue that most divides Americans from each other. 
Not only is the United States one of the most religious Western societies, 
but it has built into its constitution two principles of how government and 
religion are to be connected. The First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution 
asserts that the federal government will not establish any religion for the 
country and proclaims the rights of citizens to practice the religion of their 
choice. Exactly how these two clauses are to be weighed and put together 
tends to generate considerable controversy (Haiman 2003; Meacham 2005). 
In its initial form the First Amendment was designed to insure that decisions 
about religion stayed with the states. Well into the 1800s different states 
required their citizens to pay taxes or have affiliation with specific Christian 
religions. It was not until after the civil war and, practically speaking, 
following a series of court cases in the 1940s that contemporary notions 
about the separation of church and state began to be applied to individual 
states (Levy 1994).
Both Germany and the United States have clauses in their constitutions 
prohibiting the establishment of religion, but, as Haupt (2012) shows, the 
US allows religion to flourish in state matters much more than Germany. 
Although Thomas Jefferson wanted to build a wall between the church 
and the state, this never happened. Warren Burger, Chief Justice of the US 
Supreme Court during the 1970s, said of the constitutional battles over 
politics and religion: “the line of separation, far from being a ‘wall,’ is a 
blurred, indistinct, and variable barrier depending on the circumstances of 
a particular issue” (Meacham 2006, 240). This blurred boundary between 
religion and the state extends from interpreting law in the courts to the 
making of law in legislative hearings. When an American state considers 
changing its law with regard to a matter that ties to some people’s religious 
beliefs and other people’s rights, public discussions about what policy the 
state should adopt becomes a battlefield.
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The public hearings 
I obtained video/audio tapes of three judicial committee hearings by request-
ing them from the appropriate legislative office and then creating verbatim 
transcripts (Tracy 2005). Table 1 provides an overview of each hearing in 
terms of its date and length, the bill being debated, and the number of citi-
zens speaking for and against the bill. In Colorado and Hawaii the proposed 
bill was about extending the rights of marriage but proposed labeling gays’ 
committed relationships civil unions rather than marriage. In Rhode Island, 
there were two bills under consideration. The first bill proposed extending 
the rights of marriage and the name “marriage”; the second bill proposed 
that the issue be put to a popular vote rather than leaving it to the elected 
officials. 
How “religion” entered citizen discourse
In this site of ordinary American democracy, religion entered citizen tes-
timony in six distinct ways. The first way it entered citizen testimony was 
by a speaker referring to a religious text to argue for or against a proposal. 
When scholars (Audi & Wolterstoff, 1996) debate about the reasonableness 
of religious argument being part of public discourse, this is perhaps the key 
activity that is being contested. 
1. Naming/quoting of religious text
In these hearings citizens referred to various books in the bible, with Leviticus 
being mentioned most often, in fact 47 times across the hearings. Citizens 
varied how specifically they referred to the bible, sometimes quoting chapter 
and verse and using the language of the King James bible (e.g., sodomites, 
fornicators) and at other times merely pointing toward “the scriptures.” Ex-
cerpt 1 illustrates a detailed reference; excerpt 2 a general one. 
Excerpt 1 (Colorado, Con)
Uh with all due respect, those people are not adhering to the teachings of the 
scripture. Leviticus 18:22 says if a man lies with another man, it is an abomination. 
Leviticus 22:18 says that if a man lies with a man as with a woman, they shall both 
be put to death for an abom- abominable deed, for they have forfeited their life ... In 
the words of St. Paul the apostle, you do not know- that the unjust will not inherit 
the kingdom of God. Do not be deceived, neither fornicators, nor adulterers, nor boy 
prostitutes, nor sodomites, nor thieves, nor the greedy, nor drunkards, nor slanderers, 
will inherit the kingdom of God. First Corinthians 9:10. Ladies and gentlemen of 
the committee, we’re living in a world where the awareness of sins is ticking away. Let 
me show you that Jesus Christ is real, and he will judge us all at the moment of our 
death. If you’re not a believer, at least consider the lessons of history.
Excerpt 2 (Hawaii, Con)
Um, let’s start with God first ok? I’m a Christian, as most of us are, ok? And uh 
I’m not- I’m not gonna go through all the scriptures or whatever. But just to tell 
you that when God says something is not good, you better abide by what he says. 
Otherwise there’s gonna be some serious consequences.
Religious texts were typically used by speakers as if they settled the dispute 
about what to do. In fact this was the only way that religious texts were used 
by speakers arguing against the same-sex marriage bills. Citizens passed on 
God’s instructions to elected officials about how to vote. 
Using texts as a vehicle to straightforwardly instruct officials, how-
ever, was not the only way these texts were used. Citizens favoring the bills 
highlighted the many different messages one could find in the bible, often 
quoting passages that emphasized God’s loving character, or they cited a text 
to problematize its implications, as was seen when a citizen cited Leviticus 
to shows its datedness by noting how it condoned slavery and prohibited the 
eating of shrimp. 
2. Praying for officials
A second way religious talk entered testimony was for a citizen to begin pray-
ing in the midst of testifying. Praying changed the footing (Goffman 1981) 
State Hawaii Rhode Island Colorado
Date 2/24/2009 2/8/2011 3/31/2011
Bill No. HB444 HB5012 HB5260 SB 11-172
Hearing Length 18 hrs 8.5 hrs 7.5 hrs
Data Video Video Audio
Total Speakers 176 108 79
Pro SS unions 76 67 61
Con SS unions 100 41 18
[  6 ]
table 1  overview of the hearings
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labels to self-describe, but what was striking was the frequency of religious 
identification. Both religious leaders and ordinary believers used category 
affiliation in their openings. In another study of three hearings, Tracy and 
Parks (2013) found 16 percent of the testifiers to be religious leaders. Ex-
cerpt 4 exemplifies two religious leader openings.
Excerpt 4 
(a) Hello, my name is Dennis Dutton, I’m assistant pastor of the Family Chapel 
Estuwahu. … Today I’d like to provide three points of uh discussion concerning 
House Bill 444 (Hawaii, Con).
(b) After being identified as “Rabbi Mack” by the chair, she said, “Thank you so 
much. Um I’m here this evening, I think it’s important um that you hear from me 
as- as the only formal representative of any Jewish community here in Rhode Island. 
Um just because I am the only representative, um does not mean that uh the Jewish 
community is not widely supportive of marriage equality. I’m the Associate Rabbi at 
Temple Bethel in Providence. Um we have 950 families” (Rhode Island, Pro)
In all the hearings, although particularly Hawaii’s, ordinary believers also 
identified their religious categories with explicit identity terms. One exam-
ple is seen in the opening of excerpt 2 where the speaker identified himself 
as a Christian; others included testifiers saying, “I’m a born-again Christian” 
or “We’re Catholic,” said by a husband/wife pair. These self-labeling moves 
underscore that the policy decision is a religion matter and function as an 
implicit reason that the legislative committee should give careful attention 
to the speaker. Many speakers who began by self-labeling brought religion 
into their message in others ways, but some did not. For those who did not, 
the self-labeling functioned to cue and reinforce the existence of important 
other unsaid argument grounds for being for or more often against the pro-
posed bill.
4. Referring to the First Amendment of the U.S. Constitution
 A fourth way religion entered testimony was by referring to one or the other 
of the religious clauses of the First Amendment. Which First Amendment 
clause a speaker gave attention to, however, depended on his/her position 
on the bill (Tracy & Hughes 2014). Speakers arguing in favor of their state’s 
bill to extend marriage rights argued how it was a clear case requiring sepa-
ration of church and state. An especially nuanced argument was made by 
of the elected officials from the key addressed parties to that of overhearing 
third parties: officials were put in the position of listening in on a conversa-
tion between a testifier and God. Excerpt 3 illustrates an example, which 
occurred at the end of a lengthy speech.
Excerpt 3 (Hawaii Con)
Thank you Heavenly Father I apologize if I haven’t always acted out of love. There 
are times when I would like to kick some peoples’ butts. But I know it is out of 
love, Lord God that you called me and you loved me. And thank you for loving all 
of us and respecting the fact that you’ve given us the free choice to make our own 
choice. So it is with that love that I pray for our leaders and their families. Please 
guide them with your truth and your wisdom Heavenly Father. I pray also Lord 
God, for our nations and for the people of the nations, for every tender tongue and 
people. We are special, you made us, and you created us in your image and not to 
be degraded. I pray for our churches and our wonderful pastors and their wives 
and families and especially for those who have had the courage, thank you Jesus, 
to stand up for what God says is his word and to fear God rather than man. They 
took a risk and I thank you Jesus.
3. Labeling religious affiliation
A third way religion entered citizen talk was as a credentialing device, an 
implicit justification for why the judicial committee should listen closely. In 
citizen speeches in public meetings, a key move in openings is for the citizen 
to identify the features of self that warrant his or her views being taken seri-
ously. What exactly a citizen will mention in this opening slot will vary with 
the issue and the context. In education governance meetings, for instance, 
speakers often mention their longevity residing in a geographic area, the 
number of children they had in the school district, their role as tax-payers, 
or an occupation that gave them expertise related to the focal topic (Tracy 
2010). Because a speaker can describe self in a large variety of ways – by age, 
political party, ethnicity, occupation, place of residence – the category terms 
speakers select give us insight into what identities citizens regard as giving 
them credibility in that particular interactional site. Harvey Sacks (1992) 
would describe this practice as the use of membership terms. To describe 
persons using some membership terms rather than others is powerful be-
cause the selected term sets in motion inferences about activities, attitudes, 
and other people. In these hearings citizens used many different identity 
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one Christen minister. After describing differences in beliefs among various 
Christian groups with regard to several issues, he said:
Excerpt 5 (Rhode Island, Pro)
But here’s the thing, there’s a disagreement between religions, now it’s a civil matter. 
And from a civil point of view, when two religions disagree, and you base your 
decision on Catholic teaching, or shall I say Orthodox Catholic teaching, there 
are many Catholic brothers and sisters who would agree with us, then aren’t you 
recognizing an establishment of religion, one over the other?
In contrast, speakers arguing against proposed bills drew attention to the 
free exercise clause of the First Amendment. In the Colorado hearing the 
Senior Legal Counsel for the Alliance Defense Fund, an organization that 
describes its purpose as “build[ing] alliances between Christian attorneys 
and like-minded organizations to accomplish what none of us can do alone: 
protect and defend YOUR religious freedom” spoke extensively. After making 
a complex claim about a different issue, he launched an argument about how 
the proposed bill would violate religious freedom guarantees.
Excerpt 6 (Colorado, Con)
This bill is insufficient to protect the religious liberties in this state. People of- of 
faith an- and people of conscience. The only protection that this bill accords is 
by saying that clergy do not have to engage in the ceremonies of- of moralizing 
these civil unions. But it says nothing about uh Catholic Charities, who want to 
be involved in- in uh- in families. Or it doesn’t say anything about businesses and 
what the impact would be on businesses and their policies internally. It doesn’t say 
anything about the photographer who doesn’t want to participate in filming civil 
ceremonies. Like we have a client in New Mexico that was sued because she chose 
not to do it. And now she has been faced with civil rights charges. 
Religion entered testimony in two other ways, each of which requires infer-
ential work to identify “religion” as being invoked.
5. Denying that a proposal is a matter of civil rights
In these hearings the central argument for extending the right of marriage or 
civil unions to same-sex couples was the need for equality: Marriage, propo-
nents argued, is a basic civil right to which all citizens are entitled. This argu-
ment was repeatedly made with subtle kinds of variation by citizens favoring 
same-sex unions. As Michael Billig has shown (1987, Billig et al. 1988) every-
day thought is fundamentally argumentative. Asserting one claim conveys an 
implicit assertion about the opposing claim. Often, too, the discourse reveals 
traces of the understood opposing claim. Many speakers denied that extend-
ing civil unions to gays and lesbians was an issue of civil rights. That an issue 
is not a civil rights issue does not necessarily make it a religious one, but in this 
context, it did. In Excerpt 7, an African American speaker uses his body and 
experience to assert the issue before them is not a civil matter, cuing that its 
alternative is religious with his preface about not getting into the religious as-
pect. In Excerpt 8 the fact that “religious issue” is the competing view to “civil 
rights matter” is formulated explicitly through the speaker’s religious identity 
credentialing, claiming to represent Jesus Christ, and by describing the issue as 
a “moral” matter, a term that most would see as a cousin of religion. 
Excerpt 7 (Colorado, Con)
I’m not gonna get into the religion expect- aspect of it. But I have a super problem 
with the civil rights thing about this. Now when the gay lesbian groups compare 
this issue to the issue of Americans who are black, and to civil rights, I find it very 
disingenuous. Let me just give you a story.
Excerpt 8 (Colorado, Con)
My name is uh Pastor Roger Angis, and I represent uh myself and I also r- 
represent Jesus Christ. I’ve been listening to the testimonies from both sides of the 
fence, I hear economic policies, I hear so-called civil rights. This is not a civil right. 
... This bill has to be put up first. Is this a moral bill? And this is not a moral bill in 
any way shape or form.
We might say that the dominant counter-position in these hearings to same-
sex marriage being a civil rights issue was to regard it is a religious, moral 
matter. Thus one way speakers brought religion into the debate was to deny 
that the issue before them concerned civil rights. 
6. Claiming or disavowing (expected) neighbors of God and gays
Political attitudes and beliefs usually go together in clusters. When a speaker 
expresses a view on one issue, people will assume that the speaker has par-
ticular views on other issues and will make assumptions about what kind 
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of person the speaker is (Conover, Searing, & Crewe 2002). To state it in 
a more discourse analytic way, stances toward an issue implicate identities 
and identities implicate stances (Tracy 2011). For instance, van De Mieroop 
(2011) shows how debt defaulters being interviewed by Belgian debt media-
tion services discursively work to disavow that they are irresponsible money 
managers and reframe themselves as caring parents caught in tough circum-
stances. Claims and disavowals, then, work in two ways. Such verbal acts 
seek to redefine what should be seen as going together – as part of a bundle 
– and they underscore what the taken-for-granted bundle is.
Citizen testifiers advanced claims about the goodness/badness of 
the proposed bills, but as they did they were also doing discursive work to 
show that they as persons possessed attributes not assumed to go with the 
stance they were advocating (pro or con same-sex marriage). That is, they 
did discursive work to draw attention to the fact that either (a) they did 
not possess undesirable attributes associated with the stance or (b) they did 
possess desirable socially valued attributes not typically associated with that 
stance. The American bundle of attitudes-identities, I would suggest, sees 
being religious as aligned with patriotism, which in turn goes with being 
hostile to gays. On the flip side, being gay is seen as not being religious 
and questionably patriotic. Evidence that this is the understood bundle is 
seen when gay speakers assert their patriotism and love of country/state or 
elaborate their positive connection to God as they argue for marriage rights. 
Excerpts 9 and 10 illustrate two gay speakers asserting their love of state and 
country. These comments could seem off-topic if the bundle of positions, 
which I articulated above, were not in operation.
Excerpt 9 (RI, Pro)
I really appreciate the opportunity to speak here uh this evening on behalf of 
marriage equality, uh and I will be brief ... I’m a proud Rhode Island native. I 
grew up here. I went to school here. I’ve enjoyed a terrific professional career here 
spanning 25 years.
Excerpt 10 (Colorado, Pro)
A lot has happened in the past 15 years. The good news is that our country has 
never been more just. Our country’s founders would look at our country now and 
see the change that has taken place and look at us in admiration. I’m proud to be 
an American. In fact I work for our citizens everyday as a law enforcement officer.
Excerpt 11 from a pro-same sex marriage law professor illustrates a lesbian 
seeking to show herself, and the gay students for whom she speaks, to be 
“deeply religious.” Although her utterance construction is not straightfor-
ward, the discursive proximity of her identification of the existence of inac-
curate stereotypes and her claim that she and many of her gay students are 
religious function both to rebut and solidify the expected association.
Excerpt 11 (Hawaii, Pro)
Let me tell you a little about the students for whom I speak today. Most are local, 
born and raised in the islands, Hawaiian, Japanese, Chinese, Filipino, South Pacific 
Islander, European, Hapa. They give lie to the stereotype that gay rights are a 
mainland Haole issue. Many, myself included, are deeply religious people whose 
faith plays a central role in their and our lives.
A different strategy to seek to overturn the assumption that being gay is at 
odds with being religious is seen in excerpt 12 in which a lesbian comments 
about the character of the love she has for her partner.
Excerpt 12 (Colorado, Pro)
Living with Wendy in Loveland and being with Wendy for over 17 years has been 
the most stable, God-centered place I’ve ever been in my whole life. 
Citizens testifying against the bill oriented to the opposite problem in the 
assumed bundle. As they argued against same-sex marriage, they proclaimed 
their love of gays or disclaimed that they were prejudiced. Excerpt 13 il-
lustrates a typical proclamation of positive sentiment; excerpt 14 shows a 
speaker tackling the assumed bundle directly:
Excerpt 13 (Hawaii, Con)
I wanna state unequivocally that I love the gays, lesbians. Our church has some of 
them, the gays. Our company has employed them, my kids have gay friends. I will 
also say that I love drug addicts, alcoholics. I’ve been ministering the homeless. I’ve 
been ministering to them for the last fourteen years.
Excerpt 14 (Rhode Island, Con)
To say that this traditional understanding of marriage as many people do believe, 
and they honestly believe it, is in fact based on uh, uh bigotry and discrimination, 
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um I would say that we also have a new problem. And I do recognize that in 
society. Which is how do we demonstrate respect for our gay friends and family 
members and neighbors? And it is uh- It is a good question. It’s a serious and 
important question. ... Um, I would say this in conclusion, that uh whatever else 
our marriage tradition is, it is not based on animus or hatred or bigotry or a desire 
to do harm.
In sum, because of the assumed bundling of religion, patriotism, and anti-
gay sentiment (and the converse), speakers could indirectly bring religion 
into the exchange by referring to one or the other of the threads that com-
prised the attitudinal fabric.
Implications for rhetorical citizenship
In a response to Schudson’s (1997) essay, “Why conversation is not the soul 
of democracy,” Schroll (1999) remarks, “Some new way of talking about 
talking is needed that reflects the complexity of modern democratic life” 
(103). Two aspects of modern (American) democracies’ complexities are the 
dominance of representative formats and the focal role that public meetings 
serve in giving elected officials knowledge of their citizen desires, principles, 
and preferences. Citizen testimony in public meetings is the bread and but-
ter, or at least a main entrée, of American democracy. Any useful notion 
of rhetorical citizenship needs to take account of the frequency of citizens’ 
speeches of advocacy in public meetings.
The dominant view of good citizenship draws a tight connection 
to deliberative democracy, highlighting communicative scenes in which 
there is back-and-forth talk, reason-giving, openness to others’ views, and 
equality among participants (e.g., Gastil & Levine 2005; Habermas 1989; 
Hicks 2002). Such an ideal does not well match what citizens do in public 
hearings. As seen in the hearings on same-sex marriage, speakers evidenced 
little openness to the opposing position, and with only a few exceptions 
hearing talk involved no back-and-forth exchange. Delli-Carpini, Cook, 
and Jacobs (2004), in fact, rule out the public meeting as an activity that 
warrants the label “deliberative.” Certainly if reason-giving and open-
minded discussion among equals are needed for deliberation, then public 
hearings are not instances. But public meetings, I would argue, should not 
be conceived as flawed sites of democratic deliberation. Rather, they are a 
distinctive, valuable, and necessary site for citizenship that requires ways 
of speaking that differ from how discussion unfolds in small groups, the 
implied format for deliberation. Public meetings are places for advocacy and 
passionate expression, a type of expression that should be part of any notion 
of rhetorical citizenship.
Rhetorical citizenship and its companion concept, rhetorical democ-
racy (Kock & Villadsen 2012), carry the promise of more useful norms of 
conduct for citizens’ public participation than democratic deliberation. Pub-
lic meetings, with their thin connection between citizens and elected of-
ficials, make possible expression of strong disagreement that enables clarity 
about issues and a deeper understanding of difference. In relationship-atten-
tive, deliberative settings, the disagreements that do occur can be muted and 
not explored in depth (Karpowitz & Mansbridge 2005). 
Given rhetoric’s strong connection to strategic talk and persuasion, 
rhetorical citizenship would seem a useful counterweight to deliberative de-
mocracy. For rhetorical citizenship to be an effective ideal, however, it needs 
to keep a productive tension between deliberation and advocacy. Delibera-
tion and advocacy are essential to a well-functioning democracy, but they 
are the antithesis of each other (Heindriks 2011; Mutz 2006). Rhetorical 
citizenship needs to keep its tie to democratic deliberation loose so that it 
can equally moor its meaning in the traditions of advocacy.
Given religion’s importance in American life, including the under-
standings of what democracy entails, it seems essential to legitimate religious 
talk in the public sphere. For many Americans there would be no need to 
make this argument – religion is prominent in public debate as it well should 
be. But for others, especially academics and other intellectuals, the legitima-
tion of religious talk in public debate may seem problematic. For those of us 
who are not religious there are two reasons why legitimating religious expres-
sion is important. First, in a pluralistic society with many different flavors 
of religion, legitimating religious expression in public meetings keeps visible 
that there is a diversity of opinions on just about any issue that connects to 
religion. There is rarely a religious point of view, although sometimes tradi-
tional factions of a religion, whether they be Protestant, Catholic, or Jewish, 
will claim to speak “the religious perspective.” Lived religion – what ordinary 
religious people believe and do – often differs in a significant way from 
church religion, i.e., official doctrine (Wald and Glover 2007). Within most 
religious groups, progressive as well as traditional factions are to be found. 
Second, legitimating religious expression in public meetings is likely 
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to keep discussion of controversial issues as matters of public reason-giving 
and accountability. In the same sex marriage debates, one strategy used in 
a number of states by persons opposing particular bills was to argue that 
the issue should be settled by a popular vote. Direct democracy initiatives 
on socially sensitive issues, such as abortion or gay rights, move political 
discussion from accountable sites of public talk to private, informal discus-
sions in which people speak mostly with like-minded others (Wojcieszak & 
Mutz 2009). Under such conditions law-making is likely to become more 
restrictive of people’s civil rights (Carter 2011). Legitimating religious talk 
in the American public square is a reasonable way to encourage careful re-
flection among the many observing citizens and listening representatives as 
citizens strongly concerned about an issue advocate passionately for what 
they believe. 
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Voice, Listening, and Telling Stories: 
The Communicative Construction of 
Rhetorical Citizenship in Small Groups
C A R O LY N E L E E & J U DY B U R N S I D E- L AW RY
Introduction
We proceed from the assumption that rhetorical citizenship is constructed 
communicatively in its microcosmic form in small groups, in conversations 
about forms of social behavior, interpersonal and public, about prices or 
elections, or about general ethical issues, among other topics. Using a new 
theoretical lens comprised of the three linked aspects of voice, narrative, and 
listening, in synergy with theories of discursive democratic activity and rhe-
torical citizenship, and principles of Aristotelian rhetoric, we will examine 
opportunities for free and equal expression of voice in small group conversa-
tions, considering processes and characteristics of those initiating and exer-
cising voice, and the quality of the listening. Much research into listening 
assumes something to be listened to – speaking, or “voice,” a term that has 
recently been regenerated by Couldry to aid us in thinking about democracy 
and political/social change, and in recognizing that humans have a strong 
need for the process of voice, to narrate an account of oneself and to have 
that voice heard and taken into account. For this reason, narrative theory/
methodology (Boje 1991, 2001, 2008, 2011) can be a very useful theoretical 
strand, and will be drawn on to analyze and represent the content of discus-
sion and performances of rhetorical citizenship in a small group.
In addition to voice, we include the linked concept of narrative in 
our examination of rhetorical citizenship, and we look to some important 
narrative theorists of the past three decades in order to show the centrality 
of narrative/storytelling to human communication in general, and rhetorical 
citizenship in particular. 
For the third and final component of our new theoretical lens we draw 
on listening research, because even if both voice and narrative are produced, 
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in any context, they are pointless unless someone is listening. We use this 
new lens to analyze rhetorical citizenship in a particular instance – that is, 
small group discussions about issues in society. We conducted an empiri-
cal study, and although our overall framework supporting this new lens has 
enabled us to analyze rhetorical citizenship in a tripartite way – looking 
at voice, narrative and listening – for the purposes of this chapter we look 
mainly at the narrative component. Because our theoretical framework is 
quite new, we will demonstrate why we think this particular framework is 
useful, and then will give an example of how we have used one strand of it to 
analyze the performance of rhetorical citizenship in a small group. We chose 
the small group as our context because, following Poole and Hollingshead 
(2004), we see the group as the basic unit of communication, believing the 
analysis of small groups facilitates “the detailed study of human communica-
tion exchange” (Poole and Hollingshead 2004, p. 359), allowing a focus on 
each individual in the group. It is also a practical choice when researching 
rhetorical citizenship, as it is within their small and informal friendship and 
family groups that citizens first construct their citizenship, perhaps to a cer-
tain extent testing out their rhetorical production before performing it anew 
in larger groups, for example, at a community meeting. So it is often in the 
small group context that citizens first deliberate about issues before doing so 
in a wider public sphere. 
Theoretical framework
Whether the context is public or private, it could be said that citizenship 
is constructed communicatively every time we participate in conversations 
about forms of social behavior, about prices or elections, or about general 
ethical issues, among other topics. In such forms of discursive democratic 
activity – which is, by default, citizenship – the role of rhetoric has been 
explicitly acknowledged by many theorists for some time (e.g., Gutmann 
and Thompson 1996, Young 2000, Ivie 2002, Dryzek 2010). Most recently, 
these theories have been brought into synergy and considerably refined by 
Kock and Villadsen (2012), who focus on, among other things, the many 
informal ways in which citizens discuss issues of common concern in society, 
arguing that such civic engagement is rhetorical, that the whole process is 
always already rhetorical: we each use rhetoric to construct ourselves and 
represent the ideas and ideals we believe in, whether the process is conscious 
or not. While deliberative democracy has been theorized extensively and 
in many different ways, we align our conception with Cohen’s view of it as 
public discussion or argument among equal citizens, about issues affecting 
them, as part of wider discussions taking place ideally across the whole of 
a society (Cohen, 1989). While it is widely acknowledged that the “most 
sophisticated account of deliberative procedures is from Habermas” (Passe-
rin d'Entrèves 2002, p. 7), Habermas himself seems to want to distance his 
theories from rhetoric when he asserts that the “tradition of rhetoric … is 
interested more in speech that convinces than in its truth content” (Haber-
mas 1984, p. 27). And yet, Habermas is a rhetorician by default, given that 
he sees the study of society as the study of communication, which fits within 
the Aristotelian framework in which citizens need rhetoric to discuss and 
reflect on “those aspects of human affairs for which there are no experts and 
for which everyone is assumed to have an opinion” (Garver 1994, p. 21). 
Rhetoric is quite simply the means by which “a person advocates, or provides 
voice for, an idea” (Herrick 1997, p. 18), engages in public discourse and 
thus “communicative action” (Habermas in Foss et al. 1991, p. 252).
The process of communicating one’s (or one’s group’s) views or posi-
tion will, therefore, inevitably involve rhetoric. As Young states: “rhetoric 
constitutes the flesh and blood of any political communication, whether 
in a neighborhood meeting or on the floor of Parliament” (2000, p. 65). 
Such communication does not even have to be formally political, as it can 
take place in social or socio-political contexts, but it is inevitably enacted by 
citizens. Before discussing the theories and models we have drawn from, we 
need to make clear the specific way we use the concept of rhetorical citizen-
ship in our project. Rhetorical citizenship describes the process of rhetori-
cally constructing and articulating one’s position regarding an issue or belief 
of concern in the particular social context. But we argue it is more than 
this: rhetorical citizenship occurs ideally in a continuous feedback loop of 
articulating one’s position, listening to, taking into account, and respond-
ing appropriately to, the positions of others, resulting in a form of mutual 
sense-making.
When all components of the loop operate at optimum levels, we see 
mutual weighing up of citizens’ differing views – that is, deliberation. As 
Kock and Villadsen point out, when applied to public issues, deliberation 
“implies holding together all reasons and considerations relevant to the issue 
– not only those of one’s own that speak for a given policy but also others 
that may speak against it, and that one has not yet considered” (Kock and 
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Villadsen 2012, p. 4). We can see from this idealistic definition of delib-
eration just how mutual this sense-making process needs to be. Conversely, 
when one or more of the components is missing or inadequate, miscom-
munication occurs, the quality of rhetorical citizenship diminishes, and the 
level of debate and the quality of the communicative action of citizens in 
society can suffer.
Although it is tempting to dismiss the account of deliberation above 
as an almost impossible ideal, we argue that at least it gives us a sketch of 
what “best practice” rhetorical citizenship might look like, and how it relates 
to the automatic human activity of exercising voice. Indeed the concept of 
voice, recently taken up and theorized anew by Couldry, largely includes 
“exchange of narratives with others” (Couldry 2010, p. 8). A true exchange 
requires that one “takes into account” the views of others, which can surely 
only occur if one maintains a relatively open mind on an issue, thus con-
stituting an equally idealistic description – albeit from another angle – of 
rhetorical citizenship. As with many significant concepts, however, the devil 
is in the detail, and details are often in short supply in ambitious theories. In 
an attempt to begin conceptualizing these details, we draw on literature from 
the fields of communication, listening, democracy theory, and narrative 
analysis to first develop a critical framework for identifying the conditions 
that enhance or, conversely, impede the thriving of rhetorical citizenship.
Listening
If, then, an important part of ideal rhetorical citizenship is taking into ac-
count the narratives that citizens tell each other, what does this mean ex-
actly? “To take into account” is “to take into consideration” in other words 
“to consider” that is, to “give mental attention to; think over”. We turn to 
the International Listening Association’s definition of listening: “the process 
of receiving, constructing meaning from, and responding to spoken and/
or nonverbal messages.” Competent listening incorporates affective, cogni-
tive and behavioral (verbal, nonverbal, interactive) dimensions. How can 
we determine whether a person is listening effectively or not? Or, to use 
Coakley, Halone and Wolvin’s (1996) terms, how do we evaluate competent 
or incompetent listening? 
In order to answer this question we turn to the organizational com-
munication scholar, Thomas Jacobson, who studies participatory commu-
nication within the context of organizations that provide humanitarian aid 
to developing countries. Jacobson has found that organizations that do not 
listen to (in other words “take into account”) local community needs risk 
developing projects that lack community engagement and ownership. Ja-
cobson contends that participatory communication and listening are inter-
changeable terms, and has developed a participatory communication model, 
derived from Habermas’s theory of communicative action, to assess whether 
an organization listens and gives voice to participants during specific com-
munication events. 
As with organizations, small group dynamics can include overbearing 
participants who dominate conversation and control inter-group communi-
cation, behaviors that reduce or completely obstruct listening. We therefore 
adapt Jacobson’s (2007) participatory communication model to examine 
whether participants in small groups listen and give voice to each other as 
part of the process of rhetorical citizenship. 
Narrative
But our examination of the quality of listening is not the focus of this pre-
sentation. It is, rather, narrative. We argue for the centrality of narrative in 
rhetoric/rhetorical citizenship, and base our argument on the work of many 
communication theorists over the past few decades who have researched nar-
rative and argued for its centrality to human communication. Our species 
has even been renamed homo narrans by Walter Fisher (1987), one of the 
first theorists to see human communication as narration. Indeed Fisher be-
lieves that all forms of communication can be seen as stories; that is, they 
are “symbolic interpretations of aspects of the world, occurring in time, and 
shaped by history, culture and character” (Fisher 1987, p. xi). The relevance 
of this to rhetoric, we claim, is that these stories are – as theorised by Fisher 
– offered as “value-laden warrants for believing or acting in certain way” 
(1987, p. xi). In other words, the stories provide the means for persuasion, 
and readers probably do not need to be reminded that the universal descrip-
tion of Aristotelian Rhetoric is “the faculty of observing in any given case 
the available means of persuasion.” The centrality of storytelling has also 
been argued for from an anthropological perspective: “Before human beings 
learned how to read and write, storytelling was the medium of collective 
memory” (Allan 2002, p. 2).
We can still see this today, for example, in the collective memory of 
Indigenous Australians. In Australia there have been a number of situations 
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in which certain groups of Indigenous people, in arguing their case in legal 
processes for land rights claims, have acted and sung stories of their right to 
own areas of ancestral land. This is a very compelling example of storytelling 
as a main mode of rhetorical citizenship in a specific context. It is also an 
example of stories functioning as “windows into the emotional, political and 
symbolic lives” of people, as argued by Yiannis Gabriel (2000). As further 
support for this perspective, we can argue – following Bruner – that narra-
tive is the form intrinsic to human thinking, that our brains are hardwired 
to organize experience as narratives, with the most important of these narra-
tives being each person’s autobiographical one. 
The process of telling our stories, often using them as warrants for 
our beliefs or for our actions as citizens, aims to gain support, and thus to 
engage in a sort of collective sense-making. This was first demonstrated in an 
organizational context in Boje’s seminal 1991 article in which he conducted 
an ethnographic study of a large firm, and showed “how people perform sto-
ries to make sense of events, introduce change, and gain political advantage 
during their conversations ... [He found] the stories were dynamic, varied 
by context, and were sometimes terse, requiring the hearer to fill in silently 
major chunks of story line, context, and implication” (Boje 1991, p. 106). 
This study brought into organisational theory the view of organisations as 
“collective storytelling systems ... in which the performance of stories is a key 
part of members’ sense making.” So in organisations and in citizen interac-
tion more generally, sense making is a collective process enacted rhetorically, 
frequently via storytelling (Boje 1991).
Voice
So what happens if/when storytelling is insufficiently taken into account in 
society? It seems intuitive to suggest that there would be a deficit of shared 
sense-making among citizens. Some theorists go further than this, arguing 
that “society cannot work ... unless there is a good degree of shared meaning, 
and society’s ills are due to a lack of shared meaning” (Bohm, 1996, cited in 
Allan 2002, p. 230). In other words, the state of our democracies is suffering. 
This view of the declining quality of democracy has been articulated by many 
theorists, in particular by media theorists, of which Couldry, Livingstone and 
Markham (2007) are notable examples According to them, citizens’ shared 
orientation to the public sphere where matters of common concern are ad-
dressed has been waning since the middle of the twentieth century. 
Significantly, in seeking a way forward from this, in a world divided 
by fundamental differences in values, Couldry subsequently argued for a 
turn towards Aristotle’s ethics. This approach asks: “What do we need to 
do to live together well?” Couldry does not give us too many specifics, but 
he does say that we should aim for Aristotle’s phronēsis – that is, practical 
wisdom. This would occur, Couldry believes, through the circulation of all 
necessary information and facts in society, and through opportunities for the 
expression of opinion and voice by as many citizens as possible. We don’t all 
have to agree on everything, but we can agree on certain underlying condi-
tions – respectful listening to each other’s rhetorical constructions of their 
citizenship, shared sense-making, openness and reflexivity.
A development of this view is achieved in Couldry’s 2010 book, Why 
Voice Matters, in which he terms the “recognition of people’s capacities for 
social cooperation” as “voice” (Couldry 2010, p. 2) or, in other words, peo-
ple’s rhetorical citizenship, although he doesn’t actually use this term. Could-
ry further defines “voice” as process, as “giving an account of oneself and 
what affects one’s life … an irreducible part of what it means to be human” 
(2010, p. vi). However, the opportunity to have one’s voice heard is seriously 
diminished “across various domains: economic, political, cultural [because] 
we are now governed in ways that deny the value of voice and insist instead 
on the primacy of market functioning” (2010, p. xi). According to this view, 
voice ideally “involves us in an ongoing process of reflection, exchanging 
narratives back and forth” (2010, p. 8, emphasis added). And this sort of 
narrative exchange, this exercising of one’s “voice” needs support – an atmo-
sphere of cooperation, an optimum level of listening, and ongoing processes 
of reflection. Proceeding from Couldry’s argument, our hypothesis is that a 
crucial part of how people construct themselves rhetorically and articulate 
their positions on issues (which is of course rhetorical citizenship), and this 
is done by way of narratives, an important element of voice. So the specific 
question that we want to address in this chapter is: What part do narrative 
and voice play in rhetorical citizenship and especially in small group delib-
eration? We will now proceed to the empirical case study we conducted in 
order to explore this question.
Methodology
We follow David Snowden’s methodology (2000) which involves systematic 
collection of anecdotes using anthropological observation, capturing stories 
carolyne lee & judy burnside-lawry voice,  l istening,  and telling stories
[  174 ] [  175 ]
by recording them. The recorded stories are then transcribed, read, and sys-
tematically analyzed. We conducted a very brief analysis of this sort, and in 
our analysis we were guided by Boje’s distinction between narrative and what 
he calls “ante-narrative.” Boje argues for the use of “ante-narrative” analy-
sis, because if we look only for neat, complete narratives, we will be disap-
pointed. Boje argues that the stories we tell are more a sort of random flow 
of fragments, often not quite yet shaped into a coherent story. He says: “nar-
rative is post, a retrospective explanation of storytelling” (Boje 2001, p. 3). 
We could equally call these fragmentary flows pre- or proto-narratives, but 
since Boje has theorized and trialed ante-narrative analysis, we are following 
that method, amalgamating it with Poole’s analysis of small group talk, and 
with Snowden’s ethnographic analysis – getting people to talk, recording it, 
and analyzing it.
Our small group was made up of three volunteers – two men and one 
woman, all in their twenties, who had just completed their masters’ degrees 
at a large Australian university; two were born in Australia, the other was an 
exchange student from Italy (the pseudonyms of these three participants are 
Roy, Dino, and Gina). Each participant was asked to choose a current issue 
in society with which to start a brief conversation. We determined the order 
in which participants would choose topics by taking their names, unseen, 
out of a hat. The first conversation, chosen by Roy, was on the topic of uni-
versity courses being put online by 39 of the largest universities in the world, 
including their own university. The other two topics were national identity, 
and refugees.
We started with the topic, university courses going online. This was 
Roy’s first comment, in which he demonstrated that he wanted to make sure 
that the others understood the prevalent terminology:
R: I would like to talk about university courses going online … Does everyone 
know what MOOCs are? (R:1)
He went on to present his view, which we have decided in our analysis to 
categorize as gently pro online courses. The other two participants asked for 
some clarification. One participant, Dino, positioned himself, equally gently 
and respectfully, as not really in favor of the idea (D: 1).
The third participant, Gina, positioned herself as explicitly “neutral”:
I’m undecided on the fees versus free; like, I know it’s open access and worldwide 
and global but, like, I’m pretty neutral, I don’t really know where I stand because I 
see both sides. (G: 2)
Gina and Dino then asked short questions of Roy (the initiator of this top-
ic), in order to get more information; once they felt confident about the 
topic, probably also about how their ideas, their “voices,” would be received, 
each of the two who did not propose the topic gave a type of narrative. This 
is an example of what Couldry talks about when he says for voice to occur, 
there must be social support, for example, polite and empathic listeners and 
a feeling of comfort (Couldry, 2010, p. 9).
This is Dino’s narrative:
D: Before we were saying how people might be at work and need to have a degree... 
I could tell you a thing from personal experience: my mother at 50 years, decided 
to complete her degree in foreign languages while teaching, she’s a primary school 
teacher, and while working she went to university and got her degree. It was ... as a 
person who works, I think it’s even better to have someone, a teacher, who guides 
you because you don’t have any experience, you’re not used to studying, and you 
always need someone who guides you ... (D: 4) 
We can see here how the way he expresses his voice in non-support of online 
courses is very much embedded in his personal narrative. He uses this story 
about his mother to make his argument, the crux of which is that all learning 
should occur with a guide. This argument is the last sentence of his story. 
We see here that by way of his story he is actually presenting “value-laden 
warrants for believing or acting in certain ways” (Fisher 1987, p. xi). Dino 
rhetorically constructs his position but he tailors it to the social context he 
is in by taking into account that his position is more “contra” the issue than 
those of the other two participants, and what we see here is an example of 
his responding in a manner that he considers appropriate – not too didactic, 
not saying, “online courses are bad; everyone needs an actual teacher” – but 
in giving the story of his mother, he’s saying his position on the issue is con-
tingent on this narrative. 
What happens next is very interesting: Gina starts her narrative by 
creating a link from Dino’s story to her own story, which gives validity to 
Dino’s story, showing that she sees it as relevant, showing that she is “taking 
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into account” his voice and his story, a crucial aspect of hearing the voice 
of others. 
G: ... well I’m not as old as your mum but ... but one of the reasons I chose [this 
University]… is because it’s all on campus and you have to attend classes and 
everything; … and I tried to juggle part time masters study with full time work and 
it didn’t work, and for that reason I’ve decided … to quit full time work so I have 
the ability to come to uni and interact … because otherwise I could get my piece of 
paper on line but it would just be a piece of paper and nothing else. (G: 4)
What is notable here is that she has moved away from her original stated 
neutrality, to align more with the position Dino has articulated, and she 
voices her own personal story to reinforce her new position. Clearly Dino’s 
story resonated with her – and as a result she instigated mutual sense-making 
(Weick 1995) as she responded by telling her own story, which followed the 
same line of argument as Dino’s.
We argue that both these stories show themselves as part of a con-
tinuous feedback loop of articulating one’s position, listening to, taking into 
account, and responding appropriately to the voices of others in which each 
articulates his or her own position; by way of these voiced narratives, partici-
pants enacted a mutual weighing up of differing views, a collective process 
of sense-making (Weick 1995), evincing a very egalitarian/democratic form 
of citizenship.
The next topic the three participants discussed was refugees. Dino 
proposed the topic and Gina was the first to respond:
G: well I got really irked… [when someone used the term] “illegal asylum 
seekers”, and I was … “Well that’s just a really stupid take”... but... I don’t 
actually know too much about the situation, … I’ve just started working at 
Amnesty International. ...we’re a big country, we’ve got lots of land, why can’t 
we share? That’s just my take. None of this political rubbish ... no one comes 
here … because they think, “Oh I’m going come to Australia and see how it is...”; 
they… can’t leave [legally], often it’s a life and death situation, … it’s their one 
chance of survival, and that’s my take on it. (G: 6, emphases added)
There are narrative elements here (for example, she narrates where she 
works) but the narrative is very fragmentary, very much an example of what 
Boje calls “ante-narrative,” by which he means no “proper plot sequence and 
mediated coherence … [but instead] unconstructed and fragmented” (Boje 
2001, p. 3).
Gina’s characters in her story are vague – for example, whoever used the 
term “illegal asylum seekers” is not given, is in fact absent, one of the gaps Boje 
mentions in ante-narrative, but Gina is still expressing her voice, embedding 
her perceptions in her own lived experiences – for example, her work for Am-
nesty International. We note also the rhetorical devices she uses to make her 
argument: she represents her own emotions quite strongly, using rhetorical 
pathos, linguistic features that we have represented by bolding the text above. 
At the same time she retreats a bit from this strong stance by saying “that’s just 
my take on it,” which we argue is to use rhetorical ethos to construct herself as 
someone who can at least see that others might think differently from her on 
this issue. In offering her own voice in this way she ensures she is not dismiss-
ing the voices of the others, is still “listening” to their voices; in other words, 
she wants to maintain an open mind, and see this discussion as very much an 
“exchange” of voices, not one person simply lecturing the others in a didactic 
manner without taking their views into account.
As the conversation proceeds, Gina becomes noticeably more com-
fortable in the position she’s constructed for herself; from the implied ac-
ceptance of her position by the other two participants (they don’t disagree 
with her, they take her voice into account); she clearly feels there’s a certain 
mutuality to the sense-making, and she drops her “hedging” phrases (“that’s 
just my take”), and expresses her voice much more strongly in favor of wel-
coming others into Australia and the need for assimilation:
G: ... my dad was one of the first Indians to come, and at that time all 
the Indians were the outcasts and now they’ve assimilated, then maybe the 
Vietnamese ... If we actually look back, then it was like the Sudanese, Africans, and 
they are now assimilating and now it’s all the people who are coming as asylum 
seekers coming from [Afghanistan]... and we need to make more of an effort to 
assimilate them or to educate them ... (G: 7, emphases added)
As we can see, here she is using the story of her father’s migrant experience, 
which is also a way of constructing her own ethos – she’s the daughter of 
someone who was initially an “outcast,” but who over time became as-
similated.
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Conclusion
In this chapter we have presented our specific usage of the term rhetorical 
citizenship to include the concept that rhetorical citizenship occurs ideally 
in a continuous feedback loop of articulating one’s position, listening to, 
and responding appropriately to the positions of others. We described the 
new theoretical lens that we have constructed for our analysis of rhetorical 
citizenship, comprised of voice, listening and narrative. 
Our empirical study of a small group discussion shows that narrative 
(and/or ante-narrative) is employed by participants at various stages in the 
feedback loop – and, in fact, has led us to include another stage in the feed-
back loop. Our findings indicate that participants use narrative as a method 
to self-reflect verbally on a topic, in the early stages of a group discussion, to 
help one find one’s position and to explore the “social environment” of pub-
lic spheres; in our study narrative was also used by more than one participant 
to articulate feelings and to demonstrate taking account of others’ views – il-
lustrating one’s understanding of, or extension of, another’s viewpoint by us-
ing a story. Narrative was also used by participants as a means of responding 
to others, the final stage of our feedback loop. At times, we saw evidence of 
the use of very strong and explicit rhetoric in a narrative responding to an-
other’s position, using emotive or persuasive terms to advocate or to reassert 
one’s own position in response to another’s. 
To conclude, we ask: what are the implications of our findings for 
the process of rhetorical citizenship? To answer this, we return to Haber-
mas and his concept of the public sphere as a place for (the always rhe-
torical) exchange of views and argumentation by citizens. In this study, we 
have extended Habermas’s conception of the public sphere from 19th cen-
tury European salon society to the small group context (equally, it could 
be extended to contexts of public debate or community deliberation). 
For rhetorical citizenship to occur in its ideal form, the public sphere, in 
whatever context, will provide an environment where participants are able 
not only to use voice and narrative to formulate and then articulate their 
position, but also to facilitate listening to, taking into account the views 
of others, and to respond appropriately to, the positions of others. We 
believe our analysis of the micro public sphere has implications for the 
policy and practice of democratic participation in macro public spheres – 
for example, between organizations and local citizens during deliberation 
about the planning of projects that impact a community. Acknowledging 
that more sustainable societies cannot be achieved without the participa-
tion of local communities, stakeholders and interest groups in more open, 
deliberative processes, the UN Conference on Environment and Develop-
ment formalized Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration on Environment and 
Development, stating the need for participation of all concerned citizens 
and the imperative of providing them with access to information, judicial 
and administrative proceedings (UNCED, 1992, Principle 10). In 1998, the 
adoption of the Aarhus Convention, Article 8, as part of the UN European 
Economic Commission, established citizens’ rights to information and to 
fair participation in the development of environmental regulations (United 
Nations Treaty Collection, 1998). 
Citizen participation has been embedded in France’s national legal 
framework since the mid-1980s, following major conflicts concerning trans-
port infrastructure projects. New legal procedures were enacted during the 
1990s to enhance public and stakeholder participation, including the Law 
of Public Debate (CNDP, 1996), and creation of the National Commission 
of Public Debate (CNDP). The CNDP, as an independent administrative au-
thority, was created to administer organization–citizen debates, to guarantee 
impartiality, to ensure the quality of debates, and to watch over the respec-
tive organization’s methods of engagement.
The emerging theme from these and other international policies is the 
need for democratic empowerment of citizens in decision-making. Findings 
from this study can assist governments and organizations to ensure their 
policies for democratic public participation provide a public sphere for rhe-
torical citizenship that operates in a continuous feedback loop of articulating 
one’s position, listening to the positions of others, and finally responding 
appropriately to them.
Given that stories are the main way humans share meanings, more 
research built upon our framework could assist in mitigating the noted pres-
ent lack of voice in society, by suggesting conditions that would enhance the 
expression of voice and the construction of shared meanings among citizens.
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Argumentative Literacy and Rhetorical 
Citizenship: The Case of Genetically 
Modified Food in the Institutional Setting 
of a Greek Primary School
F O T I N I E G G L E Z O U
Introduction
Ever since antiquity, rhetoric, as bipolar thinking and arguing upon every 
issue, has been interwoven with the instillation of virtues such as reflection, 
reasoning, awareness of the civil identity and of the sense of common good. 
In our era, characterized by rapid social and economic changes at both the 
polis and the cosmopolis levels, such an effort becomes essential for the forma-
tion of a more reasonable and humanistic social reality. Therefore, teaching 
rhetorical argumentation, even in the earliest stages of education, becomes 
one of the most powerful tools for the attainment of such a goal through the 
development of multi-level literacies and the concomitant construction of 
individual and social identities. 
Theoretical framework
Rhetorical citizenship: from Isocrates to a critical and socio-cultural 
pedagogy of citizenship
Isocrates attributes to rhetoric as philosophy an essential role in the devel-
opment of civic education. As a pioneer, he combined rhetoric – as good 
speaking (εὖ λέγειν/eu legein) – and literacy with the necessity of prudential 
action, of praxis (εὖ πράττειν/eu prattein). Within the Isocratean rhetorical 
paideia, literacy, the capacity of talking, reading and writing effectively, is 
accompanied by reflection (στοχάζεσθαι/stokhazesthai) and appropriate ex-
pression (πρέπον/prepon) of subjective opinions (δόξαι/doxai) upon current 
civic matters (καιρός/kairos). In particular, writing – an important feature of 
literacy – becomes a powerful “epistemic tool” that permits, first, the expres-
sion of kairos and prepon and, second, the formation of an ethos “within 
which both personal and public can work” (Walters 1993, p. 162). In this 
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way, Isocrates shaped the individual and social values and identities of his 
students in the democratic context of his era. By cultivating their eloquence, 
literacy and the aptitude to take political decisions, Isocrates sought to instill 
in his students the quality of practical wisdom, of phronēsis, and to lead them 
to “a collective inquiry into the good” (Poulakos 1997, pp. 4-5). For Papil-
lion, “precept, practice and example” (1995, p. 151) were the cornerstones 
of Isocrates’ technē that combined rhetorical training and practice with civic 
education. In Antidosis (§ 184) Isocrates notes (1929, pp. 289, 291):
… the teachers of philosophy impart all the forms of discourse in which the 
mind expresses itself. Then, when they have made them familiar and thoroughly 
conversant with their lessons then they set them at exercises, habituate them to 
work, and require them to combine in practice the particular things which they 
have learned, in order that they may grasp them more firmly and bring their 
theories into closer touch with the occasions for applying them ...
Almost 2,500 years later, central notions of critical pedagogy are related to 
Isocratean principles of civic education for young citizens. For Freire (1985), 
Giroux (1988) and Welch (1999), the empowerment of citizenship is based 
on the interaction of a) the reflective challenge to political, socio-scientific 
and cultural data, b) consciousness raising, which instills social identity in 
individuals, and c) the improvement of current social data through the active 
learning and participation of citizen-agents. Active involvement in learning 
(Dewey 1933) is guaranteed by participatory, dialogic, situated activities that 
lead students to become informed participants and literate persons in a com-
munity (Shor 1999).
As regards the essential role of literacy in the acquisition of civic edu-
cation (Knobel 1999), the modern socio-cultural approach (Christie 1990) 
confirms the primitive – although crucial – interrelation that Isocrates had 
pointed out during the middle of the 4th century B.C., when the passage 
from an oral to a literate culture characterized the socio-cultural reality of 
the era. According to UNESCO’s definition (2004, p. 13), “literacy involves 
a continuum of learning in enabling individuals to achieve their goals, to 
develop their knowledge and potential and to participate fully in their com-
munity and wider society.” The extension and plurality of the term literacy 
makes it a prerequisite to civic education. At the same time, active citizen-
ship is identified as a form of literacy mutually interrelated with other forms 
or levels of it. Critical, genetic, argumentative and school literacy constitute 
some of these levels, as will be shown later in this paper. 
Teaching citizenship and multi-level literacy in the modern Greek school 
context
Since the era of Isocrates’ celebrated educational establishment of rhetoric in 
Athens, the school system, as a socio-cultural institution, offers a favorable 
“cultural environment” where students and teachers co-construct desirable 
civil virtues. In modern Greece, the Single Interdisciplinary Curriculum directs 
its gaze to a broader conception of citizenship following the demands created 
by the interdependence of events in different fields of the global social life 
(Keating et al. 2009). Therefore, besides the development of “Greek iden-
tity and consciousness,” it aims at the intellectual, moral, social, economic, 
political and cultural development of young Greek citizens. The knowledge 
and understanding of universal and diachronic social values, critical evalu-
ation of matters concerning liberty, equity, justice, human rights etc., the 
acquisition of necessary skills for free, responsible and active participation 
in the social, political and economic spheres are cited as necessary processes 
for attaining such goals. The whole effort takes a more systematic and or-
ganized form, once a week, in the 5th and 6th grade of primary school (11 
and 12 year-olds) and the third class of High School (Gymnasio). Because of 
the limited time dedicated to formal civic education, its development is also 
attributed to an interdisciplinary approach ranging across the curriculum. 
For example, in primary school the “semi-typical” lesson of Flexible 
Zone consists of an “umbrella” (Generalized Application ... 2005, p. 17715) 
under which various interdisciplinary programs are included. Emphasis is 
put on the development of critical thinking through collective forms of ac-
tion and of dialectical communication (Ministry of National Education and 
Religion 2001, p. 10). The lesson aims at the students’ cognitive develop-
ment and the learning of values and pragmatic aspects of real life. Therefore, 
it offers an opportunity to develop “citizenship literacy” by examining so-
cially contentious questions, such as the socio-scientific issue (SSI) of Geneti-
cally Modified Food (GMF). The interrelation of the genetic issue with argu-
mentative and critical literacy facilitates the construction and expression of 
students’ identities as members of a social group through purposeful literacy 
practices (Gee 1990). 
In the case of genetics such an effort becomes necessary. The science 
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of genes, as a field of scientific endeavor and of social interest, directs and 
imposes new modes of individual and collective thinking and decision mak-
ing about the creation of life, health, the environment and, consequently, 
the global society. It demands the active engagement of individuals with 
various sources of information and knowledge as well as with the actions of 
debating and arguing about the application of bio-technology in modern 
human life. 
On the other hand, argumentation, as the linguistic expression of a 
socio-cultural practice, contributes to civic education. First, it represents a 
form of social action based on rhetorical, situated practices and activities 
(Miller 1984, p. 163). Second, it favors the emergence of critical thinking 
and of participatory skills due to its interactive nature (Schwarz 2009). Also, 
argumentation becomes a necessary tool for exploring linguistic possibilities. 
The students engaged in argumentation discover the necessary linguistic and 
meta-linguistic expressions (e.g. argumentative markers) that facilitate the 
representation of their identities (Golder 1993) and the negotiation of their 
standpoints (Tseronis 2011). Finally, argumentation is the key factor in sup-
porting Isocrates’ rhetorical education: “to explore the senses in which logos 
can articulate communal purposes, address situational demands, induce co-
operation and secure wise deliberations” (Poulakos 1986, p. 307). 
In sum, rhetorical engagement in the global issue of GMF creates a 
parallel activation of multi-level literacies, capable of conducing students to 
“the expansion of [their] personal and social identity” (Intzidis and Karant-
zola 2008, p. 8). As will be obvious, the idea of the construction of a liter-
ate, social identity informs the present case study. At the same time, the 
paper examines whether the Isocratean ideal of logōn paideia, education in 
argumentative discourse (in oral and written form), may still lead modern 
students to “wisdom and involvement in their culture” in order to benefit 
the polis as well as themselves (Blair 1992, p. 4). 
About the study 
Purpose 
The purpose of the study was the improvement of argumentative writing 
and the production of higher level argumentative texts through which stu-
dents might express their opinions about the use of GMF.
Materials and methods
Theory and methodology
The study describes an experiment with 24 twelve-year-old students, in the 
sixth grade of a public elementary school in Alimos, an urban zone of Athens. 
The experimental group shared an homogeneous middle class social back-
ground. The intervention was carried out for a total of forty-four class hours.
Our program aimed at finding an appropriate method for the con-
struction of a literate civic identity. To the social constructionist approach, 
the shape of an identity stems from the community in which we belong as 
individuals. Writing, as an “act of identity” (Ivanič 1998, p. 32) is influenced 
by the applied practices and interactions of the community in which it is 
generated. Therefore, the destabilization of pre-existent educational prac-
tices or habitus and of crystallized ways of thinking and acting, and the en-
hancement of a more reflexive monitoring of texts, of classroom practices, 
of the self and of the society, may lead to the genesis of conscious, literate 
and active citizens. As Vygotsky notes (1981, p. 157), both social life and 
argumentation determine the higher intellectual capacities and possibilities 
of each individual. 
Theoretical and methodological models that informed our interven-
tion were: 
a) The rhombus model of education (Fig.1). It represents the teaching of 
language as macro-genre. According to it, a bilateral relation may be shown 
to obtain between the promotion of literacy and the construction of identi-
ties of the participants-agents (Koutsogiannis and Alexiou 2012, p. 71). This 
relation is developed in a more complex web through the interdependence 
of all its factors such as: 1) knowledge about the world (values, attitudes etc.), 
2) knowledge about language (meta-language), 3) teaching practices, 4) the 
intervention of literacies and 5) identities. The model seems to be influenced 
by the sociological model, which examines the development of citizenship as 
a complex process, directly interwoven with the acquisition of identity and 
of civic virtues, integration into a certain community (classroom) and access 
to various economic, cultural and political resources (school) (Turner 1997). 
Other resources were: b) The theory of social identity: for Tajfel and 
Turner (2004) the formation of social identities depends on the meanings 
that individuals attribute to themselves as members of a particular social 
category and c) the sociological analysis of emotions (Stets and Turner 2008). 
According to it, there is a recursive and transformative interaction between, 
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on the one hand, emotions and cognitive representations of the self and of 
features of the social reality and, on the other, with the social structure and 
culture which influence the expression of salient identities (Stets 2007).
The corpus of data consisted of: a) transcripts from audiotaped activities in 
the classroom and b) students’ individual pre-test texts (Text A) and post-
test texts (Text B) in the form of an argumentative opinion essay. The results 
of the students’ oral activities and written texts were analyzed in qualitative 
and quantitative terms (triangulation of data). The qualitative analysis was 
based on the dialectical-relational approach of Critical Discourse Analysis. 
More specifically, Fairclough’s three-dimensional model (1995) examines the 
linguistic choices that reveal the form and the texture of the produced texts, 
situated in a specific social context and interwoven with the practices that 
generate them (Wodak and Meyer 2009). The category system was identi-
fied as reliable based on the calculation of Cohen’s Kappa coefficient for two 
raters (Cohen 1960). Alpha values of 0.60 (statistical significance: p < 0.003) 
and 0.833 (p < 0.000) were obtained for the observations regarding the level 
of the decided and evaluativist argumentative texts written after the interven-
tion (Text B; see 4.2). Therefore, there was evidence that the observation 
system used by the researcher was valid. 
Materials and treatment
The treatment was realized in two phases: 
Phase I: The first phase included typical strategies such as: 1) the choice 
of the theme (1 hour): the issue of Genetics was included in the official man-
ual of Flexible Zone and was freely chosen by the students among other issues 
for further research; 2) reading and analysis of textbook material (1 hour); 
3) gathering and presentation of data (5 hours): students chose, and read in 
class, texts (journalistic, web-texts) and presented photos relative to the issue. 
A short discussion about GMF followed; 4) writing an argumentative text (1 
hour): students developed their arguments for or against GMF (pre-test). The 
theme was: “What is your opinion of the use of GMF in your daily life?” Dur-
ing this phase, the oral interactions among teacher and students were limited 
to typical forms of questions and answers. The above habitual educational 
practices aimed at students’ acquisition of a basic knowledge about GMF and 
their familiarization with the necessary vocabulary relating to the issue.
Phase II: The second phase included cognitive and social strategies of 
learning such as: 
1) use of audiovisual media (1 hour): a short video from Greek edu-
cational television (http://www.edutv.gr) was presented in order to increase 
students’ knowledge about GMF. Students were informed equally about the 
possible positive and negative consequences of genetically modified products; 
2) expert opinions (2 hours): two experts, an industrial chemist and a 
member of the Greek World Wildlife Fund (WWF), visited the classroom in 
order to further cultivate the genetic literacy of the students. A short conver-
sation about the role of bio-technology in foods followed; 
3) drawing ideas (2 hours): after these visits, students were asked by 
the teacher to draw a picture illustrating the possible positive and negative 
effects of GMF. As evident in Figures 2 and 3, the visual antithesis among 
the drawings provoked a further classroom discussion of the controversial 
character of GMF in real life; 
4) posing the problem (2 hours): students expressed and justified their 
initial attitude about GMF by playing the linguistic game The chain of expla-
nations; 
5) direct instruction (4 hours): students were taught basic elements 
of the argumentative genre such as: argumentative topics (cause and effect, 
antithesis etc.), types of evidence (statistics, testimonies etc.), expressions of 
modality (should, must etc.) and connectives (oppositional, concessive, etc.) in 
order to increase their knowledge about argumentation as a linguistic activity; 
6) modeling (1 hour): a modeling of an argumentative text as a train 
(Egglezou 2010) was used, aimed at facilitating recall of its structure (thesis/
reason(s)/counterargument(s)/rebuttal(s)/conclusion/evidence); 
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7) reading, listening and analysis of model texts (5 hours): five texts about 
GMF, brought to the classroom by the students, were re-read and broken down 
into their component parts by the teacher in cooperation with the students, in 
order to help them analyze the argumentation provided for or against GMF; 
figure 2 the butterfly-apple figure 3 no to gmf
8) oral interactions between students (10 hours): students engaged in vari-
ous oral interactions such as a) linguistic games: during the game “Tell the 
opposite” each student stated his/her opinion and asked the next classmate 
to state the opposite idea about GMF (1 hour); b) role-playing debates: these 
debates created the necessary context for the development of the students’ 
arguments. For example, students acting as consumers asked the greengro-
cer of the ‘laiki’ market (a typical Greek farmers’ market) why the tomatoes 
were so big, red and round or, as commercial agents of Monsanto, tried to 
persuade producers to buy GM tomato seeds (2 hours); c) the Six Thinking 
Hats of De Bono (1985; 3 hours). The students, as consumers, producers, 
citizens and scientists, worked collaboratively and developed their parallel 
argumentation considering the issue of GMF under multiple perspectives; 
d) brainstorming: students were divided into six groups of four and tried to 
find arguments for and against the use of GMF for (i) human health, (ii) the 
environment, and iii) society (1 hour); e) Parliamentary debates (3 hours): 
students exchanged arguments for and against GMF. All the above practices 
permitted the students’ familiarization with various roles, allowed them to 
deliberate and/or arrive at justified opinions, while they shared common 
experiences and interacted pleasantly during the learning process; 
9) emotional arousal (2 hours): students expressed their feelings and 
thoughts about a real case. Four of the biggest Greek dairy companies were 
accused by Greenpeace of using GM animal feed at a percentage of 90 %, 
with the result that the milk tested positive for GM substances; 
10) dyadic collaborative writing (2 hours): students, in pairs, wrote a 
letter to the dairy companies, complaining, as responsible citizens, about the 
use of GM animal feed; 
11) observational learning (4 hours): students, as observers, developed 
their metacognitive, metalinguistic and critical skills by evaluating and com-
menting the oral and written activities of their classmates; 
12) individual writing (1 hour): students wrote a second text (post-
test) stating their arguments on GMF.
Findings
Qualitative analysis of the oral activities
The aforementioned oral activities aimed at changing formal educational 
practices as well as students’ knowledge about the world and the language. 
The game The chain of explanations provoked their skepticism about per-
sonal thoughts and attitudes and established the basis for their further delib-
eration on GMF. For example:
(Antonis): “In the beginning I thought that it would be fun ... ehhh ... to ... create 
new products, but, then, Mrs. Helen made me understand that they are dangerous 
...What about you?” 
(Konstantina): “I still don’t know if they are good or bad. I am very confused ... 
What about you?”
The game “Tell the opposite” familiarized students with the expression of coun-
terarguments related to the use of GMF and to the development of the art of 
controversy. The students exchanged different ideas on the issue of GMF:
“The use of GMF will solve the problem of malnutrition worldwide, because the 
production will be increased”. 
“Maybe you are right, but have you ever thought that the industries will control the 
production of goods? The farmers will be obliged to buy new genes every year!”
The role-playing debates, as an introduction to debate, made students as-
sume various roles and produce arguments from those perspectives. At the 
same time this activity helped them develop the necessary civic qualities of 
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empathy and tolerance, that is, the ability to recognize, understand and accept 
another person’s perceptions: 
(Nikos as farmer/seller): “These tomatoes are improved. That’s why they have 
this color and shape. Also, they are more tolerant to cold weather. So you can eat 
tomatoes all year long.”
 (Apostolos as producer): “The crops that you are selling destroy bio-diversity. 
Nature knows how to improve its products by itself.”
(Despina as agent): “You are right to have doubts. But you must know that the 
crops produced by precise genetic engineering techniques are as safe as the crops 
which are generated by naturally selected intersections. You will have secure results 
and, trust me, your output will increase. So you will earn more money.” 
By wearing the Six Thinking Hats of De Bono (1985) students extended 
their thinking skills. Their argumentation varied according to the students’ 
identification with different social groups (e.g. consumers, producers, citi-
zens and scientists). For example: 
(Mary): “As a scientist, wearing the yellow hat of optimism, I assure you that you 
don’t have to be afraid of GMF. Genetics is the science of the future, the science 
that will guarantee a better and healthier life to our children. The scientists will 
continue the research in order to prove that genetic modification does no harm to 
human beings. We want consumers to trust our products and choose them of their 
own free will because they prefer them.” 
Two debates were carried out in the classroom in order to offer students 
the opportunity to be engaged in public speaking, to “inter-think” (Mercer 
2009, p. 182) and to understand the usefulness of audience-based discourse. 
(Evangelos): “I and my team, we are against the use of GMF. The opponent team 
said that GMF has beautiful shape and color. But I really don’t understand how it 
is possible for you to like a purple tomato. Also, maybe some mice lived 20 more 
days in the labs in Great Britain ... but the researches refer only to animals not to 
humans ... and we all know that we are different organisms from mice. So, we don’t 
really know if they are good or bad ...”
The information that the daily milk tested positive for GM substances acted 
in a catalytic way on the students’ judgments. Intense feelings such as rage, 
anger, sorrow, insecurity, anxiety arose in students, proving that “increasing 
our capacity for emotion enhances our ability to reason” (Nelson 2005, p.8) 
and illustrating the role of passion in every rhetorical situation. At the same 
time, salient thoughts and judgments were activated. Students wondered 
about the role of legislation and the informative role of television, and as 
consumers they demanded official information about what they ate, asking 
for GMF labels in supermarkets, and criticizing, implicitly, current policies or 
failures to act on the part of the state or consumers:
(Dimitris): “I don’t feel safe because I don’ know if what I eat is genetically 
engineered or not. Shouldn’t the representatives of the milk industries be taken to 
court and put in jail? What they did was awful, since thousands of Greek children 
drink their milk. Fortunately Greenpeace revealed this big secret that concerns all 
Greeks ... If I could have the control of these industries I would try to change a lot 
of their practices ...”
(Nikolas): “I feel angry because we pay a lot of money for our milk. I am 
wondering why TV didn’t present this information.”
Statistical analysis of the written texts 
The evaluation criteria for students’ pre-test texts (Text A) and post-test texts 
(Text B) were:
a) the argumentative level of the text. Following the taxonomy of levels 
of argumentative texts proposed by Mani-Ikan (2000) a rating scale from 1-5 
was created. Each text was marked by a number representing a different argu-
mentative level: a) unwarranted texts (1 point), b) one-sided texts (2 points), 
c) multiplist texts where despite the appearance of oppositional arguments no 
explicit conclusion was drawn (3 points), d) decided texts where the choice 
between the contrasting arguments was not grounded (4 points) and e) evalu-
ativist texts where the adoption of the proposed argumentation was based on 
a refutation of the opposing argument(s) (5 points). Lower average means of 
the scale represented a lower argumentative level of the text while higher aver-
age means represented a higher argumentative level of the text; 
b) argumentative markers (of claim and modality). A rating scale from 
0-2 was created according to the following norm: a) no use of argumentative 
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markers of claim or modality: 0 points, b) use of an argumentative marker 
of claim or modality at least once in the text: one point, c) use of both argu-
mentative markers at least once in the text: two points. Lower average means 
of the scale represented limited use of argumentative markers in the text.
Two statistical tests were used: a) the McNemar non-parametric test, 
for measuring the significance of the percentage of the matched pre/post test 
results. In our case the test was applied in order to determine whether the 
intervention had an effect on argumentative writing according to the above 
criteria at a significant level; b) the Wilcoxon non-parametric test was used 
in order to detect the existence of differences at a significant level between 
the average means of texts A and B as regards the first and second criterion 
of analysis.
The activities during the second phase of the intervention were con-
sidered as the independent variable of the research (YES/NO) (Verma and 
Mallick 1999). The average mean of the argumentative level of the text and 
of the argumentative markers constituted the dependent variables.
As for the first criterion of analysis, the McNemar test showed signifi-
cant changes in the percentage of the level of the texts written before and 
after the intervention (Text A vs. Text B). After the intervention a significant 
difference was observed in the percentage of the produced texts of the un-
warranted level (Text A 33 % vs. Text B 0) (p = 0.008), of the decided level 
(Text A 0 vs. Text B 29.2 %) (p = 0.016), and of the evaluativist level (Text A 
4.2 % vs. Text B 45.8 %) (p = 0.002), while no significance was noticed in the 
texts of one-sided level (Text A 54.2% vs. Text B 20.8 %), and of the multiplist 
level (Text A 8.2 % vs. Text B 4.1 %). 
According to the Wilcoxon signed rank test the average mean M = 
1.88 (SD = ± 0.9) of the argumentative level of the pre-test (Text A) in-
creased in the post-test (Text B) (M = 4.00, SD = ± 1.18). The analysis 
showed a significant difference in the mean argumentative level between 
Texts A and B (p = 0.000). Positive differences in Figure 4 indicate that the 
students produced texts at a higher argumentative level after the activities of 
the second phase (Text B), while the negative difference expresses the final 
absence of “unwarranted” texts.
For the second criterion a significant increase in the percentage of 
argumentative markers was noticed. In particular, the proportion of the 
students (N=12) that used argumentative markers of claim varied from 50 
% (Text A) to 91.7 % (N = 22) in Text B. The McNemar test confirmed 
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a significant difference in the use of argumentative markers of claim (p = 
0.000). A significant difference relative to the use of argumentative markers 
of modality (p = 0.002) was also noticed. The percentage of the students that 
used argumentative modality markers increased between Texts A and B from 
8.3% (N=2) to 62.5% (N=15) correspondingly. 
According to the Wilcoxon signed rank test the average mean of the 
use of argumentative markers varied significantly (p = 0.000) from M = 0.58 
in Text A (SD = ± 0.654) to M = 1.54 in Text B (SD = ± 0.658). The positive 
differences shown in Figure 5 highlight the increased use of argumentative 
markers after the activities of the second phase. 
Triangulation of data: further analysis of the texts
The free written argumentative text (Text A) reflected a generalized nega-
tive reception and attitude (Gaskell 1999) towards GMF, which represents 
a broader public European and, especially, Greek perception of the issue 
(Marouda-Chatjoulis et al. 1998). Thirteen students (54 %) stated their op-
position to GMF, four students (16.6 %) kept a positive attitude towards it, 
while seven students (29 %) were neutral on the use of GMF (Fig. 7). 
Despite the results, the qualitative analysis of the produced texts 
showed that the generalized rejection of GMF wasn’t supported by personal 
and conscious “discursive constructions” (Lankshear and Knobel 1997, p. 
95). The students seemed to have difficulties expressing their “discursive 
self ” as writers. Linguistic units expressing personal values, beliefs or experi-
ences, that is, elements of individual identity, were lacking. Corresponding-
ly, only three students used linguistic patterns identifying themselves with 
some social group. In other words, students had a superficial approach to the 
whole issue during the first phase owing to embedded, habitual practices of 
communicating, reading and writing.
Most of the texts A were either unwarranted (33.3 %) or one-sided 
(54.2 %). Either a jumble of information about GMF was given, or the argu-
ments were clichés, mechanical reproductions of stereotypical ideas about 
human health. The negotiation and critical evaluation of opposite ideas were 
lacking (4.2 %) (Fig. 8). 
“The scientists modified fruits and vegetables in order to grow sooner than the 
natural ones and to be more nutritious and delicious. The label of GMF is a triangle 
with four circles inside, but, we rarely see it on the products.” 
The lack of personal interest and engagement in the issue was shown by 
the limited use of argumentative markers of claim (50 %) and of modal-
ity (8.3%) in text A (Fig. 6). Even the incidental use of modality markers 
weakened the argumentation presented, since their ‘value’ indicated either 
a possibility or an uncertainty of the writer about the position supported 
(maybe, possibly, etc.). 
“I believe that GMF is, possibly, harmful to our health, since they change the cells 
of the fruits or of the animals we eat. For example, they may put cells of lemon in a 
banana” (Mary).
On the other hand, the activities during the second phase had a positive 
impact on the writing of Text B. The final attitude to GMF continued to be 
negative in most of the texts. Twenty-one students (87.5 %) were opposed to 
the use of GMF, two students (8.3 %) supported it, while one student (4.1 
%) remained neutral (Fig.7). But what is most important is that the students 
discovered the linguistic “tools” which helped them a) support their position 
in a more authoritative way and b) construct their identities through writ-
ing. The form of the texts was improved, achieving higher levels of argumen-
tation (Figure 8). 
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No unwarranted texts were produced, and the number of one-sided texts 
decreased to five (20.8 %). Seven students (29.2 %) managed to produce de-
cided texts through the presentation of bilateral thinking and arguing, while 
eleven students (45.8 %) achieved the evaluativist form of argumentation by 
weighing the pros and cons of GMF in order to adopt their final standpoint, 
using ‘logos’, ‘pathos’ and ‘ethos.’ We present an example of an argument 
relative to the notion of safety vs. risk: 
“On the one hand, animal testing shows that the use of GMF made the animals 
live longer. On the other hand, their use provoked dangerous side-effects as toxins 
on the liver and the kidneys. I am afraid to risk my health since the researches are 
ambiguous. That’s why I am against GMF and I advise all my fellow men to be so.” 
(Zenia)
In the final texts (B), the use of argumentative markers increased significantly 
and highlighted an active commitment on the issue (Fig. 6). Twenty-two stu-
dents (91.7 %) used markers of claim (I believe that…, according to my opin-
ion…etc.) in order to express their personal opinions. Fifteen students (62.5 
%) used modality markers. What is important to notice is not only the in-
crease in the percentage but, mainly, their strong value (should…, shouldn’t… 
etc.), which revealed a greater certainty about the students’ standpoints. 
Also, the use of argumentative markers in Text B was accompanied by 
an increased use of linguistic units that revealed the students’ adherence to a 
certain social group (70.8 %). Mostly, the students were identified with the 
social groups of citizens and of consumers or both of them at the same time 
(as consumer…, as citizen…, as a consumer and citizen…). Besides that, the 
students either connected their interests to the practices of activist organiza-
tions or set themselves apart from the interests of other social groups – such 
as the industries. Also, the students proposed courses of action against GMF: 
“The big companies are afraid only of one thing: the informed citizens who protect 
their rights. If GMF was as safe as they want to present it, then why do they hide the 
identity of GM products and they don’t write it on their packages?”
Sometimes the students’ individual identity was absorbed by a collective 
one, as shown by the use of the plural personal pronoun we:
“As citizens of a democracy we demand to know what we are eating…”. 
“Because, when we play dangerous games with mother nature, we are lost from 
the very beginning. Her gifts are more than enough for all of us and we don’t need 
anything more than the perfection of nature…”.
Moreover, in some cases representing the social identity of the consumer/citi-
zen the students produced arguments in favor of organic farming, converting 
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the logic of GM crops and relating the problem of GM animal feed to the 
economic crisis of Greece, that is, to the social context in which they lived: 
“Since in Greece we have so many fields, why don’t we cultivate crops such 
as chickpeas or peas that enrich the soil and may offer so many jobs?... In our 
economic situation such farming would bring development to the country and we 
would have a better chance of coming through the crisis ...”. 
The issue of price and its connection to the Greek economic crisis was also 
part of the argumentation of the supporters of GMF:
“As a consumer, I support the use of GMF because they are rich in vitamins and 
may be cheaper than natural products and, as we all know, we are going through an 
economic crisis ... ”. 
Also it’s worth mentioning that in Text B fourteen students (58.3 %) used, at 
least once, linguistic units which permitted the expression of their ‘auto-bi-
ographical’ discursive self through the writing of examples, personal experi-
ences, testimonies, sentiments etc. Such discursive constructions were totally 
lacking in the first text. Their use in the post-test (B) helped the students 
to extend their argumentation, to formulate effective warrants and to give a 
more personal style to the texts produced. 
“My sister is allergic to various foods. How can I be sure that genetic modification 
has nothing to do with it, since several researches have shown that GMF provoke 
allergies?”
Some students declared that their participation in the activities of the pro-
gram led them to form their final opinion, to reach a higher level of self-
understanding and to gain a deeper knowledge of the socio-scientific issue 
of GMF. 
“After a long period of involvement in GM products I now have an opinion 
on them. My standpoint is negative and I drew my conclusion based on the 
information and the sources which I saw and heard…”.
Conclusions
To conclude, the statistical results of the research showed that logos was a pre-
cious tool that allowed students to get in touch with reality, to promote their 
knowledge, to deliberate on a modern socio-scientific issue and to arrive at 
justified beliefs. The students succeeded in cultivating the Isocratean quality 
of sophia or phronesis (Depew 2004, p. 171), as future deliberating citizens 
and consumers. In other words, they developed their practical reasoning and 
made decisions about the use of GM products through rhetorical argumen-
tation. So, the belief of Isocrates is still credible: that the unifying strength 
of the language embedded in rhetorical pedagogy helps the acquisition of 
literacy as well of civic engagement in young citizens. Today, more than ever, 
it is necessary to train the politai in a socially responsible rhetoric, affording 
opportunities for social change and for shaping the future polis through an 
emergent discourse of care (Ackerman and Coogan 2010).
In particular, our research revealed that the educational practices of the 
second phase of the intervention created a suitable context for a more active, 
dialogic, self-reflective and exploratory process of learning. The students’ ar-
gumentative discourse on GMF permitted them to develop the skill of contro-
versy and the capacity of evaluating and questioning the information provid-
ed. Rhetorical argumentation contributed to the expansion of their linguistic 
and metalinguistic, cognitive and metacognitive abilities. Students’ knowl-
edge about the language and the world, the self and society was broadened. 
Apart from the students’ oral argumentative activities, the writing fa-
cilitated articulation of their thoughts in written words in an orderly and 
disciplined way. The statistical analysis confirmed that written texts at a 
higher argumentative level were produced; that is, an improved form of ar-
gumentative literacy was achieved. Also, the departure from habitual teach-
ing practices seemed to have positive implications for the construction of the 
students’ individual and social identities. In the final texts, the increased use 
of argumentative markers and of various linguistic patterns relative to the 
auto-biographical and social selves of the students was a sign of active en-
gagement with the issue. Their intellectual, emotional, practical and moral 
involvement in the issue of GMF moved them away from prior habitual at-
titudes such as indifference and apathy towards everyday social phenomena. 
It might be objected that students reiterated commonsense notions 
about GMF, recycling bias and stereotypes. Indeed, this may be true up to a 
certain point. However, exploration of the self and of society, especially at 
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this age, starts from commonsense argumentation in order to criticize, re-
fute or transform it later. As Billig notes, “each repetition will be a creation, 
bringing the past towards its future” (1991, p. 22). What really matters is the 
internalization of rhetorical argumentation, implying criticism, evaluation 
and choice of the best alternative in every situation. Citizenship and civic 
virtues stem from such internalized processes and practices of individual 
thought and social existence.
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“People Power” in Philippine Presidential 
Rhetoric: (Re)Framing Democratic 
Participation in Post-authoritarian Regimes
G E N E S E G A R R A NAV E R A 
Introduction
Crucial to the development of democracy is the kind and level of civic en-
gagement citizens perform in society (Diamond 2008, pp. 359-62; Dahl 
2000, pp. 185-188). Needless to say, various societal contexts necessitate dif-
ferent forms and levels of citizen participation. In more mature democracies, 
citizen participation comes in the form of political debates and discussions 
that creatively draw upon various methods and technologies available in the 
21st century (Dahl, p. 188; Diamond, pp. 361-62). For societies that have 
gone through years of authoritarianism and have, at some point in their his-
tory, chosen to reject autocratic leadership in favor of a democratic govern-
ment, mass mobilizations and protests become the most manifest political 
expression. Such political expression was apparent in the democratization 
movements in Eastern Europe in the 1990s and in the Arab Spring at the 
turn of the second decade of the 21st century. 
The Philippines, which transitioned from a long-standing dictatorial 
regime to democratization in the latter half of the 1980s, shares with other 
societies-in-democratic transition the penchant for mass mobilizations and 
protests in order to break free from the grip of dictatorship or quell autocratic 
tendencies. In fact, protests were waged even during the dictatorial regime of 
Ferdinand Marcos despite his leadership’s notorious use of state terrorism. The 
protests culminated in what is now known as the “people power revolution” 
– a four-day mass protest of hundreds of thousands of Filipinos along a strip 
of highway called Epifanio delos Santos Avenue (EDSA). The peaceful con-
vergence of Filipinos-in-protest overthrew Marcos from his 20-year rule and 
installed Corazon Aquino, wife of a slain opposition leader and the emergent 
leader of the anti-Marcos struggle, into power. 
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Corazon Aquino’s assumption into the Philippine presidency some-
how parallels the rise of the term “people power,” an expression that, from 
then on, found its way into the political lexicon of the country. It may be ar-
gued that people power in the Philippines has served as a model for democ-
ratization movements in other parts of the world. More importantly, it has 
served as a resource for talking about and for performing democracy in the 
country. It may be worth asking then the question, how has people power 
been talked about and rhetorically constructed in the years following the fall 
of the Marcos dictatorship? People power is in itself a rhetorical phenom-
enon in that it requires the deployment of linguistic and semiotic resources 
in order to shape and create impact on politics and society; however, I wish 
to suggest that its definition and redefinition pose constraints to its realiza-
tion in the Philippines’ democratization project.
In this chapter, I examine how the notion of “people power” has been 
variably cast in the schemas of post-dictatorship Philippine presidencies. I 
specifically examine how the post-dictatorship presidencies – from Corazon 
Aquino to the incumbent president Benigno Aquino III – have conceptual-
ized the notion of democracy in their presidential rhetoric. The State of the 
Nation Addresses (SONAs) delivered by these presidents are used as primary 
data for analysis.1
In the succeeding sections, I discuss the analytical framework used 
to analyze the national speeches of five Philippine presidents including 
Corazon Aquino (1986-1992), Fidel Ramos (1992-1998), Joseph Estrada 
(1998-2001), Gloria Macapagal Arroyo (2001-2010), and Benigno Aquino 
III (2010 to the present). I then provide a brief account of the socio-political 
and historical milieu of the five presidencies to contextualize their public ad-
dresses. This is followed by sections containing analyses of presidential texts 
and discussion of insights generated from the analyses. In the discussion, I 
argue that conceptualizations of people power across the post-dictatorship 
presidencies are motivated by presidential character, agenda, and the unique 
socio-political situation presidents find themselves in. I conclude by propos-
ing that as conceptualizations of the presidencies are motivated by a host of 
1 The SONAs are annual reports to the nation delivered by the Philippine presidents before 
members of the legislative chambers. Mandated by the constitution, the SONA is the most 
publicized speech of the president and arguably the most talked about before, during and 
after its presentation.
factors, the notion of people power necessarily becomes malleable and this is 
realized in presidential text and talk. This malleability reveals the potential 
of presidential rhetoric to define the limits and possibilities of rhetorical 
citizenship.
Analytical framework
In my analytical framework, I assume that mental models (van Dijk 1998) 
mediate our sense making processes. When we make sense of texts, mental 
representations enable us to establish a link between linguistic or semiotic 
expressions and their socio-political contexts. In this paper, I examine these 
mental models by using concepts from cognitive linguistics. For the purpose 
of analysis, I use the terms “conceptual frames,” “conceptualizations,” “con-
ceptual metaphors,” and “metaphorizations” that have been largely informed 
by the works of Lakoff and Johnson (1980), Lakoff (1992, 2008), and Char-
teris-Black (2004, 2005). I generate what I call the conceptual frames of de-
mocracy through an analysis of conceptual statements including conceptual 
metaphors (Lakoff and Johnson 1980; Lakoff 1992, 2008; Charteris-Black 
2005, 2007) that underlie metaphorical and lexico-grammatical expressions 
found in political texts and talk. Specifically, I focus on identifying, describ-
ing, and analyzing conceptualizations of Philippine democracy as realized in 
the presidential speeches and how they parallel or differ from each other. I 
suggest that the presidential conceptualizations of democracy reveal how the 
notion of people power is curiously rendered in the national leaders’ visions 
of the state of the nation.
In the following sub-sections, I briefly discuss how the theme of de-
mocracy becomes a salient theme in post-authoritarian presidential rhetoric 
and illustrate (see Figure 1) how the analysis is done using extracts from the 
speeches of the first post-dictatorship president, Corazon Aquino.
The theme of democracy
This paper is derived from a larger study that looks into configurations of the 
various conceptualizations of the state of the nation across 23 national address-
es delivered by four presidencies.2 It solely focuses on the conceptualizations 
2 Navera, Gene Segarra, “Metaphorizing the Philippine Presidency: Schemas of Presidential 
Leadership in the Post-Marcos State of the Nation Addresses (1987-2009)”, (PhD diss., 
National University of Singapore, 2012).
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of democracy in the State of the Nation Address or SONA, a constitutionally 
mandated speech delivered by the Philippine president before the Congress ev-
ery third Monday of July. The identification of democracy as a salient theme in 
the post-dictatorship presidential rhetoric is based on a careful examination of 
the 23 SONAs and published historical accounts and documents on the Marcos 
authoritarian regime (from 1972 to 1986) and the four post-Marcos presiden-
cies to get a good grasp of the socio-political and historical milieu within which 
the public addresses were situated.3 Crucial to the identification of the theme 
were accounts of the socio-political situation in the Philippines during the final 
year of the Marcos presidency4 and the Aquino administration’s assessment of 
its presidential term (see Abueva and Roman, 1993). 
Based on my analysis of the primary texts and my critical appreciation 
of previous accounts of the major issues and concerns that confronted the 
four post-Marcos presidencies under question (Malaya and Malaya 2004, 
Cortes 1999, Martinez 1999), I identified democracy as an important theme 
in the post-authoritarian Philippine presidential rhetoric.5 The theme of de-
mocracy subsumes the notion of “people power,” a political expression that 
found its way into the national imagination during the fall of the Marcos 
dictatorship and at the beginning of “re-democratization” in the Philippines. 
Understandably, “people power” figures prominently when the theme of de-
mocracy is discussed in Philippine political discourse.
Method of analysis
In analyzing the SONAs of each president, I focused on portions of the 
speeches that explicate or discuss the focal theme. From these extracts, I 
3 The sources of these documents include the library and archival sections of the Philippine 
House of Representatives; the University of the Philippines Main Library’s Filipiniana 
section; the library of the UP National College of Public Administration and Governance; 
the library of the Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism (PCIJ); and the library 
of IBON Foundation, an independent think tank that regularly publishes analyses on the 
socio-economic and political situation in the Philippines. 
4 They are significant in that they highlight the issues and concerns that the post-Marcos 
presidential leadership was positioned to respond. 
5 Other themes that surfaced in my analysis of the texts include national economy, peace 
and security, and the presidency. They are not covered in this paper, but are covered in the 
unpublished doctoral dissertation by the author.
identified the metaphorical expressions relevant to the said theme. Since 
metaphorical expressions having to do with the focal theme were varied (that 
is, various source domains were used to express a focal theme), several clus-
ters of related metaphorical expressions were generated. From these clusters 
of metaphorical expressions, I derived the underlying conceptual metaphors, 
which are represented in the analysis as A is B (e.g., DEMOCRACY IS A CURE 
TO THE NATIONAL ILLS). To illustrate this point, I present the following 
extracts from the SONAs of Corazon C. Aquino:
(1) I believe that nowhere could you find more effective cures for the ills of our country 
– such as the habit of oppression, the inclination to corruption, the betrayal of 
public interest – than in the blessings of democracy: freedom; rights; transparent 
dealings; and a government of the people by the people themselves. (1988)
(2) The failed adventurism has underscored the fact that our restored democracy has 
gone past its fledgling stage. (1990)
(3) Democracy, once a word, is now alive: this is our legacy. (1991)
The extracts above, taken from SONAs delivered in 1988, 1990 and 1991, all 
deal with the theme of democracy. Metaphorical expressions are indicated 
using italics. The first extract metaphorizes democracy as a “cure for the ills 
of the country” suggesting the conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A CURE 
TO THE NATIONAL ILLS; the last two express democracy as a living (“alive”) 
and evolving (“has gone past its fledgling state”) organism, thus, the con-
ceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY. Further examination 
of the Aquino SONAs would show various metaphorical expressions that 
suggest other conceptual metaphors such as DEMOCRACY IS A BENEFAC-
TOR OF THE PEOPLE, DEMOCRACY IS RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER, and 
DEMOCRACY IS A FUNDAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO A PEOPLE-POWERED 
ECONOMY. These conceptual metaphors relate to the conceptual metaphor 
DEMOCRACY IS A CURE TO THE NATIONAL ILLS suggested by extract 1. 
They are related in that the domains suggested by the terms ‘CURE TO THE 
NATIONAL ILLS’, ‘BENEFACTOR’, ‘RESOURCE FOR PEOPLE POWER’, ‘FUN-
DAMENTAL REQUIREMENT TO A PEOPLE-POWERED ECONOMY’ yield the 
broader conceptual metaphor DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAINING SYSTEM. 
In addition to the conceptual metaphors DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-SUSTAIN-
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ING SYSTEM and DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY cued by extracts 2 and 
3, several other conceptualizations relevant to the theme of democracy have 
been generated in the analysis of the Aquino SONAs. These conceptual meta-
phors include DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT and DEMOC-
RACY IS PEOPLE-EMPOWERMENT.
Now, the conceptual metaphors generated from the various clusters 
of related metaphorical expressions on democracy are considered in the 
analysis as constitutive of a macro-conceptualization on democracy, which 
is referred to in this article as the conceptual frame. The conceptual frame 
is an overarching or general statement that shows the relationship of these 
various conceptual metaphors on a focal theme and is represented in the 
analysis in bold caps, that is, A is B. In my illustration, the two conceptual 
metaphors DEMOCRACY IS A LIVING ENTITY and DEMOCRACY IS A LIFE-
SUSTAINING SYSTEM combined with other conceptual metaphors posit-
ed from other extracts on democracy (i.e., DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL 
ACHIEVEMENT, DEMOCRACY IS PEOPLE-EMPOWERMENT) would yield the 
following frame: DEMOCRACY IS AN EVOLVING ENTITY THAT SUSTAINS 
NATIONAL LIFE. Figure1 below provides a visual representation of how the 
analysis works.
figure 1 an illustration of the levels of metaphorical analysis 
I now move on to a brief description of the socio-political historical milieu of 
the post-dictatorship presidencies to contextualize the analysis of the SONAs.
From mother to son: Presidencies after the dictatorship
When Corazon Aquino assumed the presidency after the people power revo-
lution in 1986, she worked toward restoring democratic institutions and ba-
sic freedoms curtailed under the militaristic rule of Marcos. For instance, she 
issued presidential proclamations lifting the suspension of the writ of habeas 
corpus and granting amnesty to political prisoners. However, Aquino inher-
ited from Marcos a fragmented Philippine society including a long-standing 
communist insurgency, a highly politicized military that challenged her gov-
ernment through several coup attempts, and a Moro rebellion fighting for 
an independent state in Southern Philippines. Notwithstanding these chal-
lenges, Aquino pursued economic reforms including economic liberalization 
and privatization of government-owned and -controlled corporations. Graft 
and corruption in the bureaucracy were addressed through the creation of 
the Office of Ombudsman to investigate complaints of illegal acts by gov-
ernment officials. In 1992, Aquino completed her term successfully with a 
peaceful transfer of power. She was succeeded by her defense minister Fidel 
V. Ramos, a cousin of the ousted dictator for whom he also served as the 
Chief of Staff of the Philippine Constabulary.
Considered an EDSA people power hero for breaking his allegiance 
to the Marcos regime on 22 February 1986, Ramos’ rallying principles in 
his 6-year term were “people empowerment” and “global competitiveness.” 
Ramos’ presidency sustained the economic liberalization pursued by Aquino 
and her team and pushed for the implementation of the structural adjust-
ment plans prescribed by the International Monetary Fund and the World 
Bank (IMF-WB) (Malaya and Malaya, 2004).
Economic growth and a relatively significant decline in poverty during 
the Ramos administration earned for the Philippines the label “emerging ti-
ger” economy. His term is also noted for having signed peace agreements with 
military rebels and a major separatist Muslim group in Southern Philippines. 
Despite the modest economic gains and the historic peace accord with the two 
rebel groups, the Ramos presidency was marred by a number of challenges 
and controversies including the inconclusive peace talks with the communist 
movement and the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Malaya et al., p. 262).
Succeeding Ramos was his vice president Joseph Ejercito Estrada, who 
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was a former senator and highly popular Filipino actor. Estrada was known 
for his tough persona – a stance that was particularly evident when he dealt 
with the problem of persistent communist and Muslim insurgencies (see for 
instance, Ecumenical Movement for Justice and Peace 2006). Criticized by 
the mainstream Philippine media for his laidback management style, Es-
trada faced a debilitating political crisis due to allegations of corruption. 
Barely two years after his election as president, an erstwhile friend of Estra-
da’s made an exposé on his involvement in an illegal numbers game that led 
to his impeachment trial before the Philippine Senate. The trial was eventu-
ally aborted, but it resulted in a popular mass demonstration similar to the 
“people power” in 1986. Estrada was ousted from power and was replaced by 
his vice president, Gloria Macapagal Arroyo.
Arroyo’s early months as president were hounded by questions on the 
legitimacy of her assumption to power. As there were still a considerable 
number of Estrada supporters, her successor presidency was confronted by a 
divided society. In her first SONA, she called for an end to political bickering 
and presented her agenda to win the war against poverty. She later estab-
lished the link between her administration’s war on poverty and the global 
war against terror by arguing that the commitment to the US-led war was 
necessary in building a “strong republic” (Navera 2011). 
Arroyo ran for a full presidential term in 2004, won, but was later 
accused of rigging the elections. Public condemnation of her alleged involve-
ment in electoral fraud resulted in congressional hearings, failed impeach-
ment complaints, and mass protests to which the Arroyo government re-
sponded with a series of controversial executive orders and proclamations. 
These included, among others, an executive order that prohibited govern-
ment officials under the executive branch attending congressional hearings 
unless permitted by the Office of the President, and the Calibrated Preemp-
tive Response, which disallowed street protests without a permit. 
In 2010, Arroyo was succeeded by Corazon Aquino’s son Benigno 
Aquino III who vowed to make the corrupt during his predecessor’s term 
accountable and who envisioned his presidency as a journey towards the 
straight and narrow path (“ang tuwid na daan”).
“People power” in Philippine presidential talk
Table 1 below shows the conceptualizations of democracy that underlie the 
post-Marcos presidential rhetoric examined in this study.
table 1 conceptualizations of democracy6 in the sonas from 1987 
to 2009
6 A detailed analysis of these conceptualizations can be found in the author’s doctoral 
research. Excluded in the said study is the incumbent presidency of Benigno Aquino III 
who is president from 2010 to 2016.
President Conceptual frames
Aquino (1987-1991) • democracy is an evolving system of government 
that sustains national life
• democracy is an evolving system that had been 
rendered weak under marcos dictatorship
• the restoration of democracy is a national 
achievement
• democracy is people-empowerment
• democracy is life-sustaining system
• democracy is a benefactor of the nation
• democracy is a nurturer
• democracy is a resource for people power
• democracy is a cure to the national ills
• democracy is a key to a people-powered economy/ 
capitalism conducive to growth
Ramos (1992-1997) • democracy is an evolving system of government 
that sustains national life
• democracy is a source of national strength
• democracy is a resource for development
• democracy is a foundation for a good society
• democracy is a functional system that is capable 
of initiating change
• democracy is a precursor for competitiveness
• democracy is a competitive edge
• democracy is a comparative advantage
Estrada (1998-2000) • democracy is an object of defense and protection
• democracy is a prized ideal
• democracy is an evolving entity
• democracy is a structure
• democracy is an organic entity
Arroyo (2001-2004) • democracy is a weapon 
• democracy is an object of threat
• democracy is a national faith that the filipinos 
have fought for
Arroyo (2005-2009) • democracy is a value that finds expression in the 
national institutions and practices
• democracy is a precursor for first world status
• democracy is an object of threat
[  9 ]
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The data show a multilayered conceptualization of democracy especially ap-
parent in the first Aquino presidency. Corazon Aquino, having been the first 
post-authoritarian president, necessarily set off the scope and boundaries of 
post-dictatorship Philippine democracy. Her multilayered conceptualization 
was bound to be adopted and re-contextualized by her successors.
A conceptualization that had been sustained in the post-Marcos presi-
dencies is the conceptualization of democracy as an evolving entity (see sec-
tions on Aquino, Ramos, and Estrada in Table 1). This conceptualization 
had been substantiated through the use of metaphors that suggest democ-
racy either as a structure that goes through alterations or as an organic entity. 
This takes into consideration that several factors influence the way democra-
cy moves from one phase to another. The influence of these factors – people 
power being a prominent one – suggests the specific and unique process of 
democratization in the Philippines, an understanding of which may possibly 
lead to the articulation of the Philippines’ contribution to theorizations and 
practice of democracy at large.
Common to all of the four presidencies covered in this study is the 
framing of democracy as a national value. This is suggested in the following 
conceptualizations of democracy from each of the four presidents: RESTORA-
TION OF DEMOCRACY IS A NATIONAL ACHIEVEMENT (Aquino); DEMOC-
RACY IS A FOUNDATION FOR A GOOD SOCIETY (Ramos); DEMOCRACY 
IS A PRIZED IDEAL (Estrada); and DEMOCRACY IS A VALUE THAT FINDS 
EXPRESSION IN NATIONAL INSTITUTIONS AND PRACTICES (Arroyo). The 
great importance given to democracy across the four presidencies suggests 
the presidents’ commitment to the national ideals embedded in the 1987 
Constitution, a major achievement in the re-democratization process. It also 
implies that public addresses of national importance like the SONA serve as 
an opportunity for national leaders to engage in what Campbell and Jamie-
son (2008) call “a public meditation on values.”
In the latter presidencies – specifically those of Estrada and Arroyo 
– emphasis given to the conceptualization DEMOCRACY IS AN OBJECT OF 
THREAT is evident. Both presidencies had been criticized for being anti-
democratic or harboring dictatorial tendencies and both responded by as-
serting that democracy was threatened under their watch. This common 
response channels that of Marcos. In his presidential statements, Marcos 
conceptualized democracy as an object of communist threat in order to jus-
tify his imposition of martial law (Marcos, 1971, 1972, 1977; Rebullida 
2006). This rendering of democracy can be seen as a common feature of 
Philippine presidential rhetoric that had been fully utilized during the Mar-
cos presidency and has been re-deployed even in post-dictatorship presiden-
cies. That democracy is used to justify the use of state power to respond to 
the opposition and critical sectors of Philippine society makes democracy a 
problematic notion. It rekindles the discourse of constitutional authoritari-
anism that Marcos used to justify his imposition of martial law and conse-
quently his abuse of presidential power.
While commonalities are evident among the conceptualizations 
across the four post-Marcos presidencies, the fluidity with which democracy 
had been conceptualized in the 23 SONAs cannot be denied. This fluid-
ity may be explained by various factors. These include differences in key 
emphasis, shifts in domestic and global concerns, shifts or changes in presi-
dential agenda, and the agency of the political actor. For instance, because 
Ramos emphasized the need to be “globally competitive” in order to attain 
the state of national industrialized country-hood (NIC-hood), there was a 
shift in the way he conceptualized democracy in his addresses. From rehears-
ing the conceptualizations rendered by his immediate predecessor, Ramos 
adopted and made more salient the conceptualizations of democracy as a 
“competitive edge” or a “unique comparative advantage.” These conceptu-
alizations were more attuned to his presidential agenda and the domestic 
and global concerns of his presidency that included the ratification of the 
General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade-World Trade Organization (GATT-
WTO). The Philippine government’s active involvement in the GATT-WTO 
marked the country’s participation in the new global economic order pri-
marily anchored on the discourse of neo-liberalization. In other words, each 
President conceptualized democracy in terms of how her/his administration 
could respond to existing domestic and global issues.
There also appears to be less articulation on democracy as a concept in 
the latter presidencies compared to those of Aquino and Ramos. If at all, the 
invocation of the democratic concept in the SONAs of Arroyo and Estrada 
was merely a reaffirmation of a national ideal – a “public meditation on val-
ues” as expressed earlier. This shows that other issues of national significance 
had through time taken the place of what was considered a primary concern 
in the early post-Marcos years. However, it takes a salient position in presi-
dential discourse when a president is accused of resorting to authoritarian 
measures as in the case of Estrada in 1999 and Arroyo after the 2005 political 
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crisis. That democracy is reaffirmed in the SONAs or any important presi-
dential speech to dispel public perception of a return to martial law indicates 
the Filipino people’s tendency to be skeptical towards a strong state and its 
propensity for abuse (see Abinales and Amoroso 2005, p. 242).
Evident in the rhetoric of the post-Marcos presidencies was a need 
to re-conceptualize people power to harness its potentials for the new order 
– the post-Marcos, post-authoritarian, and purportedly a re-democratized 
Philippines. There appeared a gradual shift from people power as a form of 
resistance to people power as an essential element of nation building. This is 
particularly evident in the presidencies of Aquino and Ramos. People power 
as protest remained visible during the first two post-Marcos presidencies. 
The new conceptualizations of people power as organized participation and 
as capital would have probably taken root in the succeeding presidencies, 
but there was a resurgence of massive street protests during the presidency 
of Estrada. He was accused of corruption and culpable violation of the con-
stitution, which eventually led to his impeachment trial that culminated in 
his ouster from power two and a half years after he was elected to the highest 
office. Estrada, during his short-lived presidency would emphatically speak 
of democracy as a national value that his leadership reaffirmed. In his 1999 
SONA, during which protests against his move to change the charter were 
rife, Estrada would assure his audience that people power was alive. He af-
firmed that it was a guarantee of the protection of freedom, but would make 
curious qualifications on the exercise of freedom: “[L]iberty without respon-
sibility is license…freedom without responsibility is the formula for chaos, 
anarchy, and lawlessness.”
Arroyo, who replaced Estrada, completed her successor term, and took 
on a full presidential term, downplayed the significance of people power as 
a symbol of protest (cf. Gonzaga 2011, p. 26). Arroyo’s presidency – includ-
ing both successor and full terms – was marred by questions of legitimacy. 
Throughout her presidency, she had to constantly reaffirm her position as 
“a constitutional successor” to the ousted president and as “a duly elected 
president” during her full term. After having faced a series of attempts to 
impeach her, Arroyo could no longer contain her disdain for people power as 
a form of resistance or protest. This is evident in the following passage from 
her speech delivered during a peace rally in commemoration of the people 
power uprising in 1986.
‘Yung mundo pinagdiriwang ang EDSA 17. Yung mundo pinayagan ang EDSA 2.8 
Yung mundo hindi patatawarin ang EDSA 3. Sasabihin ng mundo, ano ba yang 
Pilipinas? Pinakamagaling na manggagawa sa buong mundo kaya hinahanap sa 
buong mundo tapos parating binabaril ang sarili at hindi matatag? Kung ganon, 
sino ang darating na investor dito? [The world celebrated EDSA 1. The world 
tolerated EDSA 2. The world will not forgive us for EDSA 3. The world will say, 
what’s wrong with the Philippines? Because its workers are the best in the world, 
they are sought after by the entire world. But then it always shoots itself and 
does not stand firm. If that’s the case, which investor would want to come here?] 
(“PGMA’s Speech during the Peace Rally at the Capitol grounds”, 25 February 2008 
in Gonzaga 2011, p. 26)
Though not explicitly expressed in Arroyo’s SONAs, such sentiment appears 
to be salient in Philippine presidential discourse – Marcos or post-Marcos. 
When an economic environment conducive to business and foreign invest-
ment is emphasized in important political speeches, the call to reduce, if not 
dismiss, mass mobilizations almost always becomes imperative. 
The incumbent president, Benigno Aquino III, son of Corazon Aqui-
no, succeeded Arroyo in an election that other pundits would consider a 
form of people power – a repudiation of a reviled Philippine presidency. 
More than two years into his presidency as of this writing, he has also dis-
played disdain towards protest and mass mobilizations. In fact, he would 
make qualifications on the kind of citizenship that he considers beneficial to 
the nation – one that is “nakikilahok” (participative) not one that is “nakiki-
alam” (meddlesome) (SONA 2011). He also indicts what he calls the “indus-
try of criticism” especially instigated by the vibrant Philippine press.
The analysis reveals that over the last 25 years Philippine presidential 
rhetoric has worked in ways that constrain public participation. The gradual 
shift from people power as a form of resistance to people power as an ele-
ment of nation building, which I mentioned earlier, reveals a drift from a 
radical notion of participation that propels change to one that is instrumen-
talized to serve the agenda of those in power.
I suggest that the shift is motivated by a host of factors: presidential 
7 EDSA 1 is considered another expression for People Power 1. 
8 EDSA 2 refers to People Power 2, the mass mobilization that ousted Joseph Estrada from 
the presidency.
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personae, agenda, and the unique socio-political situation that presidents 
find themselves in. With these factors at play, the notion of people power has 
necessarily become malleable in so far as presidential rhetoric is concerned. 
The malleability makes it easy for the wielders of leadership to use the very 
notion of people power in order to affirm a privileged persona, assert le-
gitimacy, justify political choices, constrain public participation, and even 
redefine socio-political reality. The table below (Table 2) summarizes the 
shifts in conceptualizations of people power across five presidencies vis-à-vis 
the presidents’ varying personae, presidential agenda, and socio-political and 
historical milieu.
The shifts point to what Kock and Villadsen mention in the intro-
duction to this book as the constructive potential of rhetoric. On the one 
hand, this potential, when tapped by powerful agents such as presidents, can 
encourage citizens to participate in platforms that are deemed appropriate 
and helpful to nation-building. On the other, it sets limits to what citizens 
can do; it constrains rhetorical citizenship. In such a scenario, the value of 
protest as a symbolic action is denied in order to privilege a less disruptive 
act but one that may be more in keeping with the interests of the state. 
This makes it imperative to examine presidential rhetoric not only for its 
potential “to induce deliberation” or to contribute to the “construction of 
an effective deliberative system”, but also for its power to define rhetorical 
citizenship – how it limits and circumscribes possibilities for democratic par-
ticipation in public policy formulation, in decision-making, and in charting 
the national course, at large. 
Notwithstanding the influencing power of presidential talk, the Fili-
pino people can reclaim and redefine people power in their favor. They can 
achieve this by being cognizant of how those in public office define “people 
power” and “democracy” and by taking possession of public platforms in 
order to assert their own definitions or counter-definitions of what it takes 
to participate in a democracy. For instance, a more active public involvement 
in memorializing and discussing the relevance of people power events that 
transpired in recent history would potentially provide a necessary counter-
balance to how the current national leadership frames democratic participa-
tion. In this way, the malleability of democracy and people power works in 
favor of the general public and not just of those who hold power in pub-
lic office. The Philippines is actually not bereft of examples of citizens and 
civil society groups who express and enact alternative visions and versions 
of people power. A vibrant Philippine press and a social media environment 
that is conducive to generating public opinion have in fact served as venues 
for citizens to offer alternative frames of people power. It is through these 
platforms, for instance, that Filipino citizens have pushed for more transpar-
ency and accountability in governance both in the local and national levels. 
However, these examples have yet to be examined more systematically from 
a discourse analytical and rhetorical perspective. Needless to say, rhetorical 
citizenship thrives in a society where the concerns of the majority go be-
yond putting food on the table. In the Philippines, where major structural 
inequalities exist, it may take more than rhetoric to make rhetorical citizen-
ship work. Enabling conditions that are socio-economic in character can 
facilitate symbolic actions and discursive practices that are participatory and 
less elite-driven.
Conclusion
This paper, which examines how democracy has been conceptualized in 
post-authoritarian presidential addresses, reveals that the notion of people 
power has become malleable and this has implications on the kind and level 
of democratic participation the government expects from its constituents. 
“People power” as a political expression has evolved in that it is no lon-
ger just associated with mass mobilization employed to reclaim democratic 
space or to challenge (the threat of ) autocratic power. This is because various 
leaders who have assumed presidential power since the first post-dictatorship 
president end up putting their stamp on “people power” by reframing or 
recontextualizing the political expression in ways that are consistent with 
their personae, their agenda, and their appreciation of the socio-political and 
historical moments they need to deal with during their terms of office. These 
varied and changing conceptualizations of “people power” potentially reveal 
how citizen participation has been valued and constrained by presidential 
leadership in a period of democratization following the end of a long-stand-
ing dictatorship. A rhetorically cognizant citizenry enabled by a more egali-
tarian socio-economic structure would provide a necessary counterbalance 
to what the current post-dictatorship leadership offers.
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On Being a Simple Judge: Exploring 
Rhetorical Citizenship in Aristotelian and 
Homeric Rhetorics
M A R I L E E M I F S U D
The gifts of rhetorical history and theory
What does rhetorical history have to offer contemporary theorizing of rhetorical 
citizenship? Turning to Aristotle for answers to this question is commonplace.1 
Many resources reside within Aristotle, yet not without complications. Rhe-
torical citizenship in an Aristotelian mode could be defined as citizens enacting 
their duties to judge various contingent matters whether political, judicial, or 
cultural via civic discourse. The “citizen” as “judge” means at once someone 
requiring qualification, namely in ancient Greece birth into a qualifying family 
and gender, and someone requiring no qualification, as audiences are assumed 
to be unqualified, simple people. Aristotle tells us that the rhetorical audience 
serving as “judge” (kritēs) must be “simple” (haplous) (Rhet.1357a11-12). John 
Henry Freese translates haplous as “a simple person” (1982, 25), and Rhys Rob-
erts translates “an audience of untrained thinkers” (1954, p. 27).2
1 Recent work in rhetorical studies related to deliberative democracy, rhetorical citizenship, 
and publics demonstrates various returns to Aristotle. See for example van Haaften, Jansen, 
De Jong, and Koetsenruijter, eds. (2011); Kock and Villadsen, eds. (2012); and van Belle, 
Gillaerts, van Gorp, van De Mieroop, and Rutten, eds. (2013). The significance of the 
ancient Greek rhetorical tradition, in particular Aristotle’s Rhetoric, is being noticed in 
political theory as well. Chantal Mouffe calls for politics to connect with the great tradition 
of rhetoric originating in ancient Greece (1993, pp. 4-6; see also qtd. in Ivie 2002, p. 278). 
Danielle Allen turns to Aristotle’s Rhetoric for guidance on producing trust in democratic 
citizen discourse (2004). Iris Marion Young turns to Aristotle’s Rhetoric to advance a 
communicative theory of political discourse that could, via empathy (ēthos and pathos), 
support the democratic inclusion of difference (2000).
2 For working with Aristotle’s Rhetoric, I use translations by J.K. Freese, Rhys Roberts, and 
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The contemporary view of the classical conception of audience is not 
a positive one, caricaturing the classical view as wrongly viewing the audi-
ence as passive, needing to be acted upon by the rhetor, like a billiard ball by 
a cue (Benson 1989, p. 293). This critique of classical notions of audience is 
not unwarranted – the Platonic Socrates actually does describe the rhetor’s 
audience as so simple as to be persuadable to take an ass into battle rather 
than a horse based on resemblance (Plato, Phaedrus, 260c)! And immedi-
ately prior to the key passage in Aristotle’s Rhetoric describing the audience 
as kritēs ... haplous, we can find another less than flattering description of 
audience members, namely that they cannot follow a long chain of syllogis-
tic reasoning, hence need rhetoric to simplify complex matters (Aris. Rhet., 
1357a3-4). Plenty of evidence exists to warrant a contemporary critique of 
the classical conception of the citizen-judge as simple.
Yet, something about being simple seems lost in translation. Other 
places in Aristotle’s Rhetoric suggest being simple is a virtuous quality of 
mind, one related to divining universals at play in any particular situation, 
universals that must be acknowledged to live happily together in a polity. 
But we do not hear much about these other places. If we want to make 
the argument that rhetoric matters to citizenship and that the two – rheto-
ric and citizenship – are mutually benefitted by their exchanges, then we 
need to deal with this charge of citizens as simpletons that rings through the 
rhetorical tradition. We need to go to these other places. In juxtaposition 
with an approach relegating classical conceptions of agency and audience as 
outdated and over, I wish in this essay to avoid such a negative approach, or 
perhaps I should say such a “negating” choice. I wish to take being simple as 
a citizen judge creatively. Rather than negating citizen judges as simpletons, 
might we create something new? In this essay, I wish to try.
What can be created anew from primary text when seen with differ-
ent eyes, thought within other contexts, enacted with new tropes, lived in 
different bodies? Texts can be figured otherwise, or alloiostrophically (Sutton 
and Mifsud 2012, and Forthcoming). Alloiostrophic rhetoric make meaning 
otherwise: through turns toward difference, the other, the strange, alloio-
sis. And indeed something other, different, and strange lies lurking in the 
George Kennedy, along with my own, to navigate the ancient Greek of the Oxford Classical 
Text. I consider as well William Grimaldi’s commentary on Books 1 and 2, and Edward 
Meredith Cope’s commentary in 3 volumes.
ancient Greek concept of being a simple judge, kritēs ... haplous. For the 
purposes of this preview, I call this kritēs (judge) who is supposed to be hap-
lous (simple) “strange” for involvement in the divination of universals, the 
Homeric culture of the gift, and the telos of happiness. Rationality, contin-
gency, the needs of the polis, and the telos of judgment continue to figure the 
conditions in which the kritēs ... haplous acts, but in this essay, I turn toward 
the weird parts of being simple, the parts that are not easy to represent. I 
do so lest these weird parts be forgotten, their resource lost for theorizing, 
envisioning, imagining contemporary rhetorical citizenship. Before starting 
though, we should call to attention how I have just set up my project for 
failure by way of claiming to represent the unrepresentable. We ought to be 
always aware that this and other such paradoxes of communication are ever-
present, yet we must communicate anyway.
I begin with tracings in Aristotle’s primary text on being a judge and 
being simple. These traces take us to the Homeric culture of the gift. Creat-
ing in the limen “betwixt and between” the archaic and the classical, I offer 
considerations of rhetorical citizenship through the figure of the rhetorical 
citizen as a judge, being haplous.
On being a judge: kritēs
Aristotle uses three different terms to identify the rhetor’s audience: hearer, 
akroatēs, judge, kritēs, and observer, theōros (cf.1358b2-3). Scholarly contro-
versy exists on whether Aristotle meant different things by the various terms 
he uses for the audience of rhetoric, in particular whether the subcategories 
of akroatēs, namely kritēs and theōros, mean different things. Some like Freese 
and Roberts hold the observer in a lesser position than the judge. Freese’s 
translation takes a significant interpretive liberty by qualifying the “observer” 
as “mere:” “Now the hearer must necessarily be either a mere spectator or a 
judge” (Freese 1982, p. 33). Roberts’ translation is not so loose, “The hearer 
must be either a judge ... or an observer” (Roberts 1954, p. 32), but his note 
affirms Freese’s reading of the theōros: “a mere onlooker, present at a show, 
where he decides no grave political or legal issue (cp. 1391b16-20) and plays 
no higher role than that of speech taster, or oratorical connoisseur” (32 n. 1). 
Yet, when we follow Roberts’ direction to compare with 1391b16-20, we find 
that even though Aristotle expresses some level of privilege about the audience 
as kritēs proper being those deciding questions at issue in civic controversies, 
he recognizes that judgment cannot be restricted just to deliberative and judi-
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cial rhetoric. He says that the theōros is also a kritēs for the epideictic speech is 
put together with reference to the spectator as a judge (Aris. Rhet. 1391b15). 
I side with Grimaldi who affirms no evidential need to force a firm 
distinction between the kritēs, theōros, and akroatēs, though he says, “I be-
lieve it is clear that for A. as far as judgment is concerned the auditor in 
each class of rhetoric can rightly be called kritēs” (Grimaldi 1980, p. 81). I 
consider then kritēs as the operant term for the citizen who must judge the 
various contingent affairs of civic life, whether political, judicial, or cultural. 
Moreover, I see being kritēs as being in a position of power and an oppor-
tunity for agency, making for meaningful rhetorical citizenship, hardly the 
position of being simple, as in “simpleton.”
On being simple: haplous
What quality of mind ought we to assume the kritēs has when the kritēs is 
described as haplous? While a translation of haplous is indeed “simple,” the 
meaning in use is anything but. As Grimaldi notes (1980, p. 56), the term is 
related in use to “haplōs” which has several meanings:
(a) “singly, by itself, without the admixture of anything else,” and, so, “simply,” in 
either a physical or moral sense. Connected with this use is one in which [haplōs] 
is employed in a derogatory sense, “negligently, without sufficient care”; e.g. Met. 
987a21: “to treat a subject too simply.” (b) A second meaning is a development out 
of the first; here [haplōs] is the same as [kath’ auton], “in itself, absolutely, without 
reference to anything else,” and thus is it opposed to [pros ti] “the relative”; e.g., 
Top. 115b33-35. (c) There is a third meaning, “generally, universally,” which is used 
in opposition to kath’ ekaston or kata meros, “individually, particularly, specifically.” 
This third meaning is the meaning in our passage [1356a7] and is a common usage 
of the word (Grimaldi 1980, p. 41).
Only a small part of the semantic range of haplous suggests a “derogatory 
sense” of the word. The more prominent meanings are “singular,” “univer-
sal,” “without reference to anything else,” “given,” “simple.”3 Moreover, Lid-
3 A review of Liddell, Scott, and Jones (LSJ) on haplous and related terms reveals evidence 
across Aristotle’s corpus showing these terms signifying that which is singular, absolute, 
uncomplicated in its being, given for the whole to see or know or divine: See Pol.1268b.39, 
EN.1149a2, and Metaph.989b17, 1025b7, 1030a16.
dell, Scott, and Jones indicate that beyond the reference to Aristotle in his 
Metaphysics (which Grimaldi notes), only Isocrates, To Nicocles (2.46) uses 
haplous for its derogatory sense (LSJ 1977, p. 191). What if the interpretive 
industry has over-determined the translation of haplous to convey a deroga-
tory sense of the audience as judge, with the simple judge then being akin to 
a simpleton, in need of rhetoric to make complex things simple? What if this 
regard for the judge eventuates in a democratic citizenry living in accordance 
with this diminished view of itself? Can we imagine democracy surviving if 
rhetorical citizenship were envisioned and embodied as such? 
What if within the text lies something other lurking, something re-
sourceful, forgotten, perhaps even never understood or turned into “knowl-
edge” in the first place? Grimaldi’s range of definitions of haplous gives us 
a sense that indeed something other is present, a sense Liddell, Scott, and 
Jones confirm. Following the traces in Aristotle’s Rhetoric, which take us to 
the Homeric epics, will give us an even better sense.4
The use of the term haplous in the Rhetoric reveals a range of mean-
ing suggesting not only much more than “simpleton,” but perhaps just the 
opposite. In a key passage suggesting as much, 1367a 38, Aristotle describes 
being haplous as a virtuous quality of a person. When one needs to praise 
another who shows excessive qualities (hyperbole), one can turn to the best 
sense of these attendant qualities. For example, Aristotle tells us that if one 
who needs to be praised is manikos, or “manic,” this person could be praised 
for the virtuous part of these qualities, namely in this case being haplous. 
Common translation of this line takes haplous to mean “outspoken,” 
“straightforward,” and “frank and open” (Roberts 1954, p. 59; Kennedy 
2007, p. 79; and Freese 1982, p. 97). But this seems to miss the significance 
of Aristotle’s use of manikos. Mania in ancient Greece, albeit considered an 
excessive quality, was also recognized as a desire to speak the divined truth 
of a matter. Think of Kassandra in ancient Greek mythology, a priestess 
fated not to be believed; her divinations, never to be given credence, proved, 
nonetheless, true. Using Aristotle’s suggestion, if we were to choose to praise 
4 For working with the Homeric epics, in addition to my own readings of the Oxford 
Classical Texts, I am guided by Richmond Lattimore’s translations of both epics, as well 
as translations provided in the Loeb editions by A. T. Murray for both epics. Stanford’s 
commentary on the Odyssey is a steady source of consideration, along with Kirk, et al., and 
Heubeck et al. commentaries on the Iliad and Odyssey respectively.
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her rather than blame her, we could praise her for being haplous. The positive 
quality of mania is its connection to divination of the universal at play, and 
its capacity to discern the simple truth of any given matter. Think as well of 
Plato’s Phaedrus in which the Platonic Socrates defines mania as connected 
with the noblest of arts, for it foretells the future, gives prophecy (Plato, Pha-
edrus, 244c). Later the Platonic Socrates calls true Love, as in the true Love 
of the ideal forms of Beauty, Truth, Justice, and the Good, a mania (249d). 
If being haplous is being manikos without the hyperbole then haplous is con-
nected to all that mania is connected to, only in moderate form, hence all 
the more an Aristotelian virtue.5
This textual evidence suggests being haplous means something other 
than simple-minded in a derogatory or minimalizing sense. Another key 
passage demonstrating this point arrives when Aristotle is addressing a mat-
ter of style and organization. Here, Aristotle explains that a speech refraining 
from detail in the narrative (diēgēsis) about the facts is preferable in that it is 
a simpler (haplousteros) speech, and avoids being unnecessarily complicated. 
For example, you ought not to develop a complicated narrative “if you wish 
to praise Achilles; for all know of his actions” (Aris. Rhet., 1416b 20-28). 
One who is in a position to judge, namely any citizen, ought not need 
a long chain of reasoning or a complicated diēgēsis to discern what is good, 
just, and praiseworthy. That which is known by all is given, hence needs no 
complicated story. Givens are simple to discern. This discernment is some-
thing other than rational if “rational” is understood as syllogistic production. 
Aristotle tells us these givens, which he describes as general ideas of the just 
and unjust, can be divined (manteuontai) by all (Aris. Rhet. 1373b6-8). Note 
that Aristotle uses manteuontai and in doing so calls attention all the more 
to dimensions of mania that are involved in being haplous.
But what are these givens? One prime example of a given in Aristotle’s 
Rhetoric is happiness. Exploring this given provides all the more insight into 
being haplous.
Happiness, being haplous, and the Homeric gift
Aristotle identifies happiness (eudaimonia) as the primary topos for rhetors 
needing to derive arguments for exhortation (Rhet.1360b4-7). With this to-
pos, rhetors can argue that one should do the things that procure happiness 
5 For consideration of mania in ancient Greek culture see Dodds (1951).
or one of its parts, or increase instead of diminish it, and avoid doing those 
things that destroy or hinder happiness or bring about its opposite. Aristotle 
gives an extended account of the topoi of happiness, namely those things 
which are good such as a good birth, good children and numerous children, 
wealth, good reputation, honor, health, beauty, strength, stature, good old 
age, many friendships and good friendships, good luck, virtue (1360b19-
21). He follows this list by going into some detail revealing the given beliefs 
and opinion in each topos, the endoxa at play. 
Endoxa become topical resources for exhortation, and these endoxa are 
givens of Homeric gift culture. Moreover the endoxa can be seen circulating 
via Aristotle’s citation of Homer and reference to his works. Grimaldi notes 
that the topoi of happiness that Aristotle uses are specifically noted as marks 
of honor in the Iliad (1980, p. 114), and again Grimaldi notes that when Ar-
istotle cites “eloquence and capacity for action” as a given good at 1362b22-
23 in the Rhetoric, that the same idea is “aptly expressed in Phoenix’s words 
to Achilles” at Iliad 9.442 (Grimaldi 1980, p. 130). Moreover, Aristotle cites 
Homer three times in this section, to exemplify the significance of honor 
(timē) in these happiness topoi: 1) Iliad, 2.160 cited at Aris. Rhet.1363a6: 
Hera appeals to Athene to prevent the dishonor and unhappiness that would 
befall the Greek people if the Greeks were to retreat leaving Helen for the 
Trojans to boast of; 2) Iliad, 1.255 cited at Aris. Rhet.1362b36: Nestor uses 
an honor appeal to Achilles and Agamemnon to point out how their enemy 
would be happy if he heard all the truth about the Achaeans’ quarrelling; 
3) Iliad, 2.298 cited at Aris. Rhet.1363a6-7: Odysseus appeals to his men 
to hold out lest they be disgraced and bring upon themselves unhappiness 
returning unsuccessfully after having stayed so long.
Aristotle’s happiness topoi draw their material substance from archaic 
givens, in particular the endoxa of honor, timē, exemplified in Homeric epic. 
Timē in the archaic archive is so immense that trying to track its presence 
is like trying to track the presence of logos itself. The paths go in every di-
rection. But perhaps the most important point to make here is that in the 
Homeric lexicon, timē means first and foremost recompense, compensation, 
or indemnity (Cunliffe 1977, p. 383; see for example Il.1.159; 3.286; 16.92; 
Od.14.70, 117). Indeed timē also means honor in terms of the respect one 
is given, but so does kleos for that matter, a term that Aristotle does not use 
in these passages. The meaning of timē is more robust than “honor” as its 
primary register is that of exchange, in particular in an economy of reciproc-
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ity and mutual benefaction typifying ideals of Homeric gift culture. Timē is 
an act of giving honor as recompense for one who has done good deeds, who 
has benefitted many and in ways that are not easy to do. 
In Aristotle’s catalogue of happiness topoi, the specific topic of the gift 
is an organizing dynamic of the endoxa. The key passage on the gift occurs 
within this section on the topoi of happiness: 
Honor (timē) is a token of a reputation for doing good; and those who have already 
done good (euergetēkotes) are justly and above all honored, not but that he who 
is capable of doing good is also honored. Doing good relates either to personal 
security (sōterian) and all the causes of existence; or to wealth; or to any other good 
things which are not easy to acquire, either in any conditions, or at such a place, 
or at such a time; for many obtain honor for things that appear trifling, but this 
depends upon place and time. The components of honor are sacrifices, memorials 
in verse and prose, privileges, grants of land, front seats, public burial, State 
maintenance, and among the barbarians, prostration and giving place, and all gifts 
which are highly prized in each country. For a gift is at once a giving of a possession 
and a token of honor ... (Aris., Rhet., 1361a 27-38).
Aristotle’s description of the materials of happiness deriving from honor shows 
an intimate connection with the gift and giving. Honor is recompense for do-
ing good, euergetein (eu=well; ergon = work) (1361a30). Doing good means 
giving well, hence Kennedy’s translation of euergetein as “benefaction” (2007, 
p. 59). One who does good works is a benefactor, a giver of good things. 
Continuing to follow the tracings in the text, we can see that to give 
well is to offer what Freese calls “personal security” (1982, p. 53), and Ken-
nedy calls “safety” (2007, p. 59), along with all the causes of existence, and 
things that are hard to come by. To give security is to give not just the re-
sources that support existence but also preservation. In divine form the sōtēr 
or sōtērian are providers of safety, givers of safe passage, preservers or main-
tainers of security. Zeus is known as a sōtēr. And Aristotle references the 
Savior Goddesses in Book 3 of the Rhetoric (1419a3), who were honored for 
protection and preservation. Human benefactors are sōtēr, doing good work 
to ensure civic safety and preservation. 
Aristotle’s description of the ways in which a benefactor should be 
justly honored brings to light the archaic ethic of reciprocity in gift-giving, 
mutual benefaction. As Marcel Mauss’ classic work (1990) on archaic gift 
culture reveals, receiving a gift sparks a cycle of obligatory reciprocity, where-
in the receiver honors the gift and the giver with some kind of return gift, 
typically either equal to what was received or surpassing it. Aristotle’s passage 
on honor in happiness topoi shows how reciprocity forges civic relations as 
both givers and receivers are benefitted mutually, the receivers by way of 
safety and benefits for the happy life, and the giver by way of being honored 
for giving, ideally for giving in abundance and of those things which are 
hardest to come by. And nowhere in Aristotle’s Rhetoric is it clear that the 
receivers and the givers are mutually exclusive persons.
These classical happiness topoi are figured through the Homeric gift 
in Aristotle’s Rhetoric and serve as examples of givens. In short, giving well 
makes for a happy polis. The highest form of giving, like giving safety and 
honor, inspires the greatest happiness. This endoxa circulates from the ar-
chaic Homeric gift culture into the classical culture of the polis via Aris-
totle’s Rhetoric, and envisions a rhetor’s agency as a preparation for being 
haplous, and audience agency as discerning the simple givens that in their 
universal connection to all that is good ought to be judged simply. No need 
for lengthy and complex syllogisms exists when the principles at play are so 
easily divined, so universal, singular, so simple.
To complement this theoretical figure of being haplous, let’s consider a 
poetic figure, one presented by Aristophanes’ Lysistrata. Here is the scene: To 
forge a peace between the embattled states of Sparta and Athens, in the con-
text of a Panhellenic sex strike by the women until peace is settled, Lysistrata, 
assuming the role of citizen out of care for the security of her home, appeals 
to the Magistrates via the gift. She reminds Spartan Magistrates about the 
time when Spartans came to Athens to sit at the altars as suppliants seeking 
defense against attack. Athenians responded with great generosity, rescuing 
them. She reminds the Athenian Magistrates how, when Athenians were en-
slaved by the Thessalians, the Spartans came to their aid, liberating them, 
and replacing slaves’ rags with warm cloaks, as suits a free people (Aristo-
phanes, Lysistrata, 1149-1156). 
Lysistrata brings to light the circulation of the gift between the two 
warring states, mutual benefaction and solidarity. She then brings to light 
the violation of the gift ethic by displaying the disgrace of failed reciproc-
ity. She asks the Magistrates why, after being treated with generosity by the 
other country, they are now out to ravage this one that treated them so well 
(1137-1146). More than once she asks, “So why, after so many mutual bene-
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factions are you fighting instead of calling a halt to your misbehavior” (1161)? 
Aristophanes then portrays how Lysistrata’s gift appeals, offered generously as 
questions rather than arguments, succeed. Reconciliation ensues, along with 
much feasting and dancing. Married couples are reunited. Peace and lovemak-
ing resume. Solidarity in ever-lasting friendship becomes their lasting future. 
What a poetic vision! In it we can see Lysistrata as the simple judge hav-
ing no need for qualifications, no need for complicated reasoning, to make the 
simple offering of a universal happiness via solidarity and mutual benefaction. 
The magistrates, too, are simple judges, being asked by Lysistrata to discern 
the simple, universal goods at play. But of course these Magistrates, for more 
than once exclaiming their willingness to agree to anything for the return of 
sex, seem simple in the derogatory sense of being haplous, despite their qualifi-
cation as Magistrates. Still my point holds. If they judge peace and friendship 
to be theirs, rather than war, based only on desire for the return of sex, then 
still they are being haplous. What is a more singular, universal principle of ex-
change than sex? As Georges Bataille writes, “It should come as no surprise to 
us that the principle of the gift, which propels the movement of general activ-
ity, is at the basis of sexual activity” (p. 41). Halting sex is not just a cunning 
comedic tactic in Lysistrata, it is the primary means of halting the gift. 
We can see being haplous at work in Lysistrata, discerning that the 
simplest path to happiness is the idealized and friendly ritual of the gift. To 
be a rhetorical citizen in this Homeric mode of Aristotle’s rhetoric is to be a 
simple judge of the gift, so that happiness via solidarity and mutual benefac-
tion guides one’s choices. Commonplace in gift studies is the expression that 
the theory of the gift is a theory of human solidarity. Likewise commonplace 
is the expression that there are no free gifts.6 That which is given by way 
of the gift obligates simple acceptance. Something so simple about human 
solidarity ought not to need much by way of dialectical investigation, or 
proof by way of lengthy syllogistic reasoning. Such complications make the 
gift something quite other than a gift.7 For the gift to be given, it must be 
6 See Douglass (1990), who frontloads these ideas in her foreword to Mauss’ classic work 
on the gift.
7 See Derrida (2000) and Calvin O. Schrag for their critiques of the conditions of the gift. 
Schrag’s position is recorded well and in brief in Ramsey and Miller (2003, p. 41). See 
also Mifsud (Forthcoming) which offers a rhetorical history and theory of Homeric and 
Aristotelian rhetorics of the gift.
given simply. Yet lurking still is the possibility of the duplicitous gift, hostil-
ity in the guise of hospitality, the classic Homeric example being the gift of 
the Wooden Horse to the Trojans.8 The gift, as many have pointed out, is 
both remedy and poison.9 The gift offers no guarantees of happiness nor of 
the resolution of enmity between peoples, only a spark of possibility, and an 
agent of change in the rhetorical citizen as simple judge.
Contemporary resourcefulness of being haplous
How we do rhetoric’s history and theory matters for what we can know 
about rhetorical citizenship. Perhaps for the very reason that being haplous is 
connected to divination means it must be negated as rhetoric’s history gets 
written through the privilege of rationality. Ideas, terms, and practices that 
seem to undercut or at least fail to affirm the traditionally privileged ideas, 
terms, and practices get negated in any number of ways, all to ill effect. In a 
history privileging the rational means of knowledge production, divination 
falls into nothingness and the remnants of being haplous are reduced to a 
rather diminutive form of the simpleton. Negating these Homeric dimen-
sions of being haplous leaves only a view and an attitude of the rhetorical 
citizen as simpleton. Or, said another way, negating these Homeric dimen-
sions of being haplous is killing the spark of possibility that could have been 
the rhetorical citizen.
From recent work in rhetorical citizenship and in deliberative democ-
racy, we can see a return to Aristotle as a source of affirming the significance 
of rhetoric to civic life and theorizing the art of citizens in a democracy.10 
Bolstering critical reception of what can be seen in this “eternal return” to 
Aristotle seems an imperative lest we create what Hélène Cixous calls “the 
empire of the self-same,” a form of cultural colonization that has no place in 
8 See Derrida’s deconstruction of hospitality in his response to Anne Dufourmantelle that 
shows hospitality’s relation to hostility (2000). See also Serres’ classic work on hostility and 
the parasite (2007). See also Davis (2010, p. 132).
9 Benveniste (1997) points out that across Indo-European languages “to give” means 
simultaneously “to take.” This paradox is addressed in a range of work from the original 
sociological work by Mauss (1990), to the philosophical deconstruction of the gift by 
Derrida (2000; 1997). 
10 In addition to work cited earlier, see Gross and Walzer (2000) as an excellent 
demonstration of the return to Aristotle and the significance such a return continues to offer. 
mari  lee mifsud on being a  s imple judge
[  234 ] [  235 ]
democratic practice nor the happy life (2001, pp. 78-83). This exploration 
of being haplous offers what Cixous calls a “sortie” an escape from the tradi-
tional story of the death of the other (2001, p. 78). By way of going back to 
Aristotle to see that which is strange anew for its resourcefulness, acknowl-
edgement is given to the resources within rhetorical history to create new 
structures for exchange, structures oriented towards what Cixous calls joy 
and Aristotle happiness. The strangeness that we see anew in this essay is the 
virtue of being simple in rhetorical judgment, exemplified theoretically and 
poetically through rhetoric and the gift. In Aristotle’s Rhetoric and its related 
citation of Homeric epics we see the gift as directed towards happiness and 
the greatest universal good. In Lysistrata, we see the gift used rhetorically as 
a simple path to peace. To shape rhetorical citizenship in and through the 
gift is to allow the most singular and simple forms of human solidarity to be 
discerned, divined, judged, and lived.
But to conclude that a rhetoric of being haplous is a technē of rhetoric 
would be mistaken. Being a simple judge is a quality prior to technē, prior to 
the need to be persuasive about anything in particular. Being a simple judge is 
not an appropriative position where the given is only ever acknowledged for 
what it can give the rhetor by way of persuasiveness. Lysistrata is no techni-
cian. Nor Homer. Being a simple judge marks a kind of judgment other than 
one wrought by technē. To be simple is to be untrained, and to be appropri-
ate as is, both qualities stand in juxtaposition to being technē. To be technē is 
to have an awareness of awareness towards the end of greater, even absolute, 
efficiency in achieving desired ends, namely rational judgment on the con-
tingent matters of civic life. Technical efficiency works against the grain of 
democracy’s messiness, and some describe technē’s telos as ensuring mutual 
destruction rather than mutual benefaction. Kenneth Burke describes the 
human condition as separated from its own nature by instruments of its own 
making, goaded by the spirit of hierarchy, and rotten with perfection (Burke 
1966, p. 16). Henry Johnstone describes a brutalizing effect of technical 
communication (Johnstone 1982). David Lovekin argues that a technical 
orientation towards symbols and society has an alienating effect, turning us 
all into strangers in a political landscape (Lovekin 1991). Even Aristotle is 
careful to note that rhetoric deals with things about which we deliberate but 
for which we have no systematic rules, no technai (Aris. Rhet., 1357a2), and 
this despite technē being much of the focus of and on Aristotle’s Rhetoric. 
This paradox turns out to be a very good thing. Rhetoric has a technē, and 
rhetoric has this other dimension, this dimension that is other than technē, 
incapable of being translated into technē, this simple dimension, connected 
to that which is given, not technically produced, but free. To be free and 
enact freedom, rhetoric must be more than a technē of persuasion, or even a 
technē of rhetorical citizenship. Bringing this strange dimension of rhetoric 
to light, we see it can serve as an irritant to the whole of our thinking about 
rhetoric, like sand in an oyster making a pearl.11
11 See Sutton and Mifsud (2012, p. 230) for discussion of alloiostrophic rhetoric as irritant. 
See as well, Sutton and Mifsud, Forthcoming. For a robust consideration of how theorizing 
rhetoric through the gift, beyond technē, offers resource to rhetorical citizenship in new 
media spaces via a concept of “netoric,” see Petra Aczél (2013).
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The Rhetorical Citizen: Enacting Agency
R AYM I E E .  M C K E R R O W
This essay will consider the nature of, and enactment of, agency in the guise 
of the rhetorical citizen. The essay considers the rhetorical citizen as a person 
whose actions within the public sphere encompass considerations of race, 
class, sex, gender lines. Two major criteria undergirding the enactment of 
citizenship will be explored: the constraints provided with respect to ac-
cess – whether one can gain both presence in and express voice – and the 
role of motive in highlighting why one acts in giving voice to one’s role as 
a citizen. The role of voice includes that of silence – the decision to remain 
silent in the context of an ability to access and present one’s voice is itself 
a message to the community of which one is a part. The refusal to act is as 
much a rhetorical statement, provided the motive is clear, as is an overt ac-
tion. The methodological grounding for this exploration will be premised on 
a Burkean sense of motive.
The rhetorical citizen
Karlyn Kohrs Campbell’s treatment of rhetorical agency provides a useful 
starting point for an examination of the role that may be played by the 
rhetorical citizen: “Whatever else it may be, rhetorical agency refers to the 
capacity to act, that is, to have the competence to speak or write in a way 
that will be recognized or heeded by others in one’s community. Such com-
petency permits entry into ongoing cultural conversations and is the sine 
qua non of public participation, much less resistance as a counter-public” 
(2005, p. 3). The key term in this orientation to agency is “capacity”; while 
I will have reason to object to “competence” as the sole explanation of what 
it means to have capacity, an ability to state a position is one potential at-
tribute of a person’s agency. Stacey Sowards (2010) provides a useful listing 
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of the “whatever else” in noting its varied nature includes terms such as 
enactment, performance, articulation, personal will, and resistance, among 
others. In noting the complex nature of this concept, Sowards offers a con-
cise perspective that serves well for my use: “rhetorical agency is a function 
of individual dispositions, social contexts, and a rhetor’s ability to respond 
to those situations as they change over time and negotiate social standings 
related to gender, race, ethnicity, class, and national origin status” (pp. 227-
28). Agency, then, encompasses the complexity involved in any human in-
teraction in which ideas are held in conflict. As such, it embodies issues of 
access to public space as well as motives for engagement (as will be addressed 
later). More precisely, this “agentic orientation” is at odds with what Joshua 
Gunn and Dana Cloud (2010) accurately label “magical voluntarism,” as a 
reference to “any theory of agency that suggests one can fulfill one’s needs 
and desires through the independent, willful manipulation of symbols irrel-
evant of structural limitation or constraint” (p. 62).1 In Foucaultian terms, 
agency exists, not as a possession of a person, but as a capacity to act within 
relations between and among people and the lifeworld they inhabit at a mo-
ment in time (Martin 1988).2 
Having considered the sense of “agency” in the title, I return to the 
first phrase. Rhetorical citizen has entered the lexicon in various manifesta-
tions over the past decade or so (see Greene, 2004, 2007; Martin, 2009; 
McKerrow, 2010, 2012). My purpose in this essay is to “trouble” the senses 
in which this term might be employed in relation to rhetorical agency. The 
central argument I want to advance is that current scholarly interest in ar-
ticulating a conception of rhetorical democracy, within which the rhetorical 
citizen is presumed to act, excludes consideration of what it means, rhetori-
1 Their essay is a trenchant critique of a 2007 essay by Sonja Foss, William Waters, and 
Bernard J. Armada. As Gunn and Cloud (2010) note, this is a more complex issue than an 
assumption that a person can choose agency and enact change as a result of that choice. Space 
does not allow a summary of their extensive review of recent rhetorical positions related 
to “What is agency?” Suffice it to note that the position they arrive at, which incorporates 
materialist and dialectic considerations, advances the discussion (See Geisler, 2005). 
2 Agency is a resource for change. In noting “My role – and that is too emphatic a word – 
is to show people that they are much freer than they feel” Foucault suggests that individuals 
can choose, but that freedom is not absolute; it is always constrained within a social matrix 
that pre-exists their presence (See Rux Martin, 1988, p. 10). 
cally, to enact agency by not participating, via silence or the overt refusal 
to engage others within any of the public spaces reserved for interaction. 
The argument will proceed in two stages. First, it is important to frame the 
potential exercise of agency within a sense of rhetorical or “communicative 
democracy” as distinguished from highly anti-rhetorical conceptions of pub-
lic deliberation (Young, 2000; McKerrow, 2012). With this as a conceptual 
backdrop, the essay then considers two principal issues – access, in reference 
to race, class, etc., and motive within which a sense of silence, or what is 
perceived as non-action is advanced as a potentially positive act on the part 
of the rhetorical citizen. 
Framing rhetorical democracy
Chantal Mouffe, whose work has privileged the possibility of dissensus as 
the primary ingredient in a working democracy, provides a starting point. In 
a 2006 interview, she notes:
I would argue that conflict is ineradicable, but there are different ways in which 
conflict can express itself. Democracy entails the legitimisation (sic) of conflict. 
Its aim is to enable forms of expressing conflict that are not going to destroy the 
political association. ... When a society does not allow for this agonistic form of 
conflict to express itself, you see the emergence of antagonistic forms of conflict. ... 
Public spaces should be places for the expression of dissensus, for bringing to the 
fore what forces attempt to keep concealed. (Carpentier and Cammaerts, p. 973)3 
It is useful to contrast this assessment of the nature of a rhetorically oriented 
approach to democratic action with Robert Ivie’s (2004) astute claim that 
“democratic dissent was rendered oxymoronic in America after 9/11 under 
the sign of a timeless war on global terror. ... [The] domestic dissenter sym-
bolizes democracy’s foreign threat, its enemy Other, a traitor to the people 
and their cause” (p. 20). America has forever been oriented toward exor-
cizing the perceived enemy within, when outside forces appear as a threat. 
Witness the creation of a House Un-American Activities Committee, the 
incarceration of Japanese-Americans in detention camps after Pearl Harbor, 
the attacks on German-American citizens in the same period, and post 9/11, 
the downfall of the Dixie Chicks after a brief utterance in relation to then 
3 For a brief review of Mouffe’s sense of “agonism,” see Mouffe (2007 and 2013).
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President Bush’s status as a Texan, and myriad other episodes in which the 
“foreign other” within American boundaries has been targeted as a symbol 
of the enemy without. We are forever marking the Other with difference as 
if it mattered in terms of our own safety and security. 
The contrary force, consensus, is equally problematic as a response to 
the disciplining of dissent. As Jacques Rancière (2009) notes: 
Before becoming a preference for peace over war, consensus is a certain regime 
of the perceptible: the regime in which the parties are presupposed as already 
given, their community established and the count of their speech identical to their 
linguistic performance. What consensus thus presupposes is the disappearance 
of any gap between a party to a dispute and a part of society. ... It is the absolute 
removal of the sphere of appearance of a people. (pp. 102-03) 
Instead of providing a measured, appropriate response to civil discord, con-
sensus excludes those whose voice would otherwise impede progress. It is the 
privilege of those already in control of the processes of governance, acting 
on behalf of the people, to determine whose voice will be determined help-
ful, and which will be silenced via exclusion from the public spaces in which 
deliberative assembly might occur. From Rancière’s (1999) perspective, the 
“appearance” relates to “a part of those who have no part” in the affairs of 
civil society (p. 99); their appearance serves to “trouble” the make-up of 
consensus society in articulating their right to be heard as equals. It should 
be noted, however, that Rancière’s (2011) sense of dissensus differs markedly 
from that provided by Mouffe: 
Political dissensus is not a discussion between speaking people who would confront 
their interests and values. It is a conflict about who speaks and who does not speak, 
about what has to be heard as the voice of pain and what has to be heard as an 
argument on justice. (p. 2)4
4 As a further example, consider Darrin Hicks’ (1995) observation that “By limiting 
the range of what we persons can say and have count as a legitimate contribution to the 
discussion, deliberative models are not recognizable as what we know as actual human 
conversation oriented to practical questions” (p. 304). For a more comprehensive critique 
of procedural models of deliberation, see Hicks and Langsdorf (1999).
This broadens the compass of discourse from a specific argumentative en-
counter over differences to the more general sense of who is heard in speak-
ing. From my vantage point, I want to see dissensus operating in this more 
general context, as well as in contradistinction to the kind of consensus 
Mouffe considers (e.g., in the narrower frame of dissensus over discussion of 
interests). That dissensus, at both levels, is an arguably better position from 
which to perceive the workings of democracy is, of course, not a new idea, 
nor is the sense that consensus may simply serve to protect hegemonic forces 
from those whose positions appear threatening. As Mouffe notes, “there is 
no consensus without exclusion” (Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006, p. 967). 
This observation leads us to the first principle with respect to what consti-
tutes the role of the rhetorical citizen – access. Agency, as well as the decision 
not to participate, requires the requisite resources to engage social others. As 
I’ve argued elsewhere, those deemed by hegemonic forces to be incivil are 
automatically excluded from the “civility table” (McKerrow, 2001). They are 
not invited to participate as their past reveals a disdain for regulative ideals 
of decorum and respect. It is much easier for those already accepted into the 
congregation of the civil to achieve consensus – but at what cost? What is 
the price paid in terms of exclusion? As Mouffe points out, however, there 
is no way around this particular “inclusion/exclusion” principle – exclusion 
is an inherent consequence of any attempt at reaching consensus. Rancière’s 
question is worth noting in this context: “What indeed is consensus if not 
the presupposition of inclusion of all parties and their problems that pro-
hibits the political subjectification of a part of those who have no part, of 
a count of the uncounted?” (Carpentier and Cammaerts, 2006; Ranciere, 
1999, p. 116). If you are not among the counted, you have no role to play in 
presenting voice. As M. Lane Bruner (2010) notes, “all forms of consensus 
necessarily marginalize some set of discourses” (pp. 57-58). As I argue below, 
the uncounted may well exercise their voice as rhetorical citizens, if not in 
legally accepted terms, then in making clear their status as “part of those who 
have no part.” 
In working from Rancière’s position, it needs to be noted that he up-
ends the entire Western tradition of rhetoric that presumes communal con-
nection is arrived at through the appropriation of discursive mechanisms 
already ensconced within the regulative ideal of a smooth-functioning de-
mocracy. As James Martin (2009) notes, Rancière’s “analysis focuses on dis-
agreement as a relationship that exceeds any effort to regularize persuasion 
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through a typology of techniques and devices” (p. 23). Using “police” as a 
generic term encompassing all social efforts to control the activities of a peo-
ple, the traditional conception of persuasion falls under this broad umbrella 
in dictating who speaks and how their discourse shall be shaped. If “the part 
that has no part” is to be heard as equals, the dimension of what constitutes 
“the people” has to expand in challenging the conventional dictates of who 
may speak. 
Access
A key issue that needs to be addressed here is the nature of “citizen” in the 
context of recognizing rhetoric’s province as a means of overcoming the kind 
of conflict that, in Mouffe’s terms, is endemic in a vibrant democracy. I am 
in complete agreement with Robert Asen (2004), in arguing that we need to 
move from a concern over what a citizen “does” or “does not do” that marks 
their presence as a qualified citizen: 
Rather than asking what counts as citizenship, we should ask: how do people enact 
citizenship? Reorienting our framework from a question of what to a question of 
how usefully redirects our attention from acts to action. Inquiring into the how of 
citizenship recognizes citizenship as a process. ... A discourse theory conceives of 
citizenship as a mode of public engagement. (p. 191). 
An example from the earlier experience of women in attempting to secure 
rights illustrates the paucity of a “citizen rights” perspective. Susan Zaeske’s 
(2003) account of women’s attempt to be recognized by the U.S. House of 
Representatives in submitting petitions arguing for the abolition of slavery 
serves as a reminder of how a “right” or “what is done” orientation serves the 
interests of those already possessing such rights:
Women, they [Representatives] maintained lacked the requisite virtues of 
republican citizenship: they could not deliberate rationally, act independently, or 
fulfill a citizen’s obligation to serve in the military. Not unlike the scenario in which 
the representatives formally abrogated the right of slaves to petition and questioned 
that of free blacks, members suggested that women possessed no citizenship rights. 
“Have women, too, the right of petition?” asked Wise at one point in the debates. 
“Are they citizens?” (p. 131) 
What is suggested here, via Representative Wise, is a rejection of 
women’s (and Blacks’ as well) status as “citizen” because there is no action 
that “counts” in relation to the obligations set forth in a “rights” orientation. 
In seeking to petition, and later to vote, women played into this dominant 
sense of what citizenship meant. By changing from “what counts” to “how,” 
the very act of petitioning becomes a “mode” of engagement; they were citi-
zens by virtue of the varied processes they employed in seeking to be heard. 
Being heard is not, in itself, a condition of citizenship. This broader sense 
is explicit in Josue Cisneros’ (2011) examination of the role of a “hybrid 
citizenship” enacted by Latina/o immigrants (some illegal) in the process of 
a major 2006 protest against legislation that would place new restrictions 
on immigration (p. 36). In this instance, the immigrants enacted citizenship 
through public forms of protest, and problematized citizenship through their 
recognition of border violations. The point I wish to draw from Cisneros’ 
argument is that the protestors, especially those representing an “alien” or 
“illegal” status, enacted the role of the rhetorical citizen via their modes of 
engagement: they illustrated that “those who lack citizenship in the politi-
cal, legal, or cultural sense can perform citizenship on a daily basis through 
rhetorical acts” (p. 40). From a legal or technical perspective, one might not 
be named a citizen, but one can enact that role in contributing to the dis-
cursive formation of their value as beings contributing positively to a com-
munity. As Cisneros notes, however, coming out publically in this way can 
produce a backlash, wherein real citizens–those already affirmed under the 
law – perceive protestors as unworthy of inclusion, and use their protest 
as affirmation of that judgment (p. 42). As the protestors’ activity in 2006 
suggests, they came together in accessing public space to air their views over 
their status as contributors to the national scene. 
Another example, this time clearly one that illustrates that not all dis-
sensus arrives at consensus, also serves to highlight the issue of access to 
public space. In this instance, a “five-acre empty lot simply known as Wilson 
Yard” in Uptown, a suburb of Chicago, remained undeveloped after a fire 
in 1996. As plans moved forward for a large apartment complex, “dozens of 
organizations and hundreds of Uptown stakeholders ... evoked democratic 
rhetoric ... to justify and support arguments both for and against affordable 
housing at Wilson Yard” (Rai, 2010, p. 41). As Candice Rai notes, over the 
next several years those involved pro and con in how best to develop the Yard 
were “completely unable to agree on a collective vision of their neighbor-
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hood’s future” (p. 4). This did not occur due to a lack of rhetorical skill, an 
absence of access to public space in which to express opinions, or an inabil-
ity to communicate with those in power. In the end, those opposed to the 
proposal lost their lawsuit against the city, and the units (and big-box store) 
were eventually occupied in 2010, some thirteen years after the initial con-
versations began. While dissent continued, planners planned, bureaucrats 
found financing, and a developer completed the project. A collective vision 
likely still is absent. As Douglas Ehninger (1970) observed long ago, argu-
ments are never “over” even when events are concluded, such as the decision 
to build in the face of ardent opposition. Some residents of the Uptown 
neighborhood may yet refuse to shop in the new Target or grocery store now 
occupying the former vacant lot. 
In the above examples, citizens (whether official or not) have exercised 
their rhetorical voice in public spaces. These function as illustrations of the 
possibility present for any person (in theory) to enter a public space and 
give voice to their interests. That this is not open to all is also evident, as is 
shown in Ivie’s initial illustration of the difficulty for those calling attention 
to the possible complicity of the U.S. in creating conditions for Bin Laden’s 
hatred – this in no way excuses or authorizes the actions on 9/11; it does, 
however, acknowledge the possibility that hatred toward another does not 
simply appear one morning; one does not initiate hate from a vacuum. Ac-
cess may be limited by a commitment that suggests loyalty to country brooks 
no expression other than from those in support of a government’s actions in 
opposing the enemy. 
Access may also be a function of simple logistics. The meeting I wish 
to attend is in a small space, and I arrive too late to obtain a seat; my trans-
portation to a meeting place is not available, either on my own or with as-
sistance; my interest is not sufficient to overcome obstacles to attendance. 
I do not feel welcome in the public space; I do not see myself in that space 
– others of “my kind” are not present, or have not been valued when they 
attended. These are varied reasons that effectively silence the rhetorical citi-
zen’s enactment of citizenship. 
Motivation
The last reason brings us to a consideration of a second principle underlying 
the enactment of citizenship – that of motive. My argument is simple: I wish 
to create a space for what may be perceived as “non-action” as a rhetorical 
expression – as an enactment by a citizen that is worthy of consideration in 
the same way as overt discursive acts might be seen. If citizenship, as Asen 
noted, is a process, that process includes motives that may culminate in 
silence or the overt refusal to participate in ways already “counted” as those 
fulfilling one’s obligation as a citizen. Kenneth Burke’s (1965) sense of mo-
tive as “shorthand terms for situations” grounds an extension of a citizen’s 
enactment of rhetorical voice to encompass acts that are not explicitly in-
cluded in prior discussions of what it means to be a rhetorical citizen (p. 29). 
Burke notes “motive is not a fixed thing” – you can’t see one walking down 
the street, nor is it singular: “any set of motives is but part of a larger implicit 
or explicit rationalization regarding human purpose as a whole (p. 26).” A 
complex notion, motives function, in Burke’s orientation, as “distinctly lin-
guistic” properties which allow one to interpret reality (p. 35). As named, 
they do not reflect the one and only reality, but rather function as possible 
interpretations of why one has acted as they have. Burke goes to great lengths 
in A Grammar of Motives to illustrate the various ways in which motives are 
connected to the elements within the set of terms that function as a means of 
explaining situations: act, scene, agent, agency, purpose (1969, p. xv). One 
can locate a motive within each of these terms – they will be different, but 
hopefully will assist in explaining an event (see Benoit 1996; Blankenship, 
Murphy, and Rosenwasser 2012; Jasinski 2001). The indeterminacy pres-
ent in this treatment of motive is purposeful; we do not know the mind of 
another (and perhaps the other doesn’t either). The best we can do is to at-
tribute, with an understanding of the cultural background or context within 
which an event occurs, possible motives that accord with our best judgment. 
In suggesting silence as a rhetorical act that engages an event, I cannot know 
that the motive for an action is as I’ve called it. I may be wrong. A person 
who does not vote in an election may have “failed” from the perspective of 
a normative sense of an almost mandatory act of citizen engagement. How-
ever, it remains possible that this alleged failure was itself an expression of 
disgust with the system, with the selection of candidates, etc. The reason for 
not voting may, as well, be that one was well-intentioned and simply forgot, 
that one was ill, or that one simply didn’t like to get involved in any activity 
remotely connected to an expression of interest in their own lives (Romney’s 
alleged 47 % perhaps?). In the absence of precise knowledge of one’s mo-
tive, one may withhold judgment, or make whatever attribution seems most 
likely in the present context. The attribution of motive as contributing to 
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one’s actions as a citizen may be based on past information about the person’s 
beliefs and/or actions, as well as nonverbal expressions, or other sources that 
would corroborate the accuracy of what one concludes about the actions of 
another. 
To be more precise with respect to opening a space for silence as an 
act of citizenship: Is silence a means of engagement? First, consider Robert 
Scott’s (1972) observation that “every decision to say something is a decision 
not to say something else, that is, if the utterance is a choice. In speaking we 
remain silent. And in remaining silent, we speak” (p. 146). Cheryl Glenn 
(2006) elaborates on this perspective in noting that “speech and silence de-
pend on each other: behind all speech is silence, and silence surrounds all 
speech” (p. 7). This orientation to the rhetorical function of silence is evi-
dent in Zaeske’s (2010) analysis of Lincoln’s silence on issues that could have 
been noted in an 1842 speech to the Temperance Society: 
By talking about the temperance movement while staying silent on the issue of 
abstinence, Lincoln exploited the capacious indeterminacy of meaning afforded by 
the discourse of the flourishing temperance movement to articulate his notion of 
the ideal republican citizen and assert a new trajectory for the American republic. 
By silencing the public memory of Washington, he effected a parricide against the 
founding father and the slaveholding generation of the American Revolution so 
that the sensibilities of a new generation of men, the Whigs, could be heard. ... In 
what he said and, importantly, in what he did not say – in his silences – Lincoln 
articulated and demonstrated a rhetorical philosophy of public deliberation 
grounded in compassionate appeal to the self-interest of the opponent and the 
enveloping support of public opinion. (392, p. 412)
I think it is clear that silence may function to convey specific meaning. Lin-
coln’s motive in speaking is implicit; he valued an appeal to his opponent’s 
self-interest, and the desire to enhance potential for support served as the 
impetus to silence. Whether I am right is less critical (as Burke would sug-
gest) than in noting that his silence had consequences. What would have oc-
curred had he addressed abstinence, or more clearly addressed the memory 
of Washington in that setting is unclear. But in speaking and withholding, 
Lincoln served the role of rhetorical citizen. 
As another illustration, consider the silence that is endemic within 
a Quaker meeting. Paula Lippard (1988) chronicles the various motives 
for silence as a procedural element in Quaker’s consideration of proposals, 
as silence is a means toward consensus: “It is important to note here that, 
from the Quaker’s perspective, the group’s common centering in the silence 
constitutes the true ‘gathering’ of the meeting” (p. 149). Their motive for 
silence is to privilege a means of demonstrating respect and a willingness to 
listen to “inner voices” before speaking. Elizabeth Molina-Markham (2014) 
corroborates this orientation toward silence as a process in suggesting “A 
cultural premise could be formulated as: Silence during meeting for business 
prepares participants to participate in spiritual decision making and allows space 
for participants to listen for a decision to emerge” (p. 170). While this example 
does not suggest a role within public space, it gives support to the sense in 
which silence functions as a rhetorical device for, in this instance, a social 
good of value to the congregants. The same value-added nature of a motive 
for silence may underly a citizen’s decision not to speak at a meeting. 
Silence is not the only means of engagement in ways other than speak-
ing within a public space. The refusal to allow a political sign in one’s yard 
during election season may be motivated by a desire to avoid creating an un-
sightly or aesthetically unpleasing look on one’s lawn. It may be that the can-
didate, even when of the same party as the resident, is one a person wishes 
not to support. In this latter instance, the motive suggests political engage-
ment through its absence. That is, one acts in not acting. Agency remains 
present in the scene, as one has the ability to engage via sign placement or 
not, as one’s own interests dictate. It may also be the case that placing a sign 
on one’s lawn engages a conflict of interest, or a show of support for a candi-
date that violates an obligation to remain neutral. In a recent local campaign, 
for example, the police chief in an adjoining town allowed a campaign sign 
for one of the two candidates for sheriff to be placed on his lawn at home. 
The incumbent sheriff, not the one supported, took exception to a member 
of law enforcement being perceived to overtly campaign for his opponent. 
Given this circumstance, and the incumbent’s later victory, the police chief ’s 
action could mean a rift in cooperation between the two offices. There can 
be ethically appropriate reasons for a refusal to engage politically. As Burke 
reminds us, judging the action based on one motive rather than another may 
change the perception of the act. In this latter instance, the police chief was 
within his legal rights to campaign, but the social consequences might argue 
against the overt nature of his action. In either case, his action is one of a 
rhetorical citizen. 
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Silence, as Shelby Bell (2014) notes, can be a risky enterprise, espe-
cially as one loses any control over the ultimate judgment others may make: 
“Rhetorical silence limits the silent rhetors’ interpretive authority. Even 
when the rhetor later attempts to frame their silence, or is spoken for by 
another, the expectations still limit the silent rhetors’ authority and give au-
thority to other interpreters. This is one of the risks of silence as a rhetorical 
form” (p. 190). I would add “may” to the argument that authority is given 
over completely to others; in the legal case she examined, it is clear that 
justices reviewing an appeal possess the authority to ignore whatever the 
appellant thought was meant by silence as their judgment is placed within a 
consideration of prior and future legal actions. In other cases, relinquishing 
authority will depend on the circumstances, not the least of which would be 
the rhetor’s own credibility as a past and future citizen. 
When factors such as race and class are considered in the context of 
relations of power, the control over one’s reason to remain silent may be lim-
ited. As Dana Cloud (1999) argues, “the rhetoric of silence points to extra-
discursive, material relations of power which are perceived for various reasons 
to be unspeakable” (p. 179). When one is not part of what may speak, silence 
is perhaps the only protective mechanism one retains. As Cloud concludes: 
The process of being negated, or the formation of a silenced silhouette, can 
also apply to the speaker or rhetor. If the first persona is the rhetor, perhaps the 
phenomenon of self-silencing noted in these transcripts could be referred to the 
constitution of oneself in the role of “null persona.” The null persona refers to the 
self-negation of the speaker and the creation in the text of an oblique silhouette 
indicating what is not utterable. (p. 200)
While we may never know in any certain sense what motivates a particular ac-
tion, or its absence, we need to keep space available for motives that imply en-
gagement with the political culture at a given moment in time. How a citizen 
engages encompasses more than the exercise of one’s voice in public space. Po-
tentially, it extends to one’s silence, or one’s refusal to participate as evidence of 
one’s desire to send a specific message to others. Whether that message is heard 
is open to question, but it does not invalidate the person’s attempt to engage, 
any more than when ideas expressed publically are ignored, misinterpreted, 
or simply not heard. The rhetorical citizen does not have to be successful in 
achieving goals in order to be “counted” among the parts of the social. In this 
sense, Campbell’s sense of agency as tied to competence is too narrow a con-
ception – as it assumes that one’s inability to be seen as competent or be heard 
is one’s fault; it may just as easily be the fault of those refusing to hear what is 
being said. That “the people” have ignored those who have counseled against 
particular actions does not, of necessity, mean that the counsel was wrong, nor 
does it mean that the person giving voice to ideas was incompetent.
Conclusion
As the above makes clear, while starting with Campbell’s sense of rhetori-
cal agency is a useful beginning, it is necessary to take a broader view of 
the consequences of one’s attempt to act within a public space. That is the 
point with respect to the issue of access as well – while one may well be “a 
part that has no part” within the social matrix, this does not invalidate the 
attempt to give voice – to “trouble” democracy in a way that upsets what 
Rancière (2009) references as the “distribution of the sensible”: “a relation 
between occupations and equipment, between being in a specific space and 
time, performing specific activities, and being endowed with capacities of 
seeing, saying, and doing that ‘fit’ those activities” (p. 275). This troubling 
brings those who are of “no account” into account through their active in-
volvement – forcing those already “in place” to reconsider the role of those 
whose exclusion is being challenged. Although not a new conception, begin-
ning from dissensus rather than consensus as the orientation toward how a 
rhetorical citizen enacts and problematizes engagement is a preferred point 
of departure. As theorized here, I am embracing a potentially contradictory 
sense of dissensus as the larger question of who may speak, as well as the 
more precise issue of how the argument is expressed within an agonistic 
(not antagonistic) environment. This consideration of both definitions al-
lows for the sense of those who have no part to be considered in the context 
of a rhetorical citizen’s enactment of agency. The role of motive introduces a 
second problematic beyond considerations of access, as it opens up the space 
for suggesting that inaction is itself an action, that silence may well function 
rhetorically as something other than simple disinterest and disengagement. 
That one disengages from what is perceived as an obligation to act in certain 
ways may be seen as motivated by something other than disinterest. Silence 
and the refusal to act are potential acts whereby a citizen expresses disgust 
with a particular party or process, and thereby indicates, through enactment, 
her or his motive. 
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Online Civic Participation, Discourse 
Analysis and Rhetorical Citizenship
P E T E R  DA H L G R E N
Openings: a potential interface
It has been about two decades since the internet became a mass phenom-
enon, and even if this nexus of communication technologies – that I here 
simply and with some imprecision term the web – has in some ways become 
“normal” and no longer feels “revolutionary,” from an historical perspective 
it does remain an unprecedented seismic societal transformation. The use of 
the web, not least social media, also called network sites (SNS), has altered 
just about all facets of social life, its organization, and its dynamics. SNS 
such as Facebook, Twitter and Instagram are truly vernacular contexts, where 
everyday rhetorical practices contribute to the construction of social worlds, 
communities, and identities. 
Not least, these platforms facilitate new modes of political partici-
pation. Rhetorical analysis has often had political speech as its object of 
analysis; up until about two decades ago the site for such speech, aside from 
limited live venues, was largely the mass media. Today the mass media re-
main, while the web has incorporated much of the role of the mass media 
– major media outfits are now online. More significantly, the web also adds 
the dimension of interactivity, offering a whole new setting in which groups 
and individuals can express themselves politically. There are of course limi-
tations and constraints: for example, politics remains a minor focus on the 
web compared to many other activities that transpire there, and it is much 
easier to launch a blog than to attract and hold an audience for it. Still, if 
deliberative rhetoric can be seen as constituting the core of democracy, its 
site has now shifted to the web, especially SNS. Indeed, the web has become 
the dominant public space for civic communication; this is where rhetorical 
citizenship today is largely enacted.
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Within my own academic field of media and communication studies, 
the emergence of the web has been analytically followed with intensity, not 
least its use in the context of politics. Media and communication studies is 
rather eclectic, importing theories and methods from a range of other fields. 
This openness has in the past led to some interfaces with rhetoric – but 
unfortunately not enough, in my view. In this chapter I want to stage such 
an encounter between these fields by discussing web based online civic par-
ticipation and addressing the notion of rhetorical citizenship in the process. 
Along with the study of media institutions, publics, audiences, recep-
tion processes, and so on, media and communication studies also spends a 
lot of time and energy analysing media texts. We have at our disposal a rather 
wide array of intellectual traditions, research orientations and methodologies 
to draw upon, ranging from hard-nosed quantitative to qualitative currents. 
In terms of the latter, there are some approaches that seem to have some ob-
vious connections with rhetoric; here I will take up two forms of related yet 
distinct discourse analysis. What is called Critical Discourse Analysis (CDA) 
has gained prominence over the past two decades – and seen considerable 
development by scholars within our field as well. A more recent import, still 
hovering on the periphery, is called Discourse Theory (DT). I will sketch 
the contours of these two traditions in order to highlight what I see as po-
tentially mutual benefits from an exchange with rhetorical analysis. This of 
course is done without brushing under the rug the inevitable differences be-
tween them. Yet it is my sense that it can be edifying and fruitful to become 
familiar with what in essence I perceive to be potential allies: useful turns or 
developments may emerge unexpectedly on either side. 
I begin with a brief scene setting of a few central themes concerning 
the changes in political participation in Western democracies, transforma-
tions that can provoke both despair and hope. I suggest that one important 
aspect here is the evolution of politics itself. This leads me into a discussion 
on the importance of the web and SNS for political participation; these me-
dia are both a reflection of and a factor in the transformation of political 
participation. From there I take up CDA as a mode of analysis of media 
texts; it can be seen in part as a more sophisticated successor to the older and 
problematic notion of the critique of ideology. Thereafter I turn my atten-
tion to DT, extracting from its rather dense philosophical program a basic 
methodological approach for dealing with media texts. In the final section 
I pull together the main threads from the two forms of discourse analysis, 
and juxtapose them with the field of rhetorical analysis, with the notion of 
rhetorical citizenship serving as the key conceptual link.
Democracy, participation and the web: transforming politics 
While democracy has begun to take hold in many countries where it was 
notably absent only a few decades ago, in the established Western democ-
racies we have seen how the functioning of democracy has become all the 
more problematic; a crescendo of international voices talk about “crises” and 
“dilemmas,” or at the very least note profound and problematic “transforma-
tions.” The causes are found in an array of factors (I offer a more detailed 
overview of this literature in Dahlgren 2013). Some analysts point to the 
late modern processes of individualization and socio-cultural fragmentation 
that can undermine collective purpose and action. Others argue that the on-
slaught of neoliberalism subverts democracy by depoliticizing public issues 
and allowing societal power to drift towards the democratically unaccount-
able private corporate sector. There are other explanations on offer as well, 
with considerable disagreement among various camps. 
All observers, however, are in agreement that citizen participation 
in formal party politics is on the decline in most Western democracies, as 
citizens often feel marginalized, sensing that established politics offers few 
opportunities for meaningful engagement. Civic cynicism grows, especially 
in the face of financial and social crises; many citizens feel political elites 
subordinate the public interest for private gain, and that governments are 
inefficient in their use of the public’s tax money. The consequences of this 
discontent have led to significant declines in participation in party politics 
on many fronts.
However, if such trends can lead to a generalized sense of political 
disenchantment for many citizens, for others it becomes a signal to engage 
politically, to participate – on local, national, regional and transnational lev-
els. While we see some upsurge in engagement in party politics (includ-
ing, unfortunately, a growth in extreme right wing parties in Europe), the 
biggest growth is in the alternative, extra-parliamentarian political domain, 
where on both the Left and the Right, innumerable advocacy groups, activist 
networks, citizen collectives, social movements, and transient moblizations 
enter the public sphere to pursue their own interests and/or their visions of 
a better world. There are movements on many fronts – human rights, eco-
nomic justice, environment, gender issues, and so on – that cross national 
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boundaries, generating the contours of global civil society; see, for example 
Manuel Castells (2012) and Paolo Gerbaudo (2012). The web can foster 
the sociality needed for political cooperation, as Nancy K. Baym demon-
strates (2010), and connect citizens to discussions and causes in ways that are 
personally meaningful, as W. Lance Bennett and Alexandra Segerberg show 
from their research (2013). In particular SNS are effective in linking citizens 
to the political; see for instance The Journal of Communication (2012) and 
the collection by Brian Loader and Dan Mercea (2012). Such involvement, 
of course, manifests at least as much affective as cognitive engagement, 
which Zizi Papacharissi, among others, emphasizes (2014).
In these developments, many observers claim that the notion of poli-
tics itself is transmuting, as citizens broaden the notion of what constitutes 
political issues. Overarching traditional ideologies become less compelling 
for many citizens, especially younger ones, as they engage with issues that 
appear more personally meaningful to them, having to do with values, iden-
tities, life-style choices, and single issue movements. In the process, they are 
finding new ways of enacting citizenship, developing new practices for doing 
democracy. Chantal Mouffe (2013) and others use the notion of “the politi-
cal” to point to collective contestations that can emerge anywhere in society; 
at times these issues may become incorporated into formal politics, but often 
they live a separate life, in a much expanded public sphere.
As stated at the outset, the location for much of this activity – and 
increasingly for politics in general – is of course the web. Since the advent of 
the internet as a ubiquitous phenomenon in the mid-1990s, there have been 
debates about how and to what extent these communication technologies 
enhance the public sphere or can “save” democracy. James Curran, Natalie 
Fenton and Des Freedman confront the wishful thinking often involved in 
such discussions (2012). We need to be cautious in making assumptions 
about the web and its affordances; Mathew Hindman (2009) and Evgeny 
Morozov (2011) from different angles argue strongly that there can be no 
techno-fix for democracy. The web cannot be seen as some simple solution 
to democracy’s problems; going online per se does not make engaged citizens 
out of people who are otherwise uninvolved. 
Civic online participation is shaped by the character of the web en-
vironment, which of course varies; YouTube has different technical affor-
dances and discursive possibilities than, say, Twitter. More generally there 
are troubling factors built into the web’s present architecture and political 
economy, as Robert McChesney points out (2013). José van Dijk addresses 
these issues in regard to social media, highlighting the now well-known is-
sue of political surveillance and the gathering of personal data for commer-
cial purposes. In addition many observers have noted the growth of “echo 
chambers,” sites where like-minded people gather to confirm their views 
and avoid conflicting perspectives; this runs counter to the very ideal of the 
public sphere. Other problems have to do with “slackitivism” or “clicktiv-
ism,” which points to the danger of having exclusively screen-based connec-
tion with the political world. As I discuss, with low levels of commitment, 
attention can easily be drawn from the political into online consumption, 
entertainment, gaming, and so on (Dahlgren 2013). Not least, the web can 
be and often is used for undemocratic purposes by all kinds of political ac-
tors, from individuals who harass public figures to political groups spreading 
lies and disinformation. However, despite these and other issues, the web re-
mains a vital resource for civic participation; indeed, it is difficult to imagine 
political life today without it.
In today’s world, on- and offline contexts have become ever more en-
twined. The web is interwoven with our social worlds, increasingly embed-
ded in our daily activities of social interaction, gossip, entertainment, con-
sumption, hobbies, and so forth. We usually demarcate politics from other 
domains of life, yet the boundary is also fluid: via the web, the political can 
arise unexpectedly in the mundane settings of the everyday. Web tools have 
become more effective, less expensive, and easier to use; access and collabora-
tion are increasing, and we are evolving from being mostly media consumers 
to including many media producers – or “produsers,” as they are sometimes 
called. The relatively easy mastery of web techniques is often an empowering 
experience in itself, leading to further innovative and creative uses.
Communication among citizens of course manifests many modes and 
can vary enormously according to local cultures, political traditions, his-
torical experience, and organizational situations. On the web, the range of 
discursive registers is amplified, especially in SNS; political communication 
is often quite cacophonic and often most decidedly does not express formal-
ized deliberation. Media genres hybridize; many citizens are doing versions 
of what might pass for journalism, further enhancing – or problematizing 
according to some commentators – how journalism is defined. Leah A. Liev-
rouw writes: “Media culture in the digital age has become more personal, 
skeptical, ironic, perishable, idiosyncratic, collaborative, and almost incon-
peter dahlgren online civic participation, discourse analysis & rhetorical citizenship
[  262 ] [  263 ]
ceivably diversified” (2011, p. 45). Politics and the political are an integral 
part of this messy online world, which offers innumerable concrete yet often 
shifting and contradictory discursive contexts for participation. 
Specifying the factors that promote or hinder online participation 
among citizens is naturally a daunting undertaking, but I can briefly note 
that such discursive agency is facilitated by what I call civic cultures (Dahl-
gren 2009). These are taken-for-granted resources that need to be available to 
citizens in their everyday lives; they have to do with knowledge, democratic 
values, social trust, communicative practices and skills, and civic identities. 
That civic cultures could be translated into concepts from rhetorical analy-
sis should be apparent. Civic cultures are strong in that they can enhance 
agency; citizens through their practices can in turn further develop civic cul-
tures. Yet civic cultures are always vulnerable to the exercise of undemocratic 
power: civic trust can be undermined by sowing suspicion; knowledge and 
practices can be circumscribed. The point here is that – with sound social 
constructionist grounding – the sustained enactment of citizenship has the 
possibility of further strengthening democratic traditions as well as empow-
ering citizens to participate. 
Democracy is in turbulent transition, new practices and notions of 
the political are emerging, and the web has become a new location for dis-
cursive agency and political participation. Let us now turn to the two tradi-
tions of discourse analysis to see how they help us to analytically approach 
these circumstances of today’s political communication among citizens.
Critical Discourse Analysis: updating ideology critique
By the 1980s, the Marxian paradigm was facing a number of serious concep-
tual (and political) problems; among them was the contested notion of ide-
ology. Elements of Marxian analysis had been used in some corners of media 
and communication studies since the late 1960s; it examined how specific 
media form and content reproduce illegitimate and unacknowledged rela-
tions of power. Ideology in this critical sense implies some distortion of re-
ality, which serves class interests (this stands in contrast the descriptive use 
of the term, which signifies, for instance, a party’s political platform). John 
Corner describes how there were various attempts to “repair” the notion of 
ideology and to re-launch it in new, improved versions (2011). These efforts 
were not successful; the term had been overloaded and bent in too many 
different directions, and the time had come to put it to rest. Yet, it was still 
clear to many scholars that the interconnections between representation, 
meaning, value, social structure and power – whatever we choose to call 
these links – remained, and they demanded critical analysis.
At a general level, the notion of “critique,” and its adjective form 
“critical,” signify an analytic approach that problematizes power relations, 
confronting domination as the unnecessary and unjustifiable restrictions on 
human liberty and equality. Today this perspective extends far beyond class 
relations. Indeed, the single-minded focus on class was being challenged by 
voices pointing to other modes of subordination, arising from, for example, 
gender, ethnicity, and sexual orientation; not least the ascent of Cultural 
Studies played an important role here. Further, more sophisticated episte-
mological reflection was rendering the categories of “true” and “false” depic-
tions of society as untenable. And in media studies, the view of audiences as 
victims of ideological media power began to give way to an understanding 
of them as active, sense-making agents, capable of independent (and critical) 
interpretation. 
As the ideology concept drifted to the margins, another enterprise 
moved into some of the ground it had covered. CDA, in its various versions, 
began to emerge in the early 1990s, retaining some obvious connection with 
the critique of ideology tradition. Norman Fairclough (2010), Ruth Wodak 
and Michael Meyer, (2009) and Teun van Dijk,(1998) offer differing ports 
of entry into CDA, while an overview, by Marianne Jørgensen and Louise J. 
Phillips, provides an analytic and comparative overview of the field (2002). 
The “critical” in CDA signals precisely a central concern with power rela-
tions, and it is this that distinguishes it from other, more descriptive strands 
of discourse analysis. 
In simple terms, discourse here is understood as patterned ways of 
using language in specific social contexts; when these patterns and contexts 
take on large societal proportions, some authors (for example Foucault) 
deploy the terms discursive formations. Significantly, theories of discourse 
underscore its constitutive character: discourses participate in the shaping 
of subjectivities, identities, social relations, objects, systems of knowledge, 
modes of cognitive and normative perception – while at the same time be-
ing shaped by such elements. (Again, we can see strong parallels with the 
rhetorical tradition.) 
These theories of discourse are strongly influenced by social construc-
tionism: discourses can serve to engender and sustain social order – as well 
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as to challenge it – through patterns of meaning. Thus, discourses are more 
than just text; they are manifestations of (collective) social practice – while at 
the same time functioning as linguistic contexts, as symbolic environments 
for human action. Action, in turn, as the meaningful expression of agency, 
always has a discursive dimension to it. CDA, concerned with power arrange-
ments, was rather quickly adapted by media and communication studies, 
which is not surprising: the media are ubiquitous carriers of discourses en-
meshed in power relations.
For Norman Fairclough CDA examines the dynamics between three 
basic dimensions: text, discursive practice, and social practice/structures 
(1993). Moreover the opacity of the links between discourse and social pow-
er is in itself a significant aspect of power. Methodologically the approach is 
rather diverse and open, and specific methods tend to emerge in relation to 
the given discursive object, its social contexts, and the problems perceived 
in this triad of text-practice-context. The scope of its use in media and com-
munication research is broad – in principle it can be applied to any media 
content and context. 
The web offers of course almost endless contexts where discursive 
patterns are manifested, from the mainstream journalism of commercial 
media organizations to radical political organizations at both ends of the 
spectrum. Texts emanate from powerful organizations, but also from oppo-
sitional groups and individuals. CDA can help identify significant discursive 
and societal online contexts and elucidate discursive patterns within them 
– illuminating their implications for power relations between the concerned 
parties. On the web, “text” of course can mean all sorts of multimodal audio-
visual productions, and a given discourse can be manifested across a variety 
of platforms such as Twitter and Facebook; Habermasian rationality is of 
course usually the exception in these settings. The discursive agents and their 
recipients are largely under-theorized, however; CDA does not delve exten-
sively into conceptualizations about the subject. This concern, on the other 
hand, has a more pronounced position within DT.
Discourse Theory: hegemony, contingency and subjectivity
It must be said that Discourse Theory is a somewhat unfortunate label, since 
it easily leads to confusion with CDA and other variants of discourse analysis. 
An intellectual endeavor that derives from the work of Ernesto Laclau and 
Chantal Mouffe (1991), DT encompasses an extensive philosophical ontolo-
gy and a politically radical understanding of democracy, but my focus will be 
on its discourse analytic toolkit. This has clear parallels with CDA, but goes 
further conceptually in linking discourse to other domains of social theory. 
DT has been used in a variety of contexts in social and cultural analysis with 
a political bent, but has only recently begun to be deployed within media 
and communication studies. 
Laclau and Mouffe’s by now classic text first appeared in the mid-
1980s at a time when Marxism was confronted with growing dilemmas, and 
when post-structural thought, especially as expressed in the works of Fou-
cault, Anne M. Smith (1999), Jørgensen and Phillips (2002), and Jason Gly-
nos and David Howarth (2007) offer useful introductions to this tradition 
and the debates around it. In recent years media researchers have begun to 
make use of DT in a variety of ways, as exemplified by Nico Carpentier and 
Benjamin De Cleen (2007) and Lincoln Dalhberg and Sean Phelan (2011). 
Nico Carpentier and Erik Spinoy demonstrate its utility in other domains of 
cultural analysis (2008). 
DT is post-Marxist in its efforts to better align critical social theory 
in keeping with historical realities, and it is clearly post-structural in its ap-
proach to society, knowledge, language, and the subject. This is quite evi-
dent in its emphasis on contingency: Laclau and Mouffe argue that all our 
knowledge, and the discursive modalities that it takes, are predicated on 
particular circumstances – a position not completely foreign to rhetorical 
analysis. No human practice or subjectivity exists outside the specific condi-
tions that both make them possible and delimit them. DT’s position is that 
there is no foundation or essence, no fixed meaning – for knowledge, lan-
guage, subjects, or social phenomena. There are only possibilities, nothing is 
necessary. Not everybody would align themselves with such a stark version 
of contingency, but it does have the asset of clarity. 
Turning to their methodological approach, in Laclau and Mouffe’s 
lexicon, we find elements in DT that are clearly parallel to CDA. Discourses 
refers to relatively stable structures of meanings that arise as linguistic and 
material practices within a particular context relatively social and material 
practices. Having both linguistic and non-linguistic dimensions, this con-
ception aligns itself with notions of language use as social action. DT posits 
that meaning arises via articulation – the positioning of signs, words, and 
actions in relation to others, which closely parallels the semiotic notion of 
“the play of signifiers.” While meaning is never entirely fixed, it can attain 
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a degree of social stability, and such meanings are called nodal points of dis-
courses; we can think of them as the core concepts or established vocabular-
ies. We see in DT’s view of language the general poststructuralist perspective 
on meaning, as manifested, for example, in the later Barthes’s semiology 
and in Derrida’s deconstructionism (meaning is always to some extent “de-
ferred,” as Derrida says).
Given that the political is an inexorable dimension of all social rela-
tions, power is always already present in some way in any setting – yet is often 
not readily visible, remaining occluded, which becomes a key critical point for 
DT – to flush it out. And in many instances power is seen as lacking legitima-
cy, as unjust, and should be challenged, for the same reasons that CDA would 
assert. DT posits that some discourses, in relation to others, have hegemonic 
positions, that is, they offer preferred or dominant meanings. Here we have 
the pivotal point of politics, where such prevailing discourses are challenged 
by alternative, counter-hegemonic ones. While hegemonic discourses may op-
erate as formalized political positions, mostly they seep into the micro-meshes 
of ongoing communication, for example in a Facebook group, surreptitiously 
framing assumptions and perception. Since meaning is always to some extent 
shifting and contested, even hegemonic discourses can never be fully secure – 
even if they are characterized by large degrees of inertia. 
Where DT most clearly goes beyond CDA is in its notion of the subject 
and the processes of identity. If politics has to do with antagonisms between 
groups, between an “us” and one or more “them,” discourses can serve as 
mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. Discourses interpellate subjects, ad-
dressing them and providing them with subject positions, i.e. identities, in 
relation to contested issues and those who take opposing views. In the con-
text of public spheres and politics, subject positions can be understood as 
political identities made available by pertinent discourses. However, given 
the often contested and disorderly state of discourses circulating in soci-
ety, it is often the case that subjects are to varying degrees over-determined, 
which means that they are not fully at home in any one discourse, but are 
pulled in different directions and positioned by competing discourses. Their 
political identities thus are decentered, fragmented, and the us-them divi-
sions become less self-evident (for example, one may strongly identify with 
an ecological position that argues for less industrial development in one’s 
region, yet also be a union member who wants to generate more jobs in 
industry). DT’s post-structural character is underscored by its insistence on 
ambivalence – certainly a disposition well suited to the character of the on-
line world with its chaotic array of nodal points offering over-determined 
subject positions. 
Though shaped by discourses and seen more as a process than a solidi-
fied entity, the subject is also a political actor, a contingent discursive agent. 
Conceptually there is a force-field of power between discourses and agency, 
between hegemony and counter-hegemony. DT is engaged in exploring the 
conditions that make specific identities, meanings, and practices possible, 
and how the dynamics of power support or alter them. Public spheres, not 
least online, become not just sites of political communication, but also the 
spaces where political subjectivities, with all their complexities and contra-
dictions, are constructed, negotiated, and contested. There is a vast range of 
discourses that offer (and seductively compel) subject positions on a con-
stant flow of issues on the web – via blogs, tweets, Facebook groups and 
other digital platforms. There is no finality here, assuming that democracy 
is functioning reasonably well: politics is never finished, new contestations 
and antagonisms always arise. 
Discursive subjects, rhetorical citizens
Pulling together the discussion thus far, we have seen that both CDA and 
DT are oriented towards critical analysis of discourses (as opposed to merely 
descriptive rendering), trying to illuminate how meaning is structured via 
discursive practices and elucidating their significance in societal contexts. 
There is an emphasis on power relations, which are often not overtly visible. 
Discourses have a constitutive character: they participate in the shaping of 
subjectivities, identities, social relations, systems of knowledge, modes of 
cognitive and normative perception – while at the same time being shaped 
by such elements. Discourses are more than just text; they are manifestations 
of (collective) social practices; they do things. Action, in turn, always has a 
discursive dimension to it, to the extent that it is meaningful. In terms of 
the differences between them, DT can be seen as adding theoretic weight 
beyond the program of CDA, particularly in regard to contestation between 
discourses (hegemonic and counter-hegemonic) and in particular notions 
about the subject as an often tension-ridden entity. 
Much of this should be rather familiar territory for rhetorical analysis, 
even if the terminology varies. Most rhetorical scholars today share some ver-
sion of a social constructionist view of language and see language as a form of 
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social action whereby humans constitute meaning as well as their identities 
and relationships. At bottom, rhetorical analysis addresses discourse, and all 
discourses have rhetorical dimensions. More broadly, today rhetorical analy-
sis addresses all manner of human communication in just about all types of 
situations, from institutional settings such as law, science, and journalism 
to expressions from popular culture as well as everyday life. Fiction, visuals, 
works of art, even objects and their manner of display – indeed, all symbols 
– can be understood as having a persuasory dimension and can thus be of 
potential relevance for rhetorical analysis. And in most such settings the 
potential for the political, and thus for rhetorical citizenship, is ever present.
At the epistemological level, most rhetorical analysts today assume 
that we are always already immersed in language; there is no extra-linguistic 
escape, as Burke (1969) argues (cf. White 1984). Language operates in social 
contexts to shape what we know and how we see the world; we use language, 
but language also uses us, as it were. This stance is found throughout 20th 
century philosophy, from the later Wittgenstein to post-structuralism via 
social constructionism (and can be traced back not least to Kant’s Critique 
of Pure Reason, with its emphasis on the contingencies of our knowing). As 
with discourse analysis, rhetorical analysis addresses discrepancies in knowl-
edge or assumption about social reality between communicators and their 
audiences. This suggests links with the ideas of what Paul Ricoeur calls the 
three “masters of suspicion”: Nietzsche’s idea of power-knowledge (adopted 
by Foucault), Marx’s concept of class-based ideology, and even Freud’s no-
tion of the repressive unconscious: all critically exemplify social consequenc-
es of language-based knowledge discrepancies (1970). 
The door to an interface between rhetorical analysis and CDA/DT ap-
pears open. With its keen eye for contingency and indeterminacy, rhetoric 
is equipped to deal with the protean realities of communication on the web 
and its SNS. If rhetorical analysis has traditionally tilted towards the audi-
ence side of civic communication, the realities of the web signal an unprec-
edented historical shift that actualizes the imperative to energetically address 
the participatory side of civic interaction. Via the web, democracy has gained 
innumerable rhetors who are altering the fundamental character of the pub-
lic sphere, not least through their at times dizzying displays of post-rational, 
affective communication.
 Here the concept of rhetorical citizenship becomes cogent. As under-
scored in the Introduction to this volume by the editors Christian Kock and 
Lisa Villadsen, rhetorical citizenship signifies participation via language in 
the processes of democracy. Publics are understood as processes – constant-
ly emerging and dissipating. Thus, publics are embodied in practices, and 
these are largely of a communicative-rhetorical character. Individuals who 
comprise publics can thereby be seen as rhetorical political agents, enacting 
rhetorical citizenship. Moreover, such agency varies according to prevailing 
contingencies, empowering – or disempowering – citizens according to spe-
cific circumstances. 
We can see here some parallels with discursive subjects, especially as 
conceptualized by DT. The differences reside chiefly in how and the extent 
to which the subjectivity of discursive-rhetorical agent is theorized. Rhetori-
cal analysis can extrapolate readers’ and listeners’ responses to communica-
tion, yet the subject as such remains for the most part less theorized within 
rhetorical analysis, somewhat on a par with the situation in CDA. Psychoana-
lytic perspectives are mobilized on rare occasions; most specifications of the 
subject traditionally do not go beyond basic distinctions such as cognitive vs. 
affective or classic models of the psyche such logos, ethos and pathos. More 
recently, however, theories of rhetorical agency have been underscoring the 
situational factors that impact on the rhetor – a development that could 
facilitate links to DT. 
It could readily be argued that rhetorical analysis can manage just fine 
without further ado about the dynamics of subjectivity; there is much it can 
do to illuminate civic agency on the web as it is. My assumption, however, 
is that to the extent that it wants to pursue the notion of rhetorical citizen-
ship in a deeper manner, it would benefit from enhanced reflection on the 
dimensions and contingencies of subjectivity. DT’s view of the subject as 
radically contingent and often fragmented need not be swallowed whole, 
but could be considered in small doses. Also, if rhetorical citizenship is about 
political participation, more attention to the power relations that enable and 
constrain civic participation in concrete situations would be an asset. 
Additionally, rhetorical analysis tends not to deploy a highly devel-
oped social theoretic perspective in contextualizing its studies; the so-called 
“rhetorical situation” tends to be rather micro-contextual. Pursuing the no-
tion of context further may involve taking some steps into political sociol-
ogy or other social science endeavors, but in my “undisciplined” view – that 
research in the humanities and social sciences often benefit from crossing 
disciplinary boundaries – the gains usually outweigh the efforts required. 
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Indeed, with DT, the notion of discourse itself refers to both linguistic and 
material practices: there is no border to defend between them.
And certainly CDA and DT in turn could derive methodological inspi-
ration by engaging with and adapting elements of rhetorical analysis, since 
so much of the analysis of discourse in fact has to do with how discourses 
impact their addressees. Thus, questions having to do with how discourse in-
terpellates receivers, the compelling power of nodal points within discourses, 
the interplay of text, discursive and social practices, and so forth, are aspects 
that can be productively subjected to rhetorical analysis within the overarch-
ing logics of CDA and DT. Rhetorical analysis on the one hand, and Critical 
Discourse Analysis and Discourse Theory on the other, should not be seen 
as orthodoxies, but sets of tools of potential utility – that may be comple-
mented and combined with each other. Such ventures of course require a 
degree of conceptual rigor to maintain coherence, but they may all have 
something to gain by getting to know each other better. And in the process 
we may deepen our understanding of the dynamics of citizens’ political par-
ticipation online. 
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“A Stowaway of Emigration”: Polarization 
in Hafid Bouazza’s Work
H I L D E VA N B E L L E
Introduction
An important subject of rhetorical criticism is the study of polarization, the 
process by which public opinion divides and goes to the extremes. Rhet-
oricians can examine how, in public discourse, opposition is constructed 
throughout texts, how competing choices of oppositions are put to work, 
or how fixed oppositions are changed into new ones. They can explore how 
groups are formed around certain oppositions and how different parties re-
act to one another’s challenges and arguments. The rhetorician’s focus is of-
ten double, as both style and argument are involved in the analysis. Inspired 
by Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca, scholars of rhetoric use the intersection of 
style and argument as a way to typify rhetorical discourse and characterize 
types of practices (Perelman & Olbrechts-Tyteca 1969, p. 168).
A case in point for this study is the Dutch author Hafid Bouazza 
(born 1970), whose initial refusal to take part in public debate on matters 
such as intercultural relations gradually evolved into strong participation 
and outspoken positions. I will study a collection of his non-literary work in 
general, and particularly his stance toward the politically correct polarization 
warnings he emphatically rejects. In an evaluation of Bouazza’s own “invert-
ed” strategy I will examine both the arguments Bouazza comes up with in 
his defense of polarization and the polemical style in which he often tries to 
make his point. In order to obtain a better view of Bouazza’s polarization 
strategies, I will study his ethos and involve his personal history and the re-
ception of his literary work in the discussion. It will appear that despite the 
apparent differences both in style and argument, his literary and essayistic 
works have more in common than first assumed, and his polarization strat-
egies have a clear and well-defined focus.
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Hafid Bouazza and polarization 
That’s how I know my Muslims: after the murder of Pim Fortuyn many talked 
about demonization of Islam; now they learned a new word: polarization. It is 
a riddle to me why the many Islamite organizations are not polarizing, but an 
association of ex-Muslims is (Bouazza 2011, p. 292).1
These explicit words are found in a text in defense of a Dutch committee of 
ex-muslims. The author is the Dutch writer and columnist Hafid Bouazza, 
and the tone of his argument is clear: he reproves a Dutch muslima for 
adopting the politically correct term polarization in her critique on the new 
organization. This text “Noble Savages” is part of a collection of columns 
and essays, in its turn a chapter of a larger collection of essays and reviews 
that Bouazza published in 2011, Heidense vreugde: gepeins en gezang (Hea-
thenish Joy: Pondering and Chant). The chapter “A Stowaway of Emigration” 
(“Verstekeling van de Emigratie”) is a compilation of work on intercultural 
relations published recently in Dutch quality newspapers. 
Morocco-born author Hafid Bouazza, who left his homeland for 
Arkel (the Netherlands) at the age of seven, presents himself as a clandestine 
passenger (stowaway) of emigration. As a Moroccan-Dutch writer of short 
stories, novels, plays, reviews, columns, essays and polemical pieces, and a 
translator of Arabian and English poetry, Bouazza generally is considered an 
important representative of so-called migrant literature in the Netherlands. 
In “A Stowaway of Emigration” the author tackles present-day ques-
tions such as the way western cultures and politics ought to look at Arab or 
Muslim culture, religion and politics, and vice versa. The occasion for these 
articles can be a current event, such as the murder of film director Theo Van 
Gogh (2004) or the expulsion of the Dutch-Somali politician Ayaan Hirsi 
Ali (2006), but also a less dramatic occasion such as the publication of a book 
or a debate on television, as is the case of “Noble savages.” Gender issues 
come into the picture, evidently, as well as more autobiographical stories and 
childhood memories about Ramadan in the last pages of the collection (pp. 
314, 317). Generally, the reviews are written in an unmarked, matter-of-fact 
tone and style; they are well documented and well argued. Some texts, how-
ever, are animated by a satirical, ironical, and polarizing touch. 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all translations are mine (HvB).
The question is now how to assess the polarization issue. As rhetori-
cians, we tend to believe in the power of persuasion by means of rhetorical 
strategies such as audience adaptation and a drive for consensus, but what 
about the places where those modes are bluntly denied and the discussion is 
set in an openly polemical style? Bouazza satirizes the kind of public debate 
that shuns intense discussion and condemns conflict of ideas. This so-called 
politically correct thinking is naïve and self-destructive, he claims, as it does 
not properly counter the violence of fascist, fundamentalist or right wing 
populist discourse (pp. 284-289). 
Bouazza’s polarizing style is not new, nor is it unique. It refers to a 
rich tradition of polemic work all through Western history, from Martin 
Luther to Karl Marx, from Robespierre to Noam Chomsky, from Desiderius 
Erasmus to Michael Moore. Polemics is a widely accepted and appreciated 
genre,2 not least by the media, which hunt for the wittiest polemicist and the 
spiciest controversy. 
Moreover, antithetical thinking refers to fundamental human cogni-
tive structures. We try to interpret and organize our world essentially through 
frames such as analogy and opposition. In other words, the construction of 
an argument in terms of opposition is nothing more than a basic mode of 
thinking. Trudy Govier defines the apparent inevitability of this phenom-
enon as such:
Dare I say it? It even seems (somehow) natural for human creatures to think in 
binaries. And this despite the fact that two is a small number, a fact that we all 
know perfectly well (Govier 2007, p. 3). 
Scholars such as George Kennedy suggest that thinking in oppositions might 
be a typically Western habit that originated in antiquity and still dominates 
our argument structures. His interpretation is based on cultural rather than 
natural tendencies:
It would doubtless be an exaggeration to say that speakers in other cultures 
do not understand logical contradiction, but it is perhaps true that Western 
contentiousness tends to identify and sharpen contradictions. In other cultures, and 
now in poststructural thought in the West, there is a greater inclination to entertain 
2 For an excellent introduction, see Angenot (1982).
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the possibility that two seemingly contradictory statements may both be true in 
some sense; for example, if a term is used metaphorically in one of the statements. 
Yang and yin in Chinese thought are complementaries, not opposites; ... Western 
thinking, beginning with the Greeks, has tended to polarize truth and fiction, good 
and bad, body and soul, conservative and liberal, and other such concepts, for the 
sake of clarity but often unnecessarily (Kennedy 1998, p. 206). 
In an attempt to delineate the phenomenon, Govier observes that polarizing 
discourse comes with our tendency to inflate a distinction into a dichotomy, 
to confuse contradictories (e.g., a / not a) and contraries, and to commit the 
error of contrariety by excluding a middle (e.g., safe / unsafe, wise / unwise, 
healthy / unhealthy). In what she calls a “slippery journey,” Govier proposes 
to differentiate between forms of distinction reaching all the way from dif-
ference to de-humanization. 
Difference 
Distinction 1(early exclusion)
Distinction 2 (exclusive disjunction)
Dichotomous framework 




This scalar method shows similarities with Ruth Amossy’s proposal for a 
modal conception of the argumentation that recognizes polemics. According 
to her, different positions can be defined along a continuum that goes from 
the co-construction of answers in the middle to the shock of antagonistic 
ideas at the far ends of the continuum. The arguments are the same, but they 
can appear in different modalities (Amossy 2014, pp. 54-55). 
This perspective, focusing on the way arguments are delivered, shows 
that polarization is not only a way of thinking, but a rhetorical strategy as 
well. We present ideas and arguments within a particular interpretation, per-
spective or action. We choose which opposition we will highlight and what 
solution we will present. For example, nationalist political discourse presents 
the national or regional identity as basic, creates an opposition between “us” 
and “them,” and suggests solutions that promote “us” and punish “them.” 
Thinking in binaries is one of our most fundamental cognitive struc-
tures, just as arguing along those lines determines the basic dynamics of 
argumentation in general. Scholars such as Christian Kock, Chantal Mouffe 
and Ruth Amossy endorse these structures when they stress the importance 
of conflict and opposition in the social and political field and argue that, de-
spite the risk of excess, conflict represents a constructive and vital dynamism 
in our democracy. The model of dialogue as a verbal exchange along the 
lines of rationality that aims at one party convincing the other and reaching 
a consensual solution is too limited (Kock 2009, p. 105, Amossy 2014, p. 
208). In a pluralistic democracy, differences and tensions should be voiced 
and heard, despite the utopian or theoretical ideal of consensus. Polemics 
are situated in the rhetoric of dissensus, where the existence of differences is 
considered not as a sign of failure, but rather as a fundamental characteristic 
of democratic functioning (Kock 2009, pp. 105-6, Amossy 2014, pp. 214-5). 
The Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe stresses the potentially 
positive aspects of certain forms of political conflict as an essential and con-
structive aspect of pluralist democracy. It is the aim of democratic politics to 
transform antagonism into agonism, so that the other is not an enemy but an ad-
versary. Chantal Mouffe rejects the model of deliberative democracy as it aims at 
a rational consensus in the public sphere. This consensus is impossible, because 
the idea is based on the negation of conflict as the essence of modern pluralism. 
Denying elements of conflict and passion denies the very nature of politics, 
thus creating not only political apathy but also the possibility of dangerous 
antagonisms that try to undermine democracy itself (Mouffe 2009, p. 8).3
So, when Bouazza writes in defense of polarization, he positions him-
self within a long and powerful (Western) tradition. Now the question is 
3 The dismissive attitude towards conflict is common in our own field as well. To quote 
just one arbitrary scholarly work – on the topic of dispute mediation: “Conflict is a 
problematic event, and as such, it needs to be managed. Also, it is natural to look for 
ways to resolve the conflict, because it undermines and endangers existing relationships. 
It triggers alliances and oppositions which polarize [!] the parties’ positions; it creates a 
situation of precarious rapport that may block any constructive initiative; and it focuses 
attention and energy on the parties’ reciprocal endeavour to hinder the realization of each 
other’s desires. … Yet human beings strongly desire not only to close conflict but also to 
have the possibility of saving valuable relationships and to live in a stable and friendly 
environment” (Greco Morasso 2011, pp. 14-15).
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why he feels the need to do so, why he passionately claims the right to 
camp near one end of the pole. I argue that Bouazza manages to defend the 
right to polarize and the need for dissensus and conflict, without however 
dropping the concept of rationality. By building a strong ethos, he is able to 
defend passionately a whole series of democratic values, and to reject other 
perspectives just as vehemently. In order to prove this point, I will analyze 
both Bouazza’s arguments and his ethos. 
No doubt Bouazza’s polarizing strategies can be connected to his 
ethos, i.e., his personal development and his public position on the one 
hand, and the way he presents himself in his literary and his polemical work 
on the other hand. This concept of ethos as presented by Ruth Amossy rec-
onciles the pragmatic viewpoint where all ethos is discursive and the socio-
logical perspective where discursive elements are nothing but the alibi of the 
“real” power battle that is going on elsewhere. Amossy proposes a rhetorical 
point of view, not least because the appeal to the audience and the process of 
persuasion play a significant role in the creation of ethos. The effectiveness 
of discourse is neither exclusively external (institution), nor purely internal 
(language), she claims, and it plays simultaneously at different levels. The 
discursive ethos cannot be cut off from the institutional position of the lo-
cutor, nor can discourse be cut off from social interaction in its symbolic 
exchange à la Bourdieu (Amossy 1999, p. 147).
Bouazza’s essays cannot be separated from his literary work, or from 
his personal history. The key to his polarizing strategies is to be found in the 
way he manages his triple ethos as a writer, a polemicist and a public figure.
A first and superficial rhetorical analysis of the Stowaway set of essays 
does not reveal any specific features or anomalies. Bouazza clearly plays his 
role as an intellectual and a writer who takes part in public discourse. His 
arguments concern the domain of politics, religion and culture, and his rhe-
torical strategies often consist in a questioning of prevailing lines of thought, 
proposing new perspectives and oppositions. 
The bulk of the seventy pages take on a wide public scope as it consists 
of book reviews, essays and columns. In one way or another, they all display 
a well-documented, engaged, often satirical and ironical plea against reli-
gious fundamentalism, misogyny, and all sorts of orthodoxy and repression. 
Bouazza favors reason, language, freedom of speech, imagination, individual 
responsibility and diversity. Without any doubt, most of this intellectual 
work comes down to the impassioned and sustained defense of free speech.
The case for free speech: Politics
Time and again, Bouazza warns his fellow Dutchmen that their comfortable 
belief in the power of rationality and human goodwill denies the agonism 
and the conflicts that mark the political sphere. For example, he blames 
the leftist political parties for treating muslims as noble savages that form a 
“perfect screen on which to project their own meekness and understanding” 
(Bouazza 2011, p. 292). He rejects the politically correct interpretation of 
terms such as diversity because politics should not be confused with mor-
als. He claims the right to ridicule a project called In Praise of Diversity by 
bluntly stating that the distribution of poems in 48 languages will not have 
any effect on the promotion of mutual understanding between different cul-
tures (p. 320).
Bouazza’s main argument against politically correct discourse is the 
elementary right to free speech as a basic achievement of enlightenment and 
an indispensable condition for democracy. Politics is to be interpreted in its 
agonistic sense, and freedom of expression guarantees debate and the con-
stant reinterpretation of any issue. It is remarkable how Bouazza stresses the 
Western principles of free speech and democracy again and again, wonder-
ing why Westerners seem to have forgotten the very values that this new-
comer so dearly appreciates. 
Bouazza claims the right to speak up and call the oppositions and 
conflicts by their names, in the name of political freedom. According to him, 
conflicts should be recognized before they can be tackled, and argument is 
no pathology but rather a means of communication. Bouazza refers to po-
litical, cultural and economic history in order to reveal the complex relation 
between disappearing and emerging conflicts. The wish for peace does not 
absolve one from recognizing the multiple appearances of political conflict, 
Bouazza claims. And when minorities create conflict in their desire to change 
inequality and injustice, this conflict may very well carry the positive-sound-
ing name of revolution and make its way into the official history books. 
Bouazza understands the righteous concerns about right-wing pop-
ulist discourse, but he refuses to let anybody set the terms of the debate.4 
4 Indeed, one might wonder whether it is actually possible to agree upon them. To give one 
example: in his study of manipulative racist propaganda techniques Manfred Kienpointner 
judges right-wing populists by the content of their standpoints, for example the call for 
capital punishment or for repatriation of legal immigrants, or by the fact that their arguments 
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Figures such as hyperbole or metaphor are very familiar and popular tropes 
in many kinds of discourse (Ritter 2012, p. 407, Angenot 1982, p. 254), and 
in his arguments rejecting polarization warnings and paralyzing paternalism 
Bouazza does claim the unconditional right to use them. Likewise, he could 
not be more explicit in his argument on the Theo Van Gogh murder than 
when he bluntly declares that the profile of a victim never ever excuses crim-
inal acts (Bouazza 2011, p. 286). 
When confronted with the increase of “hate speech” in the public 
sphere,5 Bouazza argues in his defense that he stands by his basic right to free 
speech as long as he takes responsibility for his words and does not incite 
people to harm or kill others:
Of course it’s not a bad idea to reflect before you say something. But I think: even 
the sharpest comment should be possible, as long as there’s no call for violence – 
that is most important. What is the alternative? Should we cosily hold each other’s 
hands and treat one another with plain silky respect and subservience? That is 
outrageous! (Geels 2011).
He is more concerned with dissecting current topics than with attacking 
particular people, and as such he sees a difference between vital political 
polemics and hate speech that runs wild in excessive enemy construction. 
Interestingly, at some point Bouazza himself recognizes the roles of 
both style and argument when he explains how Hirsi Ali is caught in a dou-
ble bind between Muslims who attack her arguments and Western politi-
cians who blame her for her polemical style. 
only mention the negative effects of immigration. Stylistic techniques that distinguish racist 
populist discourse are the use of “emotionally exciting language, for example, hyperbolic 
exaggerations” (Kienpointner 2005, p. 226), or metaphors like “invasion” and “flood” that 
“arouse dangerous emotions such as fear and hate” (p. 229). This example reveals how 
problematic it is to pin down and condemn right-wing populist discourse: Kienpointner’s 
arguments and his references to alleged manipulative techniques do not really observe his 
own caveats, which warn against the begging-the-question fallacy in assuming that right-wing 
populism is a dubious, dangerous and irrational tradition, or against the straw man fallacy, 
while blotting out the evident fact that “populist techniques of persuasion have even been 
used within the whole political spectrum, from the far right to the far left” (pp. 214-215). 
5 This term is coined by Judith Butler (2007).
Ayaan Hirsi Ali is caught between two fires. Muslims want to impose on her what 
to say, the ladies and gentlemen of politics want to command her how to express 
herself (Bouazza 2011, p. 290).
He keeps insisting on the opposition between the “meek Dutch” who un-
derestimate the problem and downsize the problems of intercultural society 
to matters of style, and fanatical Muslims who entirely reject the democratic 
principle of free speech. His opinion is as clear as it is ambitious: the “meek 
Dutch” should be more fanatical about their democratic principles, the fa-
natical Muslims should embrace free speech and democracy, and he himself 
should definitely have the right to say so. Bouazza shows that the opposition 
is not only a matter of style, but also the reflection of a fundamental conflict 
between religious thinking and democratic politics.
The case for free speech: Religion
Next to politics, one of Bouazza’s key topics is, understandably, religion. 
Many articles in the collection reject all forms of religious fundamentalism 
(not only the Muslim type) as “monolithic,” i.e., having no place for differ-
ent perspectives or debate. The opening quote of the “Noble Savages” article 
is followed by the remark that “If anything should be called polarizing, then 
it is the sectarian character of Islam, with its virulent, excluding monoper-
ception of Allah” (p. 292). This exemplifies Bouazza’s recurring reflection 
that some Muslims tend to adopt the terms of the “meek Dutch” in order 
to explain away their own stubbornness. The idea that Westerners fail to see 
how Islamic fundamentalism attacks the foundational principles of democ-
racy – similar to a predator that pretends to be a prey – dominates the collec-
tion: “Why should the obstinacy of Muslims be seen as loyalty to a religion, 
while the defense of Western values should be considered racist?” (p. 298).
Bouazza reviews much work that brings him to this topic. For exam-
ple, his review of God Against the Gods (Jonathan Kirsch), a historical work 
about the evolution from polytheism to monotheism, gives him the chance 
to promote diversity as the basis of paganism or polytheism, and to contrast 
the gentle pagans to the rigorous and misogynic Christian monotheists in 
the ages before the fifth century A.D. “The core of paganism or polytheism 
is diversity,” Bouazza concludes (p. 257). 
A biography of Mohammed serves as an occasion to condemn reli-
gion as a desire for myths and to celebrate science and the quest for facts. 
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The review then evolves further into a plea for question marks, but also for 
literature – apparently Mohammed is a frustrated poet – for irony, for crit-
icism and jest (p. 284): “Believers will take care of themselves. Only skepti-
cism, curiosity and doubt lead us, other mortals, further. And let’s not forget 
humor” (p. 270). The author clearly defends the enlightenment ideas that 
consider religion to be a personal and private matter. 
Gender issues are treated in a most expressive way, as in Bouazza’s de-
fense of Ayaan Hirsi Ali and her right to attack Islam, or in his fulminations 
against macho-imams: 
It is a travesty to think that the Netherlands, or Ayaan Hirsi Ali, or Theo van Gogh 
are responsible for the radicalization of the Islam (p. 286).
Ambassadors of Islamic countries complain to Gerrit Zalm that Ayaan Hirsi Ali 
‘doesn’t handle carefully the right to free speech.’ Of course not, for Islamists 
this right is only to be handled ‘carefully’ in order to rage against gentiles, Jews, 
Christians, women, homosexuals and dissidents (to macho-imams these are all 
synonyms) (pp. 290-291).
Bouazza plainly calls Islamic extremism a worldwide phenomenon that com-
bines totalitarian ideology with masculine aggression, and concludes with a 
merry recital of wishes in a salutation to Ayaan: “long live you, long live 
womanhood, long live free speech, long live jest, long live verbal anarchy” 
(pp. 286-289). 
The main argument in this refutation is again freedom of speech, 
thinking and religion, as this symbolizes civil society in the light of the 
American and French Revolutions. In his attacks on Islamic fundamental-
ism, Bouazza time and again invokes the roots of Western democracy that 
encompasses the possibility of change through debate, calling for a sepa-
ration of the religious and political domains. The archaic wording of the 
very book title is not without meaning in this context, as Heathenish Joy: 
Pondering and Chant explicitly evokes the old times of religious suppression 
in the West. As such, Western history is strategically linked to contemporary 
Muslim regimes in order to remind Westerners of their own (former) strug-
gle with religious institutions and repression.
Bouazza tries to persuade his fellow Dutchmen that the most impor-
tant aspect of the diversity question is public and political. He dismisses the 
dominant view that reduces the discussion to “essential” differences between 
cultural or religious groups, redirecting it towards the political domain, 
where dominant patterns of argument can be questioned again and again, 
and where the struggle for different social groups to make themselves heard 
should be considered part of the political enterprise. 
The case for free speech: culture, language and literature
Intercultural references. The third argument in Bouazza’s refutation of “politi-
cally correct thinking” concerns the domain of culture, language and litera-
ture, i.e., the domain where most of his work is situated. Again, free expres-
sion serves as a basic argument, this time presented as a plea for a colorful 
individual patchwork of styles, genres and cultural references. The book 
shows a substantial cultural and literary breadth. Bouazza presents elaborate 
reviews and essays on, e.g., Nabokov, Shakespeare, Wagner, on musicals such 
as Moulin Rouge, and in those various topics more often than not we see 
intercultural associations emerge. 
In the “Stowaway of Emigration” pieces suggestive and striking pas-
sages evoke the literary power of the author: “I quickly zapped away: the 
fragment gave me the spiritual equivalent of a swig of beer from a can that 
has been used as an ashtray” (p. 292). The reference to the sins of smoking 
and drinking in this metaphor that expresses his disgust with politically cor-
rect polarization warnings is clever and effective. Note that “Noble savages,” 
the title of this piece, is a playful reference to the rich cultural tradition of 
fascination for the primitive and exotic, as displayed by authors such as Jean-
Jacques Rousseau, Daniel Defoe, John Dryden, James F. Cooper and Henry 
W. Longfellow, to name but a few. Not surprisingly, similar intercultural 
references and associations appear in Bouazza’s literary works. To give but 
one example:
Like a Bridal Veil we Children followed the Crowd of Women that my Mother 
with Abdullah in her Hands led towards the Mosque: I can’t express the narcotic 
magnificence of the moment any better than with the use of Teutonic capitals 
(1996, p. 34).
This “Teutonic” way of evoking the otherwise very Moroccan setting of this 
story is but one of Bouazza’s many ways to play with cultural references and 
mix perspectives.
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Overall, the reception of Bouazza’s literary work has been positive; 
he has received several prizes6 and has appeared on prestigious cultural TV 
shows such as Zomergasten (Summer Guests). Critics praise his sensual, flow-
ery and baroque style that reveals his love for exuberant language and multi-
ple perspectives (Louwerse 2007, pp. 37-39). Bouazza’s essays definitely have 
a more polemical and polarizing style. It would be misleading to say that 
the openness and diversity of Bouazza’s literary work simply counterbalance 
his sharp statements elsewhere, but it does make sense to identify the stance 
of an author who proclaims the power of language to be the centre of his 
intellectual life and who concentrates his political arguments around the 
principles of free speech.7
 This double focus can enrich our conception of Bouazza’s ethos and 
our understanding of his polarizing strategies.
Bouazza’s arguments 
Hafid Bouazza’s debut collection of short stories was published in 1996, and 
from that very moment he shows irritation for the way he is being typecast 
by critics and academics. He refuses to play an exemplary role in accordance 
with the new ideal of the so-called multicultural society.
I write because I want to write, not because I aim to further intercultural relations. 
Get over it. And I certainly don’t write because I feel a spokesperson for second-
generation migrants. I am not a social worker. Does a Dutch author write in the 
name of others? (Louwerse 2007, p. 15).
6 In 1996 he was awarded the E. du Perron prize for De voeten van Abdullah. In 2003 he 
was awarded the Amsterdamprijs voor de Kunsten. In 2004 he received De Gouden Uil for his 
novel Paravion.
7 The suggested interaction between literary and non-literary work aligns with Alain 
Lempereur’s notion of the two separate domains within the study of rhetoric: one that 
focuses on literature and cherishes constant rupture and innovation, while another 
emphasizes persuasion and efficiency and cherishes constant identity (Lempereur, 1990). 
The former fosters the original and the marginal, the latter goes for the stereotypical. As 
both domains suffer from this restriction, Lempereur proposes that theories of literature 
should not deny the reference to the topical, while theories of persuasive rhetoric 
should not aim exclusively at closure but rather leave enough room for innovation and 
questioning.
Personal history has nothing to do with art, he claims, and it is neither a 
driving force nor an excuse for success, even if the stories of his debut col-
lection are set in Bertollo, the actual Moroccan village he left with his fam-
ily in 1977. He refuses the label “migrant writer” and ridicules the literary 
establishment for its biographical obsession and its fixation on the exotic: 
“A French writer is somebody that writes in French, an immigrant writer is 
somebody that writes in Immigrantese, and a Dutch writer is somebody that 
writes in Dutch” (Bouazza, NRC-Handelsblad 21-6-96). And indeed, while 
at first some critics interpret his unique baroque and archaic style as a remi-
niscence of Arab poetry, others soon take to criticizing this view (Anbeek 
2002). Hans Goedkoop ridicules its paternalism: “We take the Dutch for 
something exotic, tremendously fascinating and we pay the author a compli-
ment because as a non-native he is so charmingly different” (p. 39).
Even more significantly, in her outstanding study on the reception of 
Bouazza’s literary work Henriëtte Louwerse stresses the fact that Bouazza’s 
style and perspective are actually based on the Dutch art movement De Tach-
tigers, known to many Dutchmen for the statement by Willem Kloos that 
“art is the most individual expression of the most individual emotion.” Ac-
cording to her, this absolute fascination with language, individual expression 
and imagination, far from everyday worries, is what constitutes Bouazza’s 
real homeland (pp. 48-49).
In 2001, Bouazza was selected to write the national Dutch boeken-
weekgeschenk (the CPNB Book Week Present): a commissioned essay with 
the theme “Country of Origin: Writing between Two Cultures.” The most 
famous quote from Een beer in bontjas (“A Bear in Fur”) goes: 
If I were to believe most critics, I am a Moroccan writer. But I don’t believe most 
critics. According to other, benevolent people I am a Moroccan-Dutch writer. 
However, this signification sounds uncomfortable. It walks at the same time in 
a slipper and a clog – quite a tricky way of walking! Then there are the careful 
people who aim at integration (they are a minority), for whom I fabricated the title 
D.A.M.D.D.N. (Dutch Author of Moroccan Descent with Dutch Nationality). 
This is socially speaking the only correct signification, but it prevents you from 
making friends. It sounds like a rare disease. The D.A.M.D.D.N. syndrome. You 
don’t walk into the pub with it (2001, p. 49).
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An author finds inspiration for his subjects and style in art and literature, not 
in his personal background or social, religious, sexual or racial circumstanc-
es – that was Bouazza’s claim at that time. Individual maturation, creative 
imagination and artistic freedom are to guarantee an escape from compul-
sory classification. However, as Louwerse observes:
Hafid Bouazza’s strategy in Een beer in bontjas is characteristically paradoxical: he 
writes an autobiography in order to emphasize that the author’s life-story is irrelevant 
when it comes to producing or reading literature (Louwerse 2007, p. 227).
Indeed, the interplay between the role(s) he is expected to assume and the 
strategies he develops to resist is more complex than one would assume at 
first sight. The strict line between the literary and the extra-literary cannot 
be drawn all that clearly, and Bouazza cannot really escape his role of “mi-
grant writer.” In 2002, shortly after the publication of Een beer in bontjas, 
he enters the public scene and engages in a “full-fledged genre of public 
discourse” that goes under the name of “debating diversity” (Blommaert and 
Verschueren 1998, p. 11). He gives up the embargo on his private identity 
and tries to find a new way to challenge his readers in their perception of 
him as both an insider and an outsider to “their” culture. This did not go 
unnoticed; in November 2011, for example, Bouazza won the Scalpel 2011 
prize for his polemics about the Arab Spring.
According to Louwerse, Bouazza’s essays differ considerably from his 
literary work, both in topic and in tone. She claims: “Despite of his sharp 
statements in his political publications, in his literary texts he resists the 
need to reduce multicultural tensions to unambiguous oppositions” (Lou-
werse 2008, p. 10). It is remarkable that there seems to be an inconsistency 
between Bouazza’s literary and non-literary work. A closer look at Louwerse’s 
appreciation of his literary work, however, rather reveals a striking similarity 
between the literary and political issues: “Much of Bouazza’s writing fore-
grounds communication gaps – between orient and occident, between man 
and woman, between animal and man, between reality and the imagination, 
between oppositional places, between character and narrator.” (Louwerse 
2007, p. 96) If anything, Bouazza in his polemical work tries to define these 
communication gaps as clearly and explicitly as possible. Also the notion of 
the preconceived ideas and stereotypical expectations is mentioned:
Bouazza playfully exploits cultural expectations by painting an Arab setting which 
echoes the one-dimensional Western views of the Arab world … What had initially 
seemed a ‘safe’ opposition between us and them, is now revisited upon the readers 
as a confrontation with their own preconceived ideas (p. 231).
In “A Stowaway of Emigration,” time and again, Bouazza warns his readers 
about their preconceived ideas and their “Noble-Wild” projections. Louw-
erse perfectly captures Bouazza’s rhetorical strategies when she describes his 
literary work in polemical terms: “What appears to start off as an exposure of 
cultural opposites … evolves into a literary attack on the notion of unified, 
homogenous societies or cultures” (p. 233).
From the start, Bouazza refuses to follow the standard course of the 
political debate and develops a personal way of thinking and writing. In his 
public life, time and again he takes up the defense of free speech, argumen-
tation, imagination, style play, humor, education, and individual matura-
tion. He rejects religious and political fundamentalism in general (not just 
Islamic fundamentalism) and the excesses of fear and naiveté that go with it. 
Misogyny and all kinds of orthodoxy are disapproved of, as well as literary 
norms and stylistic restrictions. To Bouazza, imagination and argumentation 
do not exclude one another. His literary and polemical writings are closely 
connected and intertwined: they frame and reinforce one another. The right 
to develop both imagination and argumentation could be considered to be 
the basic tenor of his ethos. 
Throughout all of his work, Bouazza shows his audience that open-
ness towards the diversity of cultures and literatures does not stand on its 
own, but has a political dimension as well. It is no coincidence that he con-
nects his very personal intellectual and cultural life with the fundamental 
concept of democracy. His own history reveals that “the basic biological fact 
of diversity” is part of the condition humaine (Blommaert and Verschueren 
1998, p. 14). He is fully aware of the decision to enter the political debate 
and try to find ways out of the prevailing polarizations that classify people 
into certain groups with certain fixed features that promote homogeneity as 
the norm and makes diversity a problem (p. 117). 
Conclusion
Louwerse’s earlier remark that Bouazza’s political work is characterized by 
“sharp statements” and “unambiguous oppositions” needs reservations, I 
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suggest. The rhetorical construct Bouazza presents in his non-literary work 
shows clear oppositions indeed, but they are oppositions of a specific kind: 
they draw the sharp line between fixity and repression on the one hand and 
political freedom and imagination on the other hand. This corresponds to 
Louwerse’s appreciation of Bouazza’s literary work as a constant challenge 
of comfortable identities and a powerful confirmation of hybrid positions, 
movement and interaction. 
Opposing versions of the truth do not cancel each other out. In Bouazza’s works, 
the representation of the ‘real’ has also come unhinged, and this reality is engaged 
in a ceaseless struggle against the desire for a fixed, fossilized reality that believes in 
the essential, in the absolute, in purity and authenticity. Undermining that belief is 
the essence of Bouazza’s writing (Louwerse 2007, p. 233).
Bouazza’s literary work is marked by the shifting and energizing of existing 
polarizations; in his non-literary work, he reveals the political conditions that 
make the shiftings possible. In this light, it is perfectly possible to read Louw-
erse’s comment on his literary work as an evocation of his political program: 
“His work is a study of sustained opposition, but at the same time, an engage-
ment with the underlying assumptions of these same oppositions. Interpreta-
tive closure or unity is not an option. Fixity is there to be squashed.” (p. 76)
While Bouazza “squashes fixity” in his literary work by presenting a 
multitude of interpretations and shifts, in his polemical work he aims at the 
same target by revealing and safeguarding the very borders of this freedom 
of expression. His well-argued pleas for reason, freedom of speech, imagina-
tion, individual responsibility and diversity show that he wants the public 
domain to be rich and diverse. That is why he draws a sharp line between all 
kinds of fundamentalism and the politics of free speech.
Bouazza clearly endorses a concept of democracy that accepts dissensus 
and a concept of language that embraces polemics. This does not mean that 
his occasional harsh rhetoric should be interpreted as blind aggression or 
incitement to violence. Far from it. By pursuing related themes across differ-
ent contexts, he manages to build a powerful ethos. In light of this ethos, my 
analysis of his polarization strategies has brought to the fore that Bouazza’s 
polarization practices and his passionate plea for free speech reflect a deep 
involvement with the Dutch language, a commitment to very diverse audi-
ences, and a sustained creativity in the fostering of mutual understanding. 
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Extending Civic Rhetoric: Valuing 
Rhetorical Dimensions of Global 
Citizenship in Civic Education
R E B E C C A A .  KU E H L
In a March 8, 2011 article in the New York Times, columnist David Brooks 
writes about “the new humanism.” He explains that a new body of research 
provides additional insight into humanity: that “emotions assign value to 
things and are the basis of reason,” and that “we are social animals, deeply 
interpenetrated with one another, who emerge out of relationships” (2011, 
p. A27). This essay builds on the idea of “new humanism,” positing that 
civic rhetoric1 could benefit from a rhetorical view of global citizenship2 in 
1 Civic rhetoric is sometimes used to refer to classical accounts of rhetorical or speech 
education, but I see the terms as mostly interchangeable, depending on the context. Civic 
rhetoric describes a specific area of scholarship, whereas rhetorical or speech education tends 
to focus on the practices of how rhetorical scholars specifically teach students the necessary 
skills to enact citizenship. I use rhetorical or speech education interchangeably in this essay, 
since the terms are used differently based on historical context. See: Gehrke 2009. 
2 I purposefully use global citizenship, and not concepts such as cosmopolitanism, world 
citizenship, or transnational citizenship. Historically, global citizenship is a concept that 
evolved from philosophies of cosmopolitanism and world citizenship; see: Carter 2001. 
Because I am concerned with civic rhetoric and teaching rhetorical strategies for practice 
in citizenship, I use global citizenship as a concept and a practice. Additionally, I do not 
use transnational citizenship, a common turn in cultural and feminist studies, because I 
am concerned with conceptualizing citizenship not primarily through the state or territory, 
but instead through social belonging. For an analysis of the characteristics of transnational 
activism, see: Keck and Sikkink 1998, pp. 8-16. Transnational citizenship theorists 
are often concerned with keeping the nation-state intact when analyzing international 
activism, especially with international funding mechanisms and organizations such as 
the United Nations or World Bank. In contrast, I am more concerned with thinking 
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extending the practices of rhetorical education. This perspective describes 
how human beings identify with one another through different emotional 
attachments, developing a sense of social belonging to be able to work to-
gether to address shared global problems. 
Civic rhetoric falls under the larger umbrella of civic education; edu-
cation has a goal to prepare students to become citizens. Gerard A. Hauser 
explains the concept of civic rhetoric and its role in civic education: “[Rhe-
torical scholars] also have a birthright: rhetoric’s role in civic education. That 
role is not just in the public performance of political discourse but in the 
education of young minds that prepares them to perform their citizenship” 
(2004, p. 52). Civic rhetoric is a specific component of civic education, 
focusing on teaching skills such as critical thinking, speaking, and writing. 
Within the area of civic rhetoric, rhetorical scholars often concern 
themselves with more specific questions of rhetorical citizenship. William 
Keith and Paula Cossart define rhetorical citizenship as a “set of communica-
tive and deliberative practices that in a particular culture and political system 
allow citizens to enact and embody their citizenship, in contrast to practices 
that are merely ‘talking about’ politics” (2012, p. 46). Such a view neces-
sarily includes embodiment and enactment, which are often connected to 
emotions.3 Rhetorical citizenship is contingent on arousing people’s emotion 
beyond the nation-state, specifically through relationships grounded in social belonging. 
For an analysis of this shift away from cosmopolitan or world citizenship and toward 
global citizenship as conceptualized through global connections and a commitment to the 
collective good, see: Rhoads and Szelényi 2011, pp. 22-27. 
3 In this essay, emotions and passions are synonymous, because they are often used in 
contrast to reason and rationality. The difference in usage is often because of historical 
context. Philip Fisher suggests that it is only through the modern turn (and the split of 
what is now called psychology from philosophy) that passions have been replaced by the 
term emotion: “We can see in mid-eighteenth-century English philosophy and rhetoric 
the banishing of the term ‘passion’ and its replacement by the new term ‘emotion’” (2002, 
p. 6). For a book length study of this transition from passions in philosophy to emotion 
in psychology, see: Dixon 2003. Rhetorical scholar Daniel M. Gross does not differentiate 
between affect, emotion, or passions: “Theory can meaningfully differentiate between 
different affects (or passions, or emotions) and even between different instances of the same 
affect, by way of history…” (2006, p. 9). Gross seems to see these concepts as generally 
meaning the same idea; they are used as different terms based on the historical context. 
about political issues: “People become engaged [in politics] because issues 
touch their lives” (Hauser 1998, p. 51). A fully developed understanding 
of civic rhetoric should involve analyzing the interaction of emotion with 
reason, whether the idea of civic rhetoric is based on civic republicanism or 
civic liberalism as the political philosophy underpinning civic education. 
Daniel M. Gross writes that scholars in the humanities rarely turn to the rhe-
torical tradition when analyzing emotions (2006, p. 9). In conceptualizing 
global citizenship, a rhetorical perspective analyzes the role of emotional at-
tachments, such as feelings of concern or trust, in how activist groups reach 
people around the globe, often across identity differences such as culture, 
religion, ethnicity, and nationality.
To support the claim that rhetorical scholars should extend civic rheto-
ric to include global citizenship, this essay proceeds in four parts. In analyzing 
civic education, I first evaluate the lack of analysis of emotion in two political 
philosophies, civic republicanism and civic liberalism, that often undergird 
civic education itself. I then show how the civic rhetoric tradition has often re-
lied on national understandings of citizenship. Third, to remedy this emphasis 
on the nation, I recommend adding global citizenship to the civic rhetoric 
tradition, as both a concept and a practice. Finally, I suggest two rhetorical 
dimensions to global citizenship: emotional attachments and social belonging. 
Analyzing reason in civic education
Civic education can be connected to two different political philosophies that 
explain citizenship and its practice: civic republicanism and civic liberalism.4 
I briefly analyze examples in each tradition that emphasize reason to the det-
For example, Aristotle wrote about “passions,” David Hume wrote about “emotion” 
and “sentiment,” and 20th and 21st century theorists write about “affect,” but they are all 
working with a similar meaning, that these concepts indicate intuitive modes of feeling 
with others. For a summary of some of the current approaches in rhetorical studies 
regarding the study of affect and emotion, see: Condit, 2013, pp. 3-5. 
4 I do not address democratic theory writ large or democratic deliberation here, for the 
purposes of focusing on the different strains of citizenship crucial to understanding civic 
rhetoric and how citizenship is taught to students in rhetoric classrooms. Democratic 
deliberation is often included in these discussions as an important part of the process of 
rhetorical education, and democratic deliberation itself is often grounded in a political 
philosophy of civic liberalism or civic republicanism. 
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riment of a full analysis of emotion in articulating citizenship. Because civic 
rhetoric is a component of civic education, civic rhetoric scholars should 
consider emotional attachments in addition to reason or rationality, espe-
cially since emotions are an important characteristic of how and why people 
become motivated to take action on a given issue. 
Generally, civic republicanism conceptualizes citizenship as a practice 
(see: Longaker 2007, p. 6; Peterson 2009, p. 57; Peterson 2011, p. 3). Civic 
republicanism focuses on the characteristics and interests shared by indi-
viduals in a community. Some scholars assert that civic republicanism is 
communitarian (see: Longaker 2007, p. 212; Oldfield 1990, p. 145; Olsen 
2006, p. 1), while others keep these two ideas distinct, preferring to compare 
communitarianism to liberalism more generally as two sides of a continuum 
(see: Boyte 2003, p. 86; Peterson 2011, p. 9; Vandenberg 2000, p. 9; Voet 
1998, p. 133). Erik J. Olsen explains that “republicanism,” “neorepublican-
ism,” “communitarian republicanism,” and “civic republicanism” all refer to 
the various theories of virtue and community that emerged in the 1980s as 
a critique of civic liberalism as a political philosophy that emphasized the 
“rights, interests, and choices of the individual” (2006, p. 1). Both civic 
republicanism and communitarianism emphasize the social aspect of citi-
zenship yet do not elaborate on the emotional connections we share with 
others as part of what motivates us to care and to eventually take action.5 
For example, Adrian Oldfield asserts that “civic faiths, when they are devised 
with intent and consciously propagated, are not effective in encouraging a 
rational commitment to a practice of citizenship” (1990, p. 154). Rationality 
becomes a defining characteristic of civic republicanism. 
In contrast, civic liberalism values the different characteristics of indi-
viduals and individual motivation in political and social issues. Reason and 
rationality become important to the exclusion of emotion in any discussion 
on civic liberalism, likely because of this tradition’s connection to Immanuel 
Kant’s universal reason (Peterson, 2009, p. 60). Andrew Peterson explains 
civic liberalism in terms of rationality: “Based on the understanding of indi-
viduals as able to rationally choose and revise their own ends, liberals have 
advanced a negative understanding of freedom in terms of non-interference” 
(2011, p. 11). In the classical civic rhetoric tradition, civic rhetoric entails 
building the individual’s capacity for political involvement, especially the 
5 See especially Gerard A. Hauser’s scholarship for an important exception to this claim. 
capacities of reason and speech (Jackson 2007, p. 185; Walzer 2007, pp. 
271-72). Indeed, most traditions of civic rhetoric tend to operate with the 
assumption that reason is one of the most important capacities to cultivate 
in individual citizens.6 Reason is an important capacity for public discourse; 
however, the civic rhetoric tradition’s understanding of reason needs to be 
supplemented with a rich analysis of the role of emotion.
Both the civic republican and civic liberal perspectives tend to use the 
language of rationality and reason to define citizenship. Civic empathy, the 
ability to feel what others feel in becoming engaged citizens, has “received 
little critical attention to date” in the scholarship of civic education (Peter-
son 2009, p. 62). Some rhetorical scholars view emotion as a problem for 
public discourse and communicating about the world’s problems (Jackson 
2007, p. 190). In studying the history of speech education, discussion move-
ments relied on certain principles of reasoning that held reason above emo-
tion (Gehrke 2009, p. 42; Keith 2007, p. 158). Civic education – and in 
turn civic rhetoric – has not yet given sufficient attention to how emotional 
attachments play a key role in persuading citizens to interact with strangers 
to resolve global problems.
Reason and emotion are not separate, but shape one another. This is 
not a novel argument for rhetorical studies; theories of persuasion have long 
acknowledged that commitment cannot come from reason alone. For ex-
ample, many teachers of public speaking reference the Aristotelian appeal of 
pathos in evaluating persuasive appeals. However, the political philosophies 
that undergird civic education, and in turn civic rhetoric, have investments 
in rational approaches to citizenship rather than accounting for emotion. 
Since emotional attachments are important to cultivating social belonging, 
rhetorical citizenship scholars should more fully analyze how emotion works 
to motivate people to practice citizenship, and civic rhetoric seems especially 
well-suited to this task.
Extending the civic rhetoric tradition to global issues
Most scholarship on civic education, of which civic rhetoric is an important 
component, relies on national understandings of citizenship that exclude 
6 One exception is Hauser’s scholarship, which tends to give equal attention to emotion 
in addition to reason in any rhetorical analysis of public discourse. See especially: Hauser 
1999, 51; 2004, 41.
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global issues. Scholarship about civic education is mostly centered on na-
tion-states or nationalism (Longaker 2007, p. xii; Vandenberg 2000, p. 15), 
rather than a more comprehensive view of citizenship in a global setting. For 
example, Peterson outlines civic education programs in England, Australia, 
Canada, and the United States (2011, pp. 25-29). However, he approaches 
each program on a national level, instead of highlighting global concerns. 
Most civic rhetoric scholars also emphasize civic education on a local, state, 
or national level, but fail to take citizenship to its next logical step – the glob-
al. Mark Garrett Longaker writes: “Academics are encouraged to research 
public issues, to design classes that engage national, state, and local com-
munities, to teach students responsible democratic citizenship” (2007, p. xi). 
Such a focus on the national, state, and local is important, but so is teach-
ing students that many issues extend beyond these scales. Conceptualizing 
global citizenship as an outgrowth of these other types of citizenship, and 
inclusive of these other types of citizenship (Nussbaum and Cohen 1996, p. 
135), can be a productive move in helping students understand how to take 
action on issues that have global causes and consequences. 
Young people’s ability to articulate their ideas to others is one of the 
most important skills in producing citizens who engage the world. Civic 
rhetoric is a vital component of civic education, since discourse, discussion, 
and debate are fundamental to active citizenship (Peterson 2009, pp. 56, 
67). Cheryl Glenn writes that “rhetorical education enables people to engage 
in and change American society” (2004, p. viii). Indeed, civic rhetoric gener-
ally involves the tradition of teaching students the skills and basic concepts 
of persuasion and the art of argumentation, so that students are enabled to 
participate, criticize, and engage in public life. Longaker suggests that the 
“civic turn” in rhetoric signifies a move in research, theory, and teaching to 
promote public discourse, where citizens come together to communicate 
over shared concerns (2007, p. xii). 
Historically, civic rhetoric scholars often derive their approach from 
two traditions – a classical and a more recent historical tradition in the Unit-
ed States, which originates from the colonial era. Rhetoric has long been 
connected to the civic republican tradition, especially because of its classi-
cal roots in Greek and Roman history (Arthos 2007, p. 198), including the 
work of Isocrates, and Cicero and Quintilian, respectively (Walzer 2007, p. 
271). Specifically, the Greek tradition, paideia, includes the instruction of 
the Sophists, as well as Aristotle (Jackson 2007, p. 183). Greek paideia means 
that instructors have the goal of helping students lead the lives of active, 
engaged, and responsible citizens (Hauser 2004, p. 40). 
In contrast, some scholars have outlined a more recent history of 
speech education in the United States and its role in cultivating citizens dur-
ing the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries.7 Speech education in the United States, 
especially during the 20th century, served nationalistic purposes in further-
ing American democracy and government (Gehrke 2009, p. 43). Rhetorical 
scholars should be aware of civic rhetoric’s ideological past (Longaker 2007, 
pp. xx, 216), and especially its history in contributing to wartime propa-
ganda during the 20th century (Gehrke 2009, p. 34). Aware of that past, 
scholars should extend the tradition of speech education outward, beyond 
the nation-state. Global citizenship is not a necessary extension of ideologi-
cally-focused or nationalist perspectives on civic education. However, global 
perspectives help complicate the history of speech education for students, 
through bringing in examples from other cultures, places, and contexts and 
relating those examples to their own lives. 
Global citizenship as a concept and a practice
I suggest that global citizenship, as a concept and a practice, is useful in ex-
tending the civic rhetoric tradition. Robert A. Rhoads and Katalin Szelényi 
note that global citizenship has not been clearly defined (2011, p. 22), but 
explain that their view of the concept “incorporates both local/national aware-
ness with a growing sense of the interconnectedness of all nation-states and 
the importance of forging common ties and connections in terms of global 
rights and responsibilities” (p. 26). Although Rhoads and Szelényi’s definition 
of global citizenship is still connected to the nation-state, the emphasis on in-
terconnectedness and the importance of rights and responsibilities concerning 
all human beings is helpful in defining global citizenship. They go on to cre-
ate a chart that details different types of citizenship, using locally and globally 
informed on the x axis and individualist and collectivist on the y axis. Global 
citizenship, for them, is the globally informed collectivist (p. 27). 
While I applaud Rhoads and Szelényi’s efforts to create different ty-
pologies for citizenship in higher education (2011, p. 27), a rhetorical view 
7 For recent histories of the relationship between the discipline of speech communication, 
now known as communication studies, and citizenship, see: Denman 2004; Gehrke 2009; 
Keith 2007. 
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of global citizenship is more complex. For example, let us analyze a woman 
who participates with others in a local food share program, through pur-
chasing food from a farm located just outside her city. By participating with 
others in the food share, this is clearly a collectivist action. We might be 
quick to say that this woman is practicing global citizenship, because she is 
acting in a socially responsible way that shows she is globally aware – that her 
consumption affects others around the world. However, maybe she is also 
acting as a locally informed citizen. Perhaps another motivation for partici-
pating in the food share is because she likes the taste of locally grown food, 
because it is fresher than food at the grocery store that travels hundreds of 
miles. In talking to other citizens about her reasons for participating in the 
food share, her advocacy is more complex than simply local or global. In 
analyzing her rhetorical citizenship, or how she communicates with others 
to persuade them to participate in this food share, we must be careful not 
to oversimplify her motivations. In this case, the woman would be a locally 
and globally informed citizen in choosing to participate in and advocate for 
a food share. This case would not fit neatly into Rhoads and Szelényi’s chart 
(p. 27). Because of the complexity of people’s actions, and multiple reasons 
for those actions, global citizenship is probably too difficult to categorize in 
such a narrow typology. 
Global citizenship can be conceptualized as a specific type of rhe-
torical citizenship, and can include numerous local and/or global issues that 
span nation-states. For example, some human rights groups use the concept 
to argue a connection to strangers, across national, ethnic, or gendered lines. 
Environmental groups also use global citizenship to describe citizenship in 
practice, through activism surrounding issues such as reducing pollution. 
Many issues extend beyond national borders, including hunger, water ac-
cess, women’s rights, online privacy, and the use of natural resources. These 
commonly debated topics illustrate that the world is interconnected beyond 
the nation-state.
Global citizenship is not without its limitations, however. Common 
counterarguments include postcolonial critiques of Western privilege and 
power, problems connected to globalization and the movement of global 
capital, including migrants, and the rise of nationalism. When scholars and 
citizens see global citizenship as merely a way of denoting Western privilege 
or access to global travel and resources, the concept remains hollow. Homi 
K. Bhaba suggests scholars start first with analyzing and evaluating local 
contexts, before carefully considering global issues in a way that complicates 
systems of privilege, economic progress, and globalization (1994; pp. xiv-
xv). April Carter explains that with the rise of nationalism, global citizenship 
for some scholars is simply impossible. She analyzes the contributions of 
Hannah Arendt, David Miller, and Michael Walzer, arguing that each has 
problems with the idea of cosmopolitanism, or global citizenship. Limita-
tions include the difficulty of citizens’ participation at a national scale, let 
alone a global scale, problems with moral universalism, and a lack of insti-
tutional enforcement on a global level (2001, pp. 167-170). Although each 
counterargument has merit, some scholars suggest that global citizenship 
has still gained traction in public discourse as a useful concept, especially in 
practice. Additionally, if the concept is deployed responsibly alongside these 
counterarguments, students will have a better understanding of a critical 
reading of power and privilege associated with other concepts such as na-
tionalism, globalization, and the problems accompanying global capitalism 
and the movements of migrants and refugees. 
Despite these limitations, I believe global citizenship is useful for rhe-
torical studies, especially since numerous scholars have used the concept in 
diverse fields such as higher education, philosophy and political science (see: 
Carter 2001; Rhoads and Szelényi 2011; Schattle 2008). As human problems 
become larger in scope and implicate people across boundaries (Lister 2003, 
pp. 55-56), scholars need to expand their view of civic rhetoric. Universi-
ties are one place in which to introduce the concept and practice of global 
citizenship (Boyte 2003, p. 96), especially through courses in rhetoric, such 
as composition, argumentation, public speaking, rhetorical criticism, and 
persuasive writing. Many colleges and universities are incorporating a global 
orientation into their mission and value statements (Rhoads and Szelényi 
2011, p. 21; Stearns 2009, p. 191). To meet these missions, rhetorical educa-
tors should better incorporate global issues into their teaching.
Extending speech education to focus on global issues helps students 
gain an understanding of other cultures and traditions as well as an abil-
ity to then criticize such practices, without being ethnocentric. In teaching 
students about global citizenship, instructors should include the “study of 
different cultural traditions and institutional frameworks…but also an ap-
preciation of the kinds of forces that bear on societies around the world…
and how these forces have emerged” (Stearns 2009, p. 15). In a summary 
of the History of Rhetoric Discussion Groups at the 2004 ARS Conference, 
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Patricia Bizzell and Susan Jarratt noted that the future of rhetorical studies 
should address multiculturalism and transnationalism (2004, pp. 21-22). 
Some rhetorical scholars have begun to answer this call, but more work 
needs to be done, especially in rhetoric classrooms. As a concept, global 
citizenship illustrates the importance of being able to communicate and in-
teract with strangers who might be geographically removed from students’ 
own local context. If coupled with counterarguments of global citizenship, 
students will have a more nuanced understanding of the tensions that occur 
when practicing citizenship among various peoples, places, and cultures, and 
how to incorporate critiques of power and privilege in their communicative 
interactions. This critical view of practicing global citizenship means begin-
ning with local actions but recognizing the implications of those actions on 
others around the world.
Rhetorical dimensions of global citizenship 
In this last section, I advance two rhetorical dimensions important to global 
citizenship: emotional attachments and social belonging. Emotions help us 
identify with others, which grounds global citizenship in social belonging. 
Rhetorical educators can teach students how to practice global citizenship, 
enabling an awareness of how to work across differences while being mindful 
of critiques of global citizenship.
Valuing emotional attachments in global citizenship
A rhetorical approach to global citizenship does not dismiss emotional 
means of persuasion, but instead analyzes emotion as a necessary aspect of 
the decision-making process, especially in choosing to take action on an is-
sue. Rhetorical scholars are shifting their views about the role of emotion in 
politics and decision-making. For instance, Gross writes that emotions are 
rhetorical through a power differential, or “uneven distribution” of emotion, 
between two individuals or groups (2006, p. 5). However, such an “uneven 
distribution” may be bridged by emotion itself in order to incite action on 
a particular social or political issue. After all, without a power differential, it 
would be difficult to convince individuals to support resolving a particular 
global problem. Emotion is an important component in motivating individ-
uals or groups with less power to change their situation. In contrast, Celeste 
M. Condit focuses on the possibilities of emotions for social action. Con-
dit views pathos as “the deliberate art for the construction of shared public 
emotion” (2013, p. 5). People have mistrusted rhetoric’s role in cultivating 
emotional responses for a long time, especially in rhetorical studies of mobs 
and propaganda (Gehrke 2009, p. 53). However, humans need emotion to 
be able to make rational decisions. 
Emotion works with reason to help us make decisions to become 
involved in global issues. Kenneth Burke explains that identification is re-
ally about people understanding their “joint interests:” “A is not identical 
with his colleague, B. But insofar as their interests are joined, A is identified 
with B” (1969, p. 20). This definition of identification as “joint interests” 
seems important for crafting a rhetorical view of global citizenship. For ex-
ample, consider human rights. People can have a joint interest in recognizing 
certain basic human rights for all through an overlapping consensus. That 
consensus is not achieved through a legal or territorial definition of global 
citizenship, but instead through discussion and deliberation among people, 
which are in turn influenced by both rational and emotional appeals. 
Burke further explains that identification is linked to consubstantiali-
ty in that we become one with another person through identification yet still 
retain our individual differences. Burke writes: “In being identified with B, 
A is ‘substantially one’ with a person other than himself [sic]. Yet at the same 
time he [sic] remains unique, an individual locus of motives. Thus he [sic] 
is both joined and separate, at once a distinct substance and consubstan-
tial with another” (p. 21). When considering how emotional attachments 
reinforce identification, identification can be understood as a process that 
connects us to other people through joint interests while simultaneously 
recognizing individual differences. For example, take the issue of reducing 
pollution in a city. People working together on that global issue would have a 
common goal of reducing pollution for the sake of the planet, although their 
work is locally focused. In working together to build advocacy campaigns 
and change polluting behaviors, these people will experience emotional at-
tachments, such as compassion or trust, which will shape their interactions 
with each other. In coming together around the joint interest of pollution 
reduction, they are able to work together in advocacy across identity mark-
ers, such as race, ethnicity, and gender. 
Just as identification can connect human beings across locations and 
cultures, rhetorical strategies can also be negatively used to diminish a sense 
of community and create division among people (Tonn, Endress, and Dia-
mond 1993, pp. 167-168). Burke is well-known for theorizing identification 
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with division (1969, p. 45). Creating emotional connections across individ-
uals, borders, and cultures can be challenging. Cultivating compassion for 
other human beings is difficult because people often distance themselves as 
too different from the people who are suffering, especially with geographical 
distance. Martha C. Nussbaum notes that this distancing is always a possi-
bility in societies that are “divided by class, race, gender, and other identities, 
particularly when disgust and stigma are involved” (2013, p. 262). Hans 
Schattle similarly notes that developing a cross-cultural empathy can be al-
most impossible when faced with racism, sexism, and discrimination (2008, 
p. 50); however, he cites multiple examples of citizens who overcome their 
fears in working across difference to practice global citizenship. Citing the 
ancient Athenian tragic and comic dramas, Nussbaum explains that these 
plays “were occasions for deep emotion,” and were an important part of 
civic education. She writes, “These emotions, however, were not considered 
antithetical to the idea of a democracy based upon deliberation and argu-
ment: indeed, just the opposite. They were considered important inputs for 
political discussion” (2013, p. 260). Both emotion and reason are intercon-
nected ideas that can be used in productive or destructive ways in the con-
text of rhetorical citizenship. Rhetorical scholars need to understand how 
emotion operates in citizenship so that we can critique destructive strategies 
and promote productive strategies, especially in analyzing and evaluating 
public discourse with our students. 
Rhetorical educators should teach students the importance of debate 
and critical thinking as students begin to make their own value judgments 
about cultures, traditions, and various political issues, always considering 
the shared interests between students and strangers as well as the power and 
privilege that might be at work in a larger process of globalization. Peter N. 
Stearns writes that students need to master global-analytical skills, but that 
such skills must be practiced through debate and discussion when students 
are asked to begin making value judgments about global issues (2009, 16). 
In the classroom, I introduce the concept of global citizenship through us-
ing various contemporary news magazines, books, and documentary films 
that focus on controversial global issues, such as human trafficking. In class, 
I ask students to read a segment of a book or a brief article, or watch part of 
a film. Together, we discuss and debate how and why the author or director 
uses different rhetorical strategies to reach across identity markers, includ-
ing nationality. Usually, students quickly realize that the rhetor’s goal is civic 
empathy, or the capacity to feel what others feel within a civic context. As a 
class, we interrogate structures of power that shape communicative interac-
tions and public discourse about the issue, including political and economic 
contexts. For the issue of human trafficking, we discuss economic incentives 
for traffickers, as well as the political barriers to prosecuting those respon-
sible. To enable students to relate the issue to their own lives, we also try 
to connect the global issue to a local context. We also take time to discuss 
various emotional attachments, such as feelings of concern, and how engag-
ing these texts might cultivate empathy inside and outside of the classroom, 
once students leave the university. 
Grounding global citizenship in social belonging
People identify with one another through emotion, which helps us to de-
velop a sense of social belonging to be able to come together with others 
who are different from ourselves. The view that global citizenship should 
be grounded in social belonging differs from the more common view that 
citizenship should be connected to a state or territory, often through law, in 
scholarship about global citizenship (see especially: Armstrong 2006, p. 356; 
Butler and Spivak 2007, pp 3-4; Ford 2001, p. 210; Kivisto and Faist 2007, 
pp. 128-29; Miller 2007, pp. 39, 45; Ng’weno 2007, p. 196; Weil 2001, p. 
19). Haldun Gülalp explains this traditional view: “The modern nation-state 
is (ideally) a territorially circumscribed entity, exercising legitimate power 
within its boundaries. Citizenship in the modern state is (ideally) linked to 
territorial sovereignty, so that individual members of that community are ac-
cepted as equals” (2006, 1). Grounding global citizenship in social belonging 
makes the mission of civic rhetoric one of teaching students the importance 
of advancing global social relations and communicating with strangers. Us-
ing Rhoads and Szelényi’s concept of the social dimension of citizenship, 
social belonging involves “shared experiences one has within various social 
collectivities” (2011, p. 17). I would add to this view in suggesting that the 
“social collectivity” expands outward to the rest of the world in conceptual-
izing global citizenship. This approach shapes how student-citizens engage 
issues in the world, especially as these issues become more complex and in-
tertwined in the activities of many different nations.
Social belonging has been conceptualized through ideas such as the 
union, state, nation, and religion; however, these are not examples that ad-
vance social belonging as essential to global citizenship. Instead, I suggest 
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stranger sociability (Hariman and Lucaites 2003, pp. 36, 58; Warner 2002, p. 
75) and vulnerability (Butler 2004, pp. 22-24) are two specific modes of so-
cial belonging that ground global citizenship. Stranger sociability involves the 
necessity of being open to interacting with strangers. Vulnerability entails the 
understanding that, as human beings, we are never alone. Our identity and 
actions are shaped through others’ perspectives of us. Identification seems to 
precede emotional attachments, because a person needs to first see similarity 
to then develop an emotional connection to someone. People can acknowl-
edge division yet still identify with others, however, and this recognition of 
cultural difference while still being able to work together for a shared politi-
cal goal seems to echo this understanding of how division and identification 
work together in human interaction. Current conceptions of state-based or 
territory-based global citizenship that rely on reason as the primary mode of 
being able to identify with others fail to recognize how people connect to one 
another emotionally to be able to relate to a larger social world. 
Global citizenship should be based on social belonging, rather than on 
the state or territory, partly because the technological changes in the world 
have changed social relations and therefore call for a new view of citizenship 
(Agosin 2001, p. 10; Rhoads and Szelényi 2011, p. 7). Indeed, the idea of 
communal obligation is not new to an understanding of civic education (Ar-
thos 2007, p. 190), and is an important characteristic of global citizenship 
as understood through a rhetorical lens. Rhoads and Szelényi outline one 
major organizing principle in the variety of terms and definitions associated 
with global citizenship as “the notion of greater or lesser degrees of ethical 
responsibility toward human rights and other individual and community 
rights, as well as moving beyond the nation-state ... in acting upon one’s 
sense of responsibility” (2011, p. 23). Considering our own rights and re-
sponsibilities, and how these affect others, is important in explaining global 
citizenship as a practice to students. The civic rhetoric tradition should strive 
to include a global ethic as part of the curriculum to instruct students to 
become engaged citizens.
For students, global citizenship as a practice should become an ori-
entation to engage global issues and to consider the consequences of their 
actions for their own and others’ lives. Civic rhetoric can help students in 
“developing an awareness and mastery of globally relevant issues, skills, and 
phenomena and using such understandings in approaching and enacting 
citizen rights and responsibilities in a local, national, regional, or global 
context” (Rhoads and Szelényi 2011, p. 264). Global citizenship does not 
exclude local, regional, or national contexts, but instead builds upon these 
contexts in how people conceptualize social relations. This is similar to 
Nussbaum’s theory of cosmopolitanism as a series of concentric circles of 
concern, spreading outward from the self toward all humanity (Nussbaum 
and Cohen 1996, p. 135).
As rhetorical educators, we have a responsibility to cultivate citizens 
who can engage the world as a result of their university education. Rhoads 
and Szelényi write: “Just as we have used our sharpest university minds to 
advance science and technology, we must do the same in terms of advancing 
global social relations” (2011, p. 8). In conceptualizing global citizenship 
through creating relationships with others around the world, social belong-
ing becomes more important than the state or territory. 
Extending civic rhetoric through global citizenship 
If one of civic rhetoric’s goals is to prepare students to engage others in 
the world through discussion and debate, then global citizenship is a use-
ful addition to the civic rhetoric tradition in expanding students’ awareness 
of public problems and their role in those issues. The goal of using global 
citizenship in rhetorical education is to help students see global citizenship 
as a useful concept and practice, while complicating their understandings 
of globalization and nationalism. By doing so, students should feel better 
prepared to contribute to public arguments surrounding global issues and 
hopefully consider their own actions accordingly. 
Accounting for global citizenship in the civic rhetoric tradition is 
important as students increasingly face political issues and discussions that 
extend beyond national boundaries. Whether theorizing civic education 
through a civic republican or civic liberal tradition, this essay suggests that 
both political philosophies underemphasize the role of emotion in citi-
zenship. Grounding global citizenship in social belonging values different 
emotional attachments that inform citizens’ decision-making and engage-
ment with often distant strangers. Global citizenship highlights the impor-
tance of social relations, which becomes an important model for rhetorical 
education.
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Rhetorical Citizenship beyond the 
Frontiers of Capitalism: Marx Reloaded 
and the Dueling Myths of the 
Commodity and the Common
C AT H E R I N E C H A P U T
The problem of the left hasn’t been our adherence to a Marxist critique of 
capitalism. It’s that we have lost sight of the communist horizon. 
Jodi Dean, 2012
Rhetoric and capitalism share strikingly similar myths of origin. Rhetoric, we 
are told, emerged in Greek city-states where citizens who deliberated in the 
polis needed to be skilled orators.1 The fate of rhetoric subsequently waxed 
and waned with the fate of democracy – thriving in the classical Greek age, 
suffocating during the Roman Empire, and reappearing, along with so many 
other things, during the Renaissance. Theorists from Karl Marx (1990) to 
Giovanni Arrighi (1994) note that capitalism’s nascent form begins in the 
same Italian city-states that ushered in rhetoric’s rebirth. Capitalism does 
not, of course, reach its full development until it becomes culturally and 
discursively tethered, like rhetoric, to the democratic myth. Important to 
this process, according to historian Peter Burke (1990), is the movement of 
Renaissance humanism from Italy, through northern Europe, into the Neth-
erlands, and culminating in the British Isles, where capitalism, rhetoric, and 
democracy acquire their particularly modern appearance. Thus, by the early 
modern period, the democratic political system so connected to rhetoric also 
1 Historians of classical rhetoric, including such renowned scholars as George Kennedy 
(1994), James Murphy (2013), as well as David Timmerman and Edward Schiappa 
(2010), work from the commonplace that rhetorical training emerges with and is unique 
to democratic states. This myth is challenged by Jacques Rancière (2004), who argues 
that people without property who are treated as part of the polis have what amounts to a 
fictitious freedom.
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attached itself to capitalism. English and Scottish enlightenment thinkers 
such as John Locke, David Hume, and Adam Smith propagated a theory 
of liberty simultaneously embedded in the democratic state and the mar-
ket economy. Noting this crucial linkage, Deirdre McCloskey (2006; 2010) 
recently embarked on what is surely her magnum opus – a four-volume 
rhetorical history of capitalism that assesses its triumph through a revalua-
tion of bourgeois identity. Yet this chapter suggests that those domains that 
McCloskey skillfully ties together, rhetoric and economics, were joined al-
ready by the history of myth-making. Indeed, the story of freedom, liberty 
and citizenship that connects deliberative political participation to market 
economies is the origin myth shared by both rhetoric and capitalism. 
Myth, as Roland Barthes (1972) long ago contended, operates through 
a semantic doubling in order to further ruling class ideology. As theorized 
by Barthes, a myth functions through a signification that works twice. For 
example, capitalism and rhetoric do not simply refer to a specific economic 
configuration and a form of persuasion, but also reference democracy and its 
attendant virtues. This additional signification functions on behalf of class 
interests, transforming capitalism and its representatives from economic ac-
tors into defenders of freedom. Kenneth Burke (1961) identified the same 
kind of function in words he called “god-terms” (p. 2). He suggests that these 
highly charged words contain multiple referents within the single term; they 
house, that is, a diversity of meanings. No doubt some concepts fall beyond 
the reach of god-terms, but the vast majority can be subsumed within them. 
Burke (1966) later elaborates on the relationship between language and myth 
by discussing what he calls a “terministic screen” or a framework for reflecting 
one selection of reality and deflecting other possible selections. According to 
this theory, the terms we use to describe reality “necessarily constitute a corre-
sponding kind of screen; and any such screen necessarily directs the attention 
to one field rather than another” (p. 50). Myths are, for Burke, different frames 
for understanding the same reality. Each frame highlights some things and 
downplays others. Rather than understanding this semantic work as a particu-
lar subset of language practices, Burke comes to appreciate myth as the means 
by which one meaning, as opposed to another, bubbles to the surface and ani-
mates our way of life. So conceived, myth necessitates the notion that language 
constitutes the world in which we live by virtue of its framing metaphor.
The persuasive function of metaphors, especially within an historical 
narrative, is not missed by early economists, most of whom received rhe-
torical training as part of their formal education. Adam Smith, for instance, 
explains metaphors as rhetorically crafted language. Before the publication 
of his famous Wealth of Nations he gave public lectures on rhetoric in which 
he discussed such things as the use of metaphor. His Lectures on Rhetoric and 
Belles Lettres (2001) define a metaphor as an allusion between one thing and 
another. But such an allusion works on its audience, he says, only if “it gives 
the due strength of expression to the object described and at the same time 
does this in a more striking and interesting manner” (p. 29). Metaphors 
bring an object or idea to life by giving it a particularly remarkable and, 
consequently, enduring character. The extraordinary quality shared by capi-
talism and rhetoric is the supposedly unfailing democratic nature of each. As 
a founding metaphor or terministic screen, democracy makes capitalism and 
rhetoric untouchable for all those committed to such things as freedom and 
equality. In other words, to espouse communism or to suggest the limits of 
rhetoric is, because of their mutual democratic frame, to welcome tyranny 
and propaganda. This conclusion is mythical in the sense that it functions 
through rhetorically delimited metaphors and not in the sense of being false 
or unreal. Thus, like all great metaphors, the myth connecting rhetoric, capi-
talism, and democracy requires constant propagation. 
To take a relatively recent example, the fall of state communism at the 
end of the twentieth century offered a rhetorical opportunity to reinforce 
this mythical triple helix of freedom. Among the most memorable claims 
during this period of post-cold war elation was Francis Fukuyama’s “end of 
history” thesis. In contrast to a Marxist teleology forecasting communism as 
the final stage of human social organization wherein class struggle is erased, 
Fukuyama (1989) cites capitalism, or liberal democracy, as the culmination 
of ideological struggle. During the 1990s this triumphalist rhetoric bur-
geoned into a “Washington Consensus” purportedly capable of managing all 
economic and political challenges across the globe. The mismatch between 
what this discourse on liberal democracy claimed and the environmental, 
social, and individual destruction for many of the world’s citizens, however, 
did not escape notice among rhetoricians of globalization. Wendy Hesford’s 
(2011) recent Spectacular Rhetorics addresses the human rights violations at-
tendant in this stage of history, and Kendall Phillips and G. Mitchell Reyes’s 
(2011) edited volume Global Memoryscapes challenges a unified global narra-
tive with a collection of complex, networked, and diversified memories from 
around the globe. Even more recently, Rebecca Dingo and J. Scott Blake’s 
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(2012) collection The Megarhetorics of Global Development examines and cri-
tiques the specific rhetorical strategies used by governments and corporations 
to facilitate capitalist agendas. Further adding to this body of work, Jennifer 
Wingard’s (2012) Branded Bodies, Rhetoric, and the Neoliberal Nation-State 
explores how economic neoliberalism has constricted the rhetoric of politi-
cal media, limiting the available range of information within the narrow 
framework of economic triumphalism. These important rhetorical critiques 
participate in the ongoing struggle to define our dominant social myth – do 
we articulate the world through the framework of capitalist individualism 
or do we frame it through the lens of a more social-oriented collectivism? 
Just as the myth of a triumphant knot among rhetoric, capitalism, and de-
mocracy seems to be permanently secured, it begins to loosen, unravel, and 
require diligent tightening. 
A claim to the natural intersections among these spheres of social 
practice remains especially tenuous in our post-2008 world of global eco-
nomic disarray. The counterclaim that communism may be more aligned 
with democratic citizenship than capitalism is by no means new, and yet 
it has garnered renewed strength of late. In just the last few years Verso 
has published nearly a dozen titles in its new Pocket Communism series 
that invites authors to pose contemporary versions of what Alain Badiou 
(2010) calls the “communist hypothesis” or the exploration of ethical social 
organizations (98).2 Even though this series engages the possibility of com-
munism, other efforts reject the feasibility of a working communist state. 
For instance, the University of Chicago, the intellectual home of neoliberal 
economic thought, runs a series, through its Seagull Books, titled What Was 
Communism? Framed in the past tense, the series basically chronicles the fail-
ures of communism with titles that focus on particular states and work from 
the assumption that communism, a well-intended idea, cannot hold up its 
promise of equality and freedom. Still, the series editor, Tariq Ali (2009), 
comes to much the same conclusion as does Slavoj Žižek (2009) in his First 
as Tragedy, Then as Farce: the future of democracy exists as some blend of free 
marketism and socialism. This argument, although logically defensible, fails 
2 Further illustrative of this communist revival is a recent conference “On the Idea 
of Communism” held by The University of London’s Birkbeck Institute for the 
Humanities. The conference organizers anticipated fewer than 200 participants but had to 
accommodate an audience of 1200 people.
to garner much political strength because it asks us to envision the future 
through two different frameworks, a task that runs contrary to the polarized 
world we occupy.
The production of knowledge about political economic possibilities 
tends to represent and therefore reproduce a bifurcated world view. The Chi-
cago book series leans toward capitalism and balances the Verso series which 
leans toward communism. Recent film documentaries exhibit a similarly 
political dichotomization on the question of capitalism’s virtues. Offering 
something like an updated version of Milton Friedman’s hugely successful 
Free to Choose, PBS’s 2002 production of Commanding Heights: The Battle for 
the World Economy claims to provide the public with a better understanding 
of globalization, world trade, and economic development. The three part 
series, based on a book of the same name by Daniel Yergin and Joseph Stani-
slaw, declares global capitalism the winner in the battle between free and 
controlled markets. In contrast, Michael Moore’s Capitalism: A Love Story 
(2009), while it tends to eulogize the good old days of monopoly capitalism 
when U.S. factories mass produced domestic goods and workers were paid 
an increasingly livable wage, critiques the more ruthless stage of global capi-
talism. Despite their apparent opposition, these films squabble over what 
amounts to different versions of market economies. Adhering to the rhetori-
cal mythology that connects democracy with capitalism, they both assume 
that democracy cannot be enacted within communism.
Taking an entirely different perspective, Jason Barker’s Marx Reloaded 
poses this opposition between capitalism and communism in terms made fa-
mous by the blockbuster film The Matrix. The film suggests that a choice 
exists between a blue pill that will induce blissful ignorance and a red pill that 
will reveal the painful truth of reality. These pills function as metaphors for 
the elaborate configuration of things, ideas, and processes that fall under the 
umbrella of democracy. What becomes clear from the documentary, especially 
the segments on production and consumption, is that ideological adherence to 
private property in the form of commodities delivers the blissful inoculation 
of the blue pill while an ideological investment in something called the com-
mon yields the reality of the red pill, though suspiciously without its delivery 
pains. I explore this film more closely to suggest that the commodity and the 
common are decisive metaphors – ones upon which entire fantasy structures 
emerge – for the production of two different versions of democratic citizen-
ship. Before doing so, however, I provide a brief overview of the commodity 
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and the common as competing metaphors through which to understand not 
only economics, but also social, political, and cultural relations.
Marx used the commodity to introduce his critique of capital because 
he believed that a single item produced through the division of wage labor 
represents, or bears the traces of, the entire economic system of capitalism. 
As he famously asserted in the much debated first chapter of Capital, the 
key to our understanding “begins with the analysis of the commodity” (p. 
126). In his conception, a commodity produced by wage labor contains the 
value of the products transformed into the new product, the value of the 
labor paid to the worker in wages, and the value of the labor not paid to the 
worker or what he calls surplus value. This surplus value is simultaneously 
the mark of exploited labor and the source of profit. In Burkean terms, the 
metaphorical value of the commodity stems from framing it as the source 
of individual wealth and deflecting the collective labor also contained in it. 
Thus, if we take account of the rhetorical nature of the community, we can 
see additionally that the entire belief system of capitalism begins with an 
identification of property with owners and not with producers. To identify 
an item with the producers requires a notion of the common. 
I believe such reidentification is the key to realigning democracy 
within the communist horizon. This horizon – distanced in space and time 
and yet setting the agenda for a path toward it – represents, as Jodi Dean 
(2012) explains it, faith “that collective determination of collective condi-
tions is possible” (16). That is to say, a mythology or terministic screen of 
the common will reorganize language around an understanding that life is 
collectively produced and can be collectively regulated.
The commons, in a traditional sense, denotes the commonly held 
means of production in the precapitalist era. The destruction of the com-
mons (through such state mechanisms as the British Enclosure Acts) sepa-
rated individuals from the means of providing for themselves and subse-
quently forced them into wage labor. This version of the commons as the 
precondition for capitalism is undermined by Michael Perelman, who argues 
that primitive accumulation – the process of privatizing such commons – 
plays an ongoing role in capitalism.3 Capitalism must intervene into self-
3 The notion that “primitive accumulation” functions on an ongoing basis is evidenced by the 
global land grab in which rich countries buy up and privatize resources – both property and 
indigenous knowledge – in the global south. See, for instance, “Outsourcing’s Third Wave.”
sufficiency of all sorts (homespun health remedies, sustainable farming, or 
shared cultural texts, for instance) so that it can turn communal knowledge 
and products into commodities. To expand the capitalist marketplace re-
quires the continuous process of commodifying previously non-commodi-
fied items, which requires government intervention to mandate and regulate 
this endless social restructuring. Just as surely as this is an economic and 
political process it is also a rhetorical process: people must believe in the 
commodity and its world in order to assent to its ruling order.
Because this continuous appropriation of common resources is not 
limited to land, air, and water but includes socially produced products, 
knowledges, and practices, theorists have turned to the common, in the sin-
gular, to signify both our natural resources as well as our invented resources. 
Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri, for instance, contend that the “common 
is not only the earth we share but also the languages we create, the social 
practices we establish, the modes of sociality that define our relationships, 
and so forth” (2009, p. 350). The common produces things, but it also pro-
duces social relations, lifestyles, and agentive subjects, all of which, accord-
ing to Hardt and Negri, create value. Commodities put this collectively pro-
duced value in the hands of individuals and thus delimit its use value. To 
combat this problem, David Harvey argues that the “collective laboring that 
is now productive of value must ground collective, not individual, property 
rights” (p. 105). Recall that in Marx’s configuration, collective labor, in its 
exploited form, produces the value, invisible and yet present, within the 
commodity that creates profit for the capitalist.4 Harvey extends this theory 
by suggesting that we leverage the common value within the commodity to 
fuel a democratic transformation beyond the frontiers of capitalism – one in 
which wealth is socially accessible rather than privatized. A mythology of the 
common, contrary to a mythology of the commodity, emphasizes the collec-
tive labor constituting products. These two metaphors for understanding the 
division of contemporary labor practices, both outlined in Marx Reloaded, 
provide different discursive platforms on which to build a democratic myth 
pegged either to a capitalist or to a communist horizon.
Written and directed by Jason Barker, Marx Reloaded explores the rel-
evance of Marxist theory to the contemporary political economy. It includes 
4 Marx claims that commodities are merely “the visible incarnation, the social chrysalis 
state, of all human labour” (p. 159).
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interviews by scholars at the forefront of reviving and revising Marxism as 
well as leading economists and financial advisors who dismiss such ideas. All 
of this is structured through a four-part animation sequence which follows 
Marx through the matrix of his own thinking, beginning with the com-
modity and ending with the common. Using the global financial crisis of 
2008 as the historical event from which to launch its revaluation, the film 
asks, “Have we been living in a dream? Is the capitalist world about to be 
unmasked as an ideological illusion and replaced by the communist system 
we thought was gone for good?” Although this framing represents capital-
ism as an imagined world opposed to the possibility of a communist reality, 
the prevailing metaphors – the commodity and the common – indicate that 
both pills offer a mythology and are thus two rhetorical sides of the same 
proverbial coin. Consequently, the film determines the political task as less 
oriented toward the overthrow of capitalism and more directed toward what 
Jason Read (2010) calls “the actualisation or manifestation of the common” 
(p. 121). Before we can create this new democratic imagination, we first 
must understand the common in relationship to the commodity.
According to the documentary, the commodity is the single most im-
portant metaphor for the entire mythology of capitalism. The narrator ex-
plains, in a voice parodying Marx, that “in order to grasp capitalism’s true 
power and hold over us, we must delve into the strange and mystical world of 
the commodity.” This section of the film is signaled by an animated shot of an 
industrial street with smoke floating up from a manhole cover. The figure of 
Karl Marx falls through the manhole and, just like Alice tumbling down the 
rabbit hole, he descends into a fantasy world; but, unlike Alice, the creatures 
populating this world are commodities. The documentary continues with the 
narrator quoting Marx who says that a commodity changes an everyday thing 
“into something transcendent.”5 This transcendent quality is value – the social 
labor that goes into the commodity, allowing it to be exchanged at a particular 
price and to be converted into profit. For Marx, value is an abstraction that 
standardizes the cycle of exchange and not a quality inherent in the material 
body of the commodity. Rather than being intrinsic to the commodity, value 
is intrinsic to the human labor that goes into a commodity.
5 Marx uses the example of wood crafted into a table and sold as a commodity to explain 
this transcendence. As a commodity, the once simply wooden table comes to life and takes 
on a new existence. (See Capital, p. 163.)
It is precisely this transcendent power of working human beings that 
accounts for Marx’s conception of commodity fetishism. As he (1964) ex-
plains in the Economic and Philosophical Manuscripts of 1844, commodities 
contain the innate quality of our very species. The value-adding power of 
life emerges in labor wherein “all the natural, spiritual, and social variety of 
individual activity is manifest” (p. 66). Workers transfer life value into com-
modities, and this accounts for why we invest special powers in these things. 
In the documentary, media theorist Norbert Bolz summarizes this process 
by stating that, in addition to fulfilling our needs, commodities “convey a 
spiritual surplus value and this value is the real reason for the purchase.” 
Peter Sloterdijk puts it even more boldly, arguing that “the immortal part 
of Marx’s doctrine” is that he “discovered the fact that things live.” Com-
modities acquire this remarkable attribute from socialized human labor. The 
exploitation of wage labor means that social agency becomes externalized 
within commodities and thus alienated from large segments of the popula-
tion. Commodity fetishism, although it emphasizes a negative critique of 
capitalism, contains the seeds of a more positive theory of collective agency 
promoted as the common.
To explore the common the documentary interjects yet another ani-
mated scene. Here the camera pans down a hallway, zeroes in on a door, 
and then moves through the keyhole of that door. Inside is a room with a 
bewildered Karl Marx musing over a doll of Slavoj Žižek clashing cymbals 
together as if he was a wind-up toy. In this segment Žižek explains in an 
interview how commodity fetishism is an illusion, but it is, he claims, an “il-
lusion that is part of reality itself.” From this perspective, we can unmask the 
illusion of capitalism and its commodity fetish, but we nevertheless live ac-
cording to its myths. At heart, this argument, one central to all Žižek’s work, 
maintains that a framing myth or organizing fantasy cannot be separated 
from pragmatic action. Consequently, if we debunk the myth of capitalism, 
we must either live as though we have not done so or we must replace the 
commodity with another equally strong fantasy. For this documentary and 
many contemporary theorists, the common provides the structure for such 
an alternative. 
The common, which designates the collective and cooperative labor 
of production rather than its exploitation, offers a rhetorical spin on global 
economic interconnectivity. Besides stressing the shared nature of our natu-
ral resources, it highlights the socialization of labor. According to critical the-
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orist Jodi Dean, the common “designates and takes the place of human labor 
power (Marx’s source of value), now rereconceived in the broadest possible 
terms of the potential of creativity, thought, knowledge and communica-
tion” (pp. 134-135). The power of the common stems from the same power 
of capital – value production. The difference is that the common highlights 
the collective labor that goes into products while the commodity empha-
sizes individual profit. Through this shift in perspective, a rhetorically con-
structed mythology of the common enables and authorizes us to argue with 
impunity that the capitalist class, the now infamous one percent, “are not 
free to do as they will but are governed, controlled, and limited by the rest 
of us” (Dean 71). Because the common provides a conception of citizenship 
that nudges us toward a different democratic terrain without embracing the 
legacy of state communism, the film challenges us to create social structures 
based on the common rather than the commodity. Fittingly, its final image 
is of a crane removing the bust of Karl Marx from its unspecified location, 
suggesting that the answer to the conundrums of democracy can be found 
in what Antonio Negri (1989) calls “Marx beyond Marx” – the creative use 
of Marxist theory to bypass the stale political manifestations of Marxism. 
As I have discussed through this reading of Marx Reloaded, the myth 
that rhetorically links democracy and capitalism begins with the commod-
ity as a metaphor for the self-contained individual whose talents are crafted 
in relationship to private property. Such a metaphorical frame ignores not 
only the necessity (and often exploitation) of other individuals; it also turns 
a blind eye to the destruction of our natural environment. To engage the 
possibility of citizenship beyond the horizons of capitalism requires replac-
ing this metaphor with the metaphor of the common, which calls attention 
to collaborations among people as well as to the need to care for our shared 
worlds, both those that are natural and those that are built. No doubt, Mc-
Closkey is correct to attribute part of capitalism’s success to a rhetorical re-
valuation of self-interest, individual dignity, and other bourgeois values, and 
yet it is wrong to think that this decision was made for us several hundred 
years ago and that we have no traction on how that choice plays out for us 
today.6 Our collective agency is obviously circumscribed by a nexus of ideas, 
institutions, habits, and traditions, but it is nonetheless open to change. The 
6 See also Albert Hirschmann’s classic The Passions and the Interests (1997) for an earlier 
explanation of how self-interest shifted from a short-coming to a virtue.
goal for citizenship, from this view, begins by redefining itself through the 
common in order to engender a different democratic politics. I end with a 
brief summary of how a shift in our framing metaphors from the commodity 
to the common might adjust our other social relations.
The above table charts the two foundational myths at hand within a 
Marxist critique of capital. The first myth is one that Marx opposes. Refer-
ring to the commodity as a mere representation or form of appearance, Marx 
understands its myth as one that obscures the source of profit in capitalism, 
which he (and liberal political economic theorists before him) identifies as 
labor. According to this myth, individuals are forced to seek value in con-
sumption. As he says with characteristic sarcasm, “what I am and am capable 
of is by no means determined by my individuality. I am ugly, but can buy for 
myself the most beautiful of women” (1964, p. 167). The commodity myth 
and its object fetishism stress individualism and individual identification. 
Citizens, in this conception, find their relationship through the economy 
and the political regulation of private property. This myth aligns liberal eco-
nomics with liberal democracy as each takes the individual to be a rational 
member of society whose freedom is exercised by voting at the ballot box or 
in the marketplace. In his critique of capitalism, Marx implicitly presents an-
other myth – one that I am calling the common. His assessment of classical 
political economy depends on a notion of the common that values collective 
labor rather than individual consumption; community rather than individ-
ual identification; cultural and deliberative relations rather than economic 
and juridical ones; and a sense of citizenship based on shared resources (from 
history and knowledge to the environment to the surplus wealth) rather 
than citizenship based on individual rights. The common, that is, offers a 
different framing myth, one with the capacity to reorient democracy toward 
deeper and more engaged practices.
table 1 opposing myths of capitalism
Commodity Common
Value in individual consumption Value in collective production
Individual identification Community identification
Economic and juridical relations Cultural and deliberative relations
Citizenship as universal suffrage Citizenship as an engaged publics
[  1 1 ]
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Rhetorical citizenship, under the myth of the common, might emerge 
as more pervasive and more active publics. A broad range of social move-
ment and counterpublic theorists have been exploring this form of rhetori-
cal citizenship since at least the 1960s.7 Among their founding positions, 
however, is that this form of rhetorical citizenship is oppositional to the 
dominant structures. Indeed this is explicit in the notion of counterpublics. 
What I am suggesting is that the myth of the commodity helps maintain a 
structural relationship to both the civic and civil sphere such that the kind 
of active citizenship advocated by rhetorical theory becomes relegated to the 
margins of society and takes on the status of opposition. A shift in this fram-
ing myth, it seems to me, might reorient citizenship from a passive, rights-
based activity to an active, public-formation activity, taking what is on the 
periphery and making it central to our very notions of citizenship. Indeed, 
the work of framing society through the common is itself an act of such citi-
zenship: reimagining public space that is more environmentally sustainable 
and has people as opposed to profits at its core; working toward accessible 
public health care for all citizens; revising citizenship education by teaching 
deliberation rather than a prescribed list of historical facts; and advocating 
for an understanding of labor as an unavoidably collective activity in which 
all its participants receive its benefits – these are simultaneously rhetorical 
projects and ones in which a future common form of citizenship emerges.
7 For an example of counterpublic investigations, see Robert Asen and Daniel Brouwer’s 
collection Counterpublics and the State (2001); an equally strong articulation of 
contemporary social movement theory can be found in Christina Foust’s Transgression as a 
Mode of Resistance (2010).
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A Game with Words: Rhetorical 
Citizenship and Game Theory
TO M  D E N E I R E ,  DAV I D  E E L B O D E  & J E R O E N L AU W E R S
part i: Rhetoric and Game Theory
Introduction
The idea of rhetoric as a contest or a game goes back to the very cradle of 
rhetorical theory in ancient Greece. Famous rhetoricians like Gorgias per-
formed in a context that can aptly be characterized as a game, participating 
in debates or displaying their proficiency and giving impromptu replies (cf. 
Slethaug 1995, pp. 64-65). Moreover, the parallel between persuasive speak-
ing and a game seems to operate as a conceptual metaphor in our intuitive 
understanding of rhetorical behavior, like in political discourse. Think for 
instance of Julius Caesar’s (in)famous Alea iacta est (“The die has been cast”). 
The first part of this paper takes its point of departure in this omnipresence 
of game metaphors in rhetorical contexts and will explore the theoretical 
question whether we can use the model of mathematically formalized game 
theory for rhetorical criticism. 
This conception of rhetoric will in turn allow us to demonstrate game 
theory’s remarkable critical potential to address the systemic structures in 
which rhetorical citizenship is carried out. In an era that is driven by indi-
vidualistic concerns with rhetorical effectiveness, our game-theoretical re-
flections offer a vantage point to question the so-called “natural” character of 
the rhetorical situations in present-day politics as stemming from a rational 
response to the arbitrary rules of the political game. Specifically, we will ana-
lyze current electoral dynamics as a rational result of the particular way in 
which we cast our political votes, and we will show how an alternative voting 
system can more effectively reward constructive political discourses. 
catherine chaput
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State of the art
Game theory has often been integrated in non-exact fields like psychology or 
social studies. In sociolinguistics, for instance, it is used to explore interper-
sonal dynamics like politeness, vagueness and deniability (Pinker 2008, pp. 
373-425). In political studies, a whole subfield of political game theory has 
been developed, which researches specific political games such as jury voting, 
veto threats, etc., alongside more general social dynamics like collective choice 
or negotiating (McCarty and Meirowitz 2007). Game theory has also found 
its way into literary studies, where it is used to illuminate the rational choices 
made by characters in literary narrative.1 Yet for all this reflection on game 
theory’s broad potential, the secondary literature does not appear to have con-
sidered the specific question of game theory and rhetorical criticism. Three 
contributions seem to broach the topic, without however really going into it.
Before discussing a particular example of conflict rhetoric from the 
Korean War, Bennett explains “basic game theory concepts and its poten-
tial relationship with rhetorical criticism” (Bennett 1971, p. 34). However, 
his parallel remains rather limited, as Bennett focuses on the link between 
speaker/player and speech/move. In this way, his paper uses game theory to 
interpret the results of rhetorical behavior rather than the dynamics of rhe-
torical behavior itself.
Herman (1998) describes how the interactive strategies of communal be-
havior observable in classical Athens are the same as those simulated by a com-
puterized model of the Iterated Prisoner’s Dilemma. Still, Herman’s contribu-
tion amounts to an analysis of socio-political interaction, not public speaking.
Finally, Zamora Bonilla (2006) interestingly develops a game-theoret-
ical model to analyze how scientists choose different claims as interpretations 
of the results of their research in a rhetorical context. However, Zamora 
Bonilla focuses exclusively on the rhetoric of science without really consider-
ing rhetorical behavior in general and does not describe the basic parallels 
between the mathematical game model and rhetorical theory.
It thus becomes clear that the fundamental question of the possibili-
ties of game theory as a hermeneutic model to interpret rhetorical discourse 
is as yet unresolved. 
1 See Brams (2011). Cf. de Ley (1988), who engages with Brams’ earlier ideas of game 
theory and literature, and Slethaug (1995), which deals with the general critical notion of 
“game” and “play,” and therefore far exceeds game theory stricto sensu. 
A basic exploration
In mathematical game theory, a “game” is usually defined as “a description 
of strategic interaction that includes the constraints on the actions that the 
players can take and the players’ interests, but does not specify the actions 
that the players do take. A solution is a systematic description of the out-
comes that may emerge in a family of games. Game theory suggests reason-
able solutions for classes of games and examines their properties” (Osborne 
and Rubinstein 1994, p. 2). In other words, games consist of players who 
make choices that lead to actions with consequences or outcomes, bound by 
rules or constraints, and motivated by interests or preferences. Comparing 
that to a basic definition of rhetoric, viz. Bitzer’s analysis of the rhetori-
cal situation (Bitzer 1968) – in short “the necessary condition of rhetorical 
discourse,” which “needs and invites discourse capable of participating with 
situation [sic] and thereby altering its reality” – we can already see clear par-
allels between rhetoric and game theory. 
Rhetorical discourse can be interpreted as a game in which speakers 
are players and the rhetorical situation provides the constraints on the ac-
tions the players can take. These actions lead to consequences with certain 
pay-offs, or, rhetorically speaking, to discourse capable of participating with 
the situation or altering reality. 
Utilitas and rational decision-making
It is worth exploring just how deep the conceptual similarity goes between 
rhetorical discourse and games. When rhetoric is viewed from the perspec-
tive of the speaker, rhetorical theory recognizes the crucial importance of 
utilitas, i.e., the fact that all rhetorical actors are partisan, serving their own 
particular interests, based on their estimation of the rhetorical situation at 
hand (see Lausberg 1990, §1060).2 Similarly, game theory operates from 
the basic premise that it studies the behavior of a rational decision-maker – 
“‘rational’ in the sense that he is aware of his alternatives, forms expectations 
about any unknowns, has clear preferences, and chooses his action deliber-
2 We are aware that our conception of rhetoric here only takes the speaker’s rational 
perspective into account, and thus focuses on the speaker’s estimation of his audience 
rather than on the actual interaction between the speaker and the audience. In the 
conclusion to this paper, we will further reflect on the limits and consequences of this 
approach.
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ately after some process of optimization” (Osborne and Rubinstein 1994, 
p. 4). Accordingly, defining a player’s rational choice is the first step of any 
game-theoretical analysis. 
In short, we can say that rational choice and optimization can be ap-
plied to rhetorical utilitas in three different ways: 
(1) The speaker is certain of the consequences of his actions and accord-
ingly takes the action that offers the maximal consequence.
(2) The speaker is uncertain of the consequences of his actions, but does 
know the range of possible consequences and their probability vis-
à-vis his actions, and accordingly takes the action that maximizes an 
expected result.
(3) The speaker is uncertain of the consequences of his actions and does 
not know the range of possible consequences nor their probability 
vis-à-vis his actions. Still, he takes the action that he assumes will 
maximize an expected result, based on a subjective idea of the possible 
consequences of his actions and their probability.
In other words, rhetorical optimization happens in one of the following 
three ways: 
(1) The experienced rhetor knows that only in very simple cases can he 
be certain of the consequences of his rhetorical choice. An example of 
this is the choice to argue against nuclear energy before an audience of 
Greenpeace members. 
(2) More often, however, the models of uncertainty apply to the rhetori-
cal situation (even in situations that might at first seem quite straight-
forward). Indeed, in many cases the rhetor will be conscious of his 
uncertainty of the outcome of his rhetorical choices. However, he will 
often have information about a number of possible outcomes and 
their respective probability. An example of this is the rhetorical choice 
to hold a fairly left-wing speech before an audience of non-specified 
students, among whom the rhetor expects there to be more left-wing 
than right-wing supporters. 
(3) Finally, there is the case in which the rhetor’s information on the pos-
sible outcomes of his actions and their probability is imperfect. A con-
crete manifestation of this is the situation where a rhetor is unaware of 
the fact he is speaking to a different audience than the one expected. 
Rhetoric as a strategic game
In previous literature, rhetoric tends to be compared to games of the so-
called ‘strategic’” type (players choose their strategies simultaneously and 
independently). The classical example of a strategic game is the Prisoner’s 
dilemma, where the police offer two arrested criminals the same deal: if one 
man betrays his partner, and the other remains silent, the betrayer goes free 
and the one that remains silent receives the full one-year sentence. If both 
remain silent, both are sentenced to only one month in jail for a minor 
charge. If they betray each other, they both receive a three-month sentence. 
In this game, both players have the same options, i.e., either betray or 
remain silent (B; RS). This game is then often visualized in terms of a matrix 
(Table 1):
As appears from the Table 1, a player’s best decision is to betray when the 
other does not betray, since he will be free instead of spending a month in 
jail. Moreover, when the other betrays the player’s best decision is also to 
betray, since he will be sentenced to three instead of twelve months. Each 
player thus gets a higher pay-off when betraying the other, regardless of the 
latter’s decision. As this game is symmetrical, we may conclude that the 
best action for both players is to betray (the so-called Nash equilibrium). 
This is not a matter of the safest bet, but of the mathematical reasoning of 
each individual player: the optimal decision is to betray, although the lowest 
combined sentence (two months, one for each) would be reached if they 
cooperated. 
When rhetoric is interpreted as a strategic game, it is tempting to re-
place the actions to betray or remain silent by to persuade (P) or not persuade 
(NP). However, unlike betraying or remaining silent, which are real-life 
actions, persuading or not persuading are not actions one can strategically 
choose to perform in reality. Rhetorically speaking, it would make more 
sense if we could define a game where to persuade or not are the consequences 
of the game. This would take the following basic form: players can choose 
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from a set of rhetorical actions (e.g., to use a certain argument, style, …), 
which have the consequence, respectively, of persuading or not persuading. 
Importantly, we could then also introduce the aforementioned certainty/un-
certainty governing P and NP as consequences of certain actions. This model 
would then describe the actual rhetorical game more aptly, as it can con-
ceptualize a speaker who strategically chooses that rhetorical action which 
maximizes the expected result. However, two problems remain. First, this 
model no longer allows for an analysis of the players’ interaction, as we do 
not know the effect of pairing the players’ actions, unlike what was the case 
in the Prisoner’s dilemma or our first model. And second, the main result 
of the present model is that it poses the crucial question of the relation be-
tween actions and consequences. In other words, to understand the strategy 
of the rhetorical game we need to know which actions are more likely to 
persuade. Starting from a Bitzerian view of rhetorical discourse as a response 
to a rhetorical situation, this paper is especially interested in the analysis of 
how rhetorical persuasion is generated, not of the analysis of interaction and 
strategies where the outcome, persuasion or non-persuasion, is a given fact. 
part ii: Location games
Rhetoric as a location game
A more fruitful model for our specific purpose is the location game (see Ho-
telling 1929 and Downs 1957): imagine a stretch of beach (say 100 m long), 
limited by rock at both ends. On this beach there are two people (P1 and 
P2) with hot dog stands, offering  the same products at the same prices. 
The beach is evenly filled with bathers (i.e., they are uniformly distributed), 
and they always buy hot dogs from the nearest stand. What is the optimal 
position for a stand? This is a symmetrical game, and the Nash equilibrium 
results when both players position themselves in the middle. Moreover, as 
long as, e.g., P1 is not exactly in the middle (say, somewhere to the left), it is 
better for P2 to position himself between the middle and P1, as this implies 
that he gets all the customers to his right (who are closer to him than to P1) 
plus half of the customers between both players. As a matter of fact, the worst 
that can happen to a player who chooses the middle of the beach is a tie, 
making this strategy dominant. 
Note that the model above starts from a uniformly distributed crowd. 
This condition is obviously not always fulfilled, and to model an arbitrary 
distribution of people mathematicians use density functions f(x). The value 
f(x) in a point x (say, between 0 and 100) is then interpreted as a measure of 
the number of people at that point in the domain. However, this does not 
change the core of the mathematical analysis: in case the crowd is distributed 
in terms of a known density function f(x) there still exists a Nash equilibri-
um, which can be found by solving an integral equation (one needs to locate 
the point x with the property that the number of people up to that point is 
half of the total crowd). Thinking of this density as a curve (see Figure 1), 
the solution for the non-uniform location game is then to be understood as 
the point where one can cut the picture in two pieces (along a vertical line) 
in such a way that the area under the curve is the same on both pieces (area 1 
and area 2 are equal in the picture).
In order to see how the location game helps to model the rhetorical game, 
it suffices to adapt Downs’ argument (Downs 1957, p. 142, using Hotell-
ing’s “spatial market” to analyze political ideologies as market shares and po-
litical parties as positions within that market), defining rhetorical behavior as 
manifesting itself in a spatial market of beliefs and convictions and choosing 
a certain position to claim a share of the market. Indeed, rhetorical theory 
[  1 3 ]
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teaches that persuasion always occurs against the background of shared com-
mon knowledge, on the basis of which new truths or values may be generated 
through rhetorical discourse. In this way, we can map the audience as a mar-
ket of truths and values (represented by a density function) and the speakers, 
defending a specific set of truths and values, as positions within that market. 
Besides offering an interesting way to analyze rhetorical situations 
and responses, the location game model of rhetorical behavior reveals the 
rhetorical importance of the middle position. For instance, when speaking 
to an audience with a symmetrical distribution of people in favor of and 
against certain environmental policies (i.e., a symmetrical density function), 
a “green” speaker wanting to abolish nuclear energy will best use a set of 
truths and values that is neither too green nor the opposite, in order not 
to alienate too many in his audience. At the same time, game theory shows 
what this middle position really means, as it is not necessarily the same as the 
“middle of the beach” position. Indeed, when facing a distribution of people 
that is not symmetrical, the mathematical analysis teaches us that we may 
actually find another value representing the rhetorical position that will best 
serve as a pivot of common knowledge. For example, when speaking before 
an audience of university students on the matter of freedom of speech, there 
will be almost no people holding the opinion that freedom of speech is a bad 
thing and a steadily increasing number of people believing in the absolute 
value of freedom of speech. The ideal position for a speaker is therefore not 
neutral, but a markedly positive one. We will refer to this position as “the 
middle,” to be understood as the point “where to cut the paper.” Figure 2 
shows the formal density function for this example, and the analytical solu-
tion to the location game (the cut is to be made at a point on the horizontal 
axis defined as the square root of two minus one). 
So, the location game model teaches that when the speaker is aware of his 
opponent’s position (and the density function), the optimal strategy is to 
stay as close as possible to his opponent’s position, yet slightly more towards 
the “middle.” When the speaker is not aware of his opponent’s position, the 
optimal strategy is to take the “middle” position. However, speakers do not 
always take the optimal position and therefore necessarily alienate a part of 
their audience, e.g., when they are forced to take a position that is not ideal 
in the spectrum of common knowledge. For instance, when a conservative 
Christian politician has to address a group of Gay Rights activists, it is im-
possible for the speaker, considering his convictions, to take the optimal 
position (markedly on the right, see the example above). Even if this speaker 
were to choose a neutral position, an almost impossible concession on the 
part of the Christian conservative, it is clear that the Christian speaker’s re-
sults would be considerably worse than if he had taken the optimal position. 
Location games in hyperspace
So far, our model has focused solely on the dimension of logos. Applying 
Aristotle’s terminology, persuasion obviously also comprises the components 
ethos, pathos and lexis. Indeed, while a rhetor might lose the location game in 
terms of argumentation (logos), he might win it, and therefore compensate 
for his loss, on the level of authority (ethos), emotional appeal (pathos) or 
speaking competence (lexis). All of these can individually be conceived as 
location games, which have to be mathematically combined to make up the 
whole rhetorical game. While the game-theoretical approach thus tries to 
analyze rhetorical behavior as rational choice, it does not reduce rhetoric to 
mere rationality. By analyzing highly emotional aspects such as ethos, pathos 
and lexis as individual, but mutually interacting parts of the rhetorical “equa-
tion,” so to speak, this model aims to account as fully as possible for the reali-
ties that govern the rhetorical and indeed rational choices made by speakers. 
figure 2 what the “middle” position really means  “ iddle” position rea ly means
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Formally, this leads to a location game in several dimensions (i.e., in 
hyperspace), in which we switch from a density function f(x) in one variable 
x to a density function f(x1,…,xn) depending on several variables. As for the 
rhetorical application mentioned above, it seems worth considering density 
functions depending on four variables. Although this is much harder to rep-
resent graphically, it can be handled conceptually using multivariate analysis. 
In a sense, the location game is then to be understood in terms of vendors 
looking for the best position in a park (2 dimensions) or a building (3 dimen-
sions). Let us, for simplicity’s sake, stick to the former example. Although 
we can now only take two relevant parameters into account (e.g., logos and 
pathos), this does have the advantage that we can graphically represent the 
mathematical details. Density functions f(x1,x2) can now be likened to a (not 
necessarily aesthetically pleasing) cake: the “number of people” is then pro-
portional to the volume of the piece of cake, whereas finding a Nash equi-
librium amounts to cutting the cake in equal halves. Despite the simplicity 
of this metaphor, it already illustrates the main difference from the previous 
situation: even perfectly symmetrical cakes can be cut in two equal halves in 
several ways (along the length of the cake, or orthogonally to this direction). 
More formally, this is due to the observation that the relative position 
between 2 players is now fixed in terms of two parameters: there still is the 
relative distance between the players, measured along the line connecting 
them. But the big difference is that also the orientation of the players can 
change. This is important, because as the orientation changes (think of a 
player as “walking on a circle centered around the other player”) the line 
along which the cake will have to be cut also changes. This is illustrated in 
Figure 3, in which two different positions for player 2 (P2) result in two dif-
ferent cutting lines (the full lines). 
Note that this is not just an image: one can mathematically prove (but this 
would lead us too far astray) that by optimizing his orientation, a player 
can turn a loss into a win. The strategy is thus governed by the following 
principles: 
• Optimize your market share by minimizing the relative distance in the 
domain. 
• Optimize your market share by choosing the angle that maximizes the 
difference. 
Instead of giving a formal proof of this, we will refer to a recent example from 
the 2012 US Presidential election campaign, featuring Barack Obama and 
Mitt Romney. Struggling to get his message across in the poorer communities, 
Romney on September 19, 2012, appeared on Univision, the most impor-
tant Spanish-language television network, to make his case. As media sources 
pointed out by contrasting photographs taken on the same day,3 Romney’s 
complexion looked artificial, with the shape of protective goggles seemingly 
printed on his face, causing rumors that Romney had got a spray tan. This 
was interpreted as an effort on his part to look more Hispanic. This seem-
ingly outlandish rhetorical ploy, obviously intended to strengthen Romney’s 
ethos, can be perfectly understood in our hyperspace model. Confronted with 
an unfavorable position for the logos-game on the X-axis (there were obvious 
limits to the positions Romney could take), Romney’s strategy to win the 
rhetorical game was maneuvering his position in the ethos-game on the Y-axis. 
By trying to look more Hispanic Romney intended to persuade more people 
than he would have been able to with strictly political arguments. For now the 
model cannot say how much spray tan Romney actually needed to win the de-
bate (this would require knowledge of the density function), but the location 
3 See, e.g., http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/20/mitt-romney-dyed-face-brown-
fake-tan-univision_n_1900707.html.
figure 3 a two-dimensional location game
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game in hyperspace certainly explains the idea how two rhetorical games can 
be ‘combined’ for “strategic maneuvering” (cf. van Eemeren 2009 and 2010).
part iii: Politics
As a final part of this paper, we would like to discuss how rhetorical dis-
courses as heard in present-day politics are not automatic results of human 
nature, but rather of the legislative conditions under which people vote for 
their democratic representatives. These conditions are largely coincidental, 
in that a group of people who are convinced that a different system would 
be better for them has the power to change them.
The ideals of (deliberative) democracy and political deviations
According to certain deliberative democrats such as Rawls and Habermas, 
democratic ideals are often defined as a reconciliation of ideas on a higher 
societal level as a result of rhetorical processes of persuasion. We can ask 
ourselves why, when so many are convinced of the desirability of such a 
model, there are only few communities who manage to achieve this blissful 
democratic condition.
One of the problems is that for a society that believes in the val-
ues of free speech and open deliberation, it is impossible to exclude any 
kind of discourse from the deliberation floor, which means that people who 
resist being persuaded by others cannot be banned from the deliberation 
floor on system-internal grounds. The need for some kind of adjudication 
committee undercuts the idea of full freedom, and the ideal of deliberative 
democracy – that everyone’s opinion should be respected – is no longer pos-
sible to maintain. This fact prevents deliberative democratic models from 
shrugging off their utopian appearance and manifesting themselves in real 
democratic debates.
We will here suggest a different approach to this problem by looking 
at politics as a game in which the existing rules define the best strategies for 
politicians. By suggesting an alternative voting system, we want to open a 
debate concerning the most appropriate conditions under which the ideals 
of rhetorical citizenship can be attained in the political sphere.
Politics as a game
It is a sad yet telling cliché that politicians and political parties are mostly 
perceived to chase their own individual success instead of the common good. 
Other popular complaints about politicians are related to their alleged refus-
al to display ideological consistency; instead they make every impression of 
simply adjusting their rhetorical strategies to the audience in front of them. 
Do these complaints imply, then, that politicians are essentially a class 
of less moral citizens than ordinary people? We do not think this cynical at-
titude offers the most appropriate approach. Rather, we would like to focus 
on the ‘rule book’ of the political game and show how antagonisms and 
free-rider behavior are inscribed in the electoral system that governs the field 
of politics. 
In order to define politics as a game (in a simplified manner), we can 
see politicians as the players who undertake (rhetorical) actions in order to 
maximize their impact on society. The main moment when political power 
is negotiated in a democracy is during elections. Politicians, both idealists 
and pragmatists, all have good reasons for not wanting to lose an election.
To complete our formal description of the field of politics: during 
elections, each voter gives one vote to one particular party. As a result, in our 
present system it is entirely pointless to be a voter’s second choice, because 
the voter can only give his vote to the party of his first choice. This aspect 
has some crucial consequences.
Zero-sum game and its impact on discourses
The voting game as described above has the structure of what we call a “zero-
sum game.” We know beforehand how many votes/points will be given, and 
a political party can only make progress if one or more of the other parties 
lose votes.
This zero-sum aspect has two important discursive implications for 
the way in which political parties rationally assess their best strategy. First, 
parties tend to present their own merits in antagonistic terms, in a fierce 
competition with other parties. Instead of emphasizing ideological resem-
blances and looking for ways to collaborate, it is often more beneficial to 
radically oppose oneself to parties that are nevertheless ideologically quite 
close to one’s own position (think of the location game: the toughest oppo-
nent is the one closest to your own position, not the one who is extremely 
far away!). These antagonistic tendencies, which seem to annoy many people 
nowadays, are thus rational responses to the constraints of a system in which 
votes can only be won if one can convince the voter that one is the single best 
representative. We can thus label this as a “non-cooperative game.”
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A second implication is that, even though political parties would ide-
ally like to gain 100% of the votes, the most rational response to the present 
political situation in many countries is to focus on a certain segment of the 
population and win over their sympathy at the expense of other sectors of 
society. There is as yet no mechanism that prevents politicians from bluntly 
ignoring the rights and wishes of a substantial part of the population, which 
contributes to a sense of discontent in many voters, because they do not feel 
that their political government reflects their societal choices.
Imagining an alternative
In order to see that a voting system does not inevitably need to be a zero-sum 
game, suppose that everyone were not given just one vote, but could rate 
each political party on a scale from 0 to 5. The result is that a party can only 
focus on its proper score and is no longer dependent on how other parties 
fare to achieve its own maximum score. As a result, parties who collaborate 
well in a government can all be rewarded by the voting public. Conversely, 
parties who present themselves in strongly antagonistic terms are not very 
likely to reach a high score, since the absolute support of a group of hardline 
believers is quickly leveled out by the punishment of non-believers (unless, 
of course, the group of believers is so large that the party is still successful; in 
that case, a democracy has to respect these voters’ decision).
It thus appears that a simple change in the voting game could bring 
about a radical change in the most rational strategy one has to adopt in order 
to win the political game. By rewarding cooperative strategies, the rules of 
the game themselves become responsible for installing a certain type of po-
litical etiquette that brings us closer to the ideals of deliberative democracy.
This explorative suggestion strongly opposes those political analysts 
who state that current political behaviors reflect the nature of human be-
ings.4 In a sense, these analysts are quite right, but only in so far as it is part 
of human nature to develop a rational response to a certain situation. The 
4 One influential example of this trend in thought is generally labeled neoliberalism. In 
neoliberal discourse, it is maintained that human nature is thoroughly competitive and 
that liberalist economic logic could be freely applied to the level of politics as well. What 
neoliberalist thinking ignores is that this way of viewing politics is not natural, but the 
result of coincidental rules in our legislative system. For a critique on (neo-)liberalism, see, 
e.g., Bourdieu (1998), or the influential study by Negri and Hardt (2000).
way in which we vote, however, is largely coincidental, in that there is no 
cogent reason why we must vote in the way we do nowadays, apart from 
the fact that it is probably the easiest system we can think of. If we believe, 
however, that there are important reasons to get rid of this voting system in 
order to reward conciliatory discourses, it is entirely within our power to 
change the present structures and develop an alternative sense of democracy. 
We believe that such a decision could strongly improve the citizens’ trust in 
their representatives, and could bring the field of politics more in line with 
the complexities of our postmodern society, in which paternalistic represen-
tation may no longer be an appropriate method to satisfy an individual’s 
viewpoints and desires.
Questions for the political game
The model we propose here probably entails its own structural or practical 
pitfalls. However, we believe that the heuristic value of imagining an alter-
native to present structures allows us to ask some precise questions about 
what we expect from our present-day democracies. Some questions that can 
effectively guide such a discussion about the goals of democracy could be:
(1) On what level do we believe that the reconciliation of ideological posi-
tions in a society should occur? On the level of individual choice (in 
a nuanced voting system) or on a higher level (as a sum of individual 
votes)?
(2) Do we believe that a constructive attitude in politicians leads to better 
societal results?
(3) Do we need extreme positions on the deliberation floor (cf. Lund 
Klujeff 2012), or do they distract from actual results?
(4) Does our system, which originated from a paternalistic understanding 
of political representation, still work in our postmodern society?
(5) Can a redefinition of the political game alter the way in which we 
think of politics, so that it is less seen as a spectacular clash between 
opposed ideologies, and more as a creative undertaking in which at-
tempts at reconciliation of positions are generally rewarded during 
elections and thus encouraged in future enterprises? 
part iv: Conclusion
Given the novel character of this paper, we have had to cover quite a lot of 
ground before we could demonstrate the effective value of our model for the 
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fers a model of how speakers try to predict their audience’s response (since 
antiquity, oratorical theory has recognized the rhetor’s need to do so), the 
model itself in no way claims such predictive powers. The game-theoretical 
approach to rhetoric does not interpret the audience as a passive body whose 
responses can easily be calculated, but only offers a model to understand the 
speaker’s strategic deliberation of his or her audience’s opinions, values and 
emotions.
Second, an ethical remark. As we have tried to show in part III of this 
study, it is important to realize that even purely “liberalist” rhetoric (un-
derstood as a form of rhetoric that searches for the most successful strategy 
regardless of ethics or moral beliefs) operates on a playing field that is shaped 
and constrained by laws, tenets, and societal values, and the assessment of 
the most ideal rhetorical position always needs to happen in consideration 
of these “rules.” It is worthwhile to use this game-theoretical framework to 
question the conditions under which rhetoric and discourse function in a 
given society, and to imagine alternative “rules” according to which the ide-
als of rhetorical citizenship can be more fully realized. We hope this under-
taking may inspire others to engage in a similar mode of reasoning, so that 
we can come closer to a societal model that will reward constructive demo-
cratic discourses and acts of responsible rhetorical citizenship.
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